Internet DRAFT - draft-elie-nntp-tls-recommendations
draft-elie-nntp-tls-recommendations
Independent Submission J. Elie
Internet-Draft February 7, 2017
Updates: 4642 (if approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: August 11, 2017
Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
in the Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP)
draft-elie-nntp-tls-recommendations-05
Abstract
This document provides recommendations for improving the security of
the Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) when using Transport Layer
Security (TLS). It modernizes the NNTP usage of TLS to be consistent
with TLS best current practices. If approved, this document updates
RFC 4642.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 11, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Author's Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Updates/Changes to RFC 4642 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Protocol Versions and Security Preferences . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Server Name Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Prevention of SSL Stripping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.5. Authenticated Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.6. Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Detailed Changes to RFC 4642 . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.1. Related to TLS-level Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.2. Related to Implicit TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.3. Related to RC4 Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.4. Related to Server Name Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.5. Related to Certificate Verification . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.6. Related to Other Obsolete Wording . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix C. Document History (to be removed by RFC Editor before
publication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
C.1. Changes since -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
C.2. Changes since -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
C.3. Changes since -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
C.4. Changes since -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
C.5. Changes since -00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
The Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) [RFC3977] has been using
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] (along with its precursor,
Secure Sockets Layer or SSL) since at least year 2000. The use of
TLS in NNTP was formalized in [RFC4642], providing at the same time
implementation recommendations. In order to address the evolving
threat model on the Internet today, this document provides stronger
recommendations regarding that use.
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In particular, this document updates [RFC4642] by specifying that
NNTP implementations and deployments MUST follow the best current
practices documented in the "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS
and DTLS" [RFC7525]. This includes stronger recommendations
regarding SSL/TLS protocol versions, fallback to lower versions, TLS
negotiation, TLS-level compression, TLS session resumption, cipher
suites, public key lengths, forward secrecy, hostname validation,
certificate verification, and other aspects of using TLS with NNTP.
[[Q1: For RFC Editor: Throughout the document, should [RFC7525] be
referenced as [BCP195] or [RFC7525]? Same question for other BCP
documents.]]
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document
Any term not defined in this document has the same meaning as it does
in [RFC4642] or the NNTP core specification [RFC3977].
When this document uses the terms "implicit TLS", it refers to TLS
negotiation immediately upon connection on a separate port.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
1.2. Author's Note
Please write the first letter of "Elie" with an acute accent wherever
possible -- it is U+00C9 ("É" in XML). The third letter of
"Stephane" and the penultimate letter of "allee" similarly have an
acute accent (U+00E9, "é" in XML). Also, the letters "ae" in
"Baeuerle" should be written as an a-umlaut (U+00E4, "ä" in
XML).
2. Updates/Changes to RFC 4642
This document updates [RFC4642] in the following aspects:
o NNTP implementations and deployments SHOULD disable TLS-level
compression (Section 3.3 of [RFC7525]), thus no longer using TLS
as a means to provide data compression (contrary to Abstract and
Section 2.2.2 of [RFC4642]).
o NNTP implementations and deployments SHOULD prefer implicit TLS
and therefore use strict TLS configuration (Section 3.2 of
[RFC7525]), that is to say they SHOULD use a port dedicated to
NNTP over TLS, and begin the TLS negotiation immediately upon
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connection (contrary to a dynamic upgrade from unencrypted to TLS-
protected traffic via the use of the STARTTLS command, as
Section 1 of [RFC4642] was encouraging). Implicit TLS is the
preferred way of using TLS with NNTP for the same reasons,
transposed to NNTP, as those given in Appendix A of [MUA-STS].
(Note that [MUA-STS] and [RFC4642] have one author in common.)
o NNTP implementations and deployments MUST NOT negotiate RC4 cipher
suites ([RFC7465]) contrary to Section 5 of [RFC4642] that
required them to implement the TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 cipher
suite so as to ensure that any two NNTP compliant implementations
can be configured to interoperate. This document removes that
requirement, so that NNTP client and server implementations follow
the recommendations given in Sections 4.2 and 4.2.1 of [RFC7525]
instead. The mandatory-to-implement cipher(s) suite(s) depend on
the TLS protocol version. For instance, when TLS 1.2 is used, the
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA cipher suite MUST be implemented
(Section 9 of [RFC5246]).
o All NNTP clients and any NNTP server that is known by multiple
names MUST support the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension
defined in Section 3 of [RFC6066], in conformance with Section 3.6
of [RFC7525]. It was only a "SHOULD" in Section 2.2.2 of
[RFC4642].
o NNTP implementations and deployments MUST follow the rules and
guidelines defined in [RFC6125] and [RFC5280] for hostname
validation and certificate verification. Part of Section 5 of
[RFC4642] is therefore rationalized in favour of following those
two documents.
Appendix A of this document gives detailed changes with regards to
the wording of [RFC4642].
3. Recommendations
The best current practices documented in the "Recommendations for
Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525] are included here by reference.
Therefore, NNTP implementations and deployments compliant with this
document are REQUIRED to also comply with [RFC7525].
Instead of repeating those recommendations here, this document mostly
provides supplementary information regarding secure implementation
and deployment of NNTP technologies.
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3.1. Compression
NNTP supports the use of the COMPRESS command, defined in Section 2.2
of [RFC8054], to compress data between an NNTP client and server.
Although this NNTP extension might have slightly stronger security
properties than TLS-level compression [RFC3749] (since NNTP
compression can be activated after authentication has completed, thus
reducing the chances that authentication credentials can be leaked
via for instance a Compression Ratio Info-leak Made Easy (CRIME)
attack, as described in Section 2.6 of [CRIME]), this document
neither encourages nor discourages the use of the NNTP COMPRESS
extension.
3.2. Protocol Versions and Security Preferences
NNTP implementations of news servers are encouraged to support
options to configure the minimal TLS protocol version to accept, and
which cipher suites, signature algorithms or groups (like elliptic
curves) to use for incoming connections. Additional options can
naturally also be supported. The goal is to enable administrators of
news servers to easily and quickly strengthen security, if need be
(for instance by rejecting cipher suites considered unsafe with
regards to local policy).
News clients may also support similar options, either configurable by
the user or enforced by the news reader.
3.3. Server Name Indication
The TLS extension for Server Name Indication (SNI) defined in
Section 3 of [RFC6066] MUST be implemented by all news clients. It
also MUST be implemented by any news server that is known by multiple
names. (Otherwise, it is not possible for a server with several
hostnames to present the correct certificate to the client.)
3.4. Prevention of SSL Stripping
In order to help prevent SSL Stripping attacks (Section 2.1 of
[RFC7457]), NNTP implementations and deployments MUST follow the
recommendations provided in Section 3.2 of [RFC7525]. Notably, in
case implicit TLS is not used, news clients SHOULD attempt to
negotiate TLS even if the server does not advertise the STARTTLS
capability label in response to the CAPABILITIES command (Section 2.1
of [RFC4642]).
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3.5. Authenticated Connections
[RFC4642] already provides recommendations and requirements for
certificate validation in the context of checking the client or the
server's identity. Those requirements are strengthened by
Appendix A.5 of this document.
Wherever possible, it is best to prefer certificate-based
authentication (along with SASL [RFC4422]), and ensure that:
o Clients authenticate servers.
o Servers authenticate clients.
o Servers authenticate other peer servers.
This document does not mandate certificate-based authentication,
although such authentication is strongly preferred. As mentioned in
Section 2.2.2 of [RFC4642], the AUTHINFO SASL command (Section 2.4 of
[RFC4643]) with the EXTERNAL mechanism (Appendix A of [RFC4422]) MAY
be used to authenticate a client once its TLS credentials have been
successfully exchanged.
Given the pervasiveness of eavesdropping [RFC7258], even an encrypted
but unauthenticated connection might be better than an unencrypted
connection (this is similar to the "better-than-nothing security"
approach for IPsec [RFC5386], and in accordance with opportunistic
security principles [RFC7435]). Encrypted but unauthenticated
connections include connections negotiated using anonymous
Diffie-Hellman mechanisms or using self-signed certificates, among
others.
Note: when an NNTP server receives a Netnews article, it MAY add a
<diag-match> (Section 3.1.5 of [RFC5536]), which appears as "!!" in
the Path header field of that article, to indicate that it verified
the identity of the client or peer server. This document encourages
the construction of such Path header fields, as described in
Section 3.2.1 of [RFC5537].
3.6. Human Factors
NNTP clients SHOULD provide ways for end users (and NNTP servers
SHOULD provide ways for administrators) to complete at least the
following tasks:
o Determine if a given incoming or outgoing connection is encrypted
using a security layer (either using TLS or an SASL mechanism that
negotiates a security layer).
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o Be warned if the version of TLS used for encryption of a given
stream is not secure enough.
o If authenticated encryption is used, determine how the connection
was authenticated or verified.
o Be warned if the certificate offered by an NNTP server cannot be
verified.
o Be warned if the cipher suite used to encrypt a connection is not
secure enough.
o Be warned if the certificate changes for a given server.
o When a security layer is not already in place, be warned if a
given server stops advertising the STARTTLS capability label in
response to the CAPABILITIES command (Section 2.1 of [RFC4642])
whereas it advertised the STARTTLS capability label during any
previous connection within a (possibly configurable) time frame.
(Otherwise, a human might not see the warning the first time, and
the warning would disappear immediately after that.)
o Be warned if a failure response to the STARTTLS command is
received from the server whereas the STARTTLS capability label was
advertised.
Note that the last two tasks cannot occur when implicit TLS is used,
and that the penultimate task helps prevent an attack known as SSL
Stripping (Section 2.1 of [RFC7457]).
4. Security Considerations
Beyond the security considerations already described in [RFC4642],
[RFC6125] and [RFC7525], the following caveat is worth mentioning
when not using implicit TLS: NNTP servers need to ensure that they
are not vulnerable to the STARTTLS command injection vulnerability
(Section 2.2 of [RFC7457]). Though this command MUST NOT be
pipelined, an attacker could pipeline it. Therefore, NNTP servers
MUST discard any NNTP command received between the use of STARTTLS
and the end of TLS negotiation.
5. IANA Considerations
This document does not change the formal definition of the STARTTLS
extension (Section 6 of [RFC4642]). Nonetheless, as implementations
of the STARTTLS extension should follow this document, IANA will add
its reference to the existing STARTTLS label in the NNTP capability
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labels registry contained in the Network News Transfer Protocol
(NNTP) Parameters registry:
+----------+--------------------------+----------------------+
| Label | Meaning | Reference |
+----------+--------------------------+----------------------+
| STARTTLS | Transport layer security | [RFC4642][RFC-to-be] |
+----------+--------------------------+----------------------+
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3977] Feather, C., "Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP)",
RFC 3977, DOI 10.17487/RFC3977, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3977>.
[RFC4422] Melnikov, A., Ed. and K. Zeilenga, Ed., "Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4422, June 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4422>.
[RFC4642] Murchison, K., Vinocur, J., and C. Newman, "Using
Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Network News Transfer
Protocol (NNTP)", RFC 4642, DOI 10.17487/RFC4642, October
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4642>.
[RFC4643] Vinocur, J. and K. Murchison, "Network News Transfer
Protocol (NNTP) Extension for Authentication", RFC 4643,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4643, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4643>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
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[RFC5536] Murchison, K., Ed., Lindsey, C., and D. Kohn, "Netnews
Article Format", RFC 5536, DOI 10.17487/RFC5536, November
2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5536>.
[RFC5537] Allbery, R., Ed. and C. Lindsey, "Netnews Architecture and
Protocols", RFC 5537, DOI 10.17487/RFC5537, November 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5537>.
[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
6.2. Informative References
[CRIME] Rizzo, J. and T. Duong, "The CRIME Attack", Ekoparty
Security Conference, 2012.
[MUA-STS] Moore, K. and C. Newman, "Mail User Agent Strict Transport
Security (MUA-STS)", Work in Progress, July 2016.
[RFC3749] Hollenbeck, S., "Transport Layer Security Protocol
Compression Methods", RFC 3749, DOI 10.17487/RFC3749, May
2004, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3749>.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
[RFC5386] Williams, N. and M. Richardson, "Better-Than-Nothing
Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec", RFC 5386,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5386, November 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5386>.
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[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
December 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.
[RFC7457] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing
Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, DOI 10.17487/RFC7457,
February 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7457>.
[RFC7465] Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7465, February 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7465>.
[RFC7590] Saint-Andre, P. and T. Alkemade, "Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP)", RFC 7590, DOI 10.17487/RFC7590, June
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7590>.
[RFC8054] Murchison, K. and J. Elie, "Network News Transfer Protocol
(NNTP) Extension for Compression", RFC 8054,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8054, January 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8054>.
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Appendix A. Detailed Changes to RFC 4642
This section lists detailed changes this document applies to
[RFC4642].
A.1. Related to TLS-level Compression
The second sentence in the Abstract of [RFC4642] is replaced with the
following text:
The primary goal is to provide encryption for single-link
confidentiality purposes, but data integrity, and (optional)
certificate-based peer entity authentication are also possible.
The second sentence of the first paragraph in Section 2.2.2 of
[RFC4642] is replaced with the following text:
The STARTTLS command is usually used to initiate session security,
although it can also be used for client and/or server certificate
authentication.
A.2. Related to Implicit TLS
The third and fourth paragraphs in Section 1 of [RFC4642] are
replaced with the following text:
TCP port 563 is dedicated to NNTP over TLS, and registered in the
IANA Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry for
that usage. NNTP implementations using TCP port 563 begin the TLS
negotiation immediately upon connection and then continue with the
initial steps of an NNTP session. This immediate TLS negotiation
on a separate port (referred to in this document as "implicit
TLS") is the preferred way of using TLS with NNTP.
If a host wishes to offer separate servers for transit and reading
clients (Section 3.4.1 of [NNTP]), TCP port 563 SHOULD be used for
implicit TLS with the reading server, and an unused port of its
choice different than TCP port 433 SHOULD be used for implicit TLS
with the transit server. The ports used for implicit TLS should
be clearly communicated to the clients, and specifically that no
plain-text communication occurs before the TLS session is
negotiated.
As some existing implementations negotiate TLS via a dynamic
upgrade from unencrypted to TLS-protected traffic during an NNTP
session on well-known TCP ports 119 or 433, this specification
formalizes the STARTTLS command in use for that purpose. However,
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as already mentioned above, implementations SHOULD use implicit
TLS on a separate port.
Note: a common alternative to protect NNTP exchanges with transit
servers that do not implement TLS is the use of IPsec with
encryption [RFC4301].
An additional informative reference to [RFC4301] is therefore added
to Section 7.2 of [RFC4642].
A.3. Related to RC4 Cipher Suites
The third paragraph in Section 5 of [RFC4642] is removed.
Consequently, NNTP no longer requires to implement any cipher suites,
other than those prescribed by TLS (Section 9 of [RFC5246]) and
Sections 4.2 and 4.2.1 of [RFC7525].
A.4. Related to Server Name Indication
The last two sentences of the seventh paragraph in Section 2.2.2 of
[RFC4642] are removed. Section 3.6 of [RFC7525] apply.
A.5. Related to Certificate Verification
The text between "During the TLS negotiation" and "identity
bindings)." in Section 5 of [RFC4642] is replaced with the following
text:
During TLS negotiation, the client MUST verify the server's
identity in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. The
client MUST follow the rules and guidelines defined in [RFC6125],
where the reference identifier MUST be the server hostname that
the client used to open the connection, and that is also specified
in the TLS "server_name" extension [RFC6066]. The following NNTP-
specific consideration applies: DNS domain names in server
certificates MAY contain the wildcard character "*" as the
complete left-most label within the identifier.
If the match fails, the client MUST follow the recommendations in
Section 6.6 of [RFC6125] regarding certificate pinning and
fallback.
Beyond server identity checking, clients also MUST apply the
procedures specified in [RFC5280] for general certificate
validation (e.g., certificate integrity, signing, and path
validation).
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Additional normative references to [RFC5280] (replacing [PKI-CERT] it
obsoletes), [RFC6066], and [RFC6125] are therefore added to
Section 7.1 of [RFC4642].
A.6. Related to Other Obsolete Wording
The first two sentences of the seventh paragraph in Section 2.2.2 of
[RFC4642] are removed. There is no special requirement for NNTP with
regards to TLS Client Hello messages. Section 7.4.1.2 and Appendix E
of [RFC5246] apply.
Appendix B. Acknowledgments
This document draws heavily on ideas in [RFC7590] by Peter
Saint-Andre and Thijs Alkemade; a large portion of this text was
borrowed from that specification.
The author would like to thank the following individuals for
contributing their ideas and support for writing this specification:
Stephane Bortzmeyer, Ben Campbell, Viktor Dukhovni, Stephen Farrell,
Sabahattin Gucukoglu, Richard Kettlewell, Jouni Korhonen, Mirja
Kuehlewind, David Eric Mandelberg, Matija Nalis, Chris Newman, and
Peter Saint-Andre.
Special thanks to Michael Baeuerle, for shepherding this document,
and to the Responsible Area Director, Alexey Melnikov, for sponsoring
it. They both significantly helped to increase its quality.
Appendix C. Document History (to be removed by RFC Editor before
publication)
C.1. Changes since -04
o Take into account the remarks received during IESG telechat.
o Mention the Document Shepherd, Michael Baeuerle.
o Update the reference [NNTP-COMPRESS] to [RFC8054], now it has been
released.
o Add a reference to [RFC7435].
o Move [RFC4422], [RFC4643], [RFC5536], and [RFC5537] from
informative to normative references.
o A few wording improvements.
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C.2. Changes since -03
o Improve wording to make clear that the server hostname that the
client used to open the connection is the same as the one
specified in the TLS "server_name" extension.
o Move [RFC5280], [RFC6125] and [RFC7525] to normative references.
o In detailed changes of [RFC4642], use [NNTP] instead of [RFC3977]
as this RFC is referenced as [NNTP] in [RFC4642]. Also mention
obsolete [PKI-CERT].
C.3. Changes since -02
o Use (and define) the "implicit TLS" terminology instead of "strict
TLS". The language in [RFC7525] is unfortunate since "strict TLS"
is not clearly defined in that document, and the name suggests
that it is an alternative to "opportunistic TLS", rather than an
alternative to STARTTLS. While STARTTLS is often used
opportunistically, that is not always the case.
o Mention SSL Stripping in Section 3.6 with a reference to
Section 2.1 of [RFC7457] because the intent of the related task
may not have been clear enough. Reported by Matija Nalis.
o Add Section 3.4 about how to prevent SSL stripping, notably by an
attempt to negotiate TLS even if STARTTLS is not advertised, when
implicit TLS is not used.
o Strengthen the requirements on hostname validation and certificate
verification, by referencing [RFC6125] and [RFC5280].
o Ask IANA to add this document to the NNTP capabilily labels
registry.
o Reference the security considerations of [RFC6125].
o Mention informative and normative references to add to [RFC4642].
C.4. Changes since -01
o Take into account all the remarks sent during IETF Last Call.
o Move the part about [RFC4642] from Introduction to a new dedicated
Section named "Updates/Changes to RFC 4642" so as to make the
document a bit more structured.
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Internet-Draft Use of TLS in NNTP February 2017
o The warning about lack of STARTTLS is expanded in scope to say
"during any previous connection within a (possibly configurable)
time frame" instead of "during the previous connection".
o Remove Appendix about export restrictions on crypto. It is
useless since RFC 2804.
o Add wording about the use of strict TLS for transit. Mention the
use of a port other than 433 for strict TLS between two peers, and
add a note about a possible use of IPsec [RFC4301] for transit.
Do not only speak about port 563.
o Explicitly mention the mandatory-to-implement cipher suite for TLS
1.2.
o Do not keep the paragraph about TLS Client Hello messages and
Server Name Indication (SNI) in [RFC4642]. Support for SNI
[RFC6066] is now a MUST, and not a SHOULD.
o Reference [RFC7457] for the STARTTLS command injection
vulnerability.
o Add notes to RFC Editor to ask that [MUA-STS] and [NNTP-COMPRESS]
references be changed to their [RFCxxxx] form, once published, and
whether [BCP195] should be used instead of [RFC7525].
o Move [RFC5246] (TLS) to a normative reference.
o Minor other wording improvements.
C.5. Changes since -00
o Clarify in the introduction of Section 3 that NNTP implementations
compliant with this document are REQUIRED to also comply with
[RFC7525].
o Improve the wording of Section 3.2 to mention that configuration
is primarily intended for news servers. Also, be more consistent
in the options to accept, and include signature algorithms and
named groups.
Author's Address
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Internet-Draft Use of TLS in NNTP February 2017
Julien Elie
10 allee Clovis
Noisy-le-Grand 93160
France
EMail: julien@trigofacile.com
URI: http://www.trigofacile.com/
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