Internet DRAFT - draft-fieau-cdni-https-delegation
draft-fieau-cdni-https-delegation
Network Working Group F. Fieau, Ed.
Internet-Draft E. Stephan
Intended status: Standards Track Orange
Expires: January 4, 2018 S. Mishra
Verizon
July 3, 2017
HTTPS delegation in CDNI
draft-fieau-cdni-https-delegation-02
Abstract
This document examines probable solutions for delegating encrypted
content delivery within the context of CDN interconnection. The
HTTPS delegation also expects delivering content without compromising
security, integrity and user privacy.
Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. LURK for CDNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. uCDN Key Server (CDNI framework) . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. CSP Key server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Out-of-Band for CDNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. OOB overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. OOB applied to CDNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Sub-certificates and Short-lived Certificates for CDNI . . . 7
5.1. Short-lived certs use case for CDNI - ACME . . . . . . . 7
6. Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. LURK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. OOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3. Subcerts and SLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.4. HTTPS delegation requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.5. Implementation status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.6. E2E HTTPS delegation for CDNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
Currently, sixty percent of the HTTP traffic on the internet is
encrypted, that is, it is transported over TLS [RFC5246]. At the
same time, HTTP traffic served by CDNs is on the rise as well. The
traffic on CDNs is estimated to raise to seventy-five percent in year
2020 [ciscotraffic].
This document discusses viability of and solution for addressing
delegation of HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] traffic within the context of
CDN interconnection. HTTPS delegation allows delivering party, e.g.
a CDN, to deliver content for and on-behalf of an origin server.
This draft considers three approaches for delegating HTTPS traffic in
a CDNI context. These include Limited Use of Remote Keys (LURK),
Out-of-Band, Short-Lived Certificates and Sub-Certificates (or
delegated credentials). We examine these approaches focusing on the
following three issues:
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o Modification (or no) changes in the user agent
o Trust delegation (transitivity, that is, Is a CDN allowed to
delegate the trust it received directly from the Origin?)
o Maintain the user experience (privacy, integrity and performance)
To recap CDNi goals, the CDNi WG focuses on the relationship between
the upstream CDN and the downstream CDN. Therefore, this document
examines applicability of HTTPS delegation between two CDNs in
response to a UA request while maintaining end-to-end integrity of UA
request.
2. Terminology
o UA: User Agent
o CDNI: Content Delivery Network
o SLC: Short-Lived certificates
o LURK: Limited Use of Remote Keys
o dCDN: downstream Content Delivery Network
o uCDN: upstream Content Delivery Network
o CSP: Content Service Provider
o OOB: Out-of-Band
o PKS: Private Key Server
3. LURK for CDNI
[I-D.cdni-fieau-lurk-https-delegation] shows 2 use cases related to
CDN interconnection based on LURK [I-D.mglt-lurk-tls-use-cases]:
o uCDN Key Server: uCDN is authoritative on several origin domains.
Its key Server hosts certificates and private keys of these
origins. An interface between uCDN and dCDN allows dCDN to query
credentials per session for these origins. Note that a dCDN is
typically connected to several uCDNs.
o CSP Key Server: a Content Service Provider is authoritative source
for origin domains. CSPs key Server hosts certificates and
private keys for its domains. An interface between this key
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Server and the dCDN allows the dCDN to query credentials for a
given session for these origins.
3.1. uCDN Key Server (CDNI framework)
dCDNs have an interface to a Key Server hosted at the uCDN side. It
may be typically a case of CDNI regional delivery delegation.
When the UA has been redirected from the uCDN to a dCDN,it initiates
a TLS connection with a dCDN cache to get its content. Since dCDN
cache does not store the private keys for the requested certificate,
it queries the uCDN Key Server (KS) to get credentials to establish
the TLS session. Once the UA establishes a TLS connections with the
dCDN, the dCDN can finally begin to deliver HTTP over TLS content to
the UA.
This framework makes two assumptions:
o The UA includes the Origin domain name in the SNI field of the TLS
ClientHello to enable a dCDN to select the Key Server of uCDN to
generate credentials for the session.
o The uCDN Key Server is provisioned with the certificate and the
private key for this Origin domain name.
3.2. CSP Key server
In this framework the CSP provides a Key Server for the origin
domains it is authoritative for to ensure an end-to-end HTTPS
delegation, from the origin to the dCDN which eventually delivers the
HTTPS content to the UA. The CSP provides the LURK Key Server and
interface.
The CSP delegates the HTTPS content delivery to an uCDN that in turn
delegates the HTTPS delivery to a dCDN. The CSP provides the uCDN
with a Key Server interface to delegate the content delivery. In
that case, the dCDN relies on credentials received from a CSP Key
Server (KS) to deliver HTTPS content.
This framework supports 2 options:
o direct: The dCDN requests directly the CSP key server
o cascaded: the dCDN session key requests are relayed by the uCDN to
the Key Server
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4. Out-of-Band for CDNI
This section presents the usage of HTTP Out-of-Band mechanism
[I-D.reschke-http-oob-encoding] to deliver HTTPS content in CDNI.
4.1. OOB overview
Out-of-Band HTTPS content delivery (OOB) relies on the use of the
"out-of-band" value in "Accept-encoding" HTTP header of the request.
It indicates that the UA supports downloading the resource from
alternative locations than the Origin. To that purpose, when the
out-of-band content encoding is set, the Origin server may respond
with a list of caches to fetch the requested resource.
Example:
{sr: [{r:"https://ori/path/content1", r:"https://cdn1/path/content1"}]}
+----------+ +----------------+ +-------------+
| UA |--3) GET --->| cache |--4) GET---> |Origin Server|
+----+-----+ content +----------------+ content +----+--------+
| ^ | ^
| |---------- 2) 2OO OK, OOB + resource map-----------+ |
|--------------------- 1) HTTP GET content -------------------+
Figure 1: OOB general principle
Out-of-Band framework involves the following functional entities:
Origin server:
o OOB specifies the first step of the HTTPS delivery delegation: the
soft redirection toward alternative locations that Origin trusts
in a resource map.
o The Origin server receives new HTTP header value "accept-encoding"
and responses with a "content-encoding"
UA:
o must store resource map received from the Origin server
o must support new HTTP header "accept-encoding" values to comply
with OOB
Cache server:
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o has standard cache functions, and supports TLS for delivery and
content provisioning from origin.
o When the cache receives a request from the UA, it uses the "http
referer" of the request to know the origin url from where to pull
and store the requested content.
4.2. OOB applied to CDNI
In CDNI, uCDN may use OOB to direct a UA to dCDN by indicating a
resource map where it can fetch content. In CDNI, an end-to-end
delegation allows an origin delegate HTTPS delivery to uCDN which in
turns delegates it to dCDN.
For instance, end-to-end delegation may involve cascaded resource
maps. The Origin delegates HTTPS delivery to the uCDN using OOB, and
uCDN delegates HTTPS delivery to dCDN through OOB. In that case, the
UA requests Origin that sends back a resource map pointing at the
uCDN. Then UA requests the uCDN which sends back a resource map
(OOB) pointing at dCDN hosted resources.
User Agent dCDN uCDN Origin
| | | |
| GET http://origin/hash1/content | |
+----------------------------------------------------->|
| 200 OK + OOB | |
+<-----------------------------------------------------|
| GET http://ucdn/hash2/content | |
+------------------------------------>| |
| 200 OK + OOB | |
|<------------------------------------+ |
| | | |
|GET http://dcdn/hash2/content | |
+----------------->| | |
| | GET http://ucdn/hash2/content |
| |----------------->| |
| | 200 OK (encrypted content) |
| |<-----------------| |
| 200 OK (encrypted content) | |
|<-----------------+ | |
| | | |
figure 2: OOB with successive resource maps in CDNI
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5. Sub-certificates and Short-lived Certificates for CDNI
The need to scale is a central requirement to generalize HTTPS
content delivery across CDNs. Both [I-D.rescorla-tls-subcerts] and
[I-D.ietf-acme-star] share the same paradigm. They aim to decouple
credentials provisioning from content delivery.
The [I-D.ietf-acme-star] cert architecture adds interactions between
the CDN and the Origin and between the Origin and the CA which signs
the limited authority delegation;
[I-D.ietf-acme-star] certificate implementation do not require
modifications in the UA, but requires specific certificate request
from CSP to CA and retrieval of certificate by CDN from the CA. The
[I-D.rescorla-tls-subcerts] proposes an architecture where the TLS
server by itself can create a sub-certificate (also referred to as
"delegated credentials") based on the original certificate issued to
it by the CA. This sub-certificate's scope is only to the
credentials issued by the CA corresponding to the original
certificate the CA authorized the TLS server.
A possible applicability of this may be where a uCDN may issue
"delegated_credentials" to a dCDN for any HTTPS content it delegates
to dCDN for delivery.
This new "delegated certificate" will have a validity interval (7
days) along with the public key issued to the Content Service
Provider (CSP) or to its surrogate (CDN) by the CA.
The Subcerts require changes to the user agent. The
[I-D.rescorla-tls-subcerts] draft proposes User Agent to send an
empty "delegated_credential" extension in its ClientHello. The draft
also defines a new "DelegationUsage" extension to X.509. Only
presence of this this extension shall permit usage of delegated
credentials. The draft advises "clients MUST NOT accept delegated
credentials associated with certificates without this extension."
The applicability of subcerts in case of CDN would be when a uCDN
with a certificate can issue a "delegated credentials" to a dCDN.
5.1. Short-lived certs use case for CDNI - ACME
[I-D.ietf-acme-star] specifies mechanisms to allow a third party such
as a CDN to terminate a TLS session on behalf of a content owner
(described as domain name owner) The proposal calls for an extension
to the ACME protocol to enable the issuance of short term and
automatically renewed certificates and a protocol that allows a
Domain Name Owner (DNO) to delegate to a third party control over a
certificate that bears its own name.
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Compared to per session key exchange, it decouples the credentials
provisioning from the content delivery to limit the burden on the CSP
side. It limits signaling to periodic short term certificate
requests (CSR) sent from the uCDN to the content owner:
o As a Bootstrap process, the CDN generates a key-pair and wraps it
into a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) according to the agreed
CSR template and sends a request over the pre-established LURK
channel requests to the DNO. The DNO in turn forwards request
over an ACME protocol to an ACME CA to create the corresponding
short-term and auto-renewed (STAR) certificate;
o The ACME CA posts the certifcate and notifies the DNO and DNO in
turn notifies the CDN which downloads the certificate.
o The connection between CDN and the Origin is mutually
authenticated. The additional requests are processed as such as:
Auto-renewal: the ACME CA periodically re-issues the short-term
certificate and posts it to a public URL. The CDN would periodically
retrieve the certificate
Termination: the DNO (indirectly) stops name delegation by explicitly
requesting the ACME CA to discontinue the automatic renewal of the
certificate.
CDN and DNO have agreed on a "CSR template" to use, including subject
name, Validity, Requested Algorithm, Key length and Key usage.
The ACME issued CA has a short validity (24 hours to 72 hours).
6. Discussions
6.1. LURK
A LURK interface may provide advantages to HTTPS delegation in CDNI
such as:
o The origin of the information can be preserved, provided that DNS
is used to redirect a UA from the uCDN to a dCDN
o It mitigates the risks of CSP private keys leak by centralizing
them.
o It doesn't impact the UA nor TLS stack
o Revocation of delegation may be straightforward by denying any
access to private key server
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However, preserving UX performances cannot be guaranteed as
additional RTT are needed to fetch the needed session credentials
from the Key Server.
6.2. OOB
OOB may provide advantages to HTTPS delegation in CDNI such as:
o CDNs can be agnostic of the cached contents; contents can actually
remain encrypted on the cache when HTTP encryption encoding
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding] is used, which can be
valuable for the Content owner/provider.
o Origin URL stays unchanged in the address bar. So that Origin of
information is preserved.
However, the use of OOB to ensure HTTPS delegation in CDNI should be
clarified in many cases:
o Origin issue: how to preserve Origin in case of OOB chaining in
CDNI?
o How to improve OOB performance in E2E delegation, i.e., from the
Origin to dCDN, within a single OOB resource map received by the
UA?
o OOB for ensuring E2E delegation would raise delegation issues in
certain cases:
1. For instance, an E2E delegation using OOB with DNS redirect would
raise a delegation issue where the requested domain doesn't match the
URI which may trigger a warning on the UA. As such, delegation is
not solved (HARD problem).
The Origin delegates the delivery to uCDN with OOB, next the uCDN
delegates HTTPS delivery to a dCDN using DNS.In that case, the UA
requests origin that sends back a resource map pointing at uCDN, UA
DNS then queries uCDN.com which is resolved to a dCDN server IP, the
UA requests contents on dCDN server
2. In another example, an E2E delegation using 302 redirect first
and OOB next, would raise a delegation issue where the origin of
information is the uCDN, not the Origin.
The Origin delegates HTTPS delivery to uCDN through a 302 redirect,
next uCDN delegates HTTPS delivery to dCDN using OOB. In that case,
the UA requests Origin who redirects it to the uCDN using 302 HTTP,
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then UA requests the uCDN which answers OOB content pointing at dCDN,
then UA requests content on dCDN.
Finally, some clarifications about OOB draft are needed:
o How to avoid circular redirection
o Does the UA insert the out-of-band header in any request?
o Does the UA insert the out-of-band header when it requests a
resource it selected in a resource map it received in an "out-of-
band" response received from the origin?
6.3. Subcerts and SLC
The motivation of [I-D.rescorla-tls-subcerts] draft is to remove
dependency between the Origin Server or its surrogates and the CA
specifically for enabling the ability to issue credentials (sub-
certificates) under the authority of its own certificate and
importantly, manage lifetime of the certificates and also have the
ability to support any new cryptographic algorithms. The intent for
the authors is to give Origin Servers (or their surrogates)
operational independence when needing to either limit the life of a
certificate or when needing to issue a sub-certificate with limited
life. This process may be expeditious over needing to work with the
CA for either of the aforementioned changes while still preserving
the security and integrity of the content and communications between
the origin server or it's and surrogate and the client.
The [I-D.rescorla-tls-subcerts] draft explores several options to
allow origin server or its surrogate with capabilities to issue a
sub-certificate or delegated credentials with limited authority. The
draft also provides for ways where a client controls issuance of sub-
certificates. This control can be exerted by the clients by use of
an optional "delegated_credential" extension field in the
clientHello. The draft also calls out rules for its use, such as, a
server cannot unilaterally send this extension but that it can only
send credentials when presented by the clientHello message. The
draft also defines "DelegationUsage" extension to X.509 that
determines use of delegated credentials.
However, as noted in sub-sections, 5.2, the applicability of this
draft may be limited in cascaded delegation that is from an up stream
CDN to the downstream CDN. Further clarity may be required from the
[I-D.rescorla-tls-subcerts] draft authors on ability to cascade sub-
certificates.
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The [I-D.ietf-acme-star] and the [I-D.rescorla-tls-subcerts] propose
approaches where a TLS server, i.e., a uCDN issue certificates or a
sub-certificate with limited authority and time without having to
share a private key. The approaches avoid any additional
infrastructure cost and potential for scaling up the solution. One
of the key drawbacks with either approach is additional changes
required such as uCDN with content owner and CA for
[I-D.ietf-acme-star]. Additionally, a short-lived certificate
creation system must be fully automated, as manual renewal of
certificates every few days is not practical. An automated system
requires require business relations and agreement between the SP and
CDN, and an initial setup. In case of [I-D.rescorla-tls-subcerts],
the proposal requires changes to TLS handshake where the client
provides an extension in its ClientHello that indicates support for
this mechanism.
6.4. HTTPS delegation requirements
Generic HTTPS delegations requirements that should be discussed:
o No changes in the client: delegation doesn't impact code on UA
side.
o No (or few) impacts on the CSP side: e.g. the load of signaling
introduced by the solution should be limited on CSP side
o Preserves the Origin of information: e.g., Origin URL in address
bar is preserved.
6.5. Implementation status
At the time being, LURK, OOB and subcerts are in early stage.
Currently SLC and subcerts are not available and need to be
clarified. However some prototypes already exists for OOB
[EricssonOOB].
6.6. E2E HTTPS delegation for CDNs
In order to ensure an end-to-end delegation from the Origin to dCDN,
a CDNI HTTPS delegation solution may combine several options
described in this document.
o LURK can allow the preservation of Origin of information, and
mitigates the risk of private CSP keys leakage. Regarding
performance, requesting a key server can lead to an increase in
Time To Service (Time to First Page) for UA but does not impact
downloading performances.
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o OOB allows preserving origin URL while avoiding spreading of
private keys on CDN caches, but impacts UA. As far performance is
concerned, downloading successive resource maps and direct to the
requested resource can increase Time To Service (Time to First
Page), but still it does not impact content delivery performance.
o SubCerts: The motivation for sub-certificate
(delegated_credential) is to give an option to certificate holder
to create a sub-certificate and sign the credentials. The sub-
certificate shall have a validity interval with limited scope. On
top, the server cannot unilateral present a sub-certificate to the
client, instead, client will indicate to the user in clientHello
that it will support delegated credentials. The solution
obviously requires changes in the client and additional changes to
the issuance of certificate. Based upon the draft, it is not
clear whether sub-certificates can be cascaded (as noted in
section 5.1), that is, once a sub-certificate is issued to an
entity and whether it can further use mechanism to issue a sub-
certificate to the downstream CDN.
Currently, no single solution fits the cascaded CDNs approach alone.
As such, these solutions could be complementary to allow an end-to-
end delegation in CDNI. However, the work on these drafts are in
progress or in early stages and needs further work to provide an end-
to-end solution.
7. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA considerations.
8. Security Considerations
The entire document is about security.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
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[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6844] Hallam-Baker, P. and R. Stradling, "DNS Certification
Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record", RFC 6844,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6844, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6844>.
9.2. Informative References
[ciscotraffic]
"The Zettabyte Era--Trends and Analysis", 2016,
<http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/
service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/
vni-hyperconnectivity-wp.html]>.
[EricssonOOB]
"Ericsson BC drafts", 2016,
<https://github.com/EricssonResearch/Blind-Cache-Drafts>.
[I-D.cdni-fieau-lurk-https-delegation]
Fieau, F. and S. Emile, "Limited Use of Remote Keys for
Interconnected CDNs", draft-cdni-fieau-lurk-https-
delegation-00 (work in progress), July 2016.
[I-D.ietf-acme-caa]
Landau, H., "CAA Record Extensions for Account URI and
ACME Method Binding", draft-ietf-acme-caa-02 (work in
progress), June 2017.
[I-D.ietf-acme-star]
Sheffer, Y., Lopez, D., Dios, O., Pastor, A., and T.
Fossati, "Use of Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed (STAR)
Certificates to Delegate Authority over Web Sites", draft-
ietf-acme-star-00 (work in progress), June 2017.
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding]
Thomson, M., "Encrypted Content-Encoding for HTTP", draft-
ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding-09 (work in progress),
April 2017.
[I-D.mglt-lurk-tls-use-cases]
Migault, D., Ma, K., Salz, R., Mishra, S., and O. Dios,
"LURK TLS/DTLS Use Cases", draft-mglt-lurk-tls-use-
cases-02 (work in progress), June 2016.
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[I-D.reschke-http-oob-encoding]
Reschke, J. and S. Loreto, "'Out-Of-Band' Content Coding
for HTTP", draft-reschke-http-oob-encoding-12 (work in
progress), June 2017.
[I-D.rescorla-tls-subcerts]
Barnes, R., Iyengar, S., Sullivan, N., and E. Rescorla,
"Delegated Credentials for TLS", draft-rescorla-tls-
subcerts-01 (work in progress), March 2017.
Authors' Addresses
Frederic Fieau (editor)
Orange
40-48, avenue de la Republique
Chatillon 92320
France
Email: frederic.fieau@orange.com
Emile Stephan
Orange
2, avenue Pierre Marzin
Lannion 22300
France
Email: emile.stephan@orange.com
Sanjay Mishra
Verizon
13100 Columbia Pike
Silver Spring MD 20904
USA
Email: sanjay.mishra@verizon.com
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