Internet DRAFT - draft-gazdag-x509-slhdsa
draft-gazdag-x509-slhdsa
Network Working Group K. Bashiri
Internet-Draft BSI
Intended status: Standards Track S. Fluhrer
Expires: 25 August 2024 Cisco Systems
S. Gazdag
genua GmbH
D. Van Geest
CryptoNext Security
S. Kousidis
BSI
22 February 2024
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Algorithm Identifiers for SLH-
DSA
draft-gazdag-x509-slhdsa-00
Abstract
Digital signatures are used within X.509 certificates, Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs), and to sign messages. This document
describes the conventions for using the Stateless Hash-Based Digital
Signature Standard (SLH-DSA) in Internet X.509 certificates and
certificate revocation lists. The conventions for the associated
signatures, subject public keys, and private key are also described.
[EDNOTE: This draft is not expected to be finalized before the NIST
PQC Project has standardized FIPS 205 Stateless Hash-Based Digital
Signature Standard. The current FIPS draft was published August 24,
2023 for public review. Final versions are expected by April 2024.
This specification will use object identifiers for the new algorithms
that are assigned by NIST, and will use placeholders until these are
released.]
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gazdag-x509-slhdsa/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/x509-hbs/draft-x509-slhdsa.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 August 2024.
Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Algorithm Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. SLH-DSA Signatures in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. SLH-DSA Public Keys in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Key Usage Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. SLH-DSA Private Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Security Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signatures (SLH-DSA) is a quantum-
resistant digital signature scheme standardized in [FIPS205] [EDNOTE:
[FIPS205-ipd] until officially published] by the US National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC project [NIST-PQC].
This document specifies the use of the SLH-DSA algorithm in Public
Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX) certificates and Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs).
SLH-DSA offers three security levels. The parameters for each of the
security levels were chosen to provide 128 bits of security, 192 bits
of security, and 256 bits of security. A separate algorithm
identifier has been assigned for SLH-DSA at each of these security
levels.
[EDNOTE: TODO: sha2 vs shake, fast vs small]
This specification includes conventions for the signatureAlgorithm,
signatureValue, signature, and subjectPublicKeyInfo fields within
Internet X.509 certificates and CRLs [RFC5280], like [RFC3279] did
for classic cryptography and [RFC5480] did for elliptic curve
cryptography. It describes the encoding of digital signatures and
public keys generated with quantum-resistant signature algorithm SLH-
DSA.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Algorithm Identifiers
This specification uses placeholders for object identifiers until the
identifiers for the new algorithms are assigned by NIST.
The AlgorithmIdentifier type, which is included herein for
convenience, is defined as follows:
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AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL
}
| NOTE: The above syntax is from [RFC5280] and matches the
| version used therein, i.e., the 1988 ASN.1 syntax. See
| [RFC5912] for ASN.1 copmatible with the 2015 ASN.1 syntax.
The fields in AlgorithmIdentifier have the following meanings:
* algorithm identifies the cryptographic algorithm with an object
identifier.
* parameters, which are optional, are the associated parameters for
the algorithm identifier in the algorithm field.
The OIDs are:
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id-alg-slh-dsa-128s-shake OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) sigAlgs(3) TBD }
id-alg-slh-dsa-128f-shake OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) sigAlgs(3) TBD }
id-alg-slh-dsa-128s-sha2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) sigAlgs(3) TBD }
id-alg-slh-dsa-128f-sha2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) sigAlgs(3) TBD }
id-alg-slh-dsa-192s-shake OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) sigAlgs(3) TBD }
id-alg-slh-dsa-192f-shake OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) sigAlgs(3) TBD }
id-alg-slh-dsa-256s-shake OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) sigAlgs(3) TBD }
id-alg-slh-dsa-256f-shake OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) sigAlgs(3) TBD }
The contents of the parameters component for each algorithm are
absent.
4. SLH-DSA Signatures in PKIX
SLH-DSA is a digital signature scheme built upon hash functions. The
security of SLH-DSA relies on the presumed diffculty of finding
preimages for hash functions as well as several related properties of
the same hash functions.
Signatures are used in a number of different ASN.1 structures. As
shown in the ASN.1 representation from [RFC5280] below, in an X.509
certificate, a signature is encoded with an algorithm identifier in
the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a signatureValue attribute that
contains the actual signature.
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Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING }
Signatures are also used in the CRL list ASN.1 representation from
[RFC5280] below. In a X.509 CRL, a signature is encoded with an
algorithm identifier in the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a
signatureValue attribute that contains the actual signature.
CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertList,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING }
The identifiers defined in Section 3 can be used as the
AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence
Certificate/CertificateList and the signature field in the sequence
TBSCertificate/TBSCertList in certificates CRLs, respectively,
[RFC5280]. The parameters of these signature algorithms are absent,
as explained in Section 3.
The signatureValue field contains the corresponding SLH-DSA signature
computed upon the ASN.1 DER encoded tbsCertificate [RFC5280].
Conforming Certification Authority (CA) implementations MUST specify
the algorithms explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 3
when encoding SLH-DSA signatures in certificates and CRLs.
Conforming client implementations that process certificates and CRLs
using SLH-DSA MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs. Encoding rules
for SLH-DSA signature values are specified Section 3.
When any of the id-alg-slh-dsa-* identifiers appear in the algorithm
field as an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding MUST omit the
parameters field. That is, the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a
SEQUENCE of one component, the id-alg-slh-dsa-* OID.
5. SLH-DSA Public Keys in PKIX
In the X.509 certificate, the subjectPublicKeyInfo field has the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, which has the following ASN.1 syntax:
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING
}
The fields in SubjectPublicKeyInfo have the following meanings:
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* algorithm is the algorithm identifier and parameters for the
public key (see above).
* subjectPublicKey contains the byte stream of the public key.
The SLH--DSA public key MUST be encoded using the ASN.1 type SLH-DSA-
PublicKey:
SLH-DSA-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING
where SLH-DSA-PublicKey is a concatenation of the PK.seed and PK.root
values as defined in Section 9.1 of [FIPS205]. These parameters MUST
be encoded as a single OCTET STRING. The size required to hold a
SLH-DSA-PublicKey public key element is therefore 2*n bytes, where n
is 16, 24, or 32, depending on the parameter set.
The id-alg-slh-dsa-* identifiers defined in Section 3 MUST be used as
the algorithm field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo sequence [RFC5280] to
identify a SLH-DSA public key.
The SLH-DSA public key (a concatenation of seed and root that is an
OCTET STRING) is mapped to a subjectPublicKey (a value of type BIT
STRING) as follows: the most significant bit of the OCTET STRING
value becomes the most significant bit of the BIT STRING value, and
so on; the least significant bit of the OCTET STRING becomes the
least significant bit of the BIT STRING.
The following is an example of a [TODO: pick an OID] public key
encoded using the textual encoding defined in [RFC7468].
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
TODO
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the X.509 public key
algorithm explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when
using SLH-DSA public keys in certificates and CRLs. Conforming
client implementations that process SLH-DSA public keys when
processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the corresponding
OIDs.
6. Key Usage Bits
The intended application for the key is indicated in the keyUsage
certificate extension; see Section 4.2.1.3 of [RFC5280]. If the
keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that indicates an id-
alg-slh-dsa-* identifier in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo, then the at
least one of following MUST be present:
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digitalSignature; or
nonRepudiation; or
keyCertSign; or
cRLSign.
Requirements about the keyUsage extension bits defined in [RFC5280]
still apply.
7. SLH-DSA Private Keys
"Asymmetric Key Packages" [RFC5958] describes how to encode a private
key in a structure that both identifies what algorithm the private
key is for and allows for the public key and additional attributes
about the key to be included as well. For illustration, the ASN.1
structure OneAsymmetricKey is replicated below. The algorithm-
specific details of how a private key is encoded are left for the
document describing the algorithm itself.
OneAsymmetricKey ::= SEQUENCE {
version Version,
privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
privateKey PrivateKey,
attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL,
...,
[[2: publicKey [1] IMPLICIT PublicKey OPTIONAL ]],
...
}
PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING
PublicKey ::= BIT STRING
An SLH-DSA private key consists of the concatenation of 4 n-byte
elements, SK.seed, SK.prf, PK.seed and PK.root as defined in
Section 9.1 of [FIPS205]. The size required to hold an SLH-DSA-
PrivateKey private key is therefore 4*n bytes, where n is 16, 24, or
32, depending on the parameter set.
For the keys defined in this document, the private key is always an
opaque byte sequence. The ASN.1 type SLH-DSA-PrivateKey is defined
in this document to hold the byte sequence. Thus, when encoding a
OneAsymmetricKey object, the private key is wrapped in a SLH-DSA-
PrivateKey object and wrapped by the OCTET STRING of the "privateKey"
field.
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[EDNOTE: the above paragraph is from RFC8410, and it reads to me like
there's a double wrapping, i.e. OCTET STRING { OCTET STRING { private
key bytes} }, however that's not the case. Am I reading it wrong, or
is the text unclear?]
SLH-DSA-PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING
To encode an SLH-DSA private key, the "privateKey" field will hold
the encoded private key. The "privateKeyAlgorithm" field uses the
AlgorithmIdentifier structure. The structure is encoded as defined
above. If present, the "publicKey" field will hold the encoded key
as defined in Section 5.
The following is an example of a private key encoded using the
textual encoding defined in [RFC7468].
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
TODO
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
NOTE: There exist some private key import functions that have not
picked up the new ASN.1 structure OneAsymmetricKey that is defined in
[RFC7748]. This means that they will not accept a private key
structure that contains the public key field. This means a balancing
act needs to be done between being able to do a consistency check on
the key pair and widest ability to import the key.
8. ASN.1 Module
TODO: This is mostly copied from draft-ietf-lamps-cms-sphincs-plus;
coordinate with those authors what goes in which draft.
TODO: Also do the proper module stuff. Again this is just here until
we figure out how to do it right.
--
-- Object Identifiers
--
id-alg-slh-dsa-128s-shake OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
id-alg-slh-dsa-128f-shake OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
id-alg-slh-dsa-128s-sha2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
id-alg-slh-dsa-128f-sha2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
id-alg-slh-dsa-192s-shake OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
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id-alg-slh-dsa-192f-shake OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
id-alg-slh-dsa-256s-shake OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
id-alg-slh-dsa-256f-shake OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
--
-- Signature Algorithm, Public Key, and Private Key
--
sa-slh-dsa-128s-shake SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-128s-shake
PARAMS ARE absent
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-slh-dsa-128s-shake }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-slh-dsa-128s-shake } }
sa-slh-dsa-128f-shake SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-128f-shake
PARAMS ARE absent
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-slh-dsa-128f-shake }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-slh-dsa-128f-shake } }
sa-slh-dsa-128s-sha2 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-128s-sha2
PARAMS ARE absent
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-slh-dsa-128s-sha2 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-slh-dsa-128s-sha2 } }
sa-slh-dsa-128f-sha2 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-128f-sha2
PARAMS ARE absent
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-slh-dsa-128f-sha2 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-slh-dsa-128f-sha2 } }
sa-slh-dsa-192s-shake SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-192s-shake
PARAMS ARE absent
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-slh-dsa-192s-shake }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-slh-dsa-192s-shake } }
sa-slh-dsa-192f-shake SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-192f-shake
PARAMS ARE absent
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-slh-dsa-192f-shake }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-slh-dsa-192f-shake } }
sa-slh-dsa-256s-shake SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-256s-shake
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PARAMS ARE absent
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-slh-dsa-256s-shake }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-slh-dsa-256s-shake } }
sa-slh-dsa-256f-shake SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-256f-shake
PARAMS ARE absent
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-slh-dsa-256f-shake }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-slh-dsa-256f-shake } }
pk-slh-dsa-128s-shake PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-128s-shake
KEY SLH-DSA-PublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign }
PRIVATE-KEY SLH-DSA-PrivateKey }
pk-slh-dsa-128f-shake PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-128f-shake
KEY SLH-DSA-PublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign }
PRIVATE-KEY SLH-DSA-PrivateKey }
pk-slh-dsa-128s-sha2 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-128s-sha2
KEY SLH-DSA-PublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign }
PRIVATE-KEY SLH-DSA-PrivateKey }
pk-slh-dsa-128f-sha2 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-128f-sha2
KEY SLH-DSA-PublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign }
PRIVATE-KEY SLH-DSA-PrivateKey }
pk-slh-dsa-192s-shake PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-192s-shake
KEY SLH-DSA-PublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign }
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PRIVATE-KEY SLH-DSA-PrivateKey }
pk-slh-dsa-192f-shake PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-192f-shake
KEY SLH-DSA-PublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign }
PRIVATE-KEY SLH-DSA-PrivateKey }
pk-slh-dsa-256s-shake PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-256s-shake
KEY SLH-DSA-PublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign }
PRIVATE-KEY SLH-DSA-PrivateKey }
pk-slh-dsa-256f-shake PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-slh-dsa-256f-shake
KEY SLH-DSA-PublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent
CERT-KEY-USAGE
{ digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyCertSign, cRLSign }
PRIVATE-KEY SLH-DSA-PrivateKey }
SLH-DSA-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING
SLH-DSA-PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING
9. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [RFC5280] applies accordingly.
TODO Security
10. IANA Considerations
TODO
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[FIPS205] "TBD", n.d..
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[FIPS205-ipd]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard", 24
August 2023, <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.205.ipd.pdf>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5958>.
[RFC7468] Josefsson, S. and S. Leonard, "Textual Encodings of PKIX,
PKCS, and CMS Structures", RFC 7468, DOI 10.17487/RFC7468,
April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7468>.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
11.2. Informative References
[I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-sphincs-plus]
Housley, R., Fluhrer, S., Kampanakis, P., and B.
Westerbaan, "Use of the SLH-DSA Signature Algorithm in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-sphincs-plus-03, 14
November 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-sphincs-plus-03>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates]
Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B.
Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Algorithm Identifiers for ML-DSA", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-
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03, 5 February 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
dilithium-certificates-03>.
[NIST-PQC] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Post-
Quantum Cryptography Project", 20 December 2016,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-
cryptography>.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3279>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5480>.
[RFC8411] Schaad, J. and R. Andrews, "IANA Registration for the
Cryptographic Algorithm Object Identifier Range",
RFC 8411, DOI 10.17487/RFC8411, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8411>.
Appendix A. Security Strengths
Instead of defining the strength of a quantum algorithm in a
traditional manner using precise estimates of the number of bits of
security, NIST has instead elected to define a collection of broad
security strength categories. Each category is defined by a
comparatively easy-to-analyze reference primitive that cover a range
of security strengths offered by existing NIST standards in symmetric
cryptography, which NIST expects to offer significant resistance to
quantum cryptanalysis. These categories describe any attack that
breaks the relevant security definition that must require
computational resources comparable to or greater than those required
for: Level 1 - key search on a block cipher with a 128-bit key (e.g.,
AES128), Level 2 - collision search on a 256-bit hash function (e.g.,
SHA256/ SHA3-256), Level 3 - key search on a block cipher with a
192-bit key (e.g., AES192), Level 4 - collision search on a 384-bit
hash function (e.g. SHA384/SHA3-384), Level 5 - key search on a
block cipher with a 256-bit key (e.g., AES 256).
The parameter sets defined for NIST security levels 1, 3 and 5 are
listed in Table 1, along with the resulting signature size, public
key, and private key sizes in bytes.
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+===========================+============+======+=========+=========+
| OID | NIST | Sig. | Public | Private |
| | Level | (B) | Key (B) | Key (B) |
+===========================+============+======+=========+=========+
| id-alg-slh-dsa-128s-shake | 1 | TODO | TODO | TODO |
+---------------------------+------------+------+---------+---------+
| id-alg-slh-dsa-128f-shake | 1 | TODO | TODO | TODO |
+---------------------------+------------+------+---------+---------+
| id-alg-slh-dsa-128s-sha2 | 1 | TODO | TODO | TODO |
+---------------------------+------------+------+---------+---------+
| id-alg-slh-dsa-128f-sha2 | 1 | TODO | TODO | TODO |
+---------------------------+------------+------+---------+---------+
| id-alg-slh-dsa-192s-shake | 3 | TODO | TODO | TODO |
+---------------------------+------------+------+---------+---------+
| id-alg-slh-dsa-192f-shake | 3 | TODO | TODO | TODO |
+---------------------------+------------+------+---------+---------+
| id-alg-slh-dsa-256s-shake | 5 | TODO | TODO | TODO |
+---------------------------+------------+------+---------+---------+
| id-alg-slh-dsa-256f-shake | 5 | TODO | TODO | TODO |
+---------------------------+------------+------+---------+---------+
Table 1: SLH-DSA security strengths
Acknowledgments
Much of the structure and text of this document is based on
[I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates]. The remainder comes from
[I-D.draft-ietf-lamps-cms-sphincs-plus]. Thanks to those authors,
and the ones they based their work on, for making our work earier.
"Copying always makes things easier and less error prone" -
[RFC8411].
TODO: Hopefully others will help out. They will be acknowledged
here. And if you've read this far...
Authors' Addresses
Kaveh Bashiri
BSI
Email: kaveh.bashiri.ietf@gmail.com
Scott Fluhrer
Cisco Systems
Email: sfluhrer@cisco.com
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Stefan Gazdag
genua GmbH
Email: ietf@gazdag.de
Daniel Van Geest
CryptoNext Security
16, Boulevard Saint-Germain
75005 Paris
France
Email: daniel.vangeest.ietf@gmail.com
Stavros Kousidis
BSI
Email: kousidis.ietf@gmail.com
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