Internet DRAFT - draft-eastlake-dnsop-rfc2930bis-tkey
draft-eastlake-dnsop-rfc2930bis-tkey
INTERNET-DRAFT D. Eastlake
Obsoletes: 2930 Futurewei Technologies
Intended Status: Proposed Standard
Expires: April 23, 2023 October 24, 2022
Secret Key Agreement for DNS (TKEY Resource Record)
<draft-eastlake-dnsop-rfc2930bis-tkey-00.txt>
Abstract
RFC 8945 provides a means of efficiently authenticating Domain Name
System (DNS) protocol messages using shared secret keys via the TSIG
resource record (RR). However, it provides no mechanism for setting
up such keys other than manual configuration. This document describes
a TKEY RR that can be used in a number of different modes to
establish shared secret keys between a DNS resolver and server. This
document obsoletes RFC 2930.
Status of This Document
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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in the Revised BSD License.
Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent
to the author.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction............................................3
1.1 Terminology............................................3
1.2 Overview of Contents...................................3
2. The TKEY Resource Record................................5
2.1 The Name Field.........................................5
2.2 The TTL Field..........................................6
2.3 The Algorithm Field....................................7
2.4 The Inception and Expiration Fields....................7
2.5 The Mode Field.........................................7
2.6 The Error Field........................................7
2.7 The Key Size and Data Fields...........................8
2.8 The Other Size and Data Fields.........................8
3. General TKEY Considerations.............................9
4. Resolver Query TKEY Modes..............................11
4.1 Query for Server Assigned Keying......................11
4.2 Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying (Deprecated)..........12
4.3 Query for GSS-API Establishment.......................12
4.4 Query for Resolver Assigned Keying....................13
4.5 Query for TKEY Deletion...............................13
4.6 Query for ECDH Exchanged Keying.......................14
4.7 Example Mode..........................................15
4.8 TKEY Ping.............................................15
5. Spontaneous Server Inclusion...........................16
5.1 Spontaneous Server Key Deletion.......................16
6. Methods of Encryption..................................17
7. IANA Considerations....................................18
8. Security Considerations................................20
Appendix A: Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying...............21
Normative References......................................23
Informative References....................................24
Acknowledgments...........................................26
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1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical, distributed, highly
available database used for bi-directional mapping between domain
names and addresses, for email routing, and for other information
[RFC1034] [RFC1035]. It has been extended to provide for public key
security and dynamic update [RFC4034] [RFC4035] [RFC3007].
Familiarity with these RFCs is assumed.
[RFC8945] provides a means of efficiently authenticating DNS messages
using shared secret keys via the TSIG resource record (RR) but
provides no mechanism for setting up such keys other than manual
configuration. This document specifies a TKEY RR that can be used in
a number of different modes to establish and delete such shared
secret keys between a DNS resolver and server.
Note that TKEY established keying material and TSIGs that use it are
associated with DNS servers or resolvers. They are not associated
with zones. They may be used to authenticate queries and responses
but they do not provide zone based DNS data origin or denial
authentication [RFC4034] [RFC4035].
1.1 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
In all cases herein, the term "resolver" includes that part of a
server which may make full and incremental [RFC1995] zone transfer
queries, forwards recursive queries, and the like.
1.2 Overview of Contents
Section 2 below specifies the TKEY RR and provides a description of
and considerations for its constituent fields.
Section 3 describes general principles of operations with TKEY.
Section 4 discusses key agreement and deletion via DNS requests with
the Query opcode for RR type TKEY. This method is applicable to all
currently defined TKEY modes, although in some cases it is not what
would intuitively be called a "query".
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Section 5 discusses spontaneous inclusion of TKEY RRs in responses by
servers. This is currently used only for key deletion.
Section 6 describes encryption methods for transmitting secret key
information. In this document these are used only for the server
assigned mode and the resolver assigned mode.
Section 7 covers IANA Considerations in assignment of TKEY modes.
Finally, Section 8 provides a Security Considerations section.
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2. The TKEY Resource Record
The TKEY resource record (RR) has the structure given below. Its RR
type code is 249.
Field Type Comment
----- ---- -------
NAME domain see description below
TTYPE u_int16_t TKEY = 249
CLASS u_int16_t ignored, SHOULD be 255 (ANY)
TTL u_int32_t ignored, SHOULD be zero
RDLEN u_int16_t size of RDATA
RDATA:
Algorithm: domain name
Inception: u_int32_t
Expiration: u_int32_t
Mode: u_int16_t
Error: u_int16_t
Key Size: u_int16_t
Key Data: octet-stream
Other Size: u_int16_t
Other Data: octet-stream
2.1 The Name Field
The Name field is a DNS domain name in wire encoding format. It
relates to naming keys. Its meaning differs somewhat with mode and
context as explained in subsequent sections. Although the DNS
protocol in binary clean so that any octet value should be usable in
a label that is part of a domain name, to avoid possible
implementation bugs and ease user interface and debugging issues, it
is RECOMMENDED that Name be composed of labels consisting of letters,
digits, underscore, and hyphen. To indicate that no Name is present,
the Name field is set to the wire encoding of the domain name of the
root node, that is, the byte string consisting of a single zero value
byte.
At any DNS server or resolver only one octet string of keying
material may be in place for any particular key name. An attempt to
establish another set of keying material for an existing name returns
a BADNAME error.
For a TKEY RR appearing in a query with a non-root Name, the TKEY
Name field SHOULD be a domain name locally unique at the resolver,
less than 128 octets long in wire encoding, and meaningful to the
resolver to assist in distinguishing keys and/or key agreement
sessions. This length limit is suggested so that, when a resolver
provided name is concatenated with a server provided name portion,
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the result will fit within the DNS protocol wire encoding name length
limit of 255 octets. For TKEY RR(s) appearing in a response to a
query, the TKEY RR Name field SHOULD be a globally unique server
assigned name.
A reasonable server key naming strategy is as follows:
If the key is generated by a server as the result of a query with
root as its owner name, then the server SHOULD create a globally
unique domain name, to be the key name, by prefixing a domain name
of the server with a pseudo-random [RFC4086] label having at least
128 bits of entropy using the "file name safe" Base 64 encoding
(Section 5 of [RFC4648]). For example,
a8s9ZW_n3mDgokX072pp3_.server1.example.com. If generation of a
new pseudo-random name in each case is an excessive computation
load or entropy drain, a serial number prefix can be added to a
fixed pseudo-random name generated at DNS server start time, such
as 2001.a8s9ZW_n3mDgokX072pp3_.server1.example.com, with a new
pseudo-random portion being generated periodically and on reboot.
If the key is generated as the result of a query with a non-root
name, say 789.resolver.example.net, then use the concatenation of
that name, after deletion of its terminal root label, with a name
of the server. For example,
789.resolver.example.net.server1.example.com.
If the unique TKEY NAME produced by whatever strategy is in use
exceeds the wire encoding size limit of 255 octets, it may be
shortened to fit within that limit with only an insignificant
probability of losing uniqueness by replacing an initial portion
of the excessively long name with the shorter encoding of a strong
hash of that initial portion. For example, cut the excessively
long name between labels so that the right part is no longer than
206 octets in wire encoding. Then take the prefix label or labels
on the left, apply SHA-256 [RFC6234] to them treated as a name in
wire encoding, truncate the resulting hash to 30 octets, base32
[RFC4648] encode the result of that truncation yielding 48 octets,
and add the output of the base32 encoding as a new single prefix
label.
2.2 The TTL Field
The TTL field is meaningless in TKEY RRs. It SHOULD always be zero to
minimize the chance that a DNS implementation not recognizing the
TKEY RR would cache such an RR.
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2.3 The Algorithm Field
The algorithm name is in the form of a domain name with the same
meaning as in [RFC8945]. The algorithm determines how the secret
keying material agreed to by using the TKEY RR is actually used to
derive the algorithm specific key or keys. For example, it might need
to be truncated or extended or split into multiple keys.
2.4 The Inception and Expiration Fields
The inception and expiration times are in number of seconds since the
beginning of 1 January 1970 GMT ignoring leap seconds treated as
modulo 2**32 using ring arithmetic [RFC1982]. In messages between a
DNS resolver and a DNS server where these fields are meaningful, they
are either the requested validity interval for the keying material
asked for or specify the validity interval of keying material
provided.
To avoid different interpretations of the inception and expiration
times in TKEY RRs, resolvers and servers exchanging them MUST have
the same idea of what time it is. One way of doing this is with the
NTP protocol [RFC5905] but that or any other time synchronization
used for this purpose MUST be done securely.
2.5 The Mode Field
The mode field specifies the general scheme for key agreement or the
purpose of the TKEY DNS message. Servers and resolvers supporting
this specification MUST implement the ECDH key agreement mode (#6),
key deletion mode (#5), and TKEY ping (#8). All other modes are
OPTIONAL. A server supporting TKEY that receives a TKEY request with
a mode it does not support returns the BADMODE error. See Section 7
for initial mode field value assignments.
2.6 The Error Field
The error code field is an extended RCODE. The following values are
defined:
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Value Description
----- -----------
0 - no error
1-15 a non-extended RCODE
16 BADSIG (tsig)
17 BADKEY (tsig)
18 BADTIME (tsig)
19 BADMODE
20 BADNAME
21 BADALG
When the TKEY Error Field is non-zero in a response to a TKEY query,
the DNS header RCODE field indicates no error. However, it is
possible if a TKEY is spontaneously included in a response the TKEY
RR and DNS header error field could have unrelated non-zero error
codes.
2.7 The Key Size and Data Fields
The key data size field is an unsigned 16-bit integer in network
order which specifies the size of the key exchange data field in
octets. The meaning of this data depends on the mode.
2.8 The Other Size and Data Fields
The Other Size and Other Data fields are not used in this
specification but may be used in future extensions. The RDLEN field
MUST equal the length of the RDATA section through the end of Other
Data or the RR is to be considered malformed and rejected.
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3. General TKEY Considerations
TKEY is a meta-RR that is not stored or cached in the DNS and does
not appear in zone files. It supports a variety of modes for the
establishment and deletion of shared secret keys information between
DNS resolvers and servers. The establishment of such a shared key
requires that state be maintained at both ends and the allocation of
the resources to maintain such state may require mutual agreement. In
the absence of willingness to provide such state, servers MUST return
errors such as NOTIMP or REFUSED for an attempt to use TKEY and
resolvers are free to ignore any TKEY RRs they receive.
The shared secret keying material developed by using TKEY is an
opaque octet sequence. The means by which this shared secret keying
material, exchanged via TKEY, is actually used in any particular TSIG
algorithm is algorithm dependent and is defined in connection with
that algorithm. For example, see [RFC2104] for how TKEY agreed
shared secret keying material can be used with HMAC and a strong
hash.
There MUST NOT be more than one TKEY RR in a DNS query or response.
If more than one appears in a query, NOTIMP or FORMERR is returned.
Except for GSS-API mode, TKEY responses MUST always have DNS
transaction authentication to protect the integrity of any keying
data, error codes, etc. This authentication MUST use a previously
established secret (TSIG) or public (SIG(0)) key and MUST NOT use any
key that the response to be verified is itself providing.
TKEY queries MUST be authenticated for all modes except GSS-API and,
under some circumstances, server assignment mode. If the query for a
server assigned key is for a key to assert some privilege, such as
update authority, then the query must be authenticated to avoid
spoofing. However, if the key is just to be used for transaction
security, then spoofing will lead at worst to denial of service.
Query authentication SHOULD use an established secret (TSIG) key
authenticator if available. Otherwise, it MUST use a public (SIG(0))
key signature. It MUST NOT use any key that the query is itself
providing.
In the absence of required TKEY authentication, a NOTAUTH error MUST
be returned.
To avoid replay attacks, it is necessary that a TKEY response or
query not be valid if replayed on the order of 2**32 second (about
136 years), or a multiple thereof, later. To accomplish this, the
keying material used in any TSIG or SIG(0) RR that authenticates a
TKEY message MUST NOT have a lifetime of more than 2**31 - 1 seconds
(about 68 years). Thus, on attempted replay, the authenticating TSIG
or SIG(0) RR will not be verifiable due to key expiration and the
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replay will fail.
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4. Resolver Query TKEY Modes
One method for a resolver and a server to agree about shared secret
keying material for use in TSIG is through DNS requests from the
resolver which are syntactically DNS queries for type TKEY. Such
queries MUST be accompanied by a TKEY RR in the additional
information section to indicate the mode in use and accompanied by
other information where required.
Type TKEY queries SHOULD NOT be flagged as recursive, and servers
MUST ignore the recursive header bit in TKEY queries they receive.
4.1 Query for Server Assigned Keying
Optionally, the server can assign keying to the resolver in response
to a Server Assignment Mode (#1) query. It is sent to the resolver
encrypted under a resolver public key. See section 6 for description
of encryption methods.
A resolver sends a query for type TKEY accompanied by a TKEY RR
specifying the "server assignment" mode and a resolver KEY RR to be
used in encrypting the response, both in the additional information
section. The TKEY algorithm field is ignored and SHOULD be set to
root to minimize message size. It is RECOMMENDED that any "key data"
provided in the query TKEY RR by the resolver be strongly mixed by
the server with server generated randomness [RFC4086] to derive the
keying material to be sent which should be at least 32 octets long.
The KEY RR that appears in the query need not be accompanied by a
SIG(KEY) RR. If the query is authenticated by the resolver with a
TSIG RR [RFC8945] or SIG(0) RR and that authentication is verified,
then any SIG(KEY) provided in the query SHOULD be ignored. The KEY
RR in such a query SHOULD have a name that corresponds to the
resolver but it is only essential that it be a public key for which
the resolver has the corresponding private key so it can decrypt the
response data.
The server response contains a TKEY RR in its answer section with the
Server Assignment Mode and echoes the KEY RR provided in the query in
its additional information section.
If the response TKEY error field is zero, the key data portion of the
response answer TKEY RR will be the server assigned keying data
encrypted under the public key in the resolver provided KEY RR. In
this case, the owner name of the response answer TKEY RR will be the
server assigned name of the key.
If the error field of the response TKEY is non-zero, the query failed
for the reason given. FORMERR is given if the query specified no
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encryption key.
The inception and expiry times in the query TKEY RR are those
requested for the keying material. The inception and expiry times in
the response TKEY are the period the server will consider the keying
material valid. Servers may pre-expire keys, so this is not a
guarantee.
The resolver KEY RR MUST be authenticated, through the authentication
of this query with a TSIG or SIG(0) or the signing of the resolver
KEY with a SIG(KEY). Otherwise, an attacker can forge a resolver KEY
for which they know the private key, and thereby the attacker could
obtain a valid shared secret key from the server.
4.2 Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying (Deprecated)
The use of this mode (#2) is NOT RECOMMENDED for the following two
reasons but the specification is still included in Appendix A in case
an implementation is needed for compatibility with old TKEY
implementations. See Section 4.6 on ECDH Exchanged Keying.
The mixing function used does not meet current cryptographic
standards because it uses MD5 [RFC6151].
RSA keys must be excessively long to achieve levels of security
required by current standards.
4.3 Query for GSS-API Establishment
This mode (#3) is described in [RFC3645] which should be consulted
for the full description. Basically, the resolver and server can
exchange queries and responses for type TKEY with a TKEY RR
specifying the GSS-API mode in the additional information section and
a GSS-API token in the key data portion of the TKEY RR.
Any issues of possible encryption of parts the GSS-API token data
being transmitted are handled by the GSS-API level. In addition, the
GSS-API level provides its own authentication so that this mode of
TKEY query and response MAY be, but do not need to be, authenticated
with TSIG RR or SIG(0) RR.
The inception and expiry times in a GSS-API mode TKEY RR are ignored.
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4.4 Query for Resolver Assigned Keying
Optionally, a server can accept a resolver assigned key. The keying
material MUST be encrypted under a server key for protection in
transmission as described in Section 6.
The resolver sends a TKEY query with a Resolver Assignment Mode (#4)
TKEY RR that specifies the encrypted keying material and a KEY RR
specifying the server public key used to encrypt the data, both in
the additional information section. The name of the key and the
keying data are completely controlled by the sending resolver so a
globally unique key name SHOULD be used. The KEY RR used MUST be one
for which the server has the corresponding private key, or it will
not be able to decrypt the keying material and will return a FORMERR.
It is also important that no untrusted party (preferably no other
party than the server) has the private key corresponding to the KEY
RR because, if they do, they can capture the messages to the server,
learn the shared secret, and spoof valid TSIGs.
The query TKEY RR inception and expiry give the time period the
querier intends to consider the keying material valid. The server
can return a lesser time interval to advise that it will not maintain
state for that long and can pre-expire keys in any case.
This type of query MUST be authenticated with a TSIG or SIG(0).
Otherwise, an attacker can forge a resolver assigned TKEY query, and
thereby the attacker could specify a shared secret key that would be
accepted, used, and honored by the server.
4.5 Query for TKEY Deletion
Keys established via TKEY can be treated as soft state. Since DNS
transactions are originated by the resolver, the resolver can simply
toss keys, although it may have to go through another key exchange if
it later needs one. Similarly, the server can discard keys although
that will result in an error on receiving a query with a TSIG using
the discarded key.
To avoid attempted reliance in requests on keys no longer in effect,
servers MUST implement key deletion node (#5) whereby the server
"discards" a key on receipt from a resolver of an authenticated
delete request for a TKEY RR with the key's name. If the server has
no record of a key with that name, it returns BADNAME.
Key deletion TKEY queries MUST be authenticated. This authentication
MAY be a TSIG RR using the key to be deleted.
For querier assigned keys and ECDH or Diffie-Hellman keys, the server
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SHOULD "discard" all active state associated with the key. For
server assigned keys, the server MAY simply mark the key as no longer
retained by the client and may re-send it in response to a future
query for server assigned keying material.
4.6 Query for ECDH Exchanged Keying
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange is a means whereby
two parties can derive shared secret information without requiring
any secrecy of the messages they exchange [Schneier]. [RFC8418]
[RFC6605]
A resolver sends a query for type TKEY accompanied by a TKEY RR in
the additional information section specifying the ECDH exchange mode
and accompanied by a KEY RR also in the additional information
section specifying a resolver elliptic curve key. The TKEY RR
algorithm field is set to the authentication algorithm the resolver
plans to use. The "key data" provided in the TKEY is used as a random
[RFC4086] nonce to avoid always deriving the same keying material for
the same pair of KEY RRs.
The server response contains a TKEY in its answer section with the
ECDH assignment mode. The "key data" provided in this TKEY is used as
an additional nonce to avoid always deriving the same keying material
for the same pair of KEY RRs. If the TKEY error field is non-zero,
the query failed for the reason given. FORMERR is given if the query
included no elliptic curve KEY and BADKEY is given if the query
included an incompatible elliptic curve KEY.
If the response TKEY error field is zero, the resolver supplied
elliptic curve KEY RR SHOULD be echoed in the additional information
section and a server elliptic KEY RR MUST be present in the answer
section of the response. Both parties can then calculate the same
shared secret quantity from the pair of elliptic curve KEY RRs used
[Schneier] (provided they are compatible and the data in the TKEY
RRs. The TKEY RR data is mixed with the DH result as follows:
keying material =
XOR ( ECDH value, SHA-256 ( query data | ECDH value ),
SHA-256 ( server data | ECDH value ) )
Where XOR is an exclusive-OR operation and "|" is byte-stream
concatenation. The shorter operands to XOR are byte-wise left
justified and padded with zero-valued bytes to match the length of
the other. "ECDH value" is the shared secret value derived from the
KEY RRs. Query data and server data are the values sent in the TKEY
RR data fields. These "query data" and "server data" nonces are
suffixed by the ECDH value, digested by SHA-256, and then XORed with
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the ECDH value.
The inception and expiry times in the query TKEY RR are those
requested for the keying material. The inception and expiry times in
the response TKEY RR are the maximum period the server will consider
the keying material valid. Servers may pre-expire keys, so this is
not a guarantee.
4.7 Example Mode
The value 7 is assigned as a TKEY Mode to use in examples or
documentation. A server responds with BADMODE as the TKEY error if
it receives a TKEY RR indicating this mode.
4.8 TKEY Ping
The TKEY Ping Mode (#8) is intended for use as a test of basic TKEY
plumbing. It also provides a means for a querier to determine if TKEY
is implemented at a server without changing the key storage state. A
server implementing TKEY MUST simply echo back a Ping Mode TKEY RR in
its respose.
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5. Spontaneous Server Inclusion
A DNS server may include a TKEY RR spontaneously as additional
information in responses. This SHOULD only be done if the server
knows the querier understands TKEY and has this option implemented.
This technique can be used to delete a key and may be specified for
other modes defined in the future. A disadvantage of this technique
is that there is no way for the server to get any error or success
indication back and, in the case of UDP, no way to even know if the
DNS response reached the resolver.
5.1 Spontaneous Server Key Deletion
A server can optionally tell a client that it has deleted a secret
key by spontaneously including a TKEY RR in the additional
information section of a response with the key's name and specifying
the key deletion mode (#5). Such a response SHOULD be authenticated.
If authenticated, it "deletes" the key with the given name. The
inception and expiry times of the delete TKEY RR are ignored. Failure
by a client to receive or properly process such additional
information in a response would mean that the client might use a key
that the server had discarded and would then get an error indication.
For server assigned and ECDH keys, the client MUST "discard" active
state associated with the key. For querier assigned keys, the
querier MAY simply mark the key as no longer retained by the server
and may re-send it in a future query specifying querier assigned
keying material.
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6. Methods of Encryption
For the server assigned and resolver assigned key agreement modes,
the keying material is sent within the key data field of a TKEY RR
encrypted using the public key in an accompanying KEY RR [RFC4034].
If this KEY RR is for a public key algorithm where the public and
private keys can be used for encryption and the corresponding
decryption which recovers the originally encrypted data. The KEY RR
SHOULD correspond to a name for the decrypting resolver/server such
that the decrypting process has access to the corresponding private
key to decrypt the data. The secret keying material being sent will
generally be fairly short, usually not more than 256 bits, because
that is adequate for very strong protection with modern keyed hash or
symmetric algorithms.
If the KEY RR specifies the RSA algorithm, then the keying
material is encrypted as per the description of RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5
encryption in PKCS#1 [RFC8017]. The secret keying material being
sent is directly RSA encrypted in PKCS#1 format. It is not
"enveloped" under some other symmetric algorithm. In the unlikely
event that the keying material will not fit within one RSA modulus
of the chosen public key, additional RSA encryption blocks are
included. The length of each block is clear from the public RSA
key specified and the RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 padding makes it clear what
part of the encrypted data is actually keying material and what
part is formatting or the required at least eight bytes of random
[RFC4086] padding.
If the KEY RR accompanying the TKEY RR is for a key agreement
algorithm where the public and private keys cannot be used for
encryption/decryption, then the data to be encrypted is "enveloped"
as specified below. The Key Data Field is structured as follows:
Subfield Type Comment
-------- -------- ----------------------
Wrapping u_int8_t Key Wrapping Algorithm
WKey Size u_int8_t Size of Wrapping Key
Key octet-stream Wrapped keying material
For server assignment keying, a shared secret key is derived from the
public key in the KEY RR sent with the query and the KEY RR included
in the corresponding response. This key is used to wrap the keying
material being transmitted but may need to be truncated to the
specified WKey Size. In addition, some Key Wrapping Algorithms take a
variety of key sizes so the wrapping key size must be specified.
For resolver assignment keying TBD
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7. IANA Considerations
This section is to be interpreted as provided in [RFC8126].
The following assignments have already been made:
RR Type 249 for TKEY.
Extended RCODE Error values of 19, 20, and 21 as listed in Section
2.6.
IANA is requested to create a TKEY Mode Registry on the Domain Name
Sysmtem (DNS) Parameters web page as follows:
Name: TKEY Modes
Reference: [this document]
Registration Procedures:
0x0000 - reserved
0x0001-0x0FFF - standards action
0x1000-0xFFEF - specification required
0xFFF0-0xFFFE - experimental use
0xFFFF - reserved
Value Description Reference
------- ----------------------- -----------
0x0000 - reserved
0x0001 server assignment [this document]
0x0002 Diffie-Hellman exchange [this document]
0x0003 GSS-API negotiation [this document]
0x0004 resolver assignment [this document]
0x0005 key deletion [this document]
0x0006 ECDH exchange [this document]
0x0007 documentation/example [this document]
0x0008 TKEY ping [this document]
0x0009
- 0x0FFF - standards action
0x1000
- 0xFFEF - specification required
0xFFF0
- 0xFFFE - experimental use
0xFFFF - reserved
IANA is requested to create a Key Wrapping Algorithm Registry on a
new web page as follows:
Name: Key Wrapping Algorithms
Reference: [this document]
Registration Procedure: IETF Consensus
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Value Description Reference
----- ----------- ---------
0x00 - reserved
0x01 Triple-DES [RFC3217]
0x02 RC2 [RFC3217]
0x03 AES-pad [RFC5649]
0x04-0xFE unassigned
0xFF - reserved
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8. Security Considerations
The entirety of this specification is concerned with the secure
establishment of a shared secret between DNS clients and servers in
support of TSIG [RFC8945].
Protection against denial of service via the use of TKEY is not
provided.
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Appendix A: Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying
This TKEY Mode (#1) is deprecated for the reasons given in Section
4.1. It SHOULD NOT be used.
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange is means whereby two parties can
derive some shared secret information without requiring any secrecy
of the messages they exchange [Schneier]. Provisions have been made
for the storage of DH public keys in the DNS [RFC2539].
A resolver sends a query for type TKEY accompanied by a TKEY RR in
the additional information section specifying the Diffie-Hellman mode
and accompanied by a KEY RR also in the additional information
section specifying a resolver Diffie-Hellman key. The TKEY RR
algorithm field is set to the authentication algorithm the resolver
plans to use. The "key data" provided in the TKEY is used as a random
[RFC4086] nonce to avoid always deriving the same keying material for
the same pair of DH KEYs.
The server response contains a TKEY in its answer section with the
Diffie-Hellman mode. The "key data" provided in this TKEY is used as
an additional nonce to avoid always deriving the same keying material
for the same pair of DH KEYs. If the TKEY error field is non-zero,
the query failed for the reason given. FORMERR is given if the query
included no DH KEY and BADKEY is given if the query included an
incompatible DH KEY.
If the response TKEY error field is zero, the resolver supplied
Diffie-Hellman KEY RR SHOULD be echoed in the additional information
section and a server Diffie-Hellman KEY RR MUST be present in the
answer section of the response. Both parties can then calculate the
same shared secret quantity from the pair of Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys
used [Schneier] (provided these DH keys use the same generator and
modulus) and the data in the TKEY RRs. The TKEY RR data is mixed
with the DH result as follows:
keying material =
XOR ( DH value, MD5 ( query data | DH value ) |
MD5 ( server data | DH value ) )
Where XOR is an exclusive-OR operation and "|" is byte-stream
concatenation. The shorter of the two operands to XOR is byte-wise
left justified and padded with zero-valued bytes to match the length
of the other operand. "DH value" is the Diffie-Hellman value derived
from the KEY RRs. Query data and server data are the values sent in
the TKEY RR data fields. These "query data" and "server data" nonces
are suffixed by the DH value, digested by MD5, the results
concatenated, and then XORed with the DH value.
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The inception and expiry times in the query TKEY RR are those
requested for the keying material. The inception and expiry times in
the response TKEY RR are the maximum period the server will consider
the keying material valid. Servers may pre-expire keys, so this is
not a guarantee.
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Normative References
[RFC1982] - Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC
1982, DOI 10.17487/RFC1982, August 1996, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc1982>.
[RFC2119] - Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3217] - Housley, R., "Triple-DES and RC2 Key Wrapping", RFC 3217,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3217, December 2001, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc3217>.
[RFC3645] - Kwan, S., Garg, P., Gilroy, J., Esibov, L., Westhead, J.,
and R. Hall, "Generic Security Service Algorithm for Secret
Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (GSS-TSIG)", RFC
3645, DOI 10.17487/RFC3645, October 2003, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc3645>.
[RFC4034] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.
[RFC4648] - Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5649] - Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", RFC 5649, DOI
10.17487/RFC5649, September 2009, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc5649>.
[RFC6234] - Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash
Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC6605] - Hoffman, P. and W. Wijngaards, "Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 6605, DOI
10.17487/RFC6605, April 2012, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6605>.
[RFC8174] - Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8418] - Housley, R., "Use of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
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Key Agreement Algorithm with X25519 and X448 in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 8418, DOI
10.17487/RFC8418, August 2018, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc8418>.
Informative References
[Schneier] - Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols,
Algorithms, and Source Code in C", 1996, John Wiley and
Sons
[RFC1034] - Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and
facilities", STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] - Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC1995] - Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1995, August 1996, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc1995>.
[RFC2104] - Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, DOI
10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2539] - Eastlake 3rd, D., "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the
Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 2539, DOI 10.17487/RFC2539,
March 1999, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2539>.
[RFC3007] - Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic
Update", RFC 3007, DOI 10.17487/RFC3007, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3007>.
[RFC4035] - Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
[RFC5905] - Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
[RFC4086] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
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DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC6151] - Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>.
[RFC8017] - Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A.
Rusch, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version
2.2", RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8126] - Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8945] - Dupont, F., Morris, S., Vixie, P., Eastlake 3rd, D.,
Gudmundsson, O., and B. Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction
Authentication for DNS (TSIG)", STD 93, RFC 8945, DOI
10.17487/RFC8945, November 2020, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc8945>.
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Acknowledgments
The comments and suggestions of the following are gratefully
acknowledged:
tbd
The comments and suggestions of the following persons were
incorporated into RFC 2930, which was the previous version of this
document, and are gratefully acknowledged:
Olafur Gudmundsson, Stuart Kwan. Ed Lewis. Erik Nordmark, and
Brian Wellington.
Author's Address
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
Futurewei Technologies, Inc.
2386 Panoramic Circle
Apopka, FL 32703 USA
Telephone: +1 508 333 2270
email: d3e3e3@gmail.com
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Copyright, Disclaimer, and Additional IPR Provisions
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
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