Internet DRAFT - draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement
draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement
Transport Layer Security D. Connolly
Internet-Draft SandboxAQ
Intended status: Informational 4 March 2024
Expires: 5 September 2024
ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3
draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-agreement-00
Abstract
This memo defines ML-KEM as a standalone NamedGroup for use in TLS
1.3 to achieve post-quantum key agreement.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-connolly-tls-mlkem-key-
agreement/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Transport Layer
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Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/dconnolly/draft-tls-mlkem-key-agreement.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 September 2024.
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Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
FIPS 203 standard (ML-KEM) is a new FIPS / CNSA 2.0 standard for
post-quantum key agreement via lattice-based key establishment
mechanism (KEM). Having a fully post-quantum (not hybrid) FIPS-
compliant key agreement option for TLS 1.3 is necessary for eventual
movement beyond hybrids and for users that need to be fully post-
quantum sooner than later.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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3. Construction
We align with [hybrid] except that instead of joining ECDH options
with a KEM, we just have the KEM as a NamedGroup.
4. Security Considerations
TLS 1.3's key schedule commits to the the ML-KEM encapsulation key
and the encapsulated shared secret ciphertext, providing resilience
against re-encapsulation attacks against KEMs used for key agreement.
ML-KEM is MAL-BIND-K-PK-secure but only LEAK-BIND-K-CT and LEAK-BIND-
K,PK-CT-secure, but because of the inclusion of the ML-KEM ciphertext
in the TLS 1.3 key schedule there is no concern of malicious
tampering (MAL) adversaries, not just honestly-generated but leaked
key pairs (LEAK adversaries). The same is true of other KEMs with
weaker binding properties, even if they were to have more constraints
for secure use in contexts outside of TLS 1.3 handshake key
agreement.These computational binding properties for KEMs were
formalized in [CDM23].
5. IANA Considerations
This document requests/registers two new entries to the TLS Named
Group (or Supported Group) registry, according to the procedures in
Section 6 of [tlsiana].
Value: 0x0768 (please)
Description: MLKEM768
DTLS-OK: Y
Recommended: N
Reference: This document
Comment: FIPS 203 version of ML-KEM-768
Value: 0x1024 (please)
Description: MLKEM1024
DTLS-OK: Y
Recommended: N
Reference: This document
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Comment: FIPS 203 version of ML-KEM-1024
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[FIPS203] "*** BROKEN REFERENCE ***".
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9180] Barnes, R., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. Wood, "Hybrid
Public Key Encryption", RFC 9180, DOI 10.17487/RFC9180,
February 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9180>.
6.2. Informative References
[CDM23] Cremers, C., Dax, A., and N. Medinger, "Keeping Up with
the KEMs: Stronger Security Notions for KEMs and automated
analysis of KEM-based protocols", 2023,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1933.pdf>.
[hybrid] Stebila, D., Fluhrer, S., and S. Gueron, "Hybrid key
exchange in TLS 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-09, 7 September 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
hybrid-design-09>.
[tlsiana] Salowey, J. A. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for
TLS and DTLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-08, 23 January 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8447bis-08>.
Acknowledgments
TODO acknowledge.
Author's Address
Deirdre Connolly
SandboxAQ
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Email: durumcrustulum@gmail.com
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