Internet DRAFT - draft-carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike
draft-carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike
Network Working Group D. Carrel
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track B. Weis
Expires: September 12, 2019 Independent
March 11, 2019
IPsec Key Exchange using a Controller
draft-carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike-01
Abstract
This document presents a key exchange method allowing devices managed
by a controller (e.g., an SDN management station) to create private
pair-wise IPsec SAs without IKEv2 or any other direct peer-to-peer
session establishment messages. The method can be used when a full
mesh of IKEv2 sessions between IPsec devices is not appropriate.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.
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Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Generating Initial IPsec SAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Rekey of IPsec SAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Single IPsec Device Rekey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Simultaneous Rekey of IPsec Devices . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. IPsec Database Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. The Security Policy Database (SPD) . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2. Security Association Database (SAD) . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2.1. Generating Keying Material for IPsec SAs . . . . . . 13
5.3. Peer Authorization Database (PAD) . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Policy distributed through the Controller . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. IPsec policy negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix A. Example Controller protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.1. Example: I2NSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.2. Example: Network Controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.3. Additional controller protocol considerations . . . . . . 22
A.3.1. Peer-to-peer distribution of IPsec policy . . . . . . 22
A.3.2. Ordering of messages distributed to a controller . . 23
Appendix B. Choosing whether to use IKEv2 or Controller IKE . . 23
Appendix C. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. Introduction
Network architectures typically have included network devices
directly communicating using network control protocols such as
routing and signaling protocols. Additionally, secured
communications between these network devices are usually accomplished
with a key agreement protocol such as IKEv2 [RFC7296], in which the
network devices directly authenticate each other and agree upon
security policy and keying material to protect communications between
themselves. However, controller-based network architectures
(sometimes called "Software-Defined Networking") are now being
defined [RFC7426] [RFC8192] and implemented. In controller-based
network architectures, control protocols --including key exchange
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protocols -- are not implemented directly between the network
devices. Software-Defined Networks utilize the controller based
network design while maximizing the scalability that it provides.
The result is a significantly different trust model; rather than
apply a peer-to-peer trust model, the network applies a device-to-
controller trust model.
The use of IKEv2 in a device-to-controller trust model is not always
optimal. Instead, a new key management method is needed for these
models. Appendix B describes situations in which Controller IKE may
be a better choice than IKEv2.
+-------------+
| |
| Controller |
| |
+-+----+-----++
| | |
+---------------+ | +--------------+
| Control Plane |
| | |
| | |
+--+--+ +--+--+ +--+--+
| | | | | |
| A | | B | | C |
| | | | | |
+-+-+-+ ++--+-+ +-+-+-+
| | | | | |
| +-----------------+ +------------------+ |
+-------------------------------------------+
Secured Data Plane
Figure 1: Controller-based Secured Communications
Figure 1 shows an example controller based network design. Three
network devices (labeled A, B, and C) setup a protected control plane
connection to a Controller. The Controller distributes policy to the
network devices, which enables them to securely communicate in the
data plane.
When one considers adding a controller to a key exchange method, it
is tempting to give it the task of generating and distributing
session keys directly to network devices. However, such a design has
several security considerations. Because such a controller would
have all session keys it could become an active participant or a
passive monitor to the secured communications. Also, for scalability
reasons one might consider having a controller distribute session
keys that are group keys, either a single group key or a set of group
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keys that devices use to protect communications between them. This
document does not specify the use of group session keys.
Many key exchange methods (such as IKEv2) use a Diffie-Hellman (DH)
algorithm to derive keys. When combined with an authentication
method, the key exchange method allows two network devices to
generate private pair-wise keys with each other. This document
presents a key exchange method making use of the device-to-controller
trust model, where a controller is used to distribute keying material
and policy between network devices, also resulting in the devices
generating private pair-wise keys with each other. DH public values
are provided to controllers from IPsec devices, where the controller
relays the DH public values to authorized peers of that IPsec device
as defined by a centralized policy. Network devices then create and
install private pair-wise IPsec session keys to be used to secure
communications with their peers.
Controller-based key exchange methods can be used to create a
Gateway-to-Gateway VPN [RFC7018] in either a Full-Mesh Topology or
Dynamic Full-Mesh Topology.
Although IKEv2 is not used in this approach, the key management
interfaces between IKEv2 and IPsec defined in RFC 7296 are maintained
as much as possible.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Overview
In Controller-IKE a controller acts as a trusted third party, which
relays policy and keying material between IPsec devices. The
controller can be a standalone device, or integrated into a
management station. Communications between the controller and the
IPsec devices MUST be authenticated, encrypted, and integrity-
protected.
All algorithms are selected by the controller or a management station
associated with the controller. The combination of a controller and
a set of IPsec devices comprises a cooperating group of devices that
make up a VPN, where each IPsec device is authorized to communicate
with other IPsec devices in the group. Controller policy may allow
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an IPsec device to communicate with all other IPsec devices in the
group, or may restrict it to a subset of those devices.
DH public values are distributed to the controller from each IPsec
device and redistributed from the controller to each authorized peer
IPsec device. Each IPsec device creates and maintains a DH pair,
which it uses to communicate with other members of the VPN. This
distribution of DH public values (and other related values) is
intended to be embedded into an existing network device/controller
protocol. In particular, Controller-IKE provides a mechanism for
secure key management and only key management. It does not provide
policy information or configuration as that is assumed to be provided
by the controller. One such controller protocol
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection] is being developed at this
time in the IETF I2NSF working group. Another controller protocol
[I-D.sajassi-bess-secure-evpn] is being developed by the IETF BESS
working group.
3. Generating Initial IPsec SAs
When an IPsec device begins operation, it generates a DH pair, using
an algorithm defined in the IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs
[IKEV2-IANA]. If the device does not have any active peers it simply
distributes its DH public value to the Controller, along with a nonce
to be used during SA creation. Whenever a DH pair is created, a new
nonce MUST also be created. Whenever DH public values are
transmitted, they are transmitted with the corresponding nonce.
Whenever a DH private or DH public value is used, it is used along
with the corresponding nonce. However, in the diagrams and
descriptions below, the nonces are often left out for the sake of
clarity.
Upon receiving a peer's DH public value and nonce, the receiver
creates IPsec SAs (as described in Section 5.2). For each peer, a
pair of IPsec SAs are created by combining the IPsec device's own DH
private value with the DH public number received from the Controller.
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+---+ +----------+ +---+
| A | |Controller| | B |
+-+-+ +-----+----+ +-+-+
+----------+ | | |
|Generate | | | | +----------+
|DH pair a1| | | | |Generate |
+----------+ | a1-pub | | |DH pair b1|
+----------> | b1-pub | +----------+
| | <----------+
| | |
| | a1-pub |
| b1-pub +----------> | +-----------+
+-----------+ | <----------+ | |Create SA: |
|Create SAs:| | | | | Tx(b1-a1)|
| Tx(a1-b1)| | | | | Rx(a1-b1)|
| Rx(b1-a1)| | | | +-----------+
+-----------+ | | |
| | |
| IPsec ESP Tx(a1-b1) |
+-----------------------> |
| | |
| IPsec ESP Tx(b1-a1) |
| <-----------------------+
| | |
+ + +
Figure 2: Generation of Initial IPsec SAs between two peers
Figure 2 shows IPsec SA generation between a pair of IPsec devices.
Two IPsec devices (A and B shown in Figure 1) join the network. Each
creates it's own DH pair (labelled "a1" on A and "b1" on B), and
distributes the DH public value (labelled a1-pub and b1-pub) to the
Controller. The controller forwards the DH public value to all
authorized peers, although for simplicity of exposition the figure
only shows the two IPsec devices.
When each device receives the peer's DH public value, a pair of IPsec
SAs are generated: one outbound and one inbound. As shown in the
figure, A generates an outbound SA labeled Tx(a1-b1), representing
that it has been generated using A's DH pair labeled a1 and B's DH
pair labeled b1. B generates the same IPsec SA as an inbound SA,
which is labeled Rx(a1-b1). Similarly, A generates an inbound IPsec
SA labelled Rx(b1-a1), which is the same IPsec SA on B labelled
Tx(b1-a1).
This process repeats on both A and B as they discover other IPsec
devices with which they are authorized to communicate.
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4. Rekey of IPsec SAs
Any IPsec device may initiate a rekey at any time. Common reasons to
perform a rekey include a local time or volume based policy, or may
be the result of a cipher counter mode Initialization Vector (IV)
counter nearing its final value. The rekey process is performed
individually for each remote peer. If rekeying is performed with
multiple peers simultaneously, then the decision process and rules
described in this rekey are performed independently for each peer.
A decision process choosing an outbound IPsec SA is followed when
certain events occur, as described in the rules below. The same
decision process is followed regardless of whether the device is
performing a rekey or responding to a peer's rekey. The decision
process is:
1. Determine the outbound SAs with the remote peer's most recently
distributed DH public value.
2. Determine which of those outbound SAs are "live". A "live"
outbound SA is one built from a DH value from the local peer for
which it has observed inbound traffic using any SA based on the
same local DH pair. This proves that the remote peer is prepared
to receive traffic protected by that DH pair.
3. Choose the "live" outbound SA built from the local peer's most
recent DH public value.
A rekey operation follows these four basic rules.
Rule 1 When an IPsec device needs to perform a rekey with a remote
peer, it creates a new pair of IPsec SAs by combining the new DH
private value with the peer's DH public values. If the remote
peer is also in the midst of a rollover and its DH public value
has already been received, then this may result in creating two
sets of SAs: one pair with the remote peer's old DH public value,
and one pair with the remote peer's new DH public value.
Rule 2 When an IPsec device receives a new remote peer's DH public
value from the controller it creates and installs a new pair of
IPsec SAs by combining the remote peer's new DH public value with
its own current local DH private values. If both devices are in
the midst of a rollover, this may result in creating two sets of
SAs with the remote peer's new DH public value: one with the local
old DH private value, and one with the local new DH private value.
The outbound SA decision process is performed.
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Rule 3 The first IPsec packet received by a rekeying IPsec device on
an inbound SA using its new DH pair causes it to perform the
outbound SA decision process. It may also shorten the lifetime of
IPsec SAs using its own old DH pair that are shared with this
peer, as they are no longer in use (other than the inbound SA
might receive packets in transit).
Rule 4 The first IPsec packet received from a remote rekeying IPsec
device using the remote peer's new DH pair allows the IPsec device
to shorten the lifetime of IPsec SAs shared with this peer using
unused remote DH pairs.
Two examples follow: a single IPsec device performing a rekey with
its peers, and two IPsec devices performing a simultaneous rekey.
The same rekey operations described above are exhibited in both
cases.
4.1. Single IPsec Device Rekey
When a single IPsec device begins a rekey, it first generates a new
DH pair and generates new IPsec SA pairs for each peer with which it
is communicating. It does this by combining the new DH private value
with each peer's existing DH public value. Only when the new IPsec
SAs have been installed and the device is prepared to receive on
those new SAs does it then distribute the new DH public value to the
Controller, which forwards the new DH public value to its authorized
peers. The rekeying IPsec device continues to transmit on the old
SAs for each peer until it observes that peer begin to transmit on
the new SAs.
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+---+ +----------+ +---+
| A | |Controller| | B |
+-+-+ +-----+----+ +-+-+
+----------+ | | |
|Generate | | | |
|DH pair a2| | | |
+----------+ | | |
+--------------+ | | |
|Rule 1 | | | |
| Create SAs | | | |
| Tx(a2-b1) | | | |
| Rx(b1-a2) | | | |
| Use Tx(a1-b1)| | a2-pub | |
+--------------+ +----------> | |
| | |
| IPsec ESP Tx(a1-b1) |
+-----------------------> |
| IPsec ESP Tx(b1-a1) |
| <-----------------------+
| | |
| | a2-pub |
| +----------> | +--------------+
| | | |Rule 2 |
| | | | Create SAs |
| | | | Tx(b1-a2) |
| | | | Rx(a2-b1) |
| IPsec ESP Tx(b1-a2) | | Use Tx(b1-a2)|
+--------------+ | <-----------------------+ +--------------+
|Rule 3 | | | |
| Use Tx(a2-b1)| | | |
| Shorten life | | | |
| Tx(a1-b1) | | IPsec ESP Tx(a2-b1) |
| Rx(b1-a1) | +----------------------> | +--------------+
+--------------+ | | | |Rule 4 |
| | | | Shorten life |
| | | | Tx(b1-a1) |
| | | | Rx(a1-b1) |
| | | +--------------+
+ + +
Figure 3: Single IPsec Device Rekey Protocol Flow
In Figure 3, device A is shown as performing a rekey, and it creates
a DH pair labelled "a2". The following steps are followed.
1. Rule 1 requires creating new IPsec SAs for each peer. In this
example, A creates a new outbound IPsec SA to communicate with B
labelled Tx(a2-b1), and a new inbound IPsec SA labelled
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Rx(b1-a2). A continues to transmit on Tx(a1-b1) (generated as
shown in Figure 2).
2. A distributes the new public value (a2-pub) to the Controller who
forwards it to A's authorized peers, which includes B. During
this time, both A and B continue to use the initial IPsec SAs
setup between them using a1 and b1.
3. When B receives a2 from the controller, B follows Rule 2 by
creating Tx(b1-a2), Rx(a2-b1). B also follows the outbound SA
decision process, which causes it to change its outbound IPsec SA
to A to Tx(b1-a2).
4. When A receives a packet protected by Rx(b1-a2), it follows Rule
3 and performs the outbound SA decision process. This causes it
to change its outbound IPsec SA to Use Tx(a2-b1). It also
optionally shortens the lifetime of the old IPsec SAs shared with
this peer.
5. When B receives a packet protected by Tx(a2-b1), it follows Rule
4, in which it may shorten the lifetime of the old IPsec SAs
shared with this peer using DH pairs that are no longer in use.
At the end of the rekey, both A and B retain a single DH pair, and a
single set of IPsec SAs between them.
4.2. Simultaneous Rekey of IPsec Devices
When two or more IPsec device simultaneously begin a rekey, they each
follow the rekeying method described in the previous section. Every
rekeying IPsec device generates a new DH pair and generates new IPsec
SA pairs for each peer with which it is communicating by combining
their new DH private value with each peer's existing DH public value.
When this completes on a particular IPsec device, it distributes the
new DH public value to the Controller, which forwards it to its
authorized peers. Each continues to transmit on the existing SAs for
each peer until it observes that peer transmitting on the new SAs.
During a simultaneous rekey up to four pairs of IPsec SAs may be
temporarily created, but the four rules ensure that they converge on
a single new set of IPsec SAs.
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+---+ +----------+ +---+
| A | |Controller| | B |
+-+-+ +-----+----+ +-+-+
+---------------------+ | | | +--------------+
|Generate DH pair a2 | | | | |Gen DH pair b2|
+---------------------+ | | | +--------------+
+---------------------+ | | | +--------------+
|Rule 1 | | | | |Rule 1 |
| Create SAs | | | | | Create SAs |
| Tx(a2-b1),Rx(b1-a2)| | | | | Tx(b2-a1) |
| Use Tx(a1-b1) | | a2-pub | | | Rx(a1-b2) |
+---------------------+ +----------> | b2-pub | | Use Tx(b1-a1)|
| | <----------+ +--------------+
| IPsec ESP Tx(a1-b1) |
+-----------------------> |
| IPsec ESP Tx(b1-a1) |
| <-----------------------+
| | a2-pub |
| b2-pub +----------> | +--------------+
+---------------------+ | <----------+ | |Rule 2 |
|Rule 2 | | | | | Create SAs |
| Create SAs | | | | | Tx(b1-a2) |
| Tx(a1-b2),Rx(b2-a1)| | | | | Rx(a2-b1) |
| Tx(a2-b2),Rx(b2-a2)| | | | | Tx(b2-a2) |
| Use Tx(a1-b2) | | | | | Rx(a2-b2) |
+---------------------+ | IPsec ESP Tx(b1-a2) | | Use Tx(b1-a2)|
| <-----------------------+ +--------------+
| IPsec ESP Tx(a1-b2) |
+---------------------+ +-----------------------> | +--------------+
|Rule 3 | | | | |Rule 3 |
| Use Tx(a2-b2) | | | | | Use Tx(b2-a2)|
| Shorten life | | | | | Shorten life |
| Tx(a1-b1),Rx(b1-a1)| | | | | Tx(b1-a1) |
| Tx(a1-b2),Rx(b2-a1)| | | | | Rx(a1-b1) |
+---------------------+ | IPsec ESP Tx(a2-b2) | | Tx(b1-a2) |
+----------------------> | | Rx(a2-b1) |
| IPsec ESP Tx(b2-a2) | +--------------+
+---------------------+ <-----------------------+ +--------------+
| Rule 4 | | | | |Rule 4 |
| Shorten life | | | | | Shorten life |
| Tx(a2-b1),Rx(b1-a2)| | | | | Tx(b1-a2) |
+---------------------+ | | | | Rx(a2-b1) |
+ + + +--------------+
Figure 4: Simultaneous IPsec Device Rekey Protocol Flow
In Figure 4, device A and device B are both shown as performing a
rekey. Their initial state corresponds to the final state shown in
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Figure 2 (i.e., they are communicating using a single pair of IPsec
SAs created from DH pairs "a1" and "b1".
1. A and B follow Rule 1, which includes creating new IPsec SAs for
each peer. In this example, A creates a new outbound IPsec SA to
communicate with B labelled Tx(a2-b1), and a new inbound IPsec SA
labelled Rx(b1-a2). B creates a new outbound IPsec SA to
communicate with B labelled Tx(a1-b2), and a new inbound IPsec SA
labelled Rx(b2-a1). A and B continue to transmit on IPsec SAs
previously created from DH pairs "a1" and "b1".
2. A distributes the new public value (a2-pub) to the Controller who
forwards it to A's authorized peers, which includes B. B also
distributes the new public value (b2-pub) to the Controller who
forwards it to B's authorized peers, which includes A.
3. When A and B receive each other's new peer DH public value from
the controller they follows Rule 2. But because now there are
four DH values that could be in used between A and B, they must
be prepared to use IPsec SAs using each permutation of DH values:
a1-b1, a1-b2, a2-b1, a2-b2. Prior to implementing Rule 2, each
has already created sets of IPsec SAs matching two of the
permutations, so just two more sets must be generated during Rule
2.
* One pair is created using the IPsec device's old DH pair with
the peer's new DH pair. This is necessary, because the peer
may transmit on this pair.
* One pair is created using the IPsec device's new DH pair with
the peer's new DH pair. This is the set of IPsec SAs that
will be used at the end of the rekey process.
Each peer begins transmitting on an IPsec SA that combines the
remote peer's new DH pair and its own old DH pair, which is the
most recent "live" SA on which it can transmit. I.e., A begins
transmitting on Tx(a1-b2) and B begins transmitting on Tx(b1-a2).
4. When A receives a packet protected by Rx(b1-a2), it understands
that the remote peer has received its new DH public value. A
also understands that because of Rule 2 that B must have created
IPsec SAs using a2-b2. This allows A to follow Rule 3 and change
its outbound IPsec SA to Use Tx(a2-b2). Similarly, when B
receives a packet protected by Rx(a1-b2), B recognizes that it
can also begin to transmit using Tx(b2-a2). Note that it also
possible that A will receive a packet protected by Rx(b2-a2) or B
will receive a packet protected by Rx(a2-b2), and then knows it
can transmit on an IPsec SA using both of the new DH pairs.
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5. Also in Rule 3, Both A and B optionally shorten the lifetime of
older IPsec SAs shared with this peer derived from unused DH
pairs to be cleaned up. A shortens the lifetime of SAs based on
a1. B shortens the lifetime of SAs based on b1.
6. When A and B receive a packet protected by the remote peer's
latest DH pair, they shortens the lifetime of SAs based on the
remote peer's unused DH pair.
5. IPsec Database Generation
The PAD, SPD, and SAD all need to be setup as defined in the IPsec
Security Architecture [RFC4301].
5.1. The Security Policy Database (SPD)
The SPD is implemented using methods outside the scope of this
document. The SPD describes the type of traffic that will be
protected between IPsec devices and the policy (e.g., ciphers) used
to create SAs.
5.2. Security Association Database (SAD)
The SAD is constructed from IPsec policy (e.g., ciphers) obtained
(depending on the controller protocol method) either from the
controller or distributed by a peer (see Section 6).
Keying Material is generated following the method defined in IKEv2,
and depends on SPIs, nonces, and the Diffie-Hellman shared secret.
The following sections describe how the necessary values are
determined.
5.2.1. Generating Keying Material for IPsec SAs
5.2.1.1. g^ir
A DH public value is distributed from the peer.
A DH shared secret (g^ir) is computed using the peer's public value,
and the device's private value. The DH group to be used must be
known by the device. Options include distribution by an SDN
controller, or distribution by the peer with the DH public value (see
Section 6).
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5.2.1.2. Nonces
Nonces are distributed with a DH public value, and are used only with
that value. It is RECOMMENDED that nonces are generated as described
in Section 2.10 of [RFC7296].
IKEv2 Key derivation specifies an initiator's nonce (Ni) and a
responder's nonce (Nr). While neither peer is truly initiating a
session), in order to fit the IKE key material models the roles must
be assigned. The initiator is chosen as the peer with the larger
nonce and the responder is the peer with the smaller. This does mean
that the roles can change for each rekey and for each SA within a
rekey.
5.2.1.3. SPIs
SPI values that are unique to each generation of keying material need
to be determined. While each peer could distribute its own inbound
SA value, the SPI value would be used by many peers. Although this
is not a problem for an SA lookup (lookup can include the source and
destination IP addresses), experience has shown that this is sub-
optimal for some hardware SA lookup algorithms. Instead, this
specification proposes generating values that are unpredictable and
indistinguishable from randomly-generated SPI values.
SPI values are generated using the IKEv2 prf+ function, where nonces
are used as the input to the prf. This produces a statistically
random SPI value that should be unique. However, with a 32 bit value
there is still a very small, but non-zero, chance of SPIs repeating
for a given pair of peers. To prevent this and ensure uniqueness in
the operational window, we also use the lower 2 bits from each peer's
rekey counter.
First the SPIs are taken from the prf+ function as 32 bit values and
assigned based on which peer is taking the role of initiator and
which is taking the role of responder. The p_SPI_i is taken by the
device providing Ni, where p_SPI_r is taken by the other device.
{p_SPI_i | p_SPI_r } = prf+(Ni | Nr, "SPI generation")
Next p_SPI_i and p_SPI_r are mapped from initiator and responder
roles to local and remote roles based on the choice of Ni and Nr in
5.2.1.2 and are renamed to p_SPI_local and p_SPI_remote.
Then, 2 2-bit Rotation Numbers (RN) are generated from the 2 least
significant bits (LSB) of the 2 rekey counter values (see Section 6).
These 4 bits replace the least significant bits of p_SPI_local and
p_SPI_remote with the local RN bits taking the least significant
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position in p_SPI_local and the remote RN bits taking the least
significant position in p_SPI_remote. This shown in the following
two diagrams with RN_local shown as R_l and RN_remote shown as R_r.
(MSB) (LSB)
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| p_SPI_local bits from prf+ |R_r|R_l|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
(MSB) (LSB)
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| p_SPI_remote bits from prf+ |R_l|R_r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The reason for changing terminology from initiator/responder to
local/remote is because the roles of initiator/responder can change
in every rekey. The order of RN_local and RN_remote needs to remain
constant. If that order was based on initiator/responder, there's a
risk that if the initiator and responder roles changed and the two
peers re-keyed on different frequencies, they could end up with
identical RN values.
In some circumstances additional values may also need to be added to
the prf for peers to ensure that they have implemented the same
policy. Appendix A.3.1 includes a discussion of when this might be
needed. In these cases, only the prf+ inputs are modified and the
Rotation Numbers MUST still be added as above.
Because a device is not choosing its inbound SPI, its SA lookup
process needs to be aware that duplicates could occur across
different peers. In that case, the inbound SA Lookup SHOULD include
a source IP address in addition to the SPI value (see Section 4.1 of
[RFC4301]).
5.2.1.4. IPsec key generation
As described in previous sections, a DH public value and a nonce are
distributed by peers. These are used to generate IPsec keys
following the method defined in the IKEv2. SKEYSEED is generated
following Section 2.14 of [RFC7296]:
SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir)
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KEYMAT can be similarly derived as defined by IKEv2 (Section 2.17 of
[RFC7296]), although only SK_d is required to be generated (shown in
Section 2.14 of [RFC7296]).
SK_d = prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)
KEYMAT = prf+(SK_d, Ni | Nr)
However, with the simplification where only SK_d is generated, it can
be observed that the derivation of SK_d could be skipped entirely,
and an optimized derivation of KEYMAT could be as follows:
KEYMAT = prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)
Note: A single specification for generating KEYMAT will be determined
in a future version of this document.
5.3. Peer Authorization Database (PAD)
The PAD identifies authorized peers. PAD entries are either
statically configured, or may be dynamically updated by the
controller.
The PAD omits authentication data for each peer, because it has
delegated authentication and authorization to the controller.
The controller protocol MUST be able to describe an identity that a
receiver can match against its local PAD database, to ensure that the
peer is an authorized peer.
6. Policy distributed through the Controller
An IPsec device distributes to a controller a DH public value and the
associated information and policy needed to create IPsec SAs in a
Device Information Message (DIM). The controller then distributes
the DIM to all authorized peers of that device. The following data
elements MUST be embedded in a DIM message:
o DH public number (used for key computation)
o Nonce (used for key computation and SPI generation)
o Peer identity (used to identify a peer in the PAD)
o An Indication whether this is the initial distributed policy
o A rekey counter, which increases for each unique DIM sent
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In cases where a single fixed IPsec policy has been pre-distributed,
it is not necessary for the peer to send or receive that policy in a
DIM. However, in cases where an IPsec device needs to indicate the
policy it is willing to use, the following data elements SHOULD be
included in a DIM:
o An IPsec policy or policies
o A lifetime bounding the use of the DH public number. When this DH
public number is used to create an IPsec SA, the shortest lifetime
is used as an SA lifetime for the pair of generated IPsec SAs.
When the lifetime expires, the local version of the DIM and IPsec
SAs generated from it MUST be deleted.
Appendix A suggests different ways that this policy may be included
in a controller protocol. This document does not define a normative
protocol format, because the DIM very likely needs to be integrated
into an existing controller protocol rather than be an independent
key management protocol. However, the controller protocol MUST
provide a strong authentication between the device and the
controller, and integrity of the messages MUST be provided.
Confidentiality of the messages SHOULD also be provided. It is
important that the controller protocol be protected with algorithms
that are at least as strong as the algorithms used to protect the
IPsec packets.
6.1. IPsec policy negotiation
In many controller based networks, there is a single IPsec policy
used by all devices and there is no need to redistribute or select
policy details. However, in some circumstances, there may be a need
to have multiple policy options. This could happen when a controller
changes the policy and wants to smoothly migrate all devices to the
new policy. Or it could happen if a network supports devices with
different capabilities. In these cases, devices need to be able to
choose the correct policy to use for each other device, and must do
this without sending additional messages and without sending
individual messages to each peer. When a device supports multiple
policies, it MUST include those policies within the DIM. This is
done by sending multiple distinct policies, in order of preference,
where the first policy is the most preferred. The policy to use is
selected by taking the receiver's list of policies (i.e., the list
advertised by the device that generates Nr), starting with the first
policy, compare against the initiator's (device that generates Ni)
list, and choosing the first one found in common. The method
conforms to the IKEv2 Cryptographic Algorithm Negotiation described
in Section 2.7 of [RFC7296]. (However, see additional discussion
when IKEv2 payloads are used in Appendix A.3.1).
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If there is no match, this indicates a controller configuration
error. These devices MUST NOT establish new SAs until a DIM is
received that does produce a match.
When a device supports more than one DH group, then a unique DH
public number MUST be specified for each in order of preference. The
selection of which DH group to use follows the same logic as Policy
selection, using the receiver's list order until a match is found in
the initiator's list.
7. Security Considerations
This document proposes that a device re-use an ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman exponential with multiple peers. There are some known
potential vulnerabilities to this approach, which can be mitigated by
the device first validating a peer's public value to be a safe public
value before combining its own private value with it. The tests
which MUST be performed are described in [RFC6989]. See [REUSE] for
additional security considerations when reusing ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman keys.
A controller acts as a "trusted third party", which asserts that a
particular Diffie-Hellman public value is associated with a
particular entity. A device receiving the public key is not required
to validate the assertion.
A subverted controller can act as a "man-in-the-middle" between a
pair of devices. The easiest attack would be for the attacker to
adjust the routing for the desired traffic through a compromised
gateway and directly observe the cleartext. It is also possible that
a subverted controller could provide a device with a Diffie-Hellman
public value that actually belongs to a compromised gateway rather
than the intended gateway, but doing so does not seem to be
necessary. Nonetheless, the attack of a subverted controller can be
mitigated by having a device sign its Diffie-Hellman public value
(e.g, as a CMS Signed data object), where the receiver validates the
digital signature on the object. However, this adds significant
processing cost to a rekey and does not fit the controller-based
network architecture model.
A subverted IPsec device whose DH pair has been compromised would be
vulnerable to all of its IPsec traffic using that DH pair being
compromised. Assuming the use of strong DH algorithms (including
quantum resistant algorithms as they become available), the
compromise would most likely be due to the device itself being
compromised. Such a compromised device is also vulnerable to a
direct plaintext compromise.
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PFS is achieved between rekey periods, as DH pairs are required to be
generated independently. However, because a device uses the same
long-term key to generate session key with multiple peers, there is
no PFS between sessions within the same rekey period. To reduce key
exposure outside of a rekey period, when a connection is closed each
endpoint MUST forget not only the keys used by the connection but
also any information that could be used to recompute those keys.
However, the DH private key value and the nonce distributed with it
may be forgotten only once the last IPsec SA that uses the private
key value is removed from the SAD and there is no chance that a new
IPsec SA could be setup that requires the private key value.
If quantum resistance is considered to be an issue, the controller
can distribute a PSK, which could be used to create the SK_d in the
manner shown in [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2].
8. IANA Considerations
This memo specifies no IANA actions.
9. Acknowledgements
Graham Bartlett provided many useful comments and suggestions. Rafa
Marin-Lopez and Gabriel Lopez-Millan provided valuable reviews and
advice regarding SDN use cases.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[IKEV2-IANA]
IANA, "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
Parameters", February 2016,
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/
ikev2-parameters.xhtml#ikev2-parameters-8>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
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[RFC6989] Sheffer, Y. and S. Fluhrer, "Additional Diffie-Hellman
Tests for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", RFC 6989, DOI 10.17487/RFC6989, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6989>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection]
Lopez, R. and G. Lopez-Millan, "Software-Defined
Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection", draft-ietf-
i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-03 (work in progress),
October 2018.
[I-D.ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2]
Fluhrer, S., McGrew, D., Kampanakis, P., and V. Smyslov,
"Postquantum Preshared Keys for IKEv2", draft-ietf-
ipsecme-qr-ikev2-07 (work in progress), January 2019.
[I-D.sajassi-bess-secure-evpn]
Sajassi, A., Banerjee, A., Thoria, S., Carrel, D., and B.
Weis, "Secure EVPN", draft-sajassi-bess-secure-evpn-00
(work in progress), October 2018.
[REUSE] Menezes, A. and B. Ustaoglu, "On Reusing Ephemeral Keys In
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocols", December 2008,
<http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2008/
cacr2008-24.pdf>.
[RFC7018] Manral, V. and S. Hanna, "Auto-Discovery VPN Problem
Statement and Requirements", RFC 7018,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7018, September 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7018>.
[RFC7426] Haleplidis, E., Ed., Pentikousis, K., Ed., Denazis, S.,
Hadi Salim, J., Meyer, D., and O. Koufopavlou, "Software-
Defined Networking (SDN): Layers and Architecture
Terminology", RFC 7426, DOI 10.17487/RFC7426, January
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7426>.
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[RFC8192] Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R.,
and J. Jeong, "Interface to Network Security Functions
(I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8192, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8192>.
[RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R.
Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8329>.
Appendix A. Example Controller protocols
This section contains suggestions of how a Controller protocol might
distribute policy for the Controller-based IKE.
A.1. Example: I2NSF
IPsec devices described in this document could be implemented as an
Network Security Function (NSF) in the I2NSF Framework [RFC8329]. An
I2NSF Controller or NSF Manager could distribute a DIM as a new type
of I2NSF Policy Rule. A YANG configuration data model would need to
be defined for this. This could be a new "Case 3" defined in
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection].
A.2. Example: Network Controller
Site-to-site networks (e.g., an L2VPN or L3VPN) often use a network
controller to share networking state between routers. When those
routers use IPsec to protect the communications between themselves,
this same network controller could distribute DH public number and
nonces as well. For example, when a BGP Route Reflector (RR) is used
in a network, a new address family (AFI) could distribute the state
necessary for a controller-based IPsec key exchange. The BGP session
between BGP routers and the Route Reflector (RR) would need to at
least be integrity protected from a man in the middle and SHOULD be
protected for confidentiality to prevent identity leakage.
The controller protocol MUST provide for adequate synchronization of
the state. For example, when IPsec devices are synchronized with a
key management protocol it is often necessary for the protocol to
indicate when a device has rebooted and thinks that it is contacting
peers for the first time. This alerts peers to destroy earlier
keying state that they may still believe is current.
One possible method for distributing a DIM within a controller
protocol is to use a set of IKEv2 payloads. For example, when a
single set of IPsec policy has been distributed to all IPsec devices
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by a configuration server then the following minimum required data
elements can be distributed using the following IKEv2 payloads.
ID, [N(INITIAL_CONTACT),] KE, Ni
When initiating a rekey, the IPsec device need only distribute its
new DH public number due to Rule 1. Existing peers receiving the new
DH public number need not be re-told about the previous DH public
number. Any new peer that receives and acts upon a "stale"
controller message (containing the old DH public number) will still
be able to setup IPsec SAs using the old DH public number, and can
use them until the new DH public number is received.
A.3. Additional controller protocol considerations
If the controller protocol is more complicated, there are some
additional considerations.
A.3.1. Peer-to-peer distribution of IPsec policy
In some cases an IPsec device may have more than one IPsec policy
under which it is willing to communicate. This would result in an
IPsec device using the decision process described in Section 6.1 to
determine which policy to use between itself and that peer. An IKEv2
SA payload could be used to distribute the policies, and the decision
process could be used to determine which single set of policy is to
be used. Note that the same decision process is followed by both
peers. It is important that when an SA payload is used, that each
proposal within the SA payload MUST contain at most a single
transform for each Transform type (e.g., ENCR and (optionally) ESN
for combined mode algorithms, ENCR, INTEG, and (optionally) ESN
otherwise). This is due to the absence of a direct peer-to-peer
reply message, which would alert the sender of which proposal was
chosen.
1. Determine the Responder (as defined in Section 5.2.1.2).
2. Follow the negotiation rules defined in Section 2.7 of IKEv2
[RFC7296] (with the restrictions that more than one transform of
each type MUST NOT be present, and no error notifications are
returned to the peer). Each peer will independently compare each
Proposal in the Responder's SA payload to each Proposal in the
Initiator's SA payload and choose the first match.
3. If there is no match, then this is considered a controller error,
and the IPsec devices SHOULD report the error to the controller.
Payloads distributed in the controller protocol could be as follows:
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ID, [N(INITIAL_CONTACT),] SA, KE, Ni
where the SA payload contains one or more Proposals, each of this
includes a transform indicating the Diffie-Hellman group it is
willing to use (D-H Transform), and IPsec transforms that it is
willing to use (e.g., ENCR, INTEG, and ESN Transforms). The KE
payload includes a DH public number matching the D-H Transform.
Because there is no direct peer-to-peer IKE messages, there is a need
for peers to reliably know which Proposal in the SA payload was
chosen. That is, if they do not reliably follow the same decision
process they may end up installing IPsec SAs with incompatible
policy. A straightforward method to verify that a peer has chosen
the same policy is to include the SA Proposal number (SPN) from the
SA payload in the SPI calculation.
{p_SPI_i|p_SPI_r} = prf+(Ni | Nr, "SPI generation" | SPNi | SPNr)
If a device is willing to use more than one DH group, then a single
SA payload should be distributed, but the included Proposals may
contain different D-H Transforms. A KE payload must be included for
each D-H Group that is offered in the SA payload.
ID, [N(INITIAL_CONTACT),] [SA,] KE, [KE,] Ni
A.3.2. Ordering of messages distributed to a controller
A controller protocol may require a method of determining ordering of
messages that are distributed, i.e. a Rekey Counter (RC). It is
RECOMMENDED that the ordering be defined by a monotonically
increasing counter value distributed with the IPsec policy. It is
further RECOMMENDED that to ensure ordering after a device reboot
that the counter include a "boot count", which increments after each
reboot. For example, the counter could be a 64-bit counter where the
high order 32 bits are a "boot count", followed by the counter that
begins at 1 following the increment of the "boot count".
Appendix B. Choosing whether to use IKEv2 or Controller IKE
The following list describes the circumstances in which Controller
IKE may be preferable to IKEv2. Note that Controller IKE does not
replace IKEv2, but does provide an alternative for some network
architectures where it is more optimal.
Trust Model Controller IKE is optimal when a device-to-
controller trust model is in use. IKEv2 is a
better approach when IPsec devices require a
peer-to-peer trust model.
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Latency Controller IKE reduces tunnel session setup
latency in a device-to-controller trust model.
Once controller communications hace commenced, a
session can be initiated with any other IPsec
device managed by that controller without
requiring additional key management messages.
This is optimal when a group of IPsec devices are
sensitive to latency.
Load Balancing In some network architectures a full mesh of
IKEv2 sessions can occur without affecting the
load of IPsec and IKEv2 processing on any of the
communicating IPsec devices, including having
protocol state machinery to handle an IPsec peer
device that is overloaded and not reliably
responding. But when a set of IPsec devices is
very large, this can be problematic. Also, when
an IPsec device is overloaded there may be re-
transmissions of IKEv2 messages, which further
complicates protocol state. The simplified
control plane of Controller IKE makes load
balancing a purely local matter, where the
installation of IPsec IPsec SAs takes into
consideration only available local resources.
And because there are no peer-to-peer key
management messages, no re-transmissions occur.
Complexity Full attribute negotiation is not needed in a
controller environment. Controllers enforce the
SA policy details, moving complexity away from
end nodes. This also reduces the attack surface
on the end node.
Network Shape In some network topologies a persistent bi-
directional link does not exist between all
peers. Sometimes one direction has significantly
reduced capabilities or is even non-existent.
This can be either temporary or permanent, and
sometimes is a purposefully enforced restriction.
Provided that both peers can communicate with the
controller, Controller IKE allows for the
establishment of SAs and rekeying in these
scenarios.
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Appendix C. Implementation Considerations
The system architecture of many implementations includes a separation
between a data plane "fastpath" and a "control plane". The data
plane performs IPsec encapsulation and decapsulation in the simplest
and most expedient way possible, where the control plane handles the
complexity of network protocols including state machines, timers,
network communication, and managing the data plane.
A typical IKEv2 implementation on Linux works this way, with IKEv2
running in user space and IPSec packet processing happening in the
kernel. The kernel, or other fast path implementation, provides an
interface for the control plane to manage it. This interface
includes a way to create SAs, delete SAs, and observe statistics for
SAs. Controller IKE is designed to be able to work with these same
interfaces. For example a user space implementation of Controller
IKE could work with a Linux kernel implementation of the IPSec data
plane without needing kernel modifications. SA creation and deletion
remains the same. SA creation occurs with Rules 1 and 2. SA
deletion happens with Rules 3 and 4. Additionally Rules 3 and 4 need
to observe that traffic has arrived on a particular SA. This can be
done by observing packet counts on an SA and seeing when they go from
zero to any positive number. Due to the asynchronous nature of
Controller IKE, Rules 3 and 4 do not require immediate action when
the first packets arrive, but instead they can be implemented with
relaxed polling.
Authors' Addresses
David Carrel
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, California 95134-1706
USA
Phone: +1-408-525-7852
Email: carrel@cisco.com
Brian Weis
Independent
USA
Email: bew.stds@gmail.com
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