Internet DRAFT - draft-cerveny-bmwg-ipv6-nd
draft-cerveny-bmwg-ipv6-nd
Network Working Group W. Cerveny
Internet-Draft Arbor Networks
Intended status: Informational R. Bonica
Expires: July 8, 2015 Juniper Networks
January 4, 2015
Benchmarking Neighbor Discovery
draft-cerveny-bmwg-ipv6-nd-06
Abstract
This document is a benchmarking instantiation of RFC 6583:
"Operational Neighbor Discovery Problems" [RFC6583]. It describes a
general testing procedure and measurements that can be performed to
evaluate how the problems described in RFC 6583 may impact the
functionality or performance of intermediate nodes.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 8, 2015.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Overview of Relevant NDP and Intermediate Node Behavior . . . 3
4. Test Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Testing Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Modifiers (Variables) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Frequency of NDP Triggering Packets . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. Stale Entry Time Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1.1. General Testing Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2. Neighbor Cache Exhaustion Determination . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2.1. General Testing Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3. Dropped Flows Per Second . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3.1. General Testing Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Measurements Explicitly Excluded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. DUT CPU Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.2. Malformed Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. DUT Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
This document is a benchmarking instantiation of RFC 6583:
"Operational Neighbor Discovery Problems" [RFC6583]. It describes a
general testing procedure and measurements that can be performed to
evaluate how the problems described in RFC 6583 may impact the
functionality or performance of intermediate nodes.
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2. Terminology
Intermediate Node A router, switch, firewall or any other device
which separates end-nodes. The tests in this document can be
completed with any intermediate node which maintains a neighbor
cache, although not all measurements and performance
characteristics may apply.
Neighbor Cache The neighbor cache is a database which correlates the
link-layer address and the adjacent interface with an IPv6
address.
Neighbor Discovery See Section 1 of RFC 4861 [RFC4861]
Scanner Network The network from which the scanning tested is
connected.
Scanning Interface The interface from which the scanning activity is
conducted.
Stale Entry Time This is the duration for which a neighbor cache
entry marked "Reachable" will continue to be marked "Reachable" if
an update for the address is not received.
Target Network The network for which the scanning tests is targeted.
Target Network Destination Interface The interface that resides on
the target network, which is primarily used to measure DUT
performance while the scanning activity is occurring.
3. Overview of Relevant NDP and Intermediate Node Behavior
In a traditional network, an intermediate node must support a mapping
between a connected node's IP address and the connected node's link-
layer address and interface the node is connected to. With IPv4,
this process is handled by ARP [RFC0826]. With IPv6, this process is
handled by NDP and is documented in [RFC4861]. With IPv6, when a
packet arrives on one of an intermediate node's interfaces and the
destination address is determined to be reachable via an adjacent
network:
1. The intermediate node first determines if the destination IPv6
address is present in its neighbor cache.
2. If the address is present in the neighbor cache, the intermediate
node forwards the packet to the destination node using the
appropriate link-layer address and interface.
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3. If the destination IPv6 address is not in the intermediate node's
neighbor cache:
1. An entry for the IPv6 address is added to the neighbor cache
and the entry is marked "INCOMPLETE".
2. The intermediate node sends a neighbor solicitation packet to
the solicited-node multicast address on the interface
considered on-link.
3. If a solicited neighbor advertisement for the IPv6 address is
received by the intermediate node, the neighbor cache entry
is marked "REACHABLE" and remains in this state for 30
seconds.
4. If a neighbor advertisement is not received, the intermediate
node will continue sending neighbor solicitation packets
every second until either a neighbor solicitation is received
or the maximum number of solicitations has been sent. If a
neighbor advertisement is not received in this period, the
entry can be discarded.
There are two scenarios where a neighbor cache can grow to a very
large size:
1. There are a large number of real nodes connected via an
intermediate node's interface and a large number of these nodes
are sending and receiving traffic simultaneously.
2. There are a large number of addresses for which a scanning
activity is occuring and no real node will respond to the
neighbor solicitation. This scanning activity can be
unintentional or malicious. In addition to maintaining the
"INCOMPLETE" neighbor cache entry, the intermediate node must
send a neighbor solicitation packet every second for the maximum
number of socicitations. With today's network link bandwidths, a
scanning event could cause a lot of entries to be added to the
neighbor cache and solicited for in the time that it takes for a
neighbor cache entry to be discarded.
An intermediate node's neighbor cache is of a finite size and can
only accommodate a specific number of entries, which can be limited
by available memory or a preset operating system limit. If the
maximum number of entries in a neighbor cache is reached, the
intermediate node must either drop an existing entry to make space
for the new entry or deny the new IP address to MAC address/
interface mapping with an entry in the neighbor cache. In an extreme
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case, the intermediate node's memory may become exhausted, causing
the intermediate node to crash or begin paging memory.
At the core of the neighbor discovery problems presented in RFC 6583
[RFC6583], unintentional or malicious IPv6 traffic can transit the
intermediate node that resembles an IP address scan similar to an
IPv4-based network scan. Unlike IPv4 networks, an IPv6 end network
is typically configured with a /64 address block, allowing for
upwards of 2**64 addresses. When a network node attempts to scan all
the addresses in a /64 address block directly attached to the
intermediate node, it is possible to create a huge amount of state in
the intermediate node's neighbor cache, which may stress processing
or memory resources.
Section 7.1 of RFC 6583 recommends how intermediate nodes should
behave when the neighbor cache is exceeded. Section 6 of RFC 6583
[RFC6583] recommends how damage from an IPv6 address scan may be
mitigated. Section 6.2 of RFC 6583 [RFC6583] discusses queue tuning.
4. Test Setup
The network needs to minimally have two subnets: one from which the
scanner(s) source their scanning activity and the other which is the
target network of the address scans.
It is assumed that the latency for all network segments is neglible.
By default, the target network's subnet shall be 64-bits in length,
although some tests may involve increasing the prefix length.
Although packet size shouldn't have a direct impact, packet per
second (pps) rates will have an impact. Smaller packet sizes should
be utilized to facilitate higher packet per second rates.
For purposes of this test, the packet type being sent by the scanning
device isn't important, although most scanning applications might
want to send packets that would elicit responses from nodes within a
subnet (such as an ICMPv6 echo request). Since it is not intended
that responses be evoked from the target network node, such packets
aren't necessary.
At the beginning of each test the intermediate node should be
initialized. Minimally, the neighbor cache should be cleared.
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Basic format of test network. Note that optional "non-participating
network" is a third network not related to the scanner or target
network.
+---------------+ +-----------+ +--------------+
| | Scanner | | Target | |
| Scanning |-------------| DUT |-------------|Target Network|
| src interface | Network | | Network |dst interface |
| | | | | |
+---------------+ +-----------+ +--------------+
4.1. Testing Interfaces
Two tester interfaces are configured for most tests:
o Scanning source (src) interface: This is the interface from which
test packets are sourced. This interface sources traffic to
destination IPv6 addresses on the target network from a single
link-local address, similar to how an adjacent intermediate node
would transit traffic through the intermediate node.
o Target network destination (dst) interface: This interface
responds to neighbor solicitations as appropriate and confirms
when an intermediate node has forwarded a packet to the interface
for consumption. Where appropriate, the target network
destination interface will respond to neighbor solicitations with
a unique link-layer address per IPv6 address solicited.
5. Modifiers (Variables)
5.1. Frequency of NDP Triggering Packets
The frequency of NDP triggering packets can be as high as the maximum
packet per second rate that the scanner network will support (or is
rated for). However, it may not be necessary to send packets at a
particularly high rate. In fact, a non-benchmarking goal of testing
could be to identify if the DUT is able to withstand scans at rates
which otherwise would not impact the performance of the DUT.
Optimistically, the scanning rate should be incremented until the
DUT's performance begins deteriorating. Depending on the software
and system being used to implement the scanning, it may be
challenging to achieve a sufficient rate. Where this maximum
threshold cannot be determined, the test results should note the
highest rate tested and that DUT performance deterioration was not
noticed at this rate.
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The lowest rate tested should be the rate for which packets can be
expected to have an impact on the DUT -- this value is of course,
subjective.
6. Tests
6.1. Stale Entry Time Determination
This test determines the time interval when the intermediate node
(DUT) identifies an address as stale.
RFC 4861, section 6.3.2 [RFC4861] states that an address can be
marked "stale" at a random value between 15 and 45 seconds (as
defined via constants in the RFC). This test confirms what value is
being used by the intermediate node. Note that RFC 4861 states that
this random time can be changed "at least every few hours."
6.1.1. General Testing Procedure
1. Send a packet from the scanning source interface to an address in
target network. Observe that the intermediate node sends a
neighbor solicitation to the solicited-node multicast address on
the target network, for which tester destination interface should
respond with a neighbor advertisement. The intermediate node
should create an entry in neighbor cache for the address, marking
the address as "reachable". As this point, the packet should be
forwarded to the tester destination interface.
2. After the neighbor advertisement from the destination tester
interface in step one, no more neighbor advertisements from the
tester destination interface should be allowed.
3. Continue sending packets from the scanning source interface to
the same address in the target network.
4. Note the time at which the DUT no longer sends packets. The
stale timer value will be the period of time between when the DUT
received the first neighbor advertisement above and the point at
which the DUT no longer forwards packets for this flow to the
tester destination interface.
6.2. Neighbor Cache Exhaustion Determination
Discover the point at which the neighbor cache is exhausted and
evaluate intermediate node behavior when this threshold is reached.
If possible, the stale timer value should be locked down to a large
value. A side-effect of this test is to confirm that intermediate
node behaves correctly; in particular, it shouldn't crash.
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Note that some intermediate nodes may restrict the frequency of
allowed neighbor discovery packets transmitted. The maximum allowed
packets per second must either be set to a value which doesn't impact
the outcome of the test must allow for this restriction.
6.2.1. General Testing Procedure
1. At a very fast rate, send packets incrementally to valid unique
addresses in the target network, within stale entry time period.
Simultaneously, send packets for addresses previously added to
the neighbor cache. The neighbor cache has been exhausted when
previously added addresses must be re-discovered with a neighbor
solicitation (within the stale entry time period).
2. Observe what happens when one address greater than the maximum
neighbor cache size ("n") is reached. When "n+1" is reached, if
either the first or most recent cache entry are dropped, this may
be acceptable.
3. Confirm intermediate node doesn't crash when "n+1" is reached.
6.3. Dropped Flows Per Second
This test determines the rate that which flows are dropped once the
neighbor cache size is exceeded. The metric for this test is the
number of flows which are dropped in a minute.
6.3.1. General Testing Procedure
1. Send packets incrementally to unique valid addresses in the
target network, within stale entry time period. The number of
unique valid addresses may be as high as the size of the neighbor
cache, but may be the number of nodes that would be expected in a
deployed network. Continue sending packets to previously cached
addresses.
2. Send packets incrementally to unique invalid addresses (addresses
without valid node in target network), until the intermediate
node crashes, packets are no longer accepted or existing flows to
unique valid addresses are dropped.
7. Measurements Explicitly Excluded
These are measurements which aren't recommended because of the
itemized reasons below:
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7.1. DUT CPU Utilization
This measurement relies on the DUT to provide utilization
information, which is subjective.
7.2. Malformed Packets
This benchmarking test is not intended to test DUT behavior in the
presence of malformed packets.
8. DUT Initialization
At the beginning of each test, the neighbor cache of the DUT should
be initialized.
9. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
RFC.
10. Security Considerations
Benchmarking activities as described in this memo are limited to
technology characterization using controlled stimuli in a laboratory
environment, with dedicated address space and the constraints
specified in the sections above.
The benchmarking network topology will be an independent test setup
and MUST NOT be connected to devices that may forward the test
traffic into a production network, or misroute traffic to the test
management network.
Further, benchmarking is performed on a "black-box" basis, relying
solely on measurements observable external to the DUT/SUT. Special
capabilities SHOULD NOT exist in the DUT/SUT specifically for
benchmarking purposes.
Any implications for network security arising from the DUT/SUT SHOULD
be identical in the lab and in production networks.
11. Acknowledgements
Helpful comments and suggestions were offered by Al Morton, Joel
Jaeggli, Nalini Elkins, Scott Bradner, and Ram Krishnan, on the BMWG
e-mail list and at BMWG meetings. Precise grammatical corrections
and suggestions were offered by Ann Cerveny.
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12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC0826] Plummer, D., "Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or
converting network protocol addresses to 48.bit Ethernet
address for transmission on Ethernet hardware", STD 37,
RFC 826, November 1982.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2544] Bradner, S. and J. McQuaid, "Benchmarking Methodology for
Network Interconnect Devices", RFC 2544, March 1999.
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
September 2007.
[RFC5180] Popoviciu, C., Hamza, A., Van de Velde, G., and D.
Dugatkin, "IPv6 Benchmarking Methodology for Network
Interconnect Devices", RFC 5180, May 2008.
[RFC6583] Gashinsky, I., Jaeggli, J., and W. Kumari, "Operational
Neighbor Discovery Problems", RFC 6583, March 2012.
12.2. Informative References
[RFC7048] Nordmark, E. and I. Gashinsky, "Neighbor Unreachability
Detection Is Too Impatient", RFC 7048, January 2014.
Authors' Addresses
Bill Cerveny
Arbor Networks
2727 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
USA
Email: wcerveny@arbor.net
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Ron Bonica
Juniper Networks
2251 Corporate Park Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
Email: rbonica@juniper.net
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