Internet DRAFT - draft-chen-secure-routing-requirements
draft-chen-secure-routing-requirements
Internet Engineering Task Force Chen, Ed.
Internet-Draft L. Su
Intended status: Informational China Mobile
Expires: 19 May 2024 16 November 2023
The Requirements for Secure Routing Path
draft-chen-secure-routing-requirements-02
Abstract
Both ISPs and users have put forward requirements for secure routing,
the scenarios are analyzed in the draft draft-chen-secure-routing-
use-cases (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chen-secure-
routing-use-cases/). This draft analyzes the functions required to
implement secure routing.
Attack detection and users security requirements translateion are out
of scope.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements for Secure Routing Path . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Appraise node trustworthiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Expression of security capability . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Node security capability collection protocol . . . . . . 4
2.4. Distribution of security policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.5. Secure path validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction
Starting from the requirements of network operators and users, it is
necessary to take the security attribute as the key factor to select
the route and transmission path to measure the link transmission
security. To achieve this goal, the following contents need to be
studied.
1. Static node security, by appraising the trustworthiness, then it
can be determined whether the node is secure and whether the node
has security abilities;
2. Dynamic Security, by path scheduling, then it can be determined
whether the path is secure and whether the path have the
abilities to anti-cyberattack;
3. Close-loop validation, by path validation, then it can check
whether the selected path and the executed path are consistent;
Implementing a secure routing path will involve multiple protocols:
1. Expression of node security capability and trustworthiness, by
YANG Model;
2. Collect node trust and security factors, and advertise through
extending the BGP protocol;
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3. Collect available status information of security devices and
resources through network nodes, such as extending BGP-LS;
4. Collect JSON messages carrying security resource information
through the Restful;
5. Distribute security policy configuration through the Netconf;
6. Distribute traffic forwarding paths through programming, such as
SRv6;
7. Perform consistency verification on paths and security services,
such as extending the SFC.
+-------------------+
|Network Programming|
------------------->|Controller AND |
|Secure Routing |
+---------+---------+
|
|
|
+----------------------+--------+---------------+--------------+
| | | |
| | | |
3.Distribute routing policy | 2.collect node information |
with security policy | include security capability |
| | | |
+---+----+ +--+---+ +--+---+ |
|Ingress | |Node2 | |Node1 | +--+--+
|Node | |IPS | |WAF | |Node2|
+--------+ +------+ +------+ +-----+
1.YANG Model: expression of
Node security information
2. Requirements for Secure Routing Path
2.1. Appraise node trustworthiness
Evaluate routing nodes, such as whether they are secure boot and the
security level of the nodes. By Performing static security
assessment on routing nodes, can provide a foundation for forming
trusted or secure paths. In another draft, the concept of trusted
path routing in draft-voit-rats-trustworthy-path-routing
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-voit-rats-trustworthy-path-
routing/) was mentioned, which addresses the issue of security
evaluation for node self initiation.
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2.2. Expression of security capability
YANG model is used to describe the security capability of nodes, such
as security service type and remaining capacity.
2.3. Node security capability collection protocol
Collect the security capabilities of all nodes in the network, one
solution is through BGP-LS, draft-chen-idr-bgp-ls-security-capability
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chen-idr-bgp-ls-security-
capability/) extend BGP-LS to carry security capability information.
2.4. Distribution of security policy
Security policies can be distributed through extended SRv6 SRH.
2.5. Secure path validation
Perform consistency verification on paths and security services, At
present, this draft-liu-on-network-path-validation
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-liu-on-network-path-
validation/) provides ideas for path validation.
3. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
4. Security Considerations
TBD
Authors' Addresses
Meiling Chen (editor)
China Mobile
BeiJing
China
Email: chenmeiling@chinamobile.com
Li Su
China Mobile
BeiJing
China
Email: suli@chinamobile.com
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