Internet DRAFT - draft-card-tmrid-uas-arch
draft-card-tmrid-uas-arch
TMRID S. Card
Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
Expires: 24 September 2020 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
23 March 2020
Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification Architecture
draft-card-tmrid-uas-arch-01
Abstract
This document defines an architecture for Trustworthy Multipurpose
Remote Identification (tm-rid) protocols and services to support
Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification (UAS RID), including
its building blocks and their interfaces, all to be standardized.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Entities and their Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4. CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
Many safety and other considerations dictate that UAS be remotely
identifiable. Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are
mandating UAS RID. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
has published [Delegated] and [Implementing] Regulations. The United
States (US) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published a
Notice of Proposed Rule Making ([NPRM]). CAAs currently promulgate
performance-based regulations that do not specify techniques, but
rather cite industry consensus technical standards as acceptable
means of compliance.
ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee
F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041 (UAS Remote ID and
Tracking), is a Proposed New Standard [WK65041]. It defines 2 means
of UAS RID. Network RID defines a set of information for UAS to make
available globally indirectly via the Internet. Broadcast RID
defines a set of messages for Unmanned Aircraft (UA) to transmit
locally directly one-way over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. Network RID
depends upon Internet connectivity, in several segments, from the UAS
to the observer. Broadcast RID should need Internet (or other Wide
Area Network) connectivity only for UAS registry information lookup
using the directly locally received UAS ID as a key.
[WK65041] specifies 3 UAS ID types. Type 1 is a static, manufacturer
assigned, hardware serial number per ANSI/CTA-2063-A "Small Unmanned
Aerial System Serial Numbers" [CTA2063A]. Type 2 is a CAA assigned
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(presumably static) ID. Type 3 is a UAS Traffic Management (UTM)
system assigned UUID [RFC4122], which can but need not be dynamic.
The EU allows only Type 1; the US allows Types 1 and 3, but requires
Type 3 IDs (if used) each to be used only once. [WK65041] Broadcast
RID transmits all information in the clear as plaintext, so Type 1
static IDs enable trivial correlation of patterns of use,
unacceptable in many applications, e.g. package delivery routes of
competitors.
An ID is not an end in itself; it exists to enable lookups and
provision of services complementing mere identification.
Minimal specified information must be made available to the public;
access to other data, e.g. UAS operator Personally Identifiable
Information (PII), must be limited to strongly authenticated
personnel, properly authorized per policy. [WK65041] specifies only
how to get the UAS ID to the observer; how the observer can perform
these lookups, and how the registries first can be populated with
information, is unspecified.
Although using UAS RID to facilitate related services, such as Detect
And Avoid (DAA) and other applications of Vehicle to Vehicle or
Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2V, V2I, collectively V2X)
communications, is an obvious application (explicitly contemplated in
the FAA NPRM), it has been ommitted from [WK65041] (explicitly
declared out of scope in the ASTM working group discussions based on
a distinction between RID as a security standard vs DAA as a safety
application). Although dynamic establishment of secure
communications between the observer and the UAS pilot seems to have
been contemplated by the FAA UAS ID and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC) in their [Recommendations], it is not addressed in
any of the subsequent proposed regulations or technical
specifications.
The need for near-universal deployment of UAS RID is pressing. This
implies the need to support use by observers of already ubiquitous
mobile devices (smartphones and tablets). UA onboard RID devices are
severely constrained in Size, Weight and Power (SWaP). Cost is a
significant impediment to the necessary near-universal adoption of
UAS send and observer receive RID capabilities. To accomodate the
most severely constrained cases, all these conspire to motivate
system design decisions, especially for the Broadcast RID data link,
which complicate the protocol design problem: one-way links;
extremely short packets; and Internet-disconnected operation of UA
onboard devices. Internet-disconnected operation of observer devices
has been deemed by ASTM F38.02 too infrequent to address, but for
some users is important and presents further challenges. Heavyweight
security protocols are infeasible, yet trustworthiness of UAS RID
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information is essential. Under [WK65041], even the most basic
datum, the UAS ID string (typically number) itself can be merely an
unsubstantiated claim.
IETF can help by providing expertise as well as mature and evolving
standards. Existing Internet resources (business models,
infrastructure and protocol standards) should be leveraged. Host
Identity Protocol (HIPv2) [RFC7401] and its Domain Name System (DNS)
extensions [RFC8005], together with the Registry Data Access Protocl
(RDAP) and the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP), can complement
emerging external standards for UAS RID. This will facilitate
utilization of existing and provision of enhanced network services,
and enable verification that UAS RID information is trustworthy (to
some extent, even in the absence of Internet connectivity at the
receiving node). The natural Internet architecture for UAS RID
described herein addresses requirements defined in a companion UAS
RID Requirements document.
2. Terms and Definitions
2.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2.2. Definitions
$SWaP
Cost, Size, Weight and Power.
AAA
Attestation, Authentication, Authorization, Access Control,
Accounting, Attribution, Audit.
ABDAA
AirBorne DAA. Also known as "self-separation".
AGL
Above Ground Level. Relative altitude, above the variously
defined local ground level, typically of an UA, typically measured
in feet.
CAA
Civil Aviation Authority. An example is the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) in the United States of America.
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C2
Command and Control. A set of organizational and technical
attributes and processes that employs human, physical, and
information resources to solve problems and accomplish missions.
Mainly used in military contexts.
CS-RID
Crowd Sourced Remote Identification. An optional TM-RID service
that gateways Broadcast RID to Network RID, and supports
verification of RID positon/velocity claims with independent
measurements (e.g. by multilateration), via a SDSP.
DAA
Detect And Avoid, formerly Sense And Avoid (SAA). A means of
keeping aircraft "well clear" of each other for safety.
E2E
End to End.
GBDAA
Ground Based DAA.
GCS
Ground Control Station. The part of the UAS that the remote pilot
uses to exercise C2 over the UA, whether by remotely exercising UA
flight controls to fly the UA, by setting GPS waypoints, or
otherwise directing its flight.
GPS
Global Positioning System. In this context, misused in place of
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) or more generally SATNAV
to refer generically to satellite based timing and/or positioning.
HI
Host Identity. The public key portion of an asymmetric keypair
from HIP. In this document it is assumed that the HI is based on
a EdDSA25519 keypair. This is supported by new crypto defined in
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-new-crypto].
HIP
Host Identity Protocol. The origin of HI, HIT, and HHIT, required
for TM-RID. Optional full use of HIP enables additional TM-RID
functionality.
HHIT
Hierarchical Host Identity Tag. A HIT with extra information not
found in a standard HIT. Defined in
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit].
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HIT
Host Identity Tag. A 128 bit handle on the HI. Defined in HIPv2
[RFC7401].
Limited RID
Per the FAA NPRM, a mode of operation that must use Network RID,
must not use Broadcast RID, and must provide pilot/GCS location
only (not UA location). This mode is only allowed for UA that
neither require (due to e.g. size) nor are equipped for Standard
RID, operated within V-LOS and within 400 feet of the pilor, below
400 feet AGL, etc.
LOS
Line Of Sight. An adjectival phrase describing any information
transfer that travels in a nearly straight line (e.g.
electromagnetic energy, whether in the visual light, RF or other
frequency range) and is subject to blockage. A term to be avoided
due to ambiguity, in this context, between RF-LOS and V-LOS.
MSL
Mean Sea Level. Relative altitude, above the variously defined
mean sea level, typically of an UA (but in FAA NPRM Limited RID
for a GCS), typically measured in feet.
NETDP
UAS RID Display Provider. System component that requests data
from one or more NETSP and aggregates them to display to a user
application on a device. Often an USS.
NETSP
UAS RID Service Provider. System component that compiles
information from various sources (and methods) in its given
service area. Usually an USS.
Observer
Referred to in other UAS RID documents as a "user", but there are
also other classes of UAS RID users, so we prefer "observer" to
denote an individual who has observed an UA and wishes to know
something about it, starting with its ID.
PII
Personally Identifiable Information. In this context, typically
of the UAS operator, Pilot In Command (PIC) or remote pilot, but
possibly of an observer or other party.
RF
Radio Frequency. May be used as an adjective or as a noun; in the
latter case, typically means Radio Frequency energy.
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RF-LOS
RF LOS. Typically used in describing operation of a direct radio
link between a GCS and the UA under its control, potentially
subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other
vehicles, but less so than V-LOS.
SDSP
Supplemental Data Service Provider. Entity that provides data
allowed and presumed useful but neither required nor standardized
as an option in UTM, such as weather. Here used to enable CS-RID.
Standard RID
Per the FAA NPRM, a mode of operation that must use both Network
RID (if Internet connectivity is available at the time in the
operating area) and Broadcast RID (always and everywhere), and
must provide both pilot/GCS location and UA location. This mode
is required for UAS that exceed the allowed envelope (e.g. size,
range) of Limited RID and for all UAS equipped for Standard RID
(even if operated within parameters that would otherwise permit
Limited RID).
TM-RID
Trustworthy Multipurpose Remote Identification, the original name
for both the putative requirements and this architectural approach
to a Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP).
UA
Unmanned Aircraft. Typically a military or commercial "drone" but
can include any and all aircraft that are unmanned.
UAS
Unmanned Aircraft System. Composed of UA, all required on-board
subsystems, payload, control station, other required off-board
subsystems, any required launch and recovery equipment, all
required crew members, and C2 links between UA and control
station.
UAS ID
Unique UAS identifier. Per [WK65041], maximum length of 20 bytes.
UAS ID Type
Identifier type index. Per [WK65041], 4 bits, values 0-3 already
specified.
UAS RID
UAS Remote Identification. System for identifying UA during
flight by other parties.
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UAS RID Verification Service
System component designed to handle the authentication
requirements of RID by offloading verification to a web hosted
service.
USS
UAS Service Supplier. Provide UTM services to support the UAS
community, to connect Operators and other entities to enable
information flow across the USS network, and to promote shared
situational awareness among UTM participants. (From FAA UTM
ConOps V1, May 2018).
UTM
UAS Traffic Management. A "traffic management" ecosystem for
"uncontrolled" UAS operations separate from, but complementary to,
the FAA's Air Traffic Management (ATM) system for "controlled"
operations of manned aircraft.
V-LOS
Visual LOS. Typically used in describing operation of an UA by a
"remote" pilot who can clearly directly (without video cameras or
any other aids other than glasses or under some rules binoculars)
see the UA and its immediate flight environment. Potentially
subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other
vehicles, more so than RF-LOS.
3. Entities and their Interfaces
Any tm-rid solutions for UAS RID must fit into the UTM system. This
implies interaction with entities including UA, GCS, USS, NETSP,
NETDP, Observers, Operators, Pilots In Command, Remote Pilots, etc.
The only additional entities introduced by tm-rid are registries,
required but not specified by the regulations and [RFC7401], and
optionally CS-RID SDSP and Finder nodes.
UAS RID registries hold both public and private information. The
public information is primarily pointers to the repositories of, and
keys for looking up, the private information. Given these different
uses, and to improve scalability, security and simplicity of
administration, the public and private information can be stored in
different registries, indeed different types of registry.
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3.1. Private Information Registry
The private information required for UAS RID is similar to that
required for Internet domain name registration. This facilitates
leveraging existing Internet resources, including domain name
registration protocols, infrastructure and business models. This
implies a further derived requirement: a tm-rid UAS ID MUST be
amenable to handling as an Internet domain name (at an arbitrary
level in the heirarchy), MUST be registered in at least a pseudo-
domain (e.g. .ip6 for reverse lookup), and MAY be registered as a
sub-domain (for forward lookup).
A tm-rid private information registry MUST support essential Internet
domain name registry operations (e.g. add, delete, update, query)
using interoperable open standard protocols. It SHOULD support the
Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) and the Registry Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) with access controls. It MAY use XACML to specify
those access controls. It MUST be listed in a DNS: that DNS MAY be
private; but absent any compelling reasons for use of private DNS,
SHOULD be the definitive public Internet DNS heirarchy. The tm-rid
private information registry in which a given UAS is registered MUST
be locatable, starting from the UAS ID, using the methods specified
in [RFC7484].
3.2. Public Information Registry
The public information required to be made available by UAS RID is
transmitted as clear plaintext to local observers in Broadcast RID
and is served to a client by a NETDP in Network RID. Therefore,
while IETF can offer e.g. [RFC6280] as one way to implement Network
RID, the only public information required to support essential tm-rid
functions for UAS RID is that required to look up Internet domain
hosts, services, etc.
A tm-rid public information registry MUST be a standard DNS server,
in the definitive public Internet DNS heirarchy. It MUST support NS,
MX, SRV, TXT, AAAA, PTR, CNAME and HIP RR types.
3.3. CS-RID SDSP
A CS-RID SDSP MUST appear (i.e. present the same interface) to a
NETSP as a NETDP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST appear to a NETDP as a NETSP.
A CS-RID SDSP MUST NOT present a standard GCS-facing interface as if
it were a NETSP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST NOT present a standard client-
facing interface as if it were a NETDP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST present a
TBD interface to a CS-RID Finder; this interface SHOULD be based upon
but readily distinguishable from that between a GCS and a NETSP.
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3.4. CS-RID Finder
A CS-RID Finder MUST present a TBD interface to a CS-RID SDSP; this
interface SHOULD be based upon but readily distinguishable from that
between a GCS and a NETSP. A CS-RID Finder must implement, integrate
or accept outputs from a Broadcast RID receiver. A CS-RID Finder
MUST NOT interface directly with a GCS, NETSP, NETDP or Network RID
client.
4. Identifiers
A tm-rid UAS ID MUST be a HHIT. It SHOULD be self-generated by the
UAS (either UA or GCS) and MUST be registered with the Private
Information Registry identified in its heirarchy fields. Each UAS ID
HHIT MUST NOT be used more than once, with one exception as follows.
Each UA MAY be assigned, by its manufacturer, a single HI and derived
HHIT encoded as a hardware serial number per [CTA2063A]. Such a
static HHIT SHOULD be used only to bind one-time use UAS IDs (other
HHITs) to the unique UA. Depending upon implementation, this may
leave a HI private key in the posession of the manufacturer (see
Security Considerations).
Each UA equipped for Broadcast RID MUST be provisioned not only with
its HHIT but also with the HI public key from which the HHIT was
derived and the corresponding private key, to enable message
signature. Each UAS equipped for Network RID MUST be provisioned
likewise; the private key SHOULD reside only in the ultimate source
of Network RID messages (i.e. on the UA itself if the GCS is merely
relaying rather than sourcing Network RID messages). Each observer
device MUST be provisioned with public keys of the UAS RID root
registries and MAY be provisioned with public keys or certificates
for subordinate registries.
Operators and Private Information Registries MUST possess and other
UTM entities MAY possess UAS ID style HHITs. When present, such
HHITs SHOULD be used with HIP to strongly mutually authenticate and
optionally encrypt communications.
5. Transactions
Each Operator MUST generate a "HIo" and derived "HHITo", register
them with a Private Information Registry along with whatever Operator
data (inc. PII) is required by the cognizant CAA and the registry,
and obtain a certificate "Cro" signed with "HIr(priv)" proving such
registration.
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To add an UA, an Operator MUST generate a "HIa" and derived "HHITa",
create a certificate "Coa" signed with "HIo(priv)" to associate the
UA with its Operator, register them with a Private Information
Registry along with whatever UAS data is required by the cognizant
CAA and the registry, obtain a certificate "Croa" signed with
"HIr(priv)" proving such registration, and obtain a certificate "Cra"
signed with "HIr(priv)" proving UA registration in that specific
registry while preserving Operator privacy. The operator then MUST
provision the UA with "HIa", "HIa(priv)", "HHITa" and "Cra".
UA engaging in Broadcast RID MUST use "HIa(priv)" to sign Auth
Messages and MUST periodically broadcast "Cra". UAS engaging in
Network RID MUST use "HIa(priv)" to sign Auth Messages. Observers
MUST use "HIa" from received "Cra" to verify received Broadcast RID
Auth messages. Observers without Internet connectivity MAY use "Cra"
to identify the trust class of the UAS based on known registry
vetting. Observers with Internet connectivity MAY use "HHITa" to
perform lookups in the Public Information Registry and MAY then query
the Private Information Registry, which MUST enforce access control
policy on Operator PII and other sensitive information.
6. IANA Considerations
It is likely that an IPv6 prefix will be needed for the HHIT (or
other identifier) space; this will be specified in other drafts.
7. Security Considerations
UAS RID is all about safety and security, so content pertaining to
such is not limited to this section. The security provided by
asymmetric cryptographic techniques depends upon protection of the
private keys. A manufacturer that embeds a private key in an UA may
have retained a copy. A manufacturer whose UA are configured by a
closed source application on the GCS which communicates over the
Internet with the factory may be sending a copy of a UA or GCS self-
generated key back to the factory. Compromise of a registry private
key could do widespread harm. Key revocation procedures are as yet
to be determined. These risks are in addition to those involving
Operator key management practices.
8. Acknowledgments
The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID)
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM
and proposed IETF efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in balancing the
interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the necessary rapid
and widespread deployment of UAS RID.
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9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
[RFC7484] Blanchet, M., "Finding the Authoritative Registration Data
(RDAP) Service", RFC 7484, DOI 10.17487/RFC7484, March
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7484>.
[RFC8005] Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name
System (DNS) Extension", RFC 8005, DOI 10.17487/RFC8005,
October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8005>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References
[CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",
September 2019.
[Delegated]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/945 of 12 March 2019
on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country
operators of unmanned aircraft systems", March 2019.
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HITs for HIPv2", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-04, 3 March
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
hierarchical-hit-04>.
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-new-crypto]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "New
Cryptographic Algorithms for HIP", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-04, 23
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January 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-04>.
[Implementing]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 of 24 May 2019
on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned
aircraft", May 2019.
[NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019.
[Recommendations]
FAA UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking
Committee, "UAS ID and Tracking ARC Recommendations Final
Report", September 2017.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.
[RFC6280] Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J.,
Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, "An Architecture for
Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications",
BCP 160, RFC 6280, DOI 10.17487/RFC6280, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6280>.
[WK65041] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking",
September 2019.
Authors' Addresses
Stuart W. Card
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com
Adam Wiethuechter
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
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United States of America
Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com
Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI 48237
United States of America
Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com
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