Internet DRAFT - draft-demarco-oauth-status-attestations
draft-demarco-oauth-status-attestations
Network Working Group G. D. Marco
Internet-Draft Dipartimento per la trasformazione digitale
Intended status: Informational O. Steele
Expires: 9 August 2024 Transmute
F. Marino
Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato
6 February 2024
OAuth Status Attestations
draft-demarco-oauth-status-attestations-00
Abstract
Status Attestation is a signed object that demonstrates the validity
status of a digital credential. These attestations are ephemeral and
periodically provided to holders, who can present these to Verifiers
along with the corresponding digital credentials. The approach
outlined in this document makes the verifiers able to check the non-
revocation of a digital credential without requiring to query any
third-party entities.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://peppelinux.github.io/draft-demarco-oauth-status-attestations/
draft-demarco-oauth-status-attestations.html. Status information for
this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-
demarco-oauth-status-attestations/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/peppelinux/draft-demarco-oauth-status-
attestations.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Status Attestation Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Digital Credential Proof of Possession . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Status Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Status Attestation Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Credential Issuers Supporting Status Attestations . . . . . . 13
9.1. Credential Issuer Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.2. Issued Digital Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. Presenting Status Attestations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
12.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 15
12.2. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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1. Introduction
Status Attestation plays a crucial role in maintaining the integrity
and trustworthiness of digital credentials, since these serve as
proof that a particular digital credential, whether in JSON Web
Tokens (JWT) or CBOR Web Tokens (CWT) format, has not been revoked
and is still valid.
A digital credential may be presented to a verifier long after it has
been issued. During this interval, the digital credential could
potentially be invalidated for various reasons (e.g., due to the
device lost or holder fraud). To ensure the digital credential's
validity, the issuer provides a short-lived Status Attestation to the
holder. This attestation is bound to the digital credential and can
be provided to a verifier, together with the digital credential, as
evidence of the digital credential's non-revocation status.
Status Attestation safeguards privacy and is essential in
facilitating offline scenarios. In these circumstances, both the
wallet and the verifier work without internet connectivity during the
presentation phase; nonetheless, Status Attestation provides a method
to statically validate the validity of the digital credentials, thus
increasing the security of the digital credential system. By
limiting the disclosure of status information, Status Attestation
strikes a balance between scalability, security, and privacy.
+-----------------+ +-------------------+
| | Requests Status Attestation | |
| |---------------------------->| |
| Wallet Instance | | Credential Issuer |
| | Status Attestation | |
| |<----------------------------| |
+-----------------+ +-------------------+
+-- ----------------+ +----------+
| | Presents Digital Credential | |
| Wallet Instance | and Status Attestation | Verifier |
| |---------------------------->| |
+-------------------+ +----------+
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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3. Terminology
This specification uses the terms "End-User", "Entity" as defined by
OpenID Connect Core [@OpenID.Core], the term "JSON Web Token (JWT)"
defined by JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519].
Digital Credential: A set of one or more claims about a subject made
by a Credential Issuer.
Credential Issuer: Entity that is responsible for the issuance of
the Digital Credentials. The Issuer is responsible for the
lifecycle of their issued Digital Credentials and their validity
status.
Verifier: Entity that relies on the validity of the Digital
Credentials presented to it. This Entity, also known as a Relying
Party, needs to verify the authenticity and validity of the
Digital Credentials, including their revocation status, before
accepting them.
Wallet Instance: The digital Wallet in control of a User, also known
as Wallet or Holder. It securely stores the User's Digital
Credentials. It can present Digital Credentials to Verifiers and
request Status Attestations from Issuers under the control of the
User.
4. Rationale
OAuth Status Lists [@!I-D.looker-oauth-jwt-cwt-status-list] are
suitable for specific scenarios, especially when the Verifier needs
to verify the status of a Digital Credential at a later time after
the User has presented the Digital Credential.
However, there are cases where the Verifier only needs to check the
revocation status of a Digital Credential at the time of
presentation, or situations where the Verifier should not be allowed
to check the status of a Digital Credential over time due to some
privacy constraints, in compliance with national privacy regulations.
TODO: Add an example of national privacy constraints to give the
reader some intuition.
In scenarios where the Verifier, Credential Issuer, and OAuth Status
List Provider are all part of the same domain or operate within a
context where a high level of trust exists between them and the End-
User, the OAuth Status List is the optimal solution; while there
might be other cases where the OAuth Status List facilitates the
exposure to the following privacy risks:
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* An OAuth Status List Provider might know the association between a
specific list and a Credential Issuer, especially if the latter
issues a single type of Digital Credential. This could
inadvertently reveal the Status List Provider which list
corresponds to which Digital Credential.
* A Verifier retrieves an OAuth Status List by establishing a TCP/IP
connection with an OAuth Status List Provider. This allows the
OAuth Status List Provider to obtain the IP address of the
Verifier and potentially link it to a specific Digital Credential
type and Credential Issuer associated with that OAuth Status List.
A malicious OAuth Status List Provider could use internet
diagnostic tools, such as Whois or GeoIP lookup, to gather
additional information about the Verifier. This could
inadvertently disclose to the OAuth Status List Provider which
Digital Credential the requester is using and from which
Credential Issuer, information that should remain confidential.
Status Attestations differ significantly from OAuth Status Lists in
several ways:
1. *Privacy*: Status Attestations are designed to be privacy-
preserving. They do not require the Verifier to gather any
additional information from third-party entities, thus preventing
potential privacy leaks.
2. *Static Verification*: Status Attestations are designed to be
statically provided to Verifiers by Wallet Instance. Once a
Status Attestation is issued, it can be verified without any
further communication with the Credential Issuer or any other
party.
3. *Digital Credentials Formats*: Status Attestations are agnostic
from the Digital Credential format to which they are bound.
4. *Trust Model*: Status Attestations operate under a model where
the Verifier trusts the Credential Issuer to provide accurate
status information, while the OAuth Status Lists operate under a
model where the Verifier trusts the Status List Provider to
maintain an accurate and up-to-date list of statuses.
5. *Offline flow*: OAuth Status List can be accessed by a Verifier
when an internet connection is present. At the same time, OAuth
Status List defines how to provide a static Status List Token, to
be included within a Digital Credential. This requires the
Wallet Instance to acquire a new Digital Credential for a
specific presentation. Even if similar to the OAuth Status List
Token, the Status Attestations enable the User to persistently
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use their preexistent Digital Credentials, as long as the linked
Status Attestation is available and presented to the Verifier,
and not expired.
5. Requirements
The general requirements for the implementation of Status Attestation
are listed in this section. The Status Attestation:
* MUST be presented in conjunction with the Digital Credential. The
Status Attestation MUST be timestamped with its issuance datetime,
always referring to a previous period to the presentation time.
* MUST contain the expiration datetime after which the Digital
Credential MUST NOT be considered valid anymore. The expiration
datetime MUST be superior to the issuance datetime.
* enables offline use cases as it MUST be validated using a
cryptographic signature and the cryptographic public key of the
Credential Issuer.
Please note: in this specification the examples and the normative
properties of Attestations are reported in accordance with the JWT
standard, while for the purposes of this specification any Digital
Credential or Attestation format may be used, as long as all
attributes and requirements defined in this specification are
satisfied, even using equivalent names or values.
6. Status Attestation Request
The Credential Issuer provides the Wallet Instance with a Status
Attestation, which is bound to a Digital Credential. This allows the
Wallet Instance to present it, along with the Digital Credential
itself, to a Verifier as proof of the Digital Credential's non-
revocation status.
The following diagram shows the Wallet Instance requesting a Status
Attestation to a Credential Issuer, related to a specific Credential
issued by the same Credential Issuer.
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+-------------------+ +--------------------+
| | | |
| Wallet Instance | | Credential Issuer |
| | | |
+--------+----------+ +----------+---------+
| |
| HTTP POST /status |
| credential_pop = $CredentialPoPJWT |
+----------------------------------------------->
| |
| Response with Status Attestation JWT |
<-----------------------------------------------+
| |
+--------+----------+ +----------+---------+
| | | |
| Wallet Instance | | Credential Issuer |
| | | |
+-------------------+ +--------------------+
The Wallet Instance sends the Status Attestation request to the
Credential Issuer. The request MUST contain the Digital Credential,
for which the Status Attestation is requested, and enveloped in a
signed object as proof of possession. The proof of possession MUST
be signed with the private key corresponding to the public key
attested by the Credential Issuer and contained within the Digital
Credential.
POST /status HTTP/1.1
Host: issuer.example.org
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
credential_pop=$CredentialPoPJWT
To validate that the Wallet Instance is entitled to request its
Status Attestation, the following requirements MUST be satisfied:
* The Credential Issuer MUST verify the signature of the
credential_pop object using the public key contained in the
Digital Credential;
* the Credential Issuer MUST verify that it is the legitimate
Issuer.
The technical and details about the credential_pop object are defined
in the next section.
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6.1. Digital Credential Proof of Possession
The Wallet Instance that holds a Digital Credential, when requests a
Status Attestation, MUST demonstrate the proof of possession of the
Digital Credential to the Credential Issuer.
The proof of possession is made by enclosing the Digital Credential
in an object (JWT) signed with the private key that its related
public key is referenced in the Digital Credential.
Below is a non-normative example of a Credential proof of possession
with the JWT headers and payload are represented without applying
signature and encoding, for better readability:
{
"alg": "ES256",
"typ": "status-attestation-request+jwt",
"kid": $WIA-CNF-JWKID
}
.
{
"iss": "0b434530-e151-4c40-98b7-74c75a5ef760",
"aud": "https://issuer.example.org/status-attestation-endpoint",
"iat": 1698744039,
"exp": 1698834139,
"jti": "6f204f7e-e453-4dfd-814e-9d155319408c",
"credential_format": "vc+sd-jwt",
"credential": $Issuer-Signed-JWT
}
When the JWT format is used, the JWT MUST contain the parameters
defined in the following table.
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+========+==========================================+===========+
| JOSE | Description | Reference |
| Header | | |
+========+==========================================+===========+
| *typ* | It MUST be set to status-attestation- | [RFC7516] |
| | request+jwt | Section |
| | | 4.1.1 |
+--------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| *alg* | A digital signature algorithm identifier | [RFC7516] |
| | such as per IANA "JSON Web Signature and | Section |
| | Encryption Algorithms" registry. It | 4.1.1 |
| | MUST NOT be set to none or any symmetric | |
| | algorithm (MAC) identifier. | |
+--------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| *kid* | Unique identifier of the JWK used for | [RFC7515] |
| | the signature of the Status Attestation | |
| | Request, it MUST match the one contained | |
| | in the Credential cnf.jwk. | |
+--------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
Table 1
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+=====================+==========================+===============+
| JOSE Payload | Description | Reference |
+=====================+==========================+===============+
| *iss* | Wallet identifier. | [RFC9126], |
| | | [RFC7519] |
+---------------------+--------------------------+---------------+
| *aud* | It MUST be set to the | [RFC9126], |
| | identifier of the | [RFC7519] |
| | Credential Issuer. | |
+---------------------+--------------------------+---------------+
| *exp* | UNIX Timestamp with the | [RFC9126], |
| | expiration time of the | [RFC7519] |
| | JWT. | |
+---------------------+--------------------------+---------------+
| *iat* | UNIX Timestamp with the | [RFC9126], |
| | time of JWT issuance. | [RFC7519] |
+---------------------+--------------------------+---------------+
| *jti* | Unique identifier for | [RFC7519] |
| | the JWT. | Section 4.1.7 |
+---------------------+--------------------------+---------------+
| *credential_format* | The data format of the | this |
| | Credential. Eg: vc+sd- | specification |
| | jwt for SD-JWT, vc+mdoc | |
| | for ISO/IEC 18013-5 MDOC | |
| | CBOR [@ISO.18013-5] | |
+---------------------+--------------------------+---------------+
| *credential* | It MUST contain the | this |
| | Credential according to | specification |
| | the data format given in | |
| | the format claim. | |
+---------------------+--------------------------+---------------+
Table 2
7. Status Attestation
When a Status Attestation is requested to a Credential Issuer, the
Issuer checks the status of the Digital Credential and creates a
Status Attestation bound to it.
If the Digital Credential is valid, the Credential Issuer creates a
new Status Attestation, which a non-normative example is given below.
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{
"alg": "ES256",
"typ": "status-attestation+jwt",
"kid": $ISSUER-JWKID
}
.
{
"iss": "https://issuer.example.org",
"iat": 1504699136,
"exp": 1504700136,
"credential_hash": $CREDENTIAL-HASH,
"credential_hash_alg": "sha-256",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {...}
}
}
The Status Attestation MUST contain the following claims when the JWT
format is used.
+========+==========================================+===============+
| JOSE | Description | Reference |
| Header | | |
+========+==========================================+===============+
| *alg* | A digital signature algorithm | [RFC7515], |
| | identifier such as per IANA "JSON | [RFC7517] |
| | Web Signature and Encryption | |
| | Algorithms" registry. It MUST NOT | |
| | be set to none or to a symmetric | |
| | algorithm (MAC) identifier. | |
+--------+------------------------------------------+---------------+
| *typ* | It MUST be set to status- | [RFC7515], |
| | attestation+jwt. | [RFC7517] and |
| | | this |
| | | specification |
+--------+------------------------------------------+---------------+
| *kid* | Unique identifier of the Issuer | [RFC7515] |
| | JWK. | |
+--------+------------------------------------------+---------------+
Table 3
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+=======================+========================+===============+
| JOSE Payload | Description | Reference |
+=======================+========================+===============+
| *iss* | It MUST be set to the | [RFC9126], |
| | identifier of the | [RFC7519] |
| | Issuer. | |
+-----------------------+------------------------+---------------+
| *iat* | UNIX Timestamp with | [RFC9126], |
| | the time of the Status | [RFC7519] |
| | Attestation issuance. | |
+-----------------------+------------------------+---------------+
| *exp* | UNIX Timestamp with | [RFC9126], |
| | the expiry time of the | [RFC7519] |
| | Status Attestation. | |
+-----------------------+------------------------+---------------+
| *credential_hash* | Hash value of the | this |
| | Digital Credential the | specification |
| | Status Attestation is | |
| | bound to. | |
+-----------------------+------------------------+---------------+
| *credential_hash_alg* | The Algorithm used of | this |
| | hashing the Digital | specification |
| | Credential to which | |
| | the Status Attestation | |
| | is bound. The value | |
| | SHOULD be set to S256. | |
+-----------------------+------------------------+---------------+
| *cnf* | JSON object containing | [RFC7800] |
| | the cryptographic key | Section 3.1 |
| | binding. The cnf.jwk | |
| | value MUST match with | |
| | the one provided | |
| | within the related | |
| | Digital Credential. | |
+-----------------------+------------------------+---------------+
Table 4
8. Status Attestation Response
If the Status Attestation is requested for a non-existent, expired,
revoked or invalid Digital Credential, the Credential Issuer MUST
respond with an HTTP Response with the status code set to 404.
If the Digital Credential is valid, the Credential Issuer then
returns the Status Attestation to the Wallet Instance, as in the
following non-normative example.
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HTTP/1.1 201 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{
"status_attestation": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1Ni ...",
}
9. Credential Issuers Supporting Status Attestations
9.1. Credential Issuer Metadata
The Credential Issuers that uses the Status Attestations MUST include
in their OpenID4VCI [@!OpenID.VCI] metadata the claim
status_attestation_endpoint, which its value MUST be an HTTPs URL
indicating the endpoint where the Wallet Instances can request Status
Attestations.
9.2. Issued Digital Credentials
The Credential Issuers that uses the Status Attestations SHOULD
include in the issued Digital Credentials the object status with the
JSON member status_attestation set to a JSON Object containing the
following member:
* credential_hash_alg. REQUIRED. The Algorithm used of hashing the
Digital Credential to which the Status Attestation is bound. The
value SHOULD be set to S256.
The non-normative example of an unsecured payload of an SD-JWT VC is
shown below.
TODO: alignments with the OAuth2 Status List schema and IANA
registration.
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{
"vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
"given_name": "John",
"family_name": "Doe",
"email": "johndoe@example.com",
"phone_number": "+1-202-555-0101",
"address": {
"street_address": "123 Main St",
"locality": "Anytown",
"region": "Anystate",
"country": "US"
},
"birthdate": "1940-01-01",
"is_over_18": true,
"is_over_21": true,
"is_over_65": true,
"status": {
"status_attestation": {
"credential_hash_alg": "S256",
}
}
}
10. Presenting Status Attestations
The Wallet Instance that provides the Status Attestations SHOULD be
included in the vp_token JSON array, as defined in [@OpenID4VP], the
Status Attestation along with the related Digital Credential.
The Verifier that receives a Digital Credential supporting the Status
Attestation, SHOULD:
* Decode and validate the Digital Credential;
* check the presence of status.status_attestation in the Digital
Credential. If true, the Verifier SHOULD:
- produce the hash of the Digital Credential using the hashing
algorithm defined in status.status_attestation;
- decode all the Status Attestations provided in the
presentation, by matching the JWS Header parameter typ set to
status-attestation+jwt and looking for the credential_hash
value that matches with the hash produced at the previous
point;
- evaluate the validity of the Status Attestation.
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Please note: The importance of checking the revocation status of
Digital Credentials as a 'SHOULD' rather than a 'MUST' for a Verifier
who gets Status Attestation for the Digital Credential stems from the
fact that the decision of a Verifier to check the revocation status
of Digital Credentials is not absolute and can be influenced by
numerous variables. Consider as an example the case of age-over x;
even if it has expired, it may still perform its intended purpose.
As a result, the expiration status alone does not render it invalid.
The adaptability recognizes that the need to verify revocation status
may not always coincide with the actual usability of a Digital
Credential, allowing Verifiers to examine and make educated
conclusions based on a variety of scenarios.
11. Security Considerations
TODO Security
12. IANA Considerations
12.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
This specification requests registration of the following Claims in
the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [@IANA.JWT] established by
[RFC7519].
* Claim Name: credential_format
* Claim Description: The Digital Credential format the Status
Attestation is bound to.
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): [[ (#digital-credential-proof-of-
possession) of this specification ]]
* Claim Name: credential
* Claim Description: The Digital Credential the Status Attestation
is bound to.
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): [[ (#digital-credential-proof-of-
possession) of this specification ]]
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* Claim Name: credential_hash
* Claim Description: Hash value of the Digital Credential the Status
Attestation is bound to.
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): [[ (#status-attestation) of this
specification ]]
* Claim Name: credential_hash_alg
* Claim Description: The Algorithm used of hashing the Digital
Credential to which the Status Attestation is bound.
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): [[ (#status-attestation) of this
specification ]]
12.2. Media Type Registration
This section requests registration of the following media types
[@RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [@IANA.MediaTypes] in the
manner described in [@RFC6838].
To indicate that the content is an JWT-based Status List:
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: status-attestation-request+jwt
* Required parameters: n/a
* Optional parameters: n/a
* Encoding considerations: binary; A JWT-based Status Attestation
Request object is a JWT; JWT values are encoded as a series of
base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string)
separated by period ('.') characters.
* Security considerations: See (#Security) of [[ this specification
]]
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
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* Published specification: [[ this specification ]]
* Applications that use this media type: Applications using [[ this
specification ]] for updated status information of tokens
* Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
* Additional information:
- File extension(s): n/a
- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
* Person & email address to contact for further information:
Giuseppe De Marco, gi.demarco@innovazione.gov.it
* Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: none
* Author: Giuseppe De Marco, gi.demarco@innovazione.gov.it
* Change controller: IETF
* Provisional registration? No
To indicate that the content is an CWT-based Status List:
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: status-attestation+jwt
* Required parameters: n/a
* Optional parameters: n/a
* Encoding considerations: binary
* Security considerations: See (#Security) of [[ this specification
]]
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
* Published specification: [[ this specification ]]
* Applications that use this media type: Applications using [[ this
specification ]] for status attestation of tokens and Digital
Credentials
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* Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
* Additional information:
- File extension(s): n/a
- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
* Person & email address to contact for further information:
Giuseppe De Marco, gi.demarco@innovazione.gov.it
* Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: none
* Author: Giuseppe De Marco, gi.demarco@innovazione.gov.it
* Change controller: IETF
* Provisional registration? No
13. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7516>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7800>.
Marco, et al. Expires 9 August 2024 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft OAuth Status Attestations February 2024
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9126] Lodderstedt, T., Campbell, B., Sakimura, N., Tonge, D.,
and F. Skokan, "OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests",
RFC 9126, DOI 10.17487/RFC9126, September 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9126>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank:
* Paul Bastien
* Riccardo Iaconelli
* Victor Näslund
* Giada Sciarretta
* Amir Sharif
Appendix B. Document History
TODO changelog.
Authors' Addresses
Giuseppe De Marco
Dipartimento per la trasformazione digitale
Email: gi.demarco@innovazione.gov.it
Orie Steele
Transmute
Email: orie@transmute.industries
Francesco Marino
Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato
Email: fa.marino@ipzs.it
Marco, et al. Expires 9 August 2024 [Page 19]
