Internet DRAFT - draft-gao-bess-evpn-blackhole
draft-gao-bess-evpn-blackhole
BESS Workgroup Yuan Gao
Internet-Draft Haibo Wang
Intended status: Standards Track Huawei Technologies
Expires: July 20, 2019 January 16, 2019
EVPN blackhole community extention for Blackholing
draft-gao-bess-evpn-blackhole-01
Abstract
Ethernet Virtual Private Networks (EVPN) is becoming the de-facto
standard-based control plane solution for Data Center and layer-2
Service Provider applications.The risk of hacking and DDos attacks
within the EVPN network is general common concern.Blackhole mac is a
method used to block hacking or DDos attacks, The network device
discard the packets where destionation match the blackhole
mac.Normally blackhole mac is mannually configured on the
networkdevic,Configure blackhole mac is complex and error-prone task
for network operators.This document introduces a blackhole community
extension for evpn mac route to distribute the blackhole mac in the
EVPN networks.The evpn mac route with blackhole community allows the
bgp speaker to notify the recipients the specific mac is a blackhole
mac.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in .
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 20, 2019.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Blackhole Extended Community Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Control Plane Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Data Packets Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction
Hacking attacks are a serious threat to the network infrastructure.In
order to prevent a hacker from using a MAC address to attack a user
device or network, the MAC address of an untrusted user is configured
as blackhole mac on the network device.
DDoS attacks targeting a certain mac may cause congestion of links,In
order to block DDoS attacks, the mac being attacked could be
congfigured as blackhole mac on the network device, The network
device directly discards the received packets where the destination
MAC address is the blackhole MAC address.
Normally blackhole mac address entrys are manually configured on the
device. After blackhole mac entrys are configured, the device
discards packets destined for the blackhole mac address. Configure
blackhole mac is complex and error-prone task for network operators.
Therefore a well-known BGP community for blackholing based on evpn
route is defined for operational ease.
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This document introduces a blackhole community extension for evpn mac
route, The BGP speaker advertise evpn mac route with this community
indicate that the specific mac is a blackhole mac, the recipients
install the mac address as blackhole mac address entry and discard
the packet corresponds to the blackhole mac address.
2. Blackhole Extended Community Attribute
MAC Mobility Extended Community can be used to carry the blackhole
mac attribute. MAC Mobility Extended Community may be advertised
along with MAC/IP Advertisement routes. The thirdly octet of the
first word is Flags octect. The Flag bit 7(B Bit) of the flags
octect is defined as the "blackhole" bit . A value of 1 means that
the MAC address is blackhole mac . The semantics of this attribute is
to allow a network to interpret the presence of this community as an
advisory qualification to drop any traffic being sent towards or from
this mac.
When the Mac Mobility Extended Community's B bit is set to 1, the
sequence number is meaningless and should be set to zero.
The MAC Mobility extended community is encoded as an 8-octet value,
as follows:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0x06 | Sub-Type=0x00 |R|R|R|R|R|R|B|S| Reserved=0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
3. Control Plane Processing
When a network device is under DDos attack, it may announce the
victim's mac address as blackhole mac address for the purpose of
signaling to neighboring networks any traffic destinated to the mac
address should be discard. In such a scenarior, the victim's mac
route should attach Blackhole Extended Community. The network device
will install the victim's mac address as blackhole mac entry. Then
the network device advertise the victim's mac address in evpn mac
route with MAC Mobility Extended Community, the MAC Mobility Extended
Community set the "blackhole" flag . The recipients install the mac
address as blackhole mac address entry.
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4. Data Packets Processing
When the network device received packets where the destination MAC
address match the blackhole MAC address. The network device discards
the packet directly.
5. IANA Considerations
TBD.
6. Security Considerations
Unauthorized addition of the BLACKHOLE BGP community to a mac route
by the forwarding agent may cause a unexpected packet discard. BGP
have to support the mechanism to prevent the unauthorized
modification of information by the forwarding agent.Recipients of
routing information have the ability to to detect the unauthorized
modification. Howto prevent the unauthorized modification is out of
the scope of this document.
7. Acknowledgements
The authors of this document would like to thank zhuangshunwan for
his comments and review of this document.
8. References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7432] Sajassi, A., Ed., Aggarwal, R., Bitar, N., Isaac, A.,
Uttaro, J., Drake, J., and W. Henderickx, "BGP MPLS-Based
Ethernet VPN", RFC 7432, DOI 10.17487/RFC7432, February
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7432>.
Authors' Addresses
Yuan Gao
Huawei Technologies
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District
Nanjing 210012
P.R. China
Email: sean.gao@huawei.com
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Haibo Wang
Huawei Technologies
Huawei Bld., No.156 Beiqing Rd.
Beijing 100095
P.R. China
Email: rainsword.wang@huawei.com
