Internet DRAFT - draft-george-sidr-as-migration
draft-george-sidr-as-migration
Internet Engineering Task Force W. George
Internet-Draft Time Warner Cable
Intended status: Informational S. Murphy
Expires: August 5, 2013 SPARTA, Inc., a Parsons Company
February 1, 2013
BGPSec Considerations for AS Migration
draft-george-sidr-as-migration-01
Abstract
This draft discusses considerations and methods for supporting and
securing a common method for AS-Migration within the BGPSec protocol.
Status of this Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. General Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Origin Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. Outbound announcements (PE-->CE) . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. Inbound announcements (CE-->PE) . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Outbound (PE->CE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Inbound (CE->PE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. Other considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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1. Introduction
There is a method of managing an ASN migration using some BGP knobs
that while commonly-used are not formally part of the BGP4 [RFC4271]
protocol specification and may be vendor-specific in exact
implementation. In order to ensure that this behavior is understood
and considered for future modifications to the BGP4 protocol
specification, especially as it concerns the handling of AS_PATH
attributes, the behavior and process has been defined in
draft-ga-idr-as-migration [I-D.ga-idr-as-migration]. Accordingly, it
is necessary to discuss this de facto standard to ensure that the
process and features are properly supported in BGPSec
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol], because BGPSec is explicitly
designed to protect against changes in the BGP AS_PATH, whether by
choice, by misconfiguration, or by malicious intent. It is critical
that the BGPSec protocol framework is able to support this
operationally necessary tool without creating an unacceptable
security risk or exploit in the process.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. General Scenario
This draft assumes that the reader has read and understood the ASN
migration method discussed in draft-ga-idr-as-migration
[I-D.ga-idr-as-migration] including its examples, as they will be
heavily referenced here. The use case being discussed in the
referenced draft is as follows: For whatever the reason, a provider
is in the process of merging two or more ASNs, where eventually one
subsumes the other(s). Confederations RFC 5065 [RFC5065] are *not*
being implemented between the ASNs, but vendor-specific configuration
knobs are being used to allow the migrating PE to masquerade as the
old ASN for the PE-CE eBGP session, or to manipulate the AS_PATH, or
both. While BGPSec [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] does have a case
to handle standard confederation implementations, it may not be
applicable in this exact case. The reason that this may drive a
slightly different solution in BGPSec than a standard confederation
is that unlike in a confederation, eBGP peers may not be peering with
the "correct" external ASN, and the forward-signed updates are for a
public ASN, rather than a private one, so there is no expectation
that the BGP speaker should strip the updates before propagating the
route to its eBGP neighbors.
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In the following examples, AS300 is being subsumed by AS200, and both
ASNs represent a Service Provider (SP) network. AS100 and 400
represent end customer networks. References to PE, CE, and P routers
mirror the diagrams and references in the above draft.
3. RPKI Considerations
Since the methods and implementation discussed in
draft-ga-idr-as-migration [I-D.ga-idr-as-migration] are not
technically a part of the BGP4 protocol implementation, but rather a
vendor-specific optimization, BGPSec is not technically required to
ensure that it continues functioning as it does today. However, this
is widely used during network integrations resulting from mergers and
acquisitions, as well as network redesigns, and therefore it is not
feasible to simply eliminate this capability on any BGPSec-enabled
routers/ASNs. What follows is a discussion of the potential issues
to be considered regarding how ASN-migration and BGPSec
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] validation might interact.
One of the primary considerations for this draft and migration is
that companies rarely stop with one merger/acquisition/divestiture,
and end up accumulating several legacy ASNs over time. Since they
are using methods to migrate that do not require coordination with
customers, they do not have a great deal of control over the length
of the transition period as they might with something completely
under their administrative control like a key roll. This leaves many
SPs with multiple legacy ASNs which don't go away very quickly, if at
all. As solutions were being proposed for RPKI implementations to
solve this transition case, operational complexity and hardware
scaling considerations associated with maintaining multiple legacy
ASN keys on routers throughout the combined network have been
carefully considered. While part of the recommendation may be "SPs
SHOULD NOT remain in this transition phase indefinitely because of
the operational complexity and scaling considerations associated with
maintaining multiple legacy ASN keys on routers throughout the
combined network", this is of limited utility as a solution, and so
every effort has been made to keep the additional complexity during
the transition period to a minimum, on the assumption that it will
likely be protracted.
3.1. Origin Validation
Origin Validation does not need a unique solution to enable
migration, as the existing protocol and procedure allows for a
solution. In the scenario discussed, AS300 is being replaced by
AS200. If there are any existing routes originated by AS300 on the
router being moved into the new ASN, this simply requires generating
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new ROAs for the routes with the new ASN and treating them as new
routes to be added to AS200. However, we also need to consider the
situation where one or more other PEs are still in AS300, and are
originating one or more routes that may be distinct from any that the
router under migration is originating. When those routes arrive at
PE1, which is now a part of AS200 and instructed to use replace-as to
remove AS300 from the path, PE1 needs to be able to handle routes
originated from AS300. If the route now shows up as originating from
AS200, any downstream peers' validation check will fail unless a ROA
is *also* available for AS200 as the origin ASN, meaning that there
will be overlapping ROAs until all routers originating prefixes from
AS300 are migrated to AS200. Overlapping ROAs are permissible perRFC
6480 [RFC6480] section 3.2, and so managing origin validation during
a migration like this is merely applying the defined case where a set
of prefixes are originated from more than one ASN. Therefore, for
each ROA that authorizes AS300 to originate a prefix, a new ROA
SHOULD also be created that authorizes AS200 to originate the same
prefix.
3.2. Path Validation
BGPSec Path Validation requires that each router in the AS_PATH
cryptographically sign its update to assert that "Every AS listed in
the AS_PATH attribute of the update explicitly authorized the
advertisement of the route to the subsequent AS in the AS_PATH."
Since this migration technique is explicitly modifying the AS_PATH
between two eBGP peers who are not coordinating with one another (are
not in the same administrative domain), no level of trust can be
assumed, and therefore it may be difficult to identify legitimate
manipulation of the AS_PATH for migration activities when compared to
manipulation due to misconfiguration or malicious intent.
3.2.1. Outbound announcements (PE-->CE)
When PE1 is moved from AS300 to AS200, it will be provisioned with
the appropriate keys for AS200 so that it can begin forward-signing
routes using AS200. However, there is currently no guidance in the
BGPSec protocol specification on whether or not the forward-signed
ASN value MUST match the configured "remote-as" to validate properly.
That is, if CE1's BGP session is configured as "remote-as 300", the
presence of "local-as 300" on PE1 will ensure that there is no ASN
mismatch on the BGP session itself, but if CE1 receives updates from
its remote neighbor (PE1) forward-signed from AS200, should the
BGPSec validator on CE1 still consider those valid by default? If it
does, is there any potential attack vector to consider? RFC4271
[RFC4271] section 6.3 mentions this match between the ASN of the peer
and the AS_PATH data, but it is listed as an optional validation,
rather than a requirement.
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3.2.2. Inbound announcements (CE-->PE)
Inbound is more complicated, because the CE doesn't know that PE1 has
changed ASNs, so it is forward-signing all of its routes with AS300,
not AS200. The BGPSec speaker cannot manipulate previous signatures,
and therefore cannot manipulate the previous AS_Path without causing
a mismatch that will invalidate the route. If the updates are simply
left intact, the ISP would still need to publish and maintain valid
and active public-keys for AS 300 if it is to appear in the
BGPSec_Path_Signature in order that receivers can validate the
BGPSEC_Path_Signature arrived intact/whole. However, if the updates
are left intact, this will cause the AS_PATH length to be increased,
which as previously stated is undesirable.
4. Requirements
These requirements are written under the assumption that the
currently vendor-specific implementations will be standardized via
draft-ga-idr-as-migration [I-D.ga-idr-as-migration], as it makes
little sense to build support into a standard for something that is
not actually a standard itself. However, should IETF choose not to
standardize the discussed method of AS migration, it is possible that
this draft could be considered implementation guidance for those
vendors that have support for this method of AS migration and wish to
support it in their BGPSec implementation. Any solution to the
described problem needs to consider the following requirements,
listed in no particular order:
o BGPSec MUST support AS Migration for both inbound and outbound
route announcements (see Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). It SHOULD do
this without reducing BGPSec's protections for route path
o MUST NOT require any reconfiguration on the remote eBGP neighbor
(CE)
o SHOULD confine configuration changes to the migrating PEs e.g.
can't require global configuration changes to support migration
o MUST NOT lengthen AS Path during migration
o MUST operate within existing trust boundaries e.g. can't expect
remote side to accept pcount=0 from untrusted/non-confed neighbor
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5. Solution
As noted in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol], section 4.2, BGPSec
already has a solution for hiding ASNs where increasing the AS_PATH
length is undesirable. So one might think that a simple solution
would be to retain the keys for AS300 on PE1, and forward-sign
towards CE1 with AS300 and Pcount=0. However, this would mean
passing a pcount=0 between two ASNs that are in different
administrative and trust domains such that it could represent a
significant attack vector to manipulate BGPSec-signed paths. The
expectation for legitimate instances of Pcount=0 (to make a route-
server that is not part of the transit path invisible) is that there
is some sort of existing trust relationship between the operators of
the route-server and the downstream peers such that the peers could
be explicitly configured by policy to permit PCount=0 announcements
only on the sessions where they are expected, and otherwise reject
them. For the same reason that things like local-as are used for ASN
migration without end customer coordination, it is unrealistic to
assume any sort of coordination between the SP and the administrators
of CE1 to ensure that they will by policy accept PCount=0 signatures
during the transition period, and therefore this is not a workable
solution.
However, a better solution presents itself when considering how to
handle routes coming from the CE toward the PE, where the routes are
forward-signed to AS300, but will eventually need to show AS200 in
the outbound route announcement. Because both AS200 and AS300 are in
the same administrative domain, a signature from AS300 forward-signed
to AS200 with Pcount=0 would be acceptable as it would be within the
appropriate trust boundary so that each BGP speaker could be
explicitly configured to accept Pcount=0 where appropriate between
the two ASNs. At the very simplest, this could potentially be used
at the eBGP boundary between the two ASNs during migration. But
since the AS_PATH manipulation described above usually happens at the
PE router on a per-session basis, and does not happen network-wide
simultaneously, it is not generally appropriate to apply this AS
hiding technique across all routes exchanged between the two ASNs,
and may result in routing loops and other undesirable behavior.
Therefore the most appropriate place to implement this is on the
local PE that still has eBGP sessions associated with AS300 (using
the transition knobs detailed in the companion draft). Since that PE
has been moved to AS200, it is not possible for it to forward-sign
AS300 with Pcount=0 without some minor changes to the BGPSec
implementation to address this use case.
AS migration is using AS_PATH and remote-AS manipulation to act as if
a PE under migration exists simultaneously in both ASNs even though
it is only configured with one global ASN. This draft proposes
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applying a similar technique to the BGPSec signatures generated for
routing updates processed through this migration machinery. Each
routing update that is received from or destined to an eBGP neighbor
that is still using the old ASN (300) will be signed twice, once with
the ASN to be hidden and once with the ASN that will remain visible.
In essence, we are treating the update as if the PE had an internal
BGP hop and the update was passed across an eBGP session between
AS200 and AS300, configured to use and accept Pcount=0, while
eliminating the processing and storage overhead of actually creating
an actual eBGP session within the PE router. This will result in a
properly secured AS_PATH attribute, because the PE router will be
provisioned with valid keys for both AS200 and AS300. The procedure
is slightly different depending on whether the PE under migration is
receiving the routes from one of its eBGP peers ("inbound" as in
section 3.2.2) or destined toward the eBGP peers ("outbound" as in
section 3.2.1).
5.1. Outbound (PE->CE)
When a PE router receives an update destined for an eBGP neighbor
that is locally configured with AS-migration knobs as discussed in
draft-ga-idr-as-migration [I-D.ga-idr-as-migration] to facilitate a
move from an old ASN to a new one, it MUST generate a valid BGPSec
signature as defined in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] for _both_
configured ASNs. It MUST generate a signature from the new (global)
ASN forward signing to the old (local) ASN with Pcount=0, and then it
MUST generate a forward signature from the old (local) ASN to the
target eBGP ASN with Pcount=1 as normal.
5.2. Inbound (CE->PE)
When a PE router receives an update from an eBGP neighbor that is
locally configured with AS-migration knobs (i.e. the opposite
direction of the previous route flow), it MUST generate a signature
from the old (local) ASN forward signing to the new (global) ASN with
PCount=0. It is not necessary to generate the second signature from
the new (global) ASN because the ASBR will generate that when it
forward signs towards its eBGP peers as defined in normal BGPSec
operation. This is a deviation from standard BGPSec behavior in that
typically a signature is not added when a routing update is sent
across an iBGP session, and the next signature is added by the ASBR
when it forward-signs toward its eBGP peer as the routing update
exits the ASN.
5.3. Other considerations
In this case, the PE is adding BGPSec attributes to routes received
from or destined to an iBGP neighbor, and using PCount=0 to mask
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them. While this is not prohibited by the current BGPSec
specification, routers that receive updates from iBGP neighbors MUST
NOT reject updates with new (valid) BGPSec attributes, including the
presence of PCount=0 on a previous signature, or they will interfere
with this implementation. In similar fashion, any route-reflectors
in the path of these updates MUST reflect them transparently to their
clients.
In order to secure this set of signatures, the PE router MUST be
provisioned with valid keys for _both_ configured ASNs (old and new),
and the key for the old ASN MUST be kept valid until all eBGP
sessions are migrated to the new ASN. Downstream neighbors will see
this as a valid BGPSec path, as they will simply trust that their
upstream neighbor accepted Pcount=0 because it was explicitly
configured to do so based on a trust relationship and business
relationship between the upstream and its neighbor (the old and new
ASNs).
5.4. Example
The following example will illustrate the method being used above.
As with previous examples, PE1 is the router being migrated, AS300 is
the old AS, which is being subsumed by AS200, the "keep" AS. Some
additional notation is used to delineate the details of each
signature as follows:
The origin BGPSEC signature attribute takes the form: sig(<Target
ASN>, Origin ASN, pcount, NLRI Prefix) key
Intermediate BGPSEC signature attributes take the form: sig(<Target
ASN>, Signer ASN, pcount, <most recent sig field>) key
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Before Merger
333
|
ISP B ISP A
CE-1 <--- PE-1 <------------------- PE-2 <--- CE-2
100 Old_ASN: 300 Old_ASN: 200 400
CE-2 to PE-2: sig(<200>, O=400, pcount=1, N)K_400-CE2 [sig1]
AS_PATH=(400)
length=sum(pcount)=1
PE-2 to 333: sig(<333>, 200, pcount=1, <sig1>)K_200-PE2 [sig2]
sig(<200>, 400, pcount=1, N)K_400-CE2 [sig1]
AS_PATH=(200,400)
length=sum(pcount)=2
PE-2 to PE-1: sig(<300>, 200, pcount=1, <sig1>)K_200-PE2 [sig3]
sig(<200>, 400, pcount=1, N)K_400-CE2 [sig1]
AS_PATH=(200,400)
length=sum(pcount)=2
PE-1 to CE-1: sig(<100>, 300, pcount=1, <sig3>)K_300-PE1 [sig4]
sig(<300>, 200, pcount=1, <sig1>)K_200-PE2 [sig3]
sig(<200>, 400, pcount=1, N)K_400-CE2 [sig1]
AS_PATH = (300,200,400)
length=sum(pcount)=3
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Migrating, route flow outbound PE-1 to CE-1
333
|
ISP A' ISP A'
CE-1 <--- PE-1 <------------------- PE-2 <--- CE-2
100 Old_ASN: 300 Old_ASN: 200 400
New_ASN: 200 New_ASN: 200
CE-2 to PE-2: sig(<200>, 400, pcount=1, N)K_400-CE2 [sig11]
AS_PATH=(400)
length=sum(pcount)=1
PE-2 to 333: sig(<333>, 200, pcount=1, <sig11>)K_200-PE2 [sig12]
sig(<200>, 400, pcount=1, N)K_400-CE2 [sig11]
AS_PATH=(200,400)
length=sum(pcount)=2
PE-2 to PE-1: [sig11]
PE-1 to CE-1: sig(<100>, 300, pcount=1, <sig13>)K_300-PE1 [sig14]
sig(<300>, 200, pcount=0, <sig11>)K_200-PE2 [sig13]
sig(<200>, 400, pcount=1, N)K_400-CE2 [sig11]
AS_PATH=(300,400)
length=sum(pcount)=2 (length is NOT 3)
#PE1 adds [sig13] acting as AS200
#PE1 accepts [sig13] with PCount=0 acting as AS300,
#as it would if it received sig13 from an eBGP peer
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Migrating, route flow inbound CE-1 to PE-1
333
|
ISP A' ISP A'
CE-1 ---> PE-1 -------------------> PE-2 ---> CE-2
100 Old_ASN: 300 Old_ASN: 200 400
New_ASN: 200 New_ASN: 200
CE-1 to PE-1: sig(<300>, 100, pcount=1, N)K_100-CE1 [sig21]
AS_PATH=(100)
length=sum(pcount)=1
PE-1 to PE-2: sig(<200>, 300, pcount=0, <sig21>)K_300-PE1 [sig22]
sig(<300>, 100, pcount=1, N)K_100-CE1 [sig21]
AS_PATH=(100)
length=sum(pcount)=1 (length is NOT 2)
#PE1 adds [sig22] acting as AS300
#PE1 accepts [sig22] with PCount=0 acting as AS200,
#as it would if it received sig22 from an eBGP peer
PE-2 to 333: sig(<333>, 200, pcount=1, <sig22>)K_200-PE2 [sig23]
sig(<200>, 300, pcount=0, <sig21>)K_300-PE1 [sig22]
sig(<300>, 100, pcount=1, N)K_100-CE1 [sig21]
AS_PATH=(200,100)
length=sum(pcount)=2 (length is NOT 3)
PE-2 to CE-2: sig(<400>, 200, pcount=1, <sig22>)K_200-PE2 [sig24]
sig(<200>, 300, pcount=0, <sig21>)K_300-PE1 [sig22]
sig(<300>, 100, pcount=1, N)K_100-CE1 [sig21]
AS_PATH=(200,100)
length=sum(pcount)=2 (length is NOT 3)
6. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Kotikalapudi Sriram and Shane Amante for their review
comments.
Additionally, the solution presented in this draft is an amalgam of
several SIDR interim meeting discussions plus a discussion at IETF85,
collected and articulated thanks to Sandy Murphy.
7. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
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8. Security Considerations
This draft discusses a process by which one ASN is migrated into and
subsumed by another. Because this involves manipulating the AS_Path
to make it deviate from the actual path that it took through the
network, it is in some ways attempting to do exactly what BGPSec is
working to prevent. The BGPSec implementation MUST be able to manage
this legitimate use of AS_Path manipulation without generating a
vulnerability in the RPKI route security infrastructure that can be
exploited by a malicious actor.
The solution discussed above is considered to be reasonably secure
from exploitation by a malicious actor because it requires both
signatures to be secured as if they were forward-signed between two
eBGP neighbors. This requires any router using this solution to be
provisioned with valid keys for both the migrated and subsumed ASN so
that it can generate valid signatures for each of the two ASNs it is
adding to the path. If the AS's keys are compromised, or zero-length
keys are permitted, this does potentially enable an AS_PATH
shortening attack, but this is not fundamentally altering the
existing security risks for BGPSec.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ga-idr-as-migration]
George, W. and S. Amante, "Autonomous System (AS)
Migration Features and Their Effects on the BGP AS_PATH
Attribute", draft-ga-idr-as-migration-00 (work in
progress), September 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-06 (work in progress),
October 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, August 2007.
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[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
Authors' Addresses
Wesley George
Time Warner Cable
13820 Sunrise Valley Drive
Herndon, VA 20171
US
Phone: +1 703-561-2540
Email: wesley.george@twcable.com
Sandy Murphy
SPARTA, Inc., a Parsons Company
7110 Samuel Morse Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
US
Phone: +1 443-430-8000
Email: sandy@tislabs.com
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