Internet DRAFT - draft-guo-savnet-enhances-sav-security
draft-guo-savnet-enhances-sav-security
Network Working Group X. Guo
Internet-Draft D. Chen
Intended status: Informational Z. Xiong
Expires: 10 September 2023 J. Chen
X. Liu
China Telecom
9 March 2023
Source Address Validation enhances its security using blockchain
draft-guo-savnet-enhances-sav-security-00
Abstract
The new Source Address Validation(SAV) mechanism must not introduce
additional security vulnerabilities or risks, and the SAV mechanism
should ensure the integrity and trusted origin of the protocol
packets that deliver the required SAV information. This document
explores the use of blockchain technology to enhance the security of
the SAV mechanism itself without modifying existing protocols to
ensure the accuracy of the generated SAV rules.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 8174 [RFC8174].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 September 2023.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Security Threats Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. AS Prefix Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.3. Malicious Router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Replace RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. AS Prefix Advertisement Information Authentication . . . 4
4.3. Malicious Router Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
SAV rules are generated based on routing information (FIB/RIB) or
non-routing information. If the routing information is poisoned by
an attacker, then there will be no way to verify the authenticity of
the routing information and the generated SAV rules will be
incorrect. Many legitimate packets may be improperly discarded or
illegal packets with spoofed source addresses may be improperly
allowed. Overall, SAVNET faces similar security threats to BGP, and
if the SAV mechanism or protocol requires information exchange,
consideration should be given to avoiding routing information
tampering or injection.
2. Terminology
SAV: Source Address Validation, i.e., validating the authenticity of
a packet's source IP address.
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SAV rule: The filtering rule generated by inter-domain SAV mechanisms
that determines valid incoming interfaces for a specific source
prefix.
RPKI: Resource Public Key Infrastructure,an opt-in service that
provides security for Internet routing.
Improper block: Cases when packets with legitimate source addresses
are improperly blocked.
Improper permit: Cases when packets with spoofed source addresses are
improperly permitted.
3. Security Threats Analysis
The main security threats to SAV come from the following areas.
3.1. RPKI
The basic idea of RPKI is to construct a PKI (public key
infrastructure) to accomplish the authentication of ownership and
usage of IP address prefixes and ASNs. It helps routers verify the
authenticity of BGP messages by issuing and certifying digital
certificates and digital signatures, thus enhancing the security of
the BGP protocol and avoiding Internet routing hijacking. However,
RPKI cannot resist malicious acts initiated by CAs for the benefit of
countries and organizations, and the tree structure of RPKI has the
defect of single point of failure, and the whole network may be
paralyzed after the attack of high-level CAs, so RPKI has the problem
of being centralized and tamperable. In addition, RPKI also has a
limited scale of global deployment due to its complex protocol
mechanism and high processing overhead.
3.2. AS Prefix Advertisements
The existing routing protocols cannot guarantee the integrity of AS
prefix advertisements and cannot authenticate whether the AS
advertisement IP prefix authorization is legitimate. This lack of
authenticated unconditional trust can be used by malicious nodes to
forge and advertise false or non-compliant AS advertisement
information through replay attacks or message injection attacks,
resulting in network prefix information, network topology
information, AS path information and other key information being
hijacked, impersonated, stolen, and tampered with by attackers, which
in turn leads to the delivery and proliferation of false routing
information, causing security events such as traffic eavesdropping
and traffic black holes.
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3.3. Malicious Router
After gaining control of the legitimate router through the attack,
the attacker disguises the malicious router as a peer node of another
router to establish a session with that router, propagating false
advertisement messages or tampering with legitimate advertisement
messages, which will not only destroy the SAV function but also
affect the entire routing domain.
4. Solution
As a distributed ledger system of the new generation of Internet,
blockchain can record, encrypt and authenticate the whole life cycle
transactions of data assets on the Internet in a distributed way.
Its security is "endorsed" by the cryptography algorithm used by
blockchain technology. After verification, each transaction
interaction process can be permanently stored in the distributed
database (block). Once verified, it will be shared, anonymous and
tamper-proof, and easy to query.
Blockchain technology, due to its natural attributes of
decentralization, tamper-proof and traceability, is supported by
distributed node authentication and consensus mechanisms, allowing
any two nodes in a distributed network to reach an unmediated trust.
Another advantage of applying blockchain to SAV is that it can add
additional security without changing the BGP protocol, and by using
blockchain SAV can be protected in several ways.
4.1. Replace RPKI
The decentralized, tamper-proof and traceability features of
blockchain enable it to solve the centralized and tamper-proof
problems of RPKI. Through the two functions of resource transaction
record and resource retrieval of blockchain's smart contract
technology, the IP address and ASN registration and allocation
information are recorded, and the tracking of their usage is
supported, so as to realize the authorization authentication of IP
address and ASN network resources, prevent the security threat of
prefix hijacking and avoid the repeated allocation of resources.
4.2. AS Prefix Advertisement Information Authentication
The blockchain smart contract technology is used to record the
process of IP address authorization. When the AS prefix
advertisement is required, the prefix advertisement of the source AS
can be stored on the blockchain as transaction information. After
receiving the source AS advertisement information, the destination AS
determines the integrity of the received AS advertisement information
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through the transaction information saved on the chain. In this way,
the destination AS can verify the validity of the AS advertisement
information, and then determine whether there is any unauthorized
change attempt, and whether the resource is repeatedly allocated, so
as to avoid tampering with the AS advertisement information and
prefix hijacking.
4.3. Malicious Router Discovery
Store the routing topology relationship in the blockchain. When the
AS discovers the malicious advertisement information of the AS
through the blockchain verification, the network location of the
malicious router can be located in a timely manner by combining the
advertisement information source and the routing topology
relationship stored in the blockchain to avoid the malicious router
causing greater harm to the network. Routing topology is stored in
the blockchain through consensus mechanism. Any modification and
update of topology data in the blockchain requires the consent of
most nodes in the blockchain network to avoid malicious modification
of routing topology by a few malicious routers.
5. Security Considerations
There could be new blockchain related attacks that SAV would
experience if blockchain were to be added into SAV's policy system.
We will explore some of those here or in a new draft.
6. Acknowledgments
TBD
7. Normative References
[RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827,
May 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827>.
[RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, DOI 10.17487/RFC3704, March
2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3704>.
[RFC5210] Wu, J., Bi, J., Li, X., Ren, G., Xu, K., and M. Williams,
"A Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA) Testbed
and Deployment Experience", RFC 5210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5210, June 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5210>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8704] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., and J. Haas, "Enhanced
Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding", BCP 84,
RFC 8704, DOI 10.17487/RFC8704, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8704>.
Authors' Addresses
Xuesong Guo
China Telecom
Beijing
China
Email: guoxs@chinatelecom.cn
Dabei Chen
China Telecom
Beijing
China
Email: chendabei@chinatelecom.cn
Zihan Xiong
China Telecom
Beijing
China
Email: xiongzh1@chinatelecom.cn
Jun Chen
China Telecom
Beijing
China
Email: chenjun8@chinatelecom.cn
Xiaoping Liu
China Telecom
Beijing
China
Email: liuxp08@chinatelecom.cn
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