Internet DRAFT - draft-frost-rats-eat-collection
draft-frost-rats-eat-collection
Remote ATtestation ProcedureS S. Frost
Internet-Draft Arm
Intended status: Standards Track 9 June 2023
Expires: 11 December 2023
Entity Attestation Token (EAT) Collection Type
draft-frost-rats-eat-collection-03
Abstract
The default top-level definitions for an EAT [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
assume a hierarchy involving a leading signer within the Attester.
Some token use cases do not match that model. This specification
defines an extension to EAT allowing the top-level of the token to
consist of a collection of otherwise defined tokens.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-frost-rats-eat-collection/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Remote ATtestation
ProcedureS Working Group mailing list (mailto:rats@ietf.org), which
is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/.
Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats/.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 December 2023.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology and Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Design Considerations / Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Token Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Binder Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
An Attestation Token conforming to EAT [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] has a
default top level definition for a token to be constructed
principally as a claim set within a CBOR Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392]
with the associated COSE envelope [STD96] providing at least
integrity and authentication. An equivalent JSON encoding for a JWT
[RFC7519] in a JWS envelope [RFC7515] is supported as an alternative
at the top-level definition. The top level token can be augmented
with related claims in a Detached EAT Bundle.
For the use case of transmitting a claim set through a secure
channel, the top-level definition can be extended to use an
Unprotected CWT Claim Set (UCCS) [I-D.ietf-rats-uccs].
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This document outlines an additional top-level extension for which
neither of the above top level definitions match exactly: the
attestation token consists of a collection of objects, each with
their own integrity and some internally defined relationship through
which the integrity of the whole collection can be determined. i.e.
there is no top-level signer for the set. The objects may all share
the same logical hierarchy in a device or have a hierarchy which is
internally defined within the object set.
2. Terminology and Requirements Language
Readers are also expected to be familiar with the terminology from
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat] and [RFC9334].
In this document, the structure of data is specified in CDDL
[RFC8610] [RFC9165].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Design Considerations / Use Cases
Take a device with an attestation system consisting of a platform
claim set and a workload claim set, each controlled by different
components and with an underlying hardware Root of Trust. The two
claim sets are delivered together to make up the overall attestation
token. Depending upon the implementation and deployment use case,
the signing system can either be entirely centric to the platform RoT
or can have separate signers for the two claim sets. In either case,
a cryptographic binding is established between the two parts of the
token.
A specific manifestation of such a device is one incorporating the
Arm Confidential Compute Architecture (CCA) attestation token
[Arm-CCA]. In trying to prepare the attestation token using EAT,
there were no issues constructing the claim sets or incorporating
them into individual CWTs where appropriate. However, in trying to
design an 'envelope structure' to convey the two parts as a single
report it was found that maintaining EAT compatibility would require
very different shaped compound tokens for different models, for
example one based on a submod arrangement and another based on a
Detached EAT Bundle, though with different ‘leading’ objects. This
would create extra code and explanation in areas where keeping things
simple is desirable. There was an alternative approach considered,
which stays close to existing thinking on EAT, which would be to
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create the wrapper from the UCCS EAT extension containing only
submods for the respective components. This however stretches the
current use case for UCCS beyond its existing description. The RATS
WG approach of separating UCCS from the core EAT specification to be
an extension also encourages proposing this further extension.
To support the CCA use case, it is also relevant to consider current
attestation technologies which are based on certificate chains (e.g.
SPDM, DICE, several key attestation systems). Here also are multiple
objects with their own integrity and an internally defined
relationship. If attempting to move such a technology to the EAT
world, the same challenges apply.
An additional use case beyond the production of tokens from an
Attester occurs when using EAT to convey Attestation Results from a
Verifier. Attestation results may be separated into different
sections depending upon what aspects of Appraisal Policy are applied
by the Verifier. For example, the set of validated evidence claims
may form one section, while claims reflecting semantic conclusions
drawn by an Appraisal Policy could form another section. Given the
role of different authorities in concluding result sections, each
could have a different signer rather than all results being under a
single signature from the Verifier. In this case, a collection can
be used to collate all result sections into a single response
message. Using a collection simplifies operations if individual
sections from the collated result sections need to be later dispersed
to different Relying Parties.
A further Attestation Result use case can be seen in the "Below Zero
Trust" system described in [I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si] where the AR-
augmented Evidence credential has compound form.
4. Token Collection
The proposed extension for the top-level definition is to add a
'Token Collection' type. The contents of the type are a map of CWTs
(JWTs). The Detached EAT Bundle top-level entry for EAT is included
for completeness, and the UCCS extension can also be embraced, though
the use cases for these have not been explored. The identification
of collection members and the intra collection integrity mechanism is
considered usage specific. A verifier will be expected to extract
each of the members of the collection and check their validity both
individually and as a set. In addition to entries which have their
own integrity, it is also supported to include an unsigned Claims
Set, provided that the integrity for that Claims Set is provided
within another entry that uses one of the signed forms.
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A map was chosen rather than an unbounded array to give the
opportunity to add identifying map tags to each entry. The
interpretation of the tags will be usage specific, but may correspond
to registered identities of specific token types. To assist a
verifier correlate the expected contents a profile entry can be added
as the ‘profile-label’ identity in the map.
See Appendix A for a CDDL description of the proposed extension.
While most of the use cases for collections are for scenarios where
there will be at least two entries in a collection, the CDDL allows
for >= 1 entries in a collection to allow for the scenario where only
one entry is currently available even though the normal set is
larger.
4.1. Binder Definition
This specification includes a proposal for a Collection Binder claim
(see Figure 1). This claim would be included within any collection
entry as a definiton of the integrity mechanism that binds that
collection entry to another collection entry. There may be more than
one binder claims in a given collection entry. If a binder is
present, a verifier MUST use the information within this claim to
drive inter-collection entry integrity checking. The binders in a
collection describe a digraph structure. The verifier MUST reject a
collection that contains loops, i.e., it must make sure that the
described structure is a simple directed graph. This claim would not
be mandatory within a collection entry as a verifier may implement
the integrity checking based upon information in the profile alone.
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; The Collection Binder is a formal declaration of the inter entry
; binding mechanism. It would be included within the body of one or
; more of the collection entries.
Collection-Binder = [
binder-function,
[*binder-source-label],
destination-collection-entry,
destination-claim
]
; binder-function is the name/id of a hash algorithm
binder-function = JC<text,int>
; By definition, the binder-function is applied to a concatenation
; of the ordered list of source claims.
; If the array is empty, the function is applied to the whole
; contents of the token.
binder-source-label = Claim-Label
destination-collection-entry = collection-entry-label
destination-claim = Claim-Label
Claim-Label = JC<"text", int>
collection-entry-label = JC<text, int>
JC<J,C> = J .feature "json" / C .feature "cbor"
Figure 1: EAT collection binder
The attributes within the binder claim are:
* binder-function: the identity of the binding cryptographic
function, usually a hash function, applied to the values
identified by the binder-source-label array.
* binder-source-label: an array defining the set of claims providing
the binding information within the collection entry. It is
assumed that the values corresponding to this (ordered) list will
be concatenated and have the binder-function applied to produce a
binder value. If the array is empty, the entire source collection
entry is used as input to the binder-function. This latter
condition would normally be applied to a collection entry
consisting of a Claim Set.
* destination-collection-entry: this defines the collection entry
that will hold (receive) the binding for this (source) collection
entry.
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* destination-claim: this defines the claim label within
destination-collection-entry which will store the binder value.
A verifier can check the binding between two collection entries by
computing the binder value for one entry and comparing the result
stored within the value of the destination claim (in the destination
collection entry).
5. Security Considerations
A verifier for an attestation token must apply a verification process
for the full set of entries contained within the Token Collection.
This process will be custom to the relevant profile for the Token
Collection and take into account any individual verification per
entry and/or verification for the objects considered collectively,
including the intra token integrity scheme. As there is no overall
signature for the Collection, protection against malicious
modification MUST be contained within the entries. In general, a
secure channel for the conveyance of EAT collections MUST provide at
least end-to-end cryptographic integrity. It is expected that there
exists a cryptographic binding between entries, this can for example
be one to many or one to one in a (chain) series. The implementation
of creating these bindings may involve passing data across ABIs.
This provides an attack vector on the integrity of the collection
which must be considered within any threat model. With respect to
binder claims, these require integrity protection. This protection
can either be provided by the signature on the token entry which
contains the binder or, in the case where the entry does not have a
signature, by including the binder claim with any other claims when
preparing input into the cryptographic binding function. Depending
upon the use case and associated threat model, the freshness of
entries may need extra consideration.
6. IANA Considerations
In the registry [IANA.cbor-tags], IANA is requested to allocate the
tag in Table 1 from the FCFS space, with the present document as the
specification reference.
+========+===========+========================+
| Tag | Data Item | Semantics |
+========+===========+========================+
| TBD399 | map | EAT Collection RFCthis |
+--------+-----------+------------------------+
Table 1: EAT Collection
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6.1. Media Type Registration
IANA is requested to register the "application/eat-collection" media
type [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.media-types] in
the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that
the content is an EAT collection.
The new media type extends the set of EAT media types introduced in
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat-media-type].
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: eat-collection
* Required parameters: n/a
* Optional parameters: n/a
* Encoding considerations: binary
* Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
of RFCthis
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
* Published specification: RFCthis
* Applications that use this media type: Attesters, Relying Parties
and Verifiers sending EAT collection messages over HTTP(S) and
other transports.
* Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
* Additional information:
- Magic number(s): n/a
- File extension(s): n/a
- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
* Person & email address to contact for further information: Simon
Frost, Simon.Frost@arm.com
* Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: none
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* Author: Simon Frost, Simon.Frost@arm.com
* Change controller: IESG
* Provisional registration? No
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C.
Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-19, 19
December 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-rats-eat-19>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat-media-type]
Lundblade, L., Birkholz, H., and T. Fossati, "EAT Media
Types", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-
eat-media-type-02, 10 March 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-
eat-media-type-02>.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2046>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>.
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[RFC9165] Bormann, C., "Additional Control Operators for the Concise
Data Definition Language (CDDL)", RFC 9165,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9165, December 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9165>.
7.2. Informative References
[Arm-CCA] Arm Ltd, "Confidential Compute Architecture", 2022,
<https://www.arm.com/architecture/security-features/arm-
confidential-compute-architecture>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si]
Voit, E., Birkholz, H., Hardjono, T., Fossati, T., and V.
Scarlata, "Attestation Results for Secure Interactions",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-
04, 2 March 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-04>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-uccs]
Birkholz, H., O'Donoghue, J., Cam-Winget, N., and C.
Bormann, "A CBOR Tag for Unprotected CWT Claims Sets",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-uccs-05,
1 February 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-rats-uccs-05>.
[IANA.cbor-tags]
IANA, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cbor-tags>.
[IANA.media-types]
IANA, "Media Types",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7519>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8392>.
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[RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS)
Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January
2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.
[STD96] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.
Appendix A. CDDL
$$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token /= Tagged-Collection
$$EAT-CBOR-Untagged-Token /= TL-Collection
Tagged-Collection = #6.TBD399(TL-Collection)
TL-Collection = {
? eat-collection-identifier,
+ all-collection-types
}
eat-collection-identifier = (
profile-label => general-uri / general-oid
)
all-collection-types = (
cwt-collection-entries //
jwt-collection-entries //
claim-set-collection-entries //
detatched-eat-bundle-collection-entries
)
cwt-collection-entries = (
collection-entry-label => CWT-Messages
)
jwt-collection-entries = (
collection-entry-label => JWT-Messages
)
claim-set-collection-entries = (
collection-entry-label => JC<json-wrapped-claims-set,
cbor-wrapped-claims-set>
)
detatched-eat-bundle-collection-entries = (
collection-entry-label => BUNDLE-Messages
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)
collection-entry-label = JC<text, int>
; The Collection Binder is a formal declaration of the inter entry
; binding mechanism. It would be included within the body of one or
; more of the collection entries.
Tagged-Collection-Binder = #6.TBD99(Collection-Binder)
Collection-Binder = [
binder-function,
[*binder-source-label],
destination-collection-entry,
destination-claim
]
; binder function is normally the name/id of a hash algorithm
binder-function = JC<text,int>
; by definition, the binder-function is applied to a concatenation
; of the ordered list of source claims
; If the array is empty, the function is applied to the whole
; contents of the token
binder-source-label = Claim-Label
destination-collection-entry = collection-entry-label
destination-claim = Claim-Label
Acknowledgments
Thomas Fossati proposed the inclusion of the Binder definiton and
collaborated on the CDDL. Yogesh Deshpande provided insightful
comments and review for this proposal.
Contributors
Thomas Fossati
Arm Limited
Email: thomas.fossati@arm.com
Author's Address
Simon Frost
Arm
Email: Simon.Frost@arm.com
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