Internet DRAFT - draft-cutler-httpbis-partitioned-cookies
draft-cutler-httpbis-partitioned-cookies
HTTP D. Cutler
Internet-Draft Google LLC
Updates: 6265 (if approved) 10 November 2022
Intended status: Informational
Expires: 14 May 2023
Cookies Having Independent Partitioned State specification
draft-cutler-httpbis-partitioned-cookies-01
Abstract
This document updates RFC6265bis, defining a new attribute,
Partitioned, which restricts the contexts in which a cookie is
available to only those whose top-level document is same-site with
the top-level document that initiated the request that created the
cookie. These cookies are referred to as "partitioned cookies" and
allow embedded sites which are cross-site with the top-level frame to
have access to HTTP state which cannot be used for tracking across
multiple top-level sites.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://DCtheTall.github.io/CHIPS-spec/draft-cutler-httpbis-
partitioned-cookies.html. Status information for this document may
be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cutler-httpbis-
partitioned-cookies/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the HTTP Working Group
mailing list (mailto:ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at
https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/. Working Group
information can be found at https://httpwg.org/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/DCtheTall/CHIPS-spec.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. The Partitioned attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Computing the cookie partition key . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3. Using Set-Cookie with Partitioned . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4. Partitioned Cookies with the Same Name/Domain/Path . . . 4
2.5. Attaching a Partitioned Cookie to a Request . . . . . . . 5
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Partitioned requires Secure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Partitioned cookies and XSS attacks . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Partitioned cookies and CSRF attacks . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. State proliferation for denial of service . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Partitioned cookies improve user privacy . . . . . . . . 6
3.6. Avoiding cross-partition leaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Applying Limits to Partitioned Cookie Jars . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Third-Party Cookie Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Partitioned Cookies and Clear-Site-Data . . . . . . . . . 7
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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1. Introduction
In order to increase privacy on the web, browser vendors are either
planning or already shipping restrictions on cross-site tracking.
This includes phasing out support for third-party cookies, as defined
in Section 7.1 of [RFC6265bis].
Although third-party cookies can enable third-party sites to track
user behavior across different top-level sites, there are some cookie
use cases on the web today where cross-domain subresources require
some notion of session or persistent state that is scoped to a user's
activity on a single top-level site.
In order to meet these use cases, this document proposes changes to
RFC6265bis to support a new cookie attribute, Partitioned, which
restricts the contexts that a cookie is available to only those whose
top-level document is same-site with the top-level document that the
cookie was created in. This attribute will allow embedded sites to
use HTTP state without giving them the capability to link user
behavior across distinct top-level sites.
2. Conventions and Definitions
2.1. The Partitioned attribute
Below is the definition of the Partitioned attribute. This could be
added as a new subsection of Section 4.1.2 (Semantics
(Non-Normative)) of [RFC6265bis]:
| The Partitioned attribute limits the scope of the cookie such that
| it will only be sent when the site of the top-document (defined in
| section 5.2) is same-site with the top-document when the > cookie
| was created. Cookies set with this attribute are referred to as
| "partitioned cookies".
2.2. Computing the cookie partition key
Below is the algorithm that browsers can use to compute a request's
cookie partition key. This algorithm could be added after
Section 5.2 ("Same-site" and "cross-site" Requests) of [RFC6265bis]:
| 1. Let top-document be the active document in document's browsing
| context's top-level browsing context.
|
| 2. Let "cookie-partition-key" be the site of the top-document
| when the user agent made the request.
|
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| 3. If the cookie is being read or written via a "non-HTTP" API,
| then cookie-partition-key is the site (as defined in [HTML])
| of the top-document of the document associated with the non-
| HTTP API.
2.3. Using Set-Cookie with Partitioned
Below is the algorithm that browsers can use to parse cookie lines
with this attribute. This algorithm could be added as a new
subsection of Section 5.4 (The Set-Cookie Header Field) of
[RFC6265bis]:
| If an attribute-name case-insensitively matches the string
| "Partitioned" then the user-agent MUST append an attribute to the
| cookie-attribute-list with an attribute-name of "Partitioned" and
| an empty attribute value.
We could add an attribute to the cookie storage model described in
the first paragraph of 5.5 (Storage Model) to include a new attribute
on each cookie called the partition-key (to differentiate it from
cookie-partition-key defined in a prior section). The following
could also be added as an additional step to section 5.4:
| 1. If the cookie-attribute-list does not contain an attribute
| with an attribute-name of "Partitioned", set partition-key to
| null.
|
| If the cookie-attribute-list does contain an attribute with an
| attribute-name of "Partitioned" and the secure-only-flag is
| false, abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely.
|
| Otherwise, set partition-key to cookie-partition-key defined
| in section 5.X.X.
2.4. Partitioned Cookies with the Same Name/Domain/Path
In order to prevent cross-partition leaks, we need to allow sites to
set cookies with the same name, domain, and path as long as they have
different partition keys. In order to achieve this, we suggest the
following edit to step 22 of Section 5.5 (Storage Model) of
[RFC6265bis], note that steps b-d below are not changed.
| 1. If the cookie store contains a cookie with the same name,
| domain, host-only-flag, path, and partition-key as the newly-
| created cookie:
|
| a. Let old-cookie be the existing cookie with the same name,
| domain, host-only-flag, path, and partition-key as the newly-
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| created cookie. (Notice that this algorithm maintains the
| invariant that there is at most one such cookie.)
|
| b. If the newly-created cookie was received from a "non-HTTP"
| API and the old-cookie's http-only-flag is true, abort these
| steps and ignore the newly created cookie entirely.
|
| c. Update the creation-time of the newly-created cookie to
| match the creation-time of the old-cookie.
|
| d. Remove the old-cookie from the cookie store.
2.5. Attaching a Partitioned Cookie to a Request
The following could be added to the first step of the algorithm in
section 5.6.3 (Retrieval Algorithm):
| * If the cookie's partition-key is null, skip this step.
|
| Otherwise only include the cookie if the cookie's partition-key
| is same-site with the retrieval's cookie-partition-key.
3. Security Considerations
3.1. Partitioned requires Secure
This proposal takes the opportunity of defining the semantics of a
new cookie attribute in order to require the Secure attribute,
restricting this feature to secure protocols.
3.2. Partitioned cookies and XSS attacks
Sites are more susceptible to XSS attacks as embedded frames since
these contexts rely on cross-site cookies for a notion of user
session/state. Partitioning cross-site cookies makes them less
vulnerable to being leaked via XSS, since an attacker would need to
navigate the user's browser to the top-level site the cookie was
created on in order for the browser to send the cookie at all.
3.3. Partitioned cookies and CSRF attacks
Cross-site cookies with the Partitioned attribute are less
susceptible to CSRF attacks than unpartitioned, third-party cookies.
This is because a partitioned cookie is only sent in requests when
the browser is visiting the top-level site the cookie was created in,
so a malicious top-level site will not be able to forge a request
with an existing partitioned cookie unless they have compromised the
top-level site that the cookie was sent from.
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3.4. State proliferation for denial of service
Partitioning cross-site cookies inevitably will lead to more state
proliferation on user's machines, so there is a possible DoS risk
from partitioning cross-site cookies where a malicious embedded site
could set many cookies across different partitions to take up memory
on clients' machines. To help mitigate this, we suggest limiting the
number of cookies a domain can set on a particular top-level site in
the section below.
3.5. Partitioned cookies improve user privacy
The proposal suggests an alternate design for cross-site cookies
which does not introduce a vector for cross-site tracking. This is a
step towards making a larger privacy improvement for the web:
removing third-party cookies.
3.6. Avoiding cross-partition leaks
One important privacy consideration is that partitioned cookies must
not be subject to the 180 global per-domain cookie limit, otherwise
they risk introducing a side channel for cross-site tracking.
Instead, partitioned cookie limits should be counted separately
across different top-level sites to not leak any information about a
user's activity on each respective site.
Another privacy consideration is that when a site sends the Clear-
Site-Data header that contains "cookies", the user agent should only
clear partitioned cookies whose partition key is same-site with the
current top-level site. This will prevent abuse of partitioned
cookies and the Clear-Site-Data header to establish identifiers that
persist across different top-level sites.
Another privacy consideration is that the privacy guarantees of
partitioned cookies can be circumvented by browser extensions with
host permissions. Extensions' background contexts can query and
store cookies across partitions, meaning they could store a cross-
site identifier across partitions. Unfortunately, this type of
attack is unavoidable due to the nature of extensions. Even if we
block partitioned cookies (or even all cookies) from extensions'
background contexts, an extension could still use content scripts to
write cross-site identifiers to the DOM which the site's own script
could copy to the site's partitioned cookie jar.
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Finally, sites should be able to set partitioned cookies with the
same name, domain, and path in different partitions. Otherwise, the
presence or absence of a cookie with a particular name/domain/path
would allow sites to learn about that user's activity on different
top-level sites that make subresource requests to the cookie's
domain.
4. Implementation Considerations
4.1. Applying Limits to Partitioned Cookie Jars
The following could be added as a new subsection of section 6.1
(Limits):
| User agents SHOULD enforce a separate per-domain limit for
| partitioned cookies for a particular cookie-partition-key. This
| limit SHOULD be lower than the per-domain limit for cookies
| without the Partitioned attribute to prevent cookies set on
| different top-level sites from reaching implementation memory
| limits. Since memory is the main concern, in addition to limiting
| the number of cookies a domain may use per partition, a user agent
| MAY limit how many bytes a domain's cookies occupy on the user
| agent's device to only 10 kilobytes per top-level partition. The
| user agent SHOULD consider memory occupied by each cookie to be
| the sum of the number of octets in the cookie-name and cookie-
| value.
4.2. Third-Party Cookie Controls
We may also want to add a paragraph about partitioned cookies to
section 7.1 (Third-Party Cookies):
| Cross-site cookies which are set with the Partitioned attribute
| are only available on the top-level site in which they were
| created and therefore do not have the same privacy issues as other
| cross-site cookies. Due to this difference, user agents MAY
| exclude cross-site partitioned cookies from third-party cookie
| blocking controls.
4.3. Partitioned Cookies and Clear-Site-Data
We also can propose changes to the Clear-Site-Data header
specification to prevent abuse of that header and partitioned cookies
for cross-site tracking. The following could be added after step 2
in section 4.2.1 of [Clear-Site-Data]:
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| 1. For each cookie in cookie-list, do the following:
|
| a. If the cookie's cookie-partition-key attribute is null,
| skip this step.
|
| b. Otherwise, if the top-document is not same-site with the
| cookie's partition-key then remove the cookie from cookie-
| list.
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[Clear-Site-Data]
"Clear Site Data",
<https://www.w3.org/TR/clear-site-data/>.
[HTML] WHATWG, "HTML", <https://html.spec.whatwg.org/>.
[RFC6265bis]
Bingler, S., West, M., and J. Wilander, "Cookies: HTTP
State Management Mechanism", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-11, 7 November 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-
rfc6265bis-11>.
6.2. Informative References
[CHIPS-Explainer]
"Cookies Having Independent Partitioned State (CHIPS)
explainer", <https://github.com/privacycg/CHIPS>.
Acknowledgments
The editors would also like to thank the following individuals for
feedback, insight, and implementation of this draft and its
predecessors (in alphabetical order): Kaustubha Govind, Johann
Hofmann, Jeffrey Yasskin,
Author's Address
Dylan Cutler
Google LLC
Email: dylancutler@google.com
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