Internet DRAFT - draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates
draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates
Internet Engineering Task Force H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft Siemens
Updates: 4210 (if approved) January 27, 2020
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: July 30, 2020
CMP Updates
draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03
Abstract
This document contains a set of updates to the base syntax of
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document
updates RFC 4210.
Specifically, the CMP services updated in this document comprise the
enabling of using EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and the
definition of extended key usages to identify certificates of CMP
endpoints on certification and registration authorities.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 30, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) . 4
3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 6
3.4. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 9
3.6. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 9
3.7. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 10
3.8. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 11
3.9. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.10. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
(Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. History of changes
From version 02 -> 03:
o Added some clarification in Section 3.1.
From version 01 -> 02:
o Added clarification to section on multiple protection
o Added clarification on new EKUs after some exchange with Tomas
Gustavsson
o Reused OIDs from RFC 6402 [RFC6402] as suggested by Sean Turner at
IETF 106
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o Added clarification on the field containing the key identifier for
a revocation passphrase
o Minor changes in wording
From version 00 -> 01:
o Added a section describing the new extended key usages
o Completed the section on changes to the specification of encrypted
values
o Added a section on clarification to Appendix D.4
o Minor generalization in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] Sections 5.1.3.4 and
5.3.22
o Minor changes in wording
2. Introduction
While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
[I-D.brockhaus-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates
RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to overcome these limitations.
In general, this document aims to improve the crypto agility of CMP
to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography.
This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP
endpoints on registration and certification authorities.
2.1. Convention and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation
only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be
interpreted as carrying significance described in RFC 2119.
Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210],
RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280]. The following key words
are used:
CA: Certification authority, which issues certificates.
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RA: Registration authority, an optional system component to which a
CA delegates certificate management functions such as
authorization checks.
KGA: Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf of
an EE. The KGA could be co-located with an RA or a CA.
EE: End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI
certificate. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject
of the certificate.
3. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210
The following subsections describe feature updates to RFC 4210
[RFC4210]. They are always related to the base specification. Hence
references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used
whenever possible.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1.
The following updates are made in draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates:
o Add new extended key usages for different CMP server types, e.g.
registration authority and certification authority, to express the
authorization of the entity identified in the certificate
containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as
the indicated PKI management component.
o Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional
use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.
o Offering EnvelopedData as another choice next to EncryptedValue to
extend crypto agility in CMP. Note that according to RFC 4211
[RFC4211] section 2.1.9 the use of the EncryptedValue structure
has been deprecated in favor of the EnvelopedData structure. For
reasons of completeness and consistency the exchange of
EncryptedValue with EncryptedKey is performed not only where
required for the needed crypto agility for protection of centrally
generated private keys, but also for other purposes like
encryption of certificates and revocation passphrases.
o Extend the usage of polling also to p10cr messages.
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3.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage
Insert this section.
The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
which the certified public key may be used. It therefore restricts
the use of a certificate to specific applications. Certificates used
for CMP message protection or signed data for central key generation
SHOULD use one of the following EKUs to express its authorization for
acting as the PKI management entities described below. The ASN.1 to
define these EKUs is:
id-kp-cmpCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
id-kp-cmpRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmpKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp ... }
< TBD: id-kp-cmpKGA to be defined. >
Note: RFC 6402 section 2.10 [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a CMC CA and
a CMC RA. As the functionality of a CA and RA is not specific to
whether use CMC or CMP as certificate management protocol, the same
OIDs SHALL be used for a cmpCA and a cmpRA.
< TBD: It needs to be clarified, if the Name and Description of the
OIDs can be adapted or extended to avoid confusion as they currently
only refer to CMC endpoints. >
The description of the PKI entity for each of the EKUs is as follows:
CMP Certification Authorities are CMP endpoints on CA equipment as
described in section 3.1.1.2. The key used in the context of CMP
management operations, especially CMP message protection, need not be
the same key that signs the certificates. It is necessary, however,
to ensure that the entity acting as cmpCA is authorized to do so.
Therefore, the cmpCA MUST do one of the following,
o use the CA private key on the CMP endpoint, or
o explicitly designate this authority to another entity.
CMP message protection delegation on the CA SHALL be designated by
the inclusion of id-kp-cmpCA in an extended key usage certificate
extension included in the CMP response signer's certificate. This
certificate MUST be issued directly by the CA that is identified in
the request.
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Note: Using a separate key pair for protecting CMP management
operations at the CA decreases the number of operations of the
private key used to sign certificates.
CMP Registration Authorities are CMP endpoints on RA equipment as
described in section 3.1.1.3. A cmpRA is identified by the id-kp-
cmpRA extended key usage. This extended key usage is placed into RA
certificates.
CMP Key Generation Authorities are identified by the id-kp-cmpKGA
extended key usage. Though the cmpKGA knows the private key it
generated on behalf of the end entity, this is a very sensible
service and needs specific authorization. This authorization is
either with the CA certificate itself, or indicated by placing the
id-kp-cmpKGA extended key usage into the cmpRA or cmpCA certificate
used to authenticate the origin of the private key to express the
authorization to offer this service.
Note: In device PKIs, especially those issuing IDevID certificates,
CA may have very long validity (including the GeneralizedTime value
99991231235959Z to indicate an indefinite expiration date as
specified in IEEE 802.1AR section 8.5 [IEEE802.1AR] and RFC 5280
Section 4.1.2.5 [RFC5280]). Such validity periods SHOULD NOT be used
for protection of CMP messages. Certificates for delegated CMP
message protection (cmpCA, cmpRA, cmpKGA) MUST NOT use indefinite
expiration date.
< TBD: In bigger PKI installations the CA equipment may host, and an
RA equipment may serve several CAs. These CAs, especially those
issuing IDevID certificates may have very long validities and use
specific algorithms not suitable for protection of day-to-day PKI
management operations on a CMC, CMP or TLS level. Therefore, it may
be an advantage to utilize a specific 'Infrastructure' CA for issuing
CMC, CMP and TLS certificates to protect PKI management operations
for other CAs hosted on that PKI. A mechanism would be needed to
securely delegate authorization to act as a cmpCA, cmpRA, or cmpKGA
for a specific CA without directly issuing the cmpCA, cmpRA, and
cmpKGA certificates. I am happy for any suitable suggestions to
address this issue. >
3.3. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection
Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message.
This document opens the usage of nested messages also for batch
transport of PKI messages between different PKI management entities.
Replace the text of the section with the following text.
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In cases where an end entity sends a protected PKI message to an RA,
the RA MAY forward that message to a CA, adding its own protection
(which MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and
certificates shared between the RA and the CA). There are different
use cases for such multi protected messages.
o The RA confirms the validation and authorization of a message and
forwards the original message unchanged.
o The RA collects several messages and forwards them in a batch.
This can for instance be used to bridge an off-line connection
between two PKI management entities. In an up-stream connection
request messages and in a down-stream connection response or
announcement messages will be collected in the batch.
o The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., add or modify
particular field values or add new extensions) before forwarding
them, then it MAY create its own desired PKIBody. In case the
changes made by the RA to PKIMessage breaks the POP, the RA MUST
either set the POP RAVerified or include the original PKIMessage
from the EE in the generalInfo field of PKIHeader of the nested
message (to force the CA to check POP on the original message).
The infoType to be used in this situation is {id-it 15} (see
Section 5.3.19 for the value of id-it) and the infoValue is
PKIMessages (contents MUST be in the same order as the requests in
PKIBody). For simplicity reasons, if batching is used in
combination with inclusion of the original PKIMessage in the
generalInfo field, all messages in the batch MUST be of the same
type (e.g., ir).
These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages sent by the
end entity within a new PKI message. The structure used is as
follows.
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
(The use of PKIMessages, a SEQUENCE OF PKIMessage, lets the RA batch
the requests of several EEs in a single new message.)
3.4. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values
Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of
EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This document extends
the encryption of data to also use EnvelopedData.
Replace the text of the section with the following text.
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Where encrypted data (restricted, in this specification, to be either
private keys, certificates or passwords) are sent in PKI messages,
the EncryptedKey data structure is used.
EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData }
See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and for
EnvelopedData syntax see CMS [RFC5652]. Using the EncryptedKey data
structure, the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for backward
compatibility only) or EnvelopedData is offered. The use of the
EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it is recommended to use
EnvelopedData.
The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to either transport a
private key, certificate or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.
EnvelopedData is used as follows:
o Contains only one recepientInfo structure because the content is
encrypted only for one recipient.
o Contains private key in a SignedData structure as specified in CMS
section 5 [RFC5652] signed by the Key Generation Authority.
o Contains certificate or revocation passphrase directly in the
encryptedContent field.
Note: When transferring a centrally generated private key in a
certificate response message to the EE, the algorithm identifier and
the associated public key will anyhow be transported in this response
message. Therefore, the private key will not be delivered in a key
package structure as specified in [RFC5958] and [RFC6032]. But the
wrapping of the private key in a SignedData structure that is wrapped
in the EnvelopedData structure as specified in [RFC6032] is applied.
The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS
section 3 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated
symmetric content-encryption key. This content-encryption key MUST
be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key
management techniques.
The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender
depends on the credential available for the recipient:
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o Jointly shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the symmetric key-encryption key management
technique, as specified in CMS section 5.2.3 [RFC5652].
o Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
asserting keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the key agreement key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 5.2.2 [RFC5652].
o Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the key transport key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 5.2.1 [RFC5652].
3.5. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response
Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification
Response. This document updates the syntax by using EncryptedKey
instead of EncryptedValue as described in Section 3.1 above.
Replace the ASN.1 syntax of CertifiedKeyPair and CertOrEncCert with
the following text.
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
}
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] Certificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
}
Add the following paragraphs to the end of the section.
The use of EncryptedKey is described in section 5.2.2.
3.6. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase
Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of
a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation
request. This document updates the handling by using EncryptedKey
instead of EncryptedValue to transport this information as described
in Section 3.1 above.
Replace the text of the section with the following text.
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This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the
purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case
that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to
authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the
use of this mechanism.
GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent >
The use of EncryptedKey is described in section 5.2.2.
3.7. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response
Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling
messages are used. This document adds the polling mechanism also to
outstanding p10cr transactions.
Replace all paragraphs in front of the state machine diagram with the
following text.
This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the
client needs to poll the server in order to determine the status of
an outstanding ir, cr, p10cr, or kur transaction (i.e., when the
"waiting" PKIStatus has been received).
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }
The following clauses describe when polling messages are used, and
how they are used. It is assumed that multiple certConf messages can
be sent during transactions. There will be one sent in response to
each ip, cp, or kup that contains a CertStatus for an issued
certificate.
1 In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send a
certConf for all issued certificates and, following the ack, a
pollReq for all pending certificates.
2 In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if
one or more of the pending certificates is ready; otherwise, it
will return a pollRep.
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3 If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least as long as
the checkAfter value before sending another pollReq.
4 If an ip, cp, or kup is received in response to a pollReq, then it
will be treated in the same way as the initial response.
Note: A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo
data structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but not certificate
request number. Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all
following messages of this transaction.
3.8. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase
Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of the
revocation passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210]
to utilize EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in
Section 3.1 above, the description is updated accordingly.
Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following
text.
o The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210
[RFC4210] MAY be sent in a GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be
sent in the generalInfo field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage
at any time. (In particular, the EncryptedKey as described in
section 5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message
that confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an
initialization request or certificate request message.) This
conveys a revocation passphrase chosen by the entity (i.e., for
use of EnvelopedData this is in the decrypted bytes of
encryptedContent of the EnvelopedData structure and for use of
EncryptedValue this is in the decrypted bytes of the encValue
field) to the relevant CA/RA; furthermore, the transfer is
accomplished with appropriate confidentiality characteristics.
Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
text.
o When using EnvelopedData the unprotectedAttrs and when using
EncryptedValue the valueHint field MAY contain a key identifier
(chosen by the entity, along with the passphrase itself) to assist
in later retrieval of the correct passphrase (e.g., when the
revocation request is constructed by the entity and received by
the CA/RA).
< TBD: The attribute structure containing the key identifier in the
unprotectedAttr field could either be pkcs-9-at-friendlyName or pkcs-
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9-at-localKeyId as specified in RFC 2985 section 5.5 [RFC2985]. Are
there preferences for either one? >
3.9. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the
request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210
[RFC4210] to utilize EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as
described in Section 3.1 above, the description is updated
accordingly.
Replace the note coming after the ASN.1 syntax of POPOPrivKey of this
section with the following text.
-- **********
-- * the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211
-- * [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with
-- * Section 5.2.2, "Encrypted Values", of this specification).
-- * Therefore, this document makes the behavioral clarification of
-- * specifying that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded
-- * either as EnvelopedData or EncryptedValue (only for backward
-- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This allows
-- * the necessary conveyance and protection of the private key
-- * while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility with RFC 4211
-- * [RFC4211].
-- **********
3.10. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
Authenticated Scheme)
Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
certification scheme. This scheme shall continue to use
EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.
Replace the comment after the privateKey field of
crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response
message with the following text.
-- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
-- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue
4. IANA Considerations
< TBD: Add any IANA considerations >
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5. Security Considerations
No changes are made to the existing security considerations of
RFC 4210 [RFC4210].
6. Acknowledgements
Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration
on structuring and writing this document I got from [RFC6402] that
updates CMC.
I also like to thank all reviewers of this document for their
valuable feedback.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
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[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.brockhaus-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. Oheimb, "Lightweight CMP
Profile", draft-brockhaus-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-02
(work in progress), December 2019.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6032] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type", RFC 6032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6032, December 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6032>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
Changes to the following parts are needed
o Import from PKCS-9
friendlyName, localKeyId
FROM PKCS-9 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
< TBD: Either friendlyName or localKeyId need to be imported here. >
o Import from PKIKXCRMF-2005
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CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
CertReqMessages
FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
o In CertifiedKeyPair, CertOrEncCert and id-it-revPassphrase
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
}
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
}
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
--
-- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in
-- CMP operations
--
id-kp-cmpCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
id-kp-cmpRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmpKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp ... }
< TBD: id-kp-cmpKGA to be defined. >
< TBD: If needed the complete ASN.1 Module from RFC 4210 section
needs to be copied here. >
Author's Address
Hendrik Brockhaus
Siemens AG
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich 81739
Germany
Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
URI: http://www.siemens.com/
Brockhaus Expires July 30, 2020 [Page 15]
