Internet DRAFT - draft-haberman-iasa20dt-recs
draft-haberman-iasa20dt-recs
Individual Submission B. Haberman, Ed.
Internet-Draft Johns Hopkins University
Intended status: Informational J. Arkko
Expires: May 31, 2019 Ericsson Research
L. Daigle
Thinking Cat Enterprises LLC
J. Livingood
Comcast
JL. Hall
CDT
E. Rescorla
RTFM, Inc.
November 27, 2018
IASA 2.0 Design Team Recommendations
draft-haberman-iasa20dt-recs-03.txt
Abstract
The arrangements relating to administrative support for the IETF were
created more than ten years ago. Since then, there has been
considerable change in the tasks and in our own expectations. The
IETF community has discussed these changes and the problems they
cause. The community has some sense of the properties they expect
from future arrangements, including those related to structure,
organization, personnel, and transparency.
This document is a product of a design team, focused on providing
additional information to the community about solution options, as
well as supporting analysis of the implications of those options.
This document reflects the final snapshot of the design team
discussion and is published for historical posterity.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 31, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Current IASA Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Lack of Clarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.1. Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.2. Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.3. Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.4. Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Lack of Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Volunteers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.2. Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Lack of Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4. Funding/Operating Model Mismatch and Rising Costs . . . . 10
4. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Reorganization Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. Overall Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1.1. IASA++ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1.2. ISOC Subsidiary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1.3. Independent Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. IETFAdminOrg and the Relationship with IETF . . . . . . . 17
5.3. Oversight for IETFAdminOrg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.3.1. Board Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3.2. Advisory Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3.3. Board Changes in IASA++ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.4. Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.5. Staff Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.6. Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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5.6.1. One-time costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.6.2. Sources and Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.6.3. Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.1. Comparison to Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.2. Financial Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.3. Other Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.1. Transition Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1. Introduction
The arrangements relating to administrative support for the IETF
(referred to as the "IETF Administrative Support Activity" (IASA)
[RFC4071]) were created more than ten years ago, when the IETF
initially took charge of its own administration. The arrangements
have served the IETF reasonably well, but there's been considerable
change in the necessary tasks, in the world around us, and our own
expectations since the creation of the IASA. What administrative
arrangements best support the IETF in the next ten years?
The system has experienced various challenges and frustrations along
the way, for instance around meeting arrangements. There are also
some bigger questions about how the organizations are structured, for
instance about the division of responsibilities between IETF and The
Internet Society (ISOC).
The IETF community has discussed and continues to discuss these
topics, most recently on the "IASA 2.0" mailing list and BOFs at
IETFs 98 and 99. Alissa Cooper, the Chair of the IETF, convened a
small design team to start evaluating potential options going
forward. The purpose of the design team is to provide material that
informs the community discussion, both in terms of providing a bit
more worked through solution ideas, as well as supporting analysis of
the implications of those options. This information, along with all
other input provided in the discussion, hopefully helps the community
and IETF leadership decide what next steps to take.
To be clear, the community is in charge of adopting any
recommendations or making any decisions. This draft, the final
output of the design team's considerations, has no particular
official standing. It should also be noted that IETF administrative
matters have been organized jointly with ISOC, and it is important
that ISOC continue to be involved in IETF's reorganization.
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The design team seeks feedback particularly on three aspects:
o If the set of options outlined in this draft covers the options
that should be looked at.
o If the analysis of the implications of the options is correct.
o Which direction the community would like to take the work in
evolving IASA.
It should of course be acknowledged that there is no perfect, or even
great solution. Changing the IETF organizational structure will not
fix every problem and may bring new problems of its own. But it
seems that the current structure is brittle and the issues around
lack of staff and authority, clarity, and responsibility are
sufficiently serious to warrant exploring different options.
This document defines the goals of the IASA 2.0 effort in terms of an
abstract administrative structure, called IETFAdminOrg. Then, three
possible implementations of IETFAdminOrg are considered in the light
of how they could be used to address the goals. In no case does
IETFAdminOrg have anything to do with defining, changing, or
operating the IETF's standards process and structure (participants
(not members), WGs, IESG and so on), which remain as they stand
today. In particular, none of the options lead to the IETF becoming
a formal organisation of any sort.
As a base for this work there was a good articulation of the set of
problems we are facing in [I-D.hall-iasa20-workshops-report] and
[I-D.daigle-iasa-retrospective]. The community discussion seems have
indicated also some of the outcome properties that are expected.
The next two sections (Section 2 and Section 3) describe the
background and summarize the challenges noted in the community
discussion. The two sections after that (Section 4 and Section 5)
describe the goals and primary options for changes. The following
two sections (Section 6 and Section 7) focus on analysis of the
different options along with conclusions.
2. Background
2.1. Terminology
The following acronyms are used in this document:
o IASA - IETF Administrative Support Activity - An organized
activity that provides administrative support for the IETF, the
IAB, and the IESG.
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o IAOC - IETF Administrative Oversight Committee in the current IASA
system - A largely IETF-selected committee that oversees and
directs IASA. Accountable to the IETF community.
o IAOC committees - Recognizing the need for specialized attention
for different branches of work requiring IAOC oversight, the IAOC
expanded its support by creating committees. Currently, the
committees do the heavy lifting on specific tasks, while the IAOC
is the one responsible for final decisions.
o ISOC - The Internet Society - The organizational home of the IETF,
and one that in the current IASA system assists the IETF with
legal, administrative, and funding tasks.
o IAD - IETF Administrative Director - In the current system, the
sole staff member responsible for carrying out the work of the
IASA. An ISOC employee.
o IETF Trust - In the current system, the IETF Trust acquires,
maintains, and licenses intellectual and other property used in
connection with the administration of the IETF. Same composition
as IAOC.
2.2. Current IASA Arrangements
The administrative support structure is intended to be responsive to
the administrative needs of the IETF technical community.
RFC 4071 [RFC4071] defines the current IETF Administrative Support
Activity (IASA). It is an activity housed within the Internet
Society (ISOC), as is the rest of the IETF. RFC 4071 defines the
roles and responsibilities of the IETF Administrative Oversight
Committee (IAOC), the IETF Administrative Director (IAD), and ISOC in
the fiscal and administrative support of the IETF standards process.
It also defines the membership and selection rules for the IAOC.
As RFC 4071 notes, IASA is distinct from IETF-related technical
functions, such as the RFC Editor, the IANA, and the IETF standards
process itself. The IASA has no influence on the technical decisions
of the IETF or on the technical contents of IETF work.
Today, IASA's activities support a number of functions within the
IETF system:
o Meeting planning
o Budget and financial management
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o Contracting with and overseeing the secretariat
o Contracting with and overseeing the RFC Editor (together with the
IAB)
o Contracting with and overseeing IANA (together with the IAB)
o Legal ownership of IETF materials, domain names and copyright
o Ownership of IANA-related domain names and copyright
o General legal support (including topics beyond domains and IPR)
o The IETF website
o IETF IT services
o Tooling support, maintenance, and development (together with
volunteers)
o Meeting network support
o Remote attendance support
o Communications assistance for the IETF
o Sponsorship and funding (together with ISOC)
3. Problem Statement
The purpose of this part of the document is to describe a few problem
areas with enough detail to allow the comparison of potential IASA
structure updates (among themselves, as well as comparison to the
status quo) that must be addressed by IETFAdminOrg. This is
intentionally illustrative, rather than an exhaustive enumeration of
all possible and perceived issues with the current structure and
implementation. Nevertheless, the examples are concrete and real.
(For a fuller description of the perceived issues with the current
IASA arrangements, see [I-D.daigle-iasa-retrospective],
[I-D.hall-iasa20-workshops-report], [I-D.arkko-ietf-iasa-thoughts],
and ongoing discussion on the iasa20@ietf.org mailing list.
In general, the range of IETF administrative tasks have grown
considerably, our organizational structure is not as clear,
efficient, or as fully resourced as it should be, the division of
responsibilities between the IETF and ISOC continues to evolve,
expectations on transparency have changed, and we face continued
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challenges related to funding IETF activities on a background of
increasing costs and lack of predictability in our funding streams.
3.1. Lack of Clarity
In general, as the IETF has grown and aged, an increasing lack of
clarity exists in a number of specific areas. We discuss four areas
where this lack of clarity is specifically acute: responsibility,
representation, authority, and oversight.
3.1.1. Responsibility
The line between the IETF and ISOC is not organizationally clear-cut,
which has led to issues around transparency, allocation of staff time
and priorities, budgeting, and clarity of who is responsible for
what.
Often, it can be unclear what part of the IETF or ISOC is responsible
for a particular function. Things as simple as ensuring there is a
lanyard sponsor/coordinator, but also functions as important as
fundraising and sponsorship development have suffered from a lack of
clear responsibility.
IETFAdminOrg must have lines of responsibility that are clear enough
for non-IETFers to understand where responsibilities lie, and how to
make changes as necessary over time.
3.1.2. Representation
The respective roles of ISOC, the IETF chair, the IAOC, and the
secretariat in representing the IETF to sponsors and donors and
communicating with them are not clear.
Having ISOC represent the IETF to sponsors and donors:
o creates confusion about why the IETF does not represent itself,
o yields questions about why ISOC does not instead increase its IETF
support and how donations can be guaranteed to be dedicated to the
IETF,
o can result in those soliciting sponsorships and donations having a
lack of familiarity with IETF work, and
o creates a lack of an integrated and understandable representation
of the IETF. People not familiar with the IETF (e.g., potential
sponsors) must be able to recognize when or how an entity speaks
for the IETF.
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3.1.3. Authority
Another significant problem concerns authority, and to what extent
can IETF make decisions on its own in the current structure compared
to decisions that require ISOC approval and agreement.
For example, due to IETF's lack of legal status, contractual
agreements must be signed by ISOC on behalf of the IETF. There are
occasions when a decision that is right for the IETF and desired by
IETF leadership cannot be executed due to constraints posed by what
ISOC can and cannot agree to itself. For example, when IETF sought
to acquire a recent piece of software for business purposes, ISOC
would initially not agree to entering into an agreement with the
software provider. Ideally, IETF could make decisions free from
operational and other constraints imposed by its relationship with
ISOC.
IETFAdminOrg must have enough and appropriate authority to carry out
the IETF's administrative requirements and activities in a timely
fashion, and as the IETF desires (within reason of normal business
and legal requirements).
3.1.4. Oversight
The IAOC is the primary oversight body in the current IASA model, but
there can be confusion or mismatches in roles. For example, to the
extent that ISOC staff besides the IAD become engaged in
administrative work for the IETF, to whom do they report? The IAOC,
the IAD, or their management at ISOC? Even if the reporting line for
such staff were more clear, clearly there are power dynamics in this
role that might pull an ISOC-assigned IETF staffer in directions that
might not be in the best interests of IETF, consciously or
unconsciously.
Furthermore, when we're in a position where we need more staff
support, it's not obvious what the most appropriate path is to obtain
that support and how the IAOC's oversight fits into the kind of
performance review and career planning that ISOC staff would expect.
We have used a variety of models for acquiring staff support from
ISOC in the past, ranging from the IAD informally soliciting help
from others at ISOC, to the IAOC establishing more formal staff
relationships with ISOC personnel, to ISOC taking responsibility for
finding staff with an internal-to-ISOC reporting chain. The role of
the IAOC with respect to such staff is not defined, nor is the
mechanism for reflecting the work that they do for the IETF back to
their ISOC management.
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IETFAdminOrg's oversight functions must be complete and coherent.
For example, it might either take on full oversight responsibility
for staff employment functions (including reporting structures and
career development), or the oversight role must be limited to review
input submitted to the external sources responsible for employment.
3.2. Lack of Resources
IETF faces growing constraints on resources essential for IETF to
function, notably in volunteers and staff.
3.2.1. Volunteers
The IAD is the sole full-time employee for IETF, and the IASA
arrangement encompasses a series of volunteer committees that help to
work through issues such as finance, legal, meetings, technology
management, requests for proposals, and sponsorship. However, it is
becoming close to impossible to find qualified volunteers who are
willing to stand for open slots on the IAOC. In general, on both the
IAOC and the committees, the time that committee members have to
devote to the tasks at hand falls far short of what is required to do
much of anything beyond keeping the organization afloat. At a time
when the IETF is faced with administrative and financial challenges,
barely having enough volunteers and volunteer time to keep the
current operation running is not a sustainable model.
IETFAdminOrg must rely less on volunteers or be better assured of
engagement of willing and capable volunteers.
3.2.2. Staff
IETF faces serious constraints on staff capacity under the current
IASA model. The one IAD role and support from contractors have been
used to assure that capacity needed is for the most part in place.
However, it seems clear that the IAD role is overly complex and
taxing for a single human at this point, necessitating measures such
as providing an administrator for the IAOC to better run that body
and their meetings. IETFAdminOrg will require more paid employment
support dedicated to IETF work.
3.3. Lack of Transparency
The IAOC has sometimes been perceived to operate less transparently
than what is the norm for IETF processes and other IETF leadership
bodies. This can be observed, for example, in the failure to
publicly share agreed information in a timely fashion. The reasons
behind this vary but can sometimes be caused by lack of resources to
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review and prepare material for community review, or even fear of
community reaction to potential administrative decisions.
Work to increase transparency has made progress, but we must continue
to address and improve this. At the same time, a balance must be
struck to reach the right level of transparency, so that certain
aspects of contracts, business terms, and negotiations can remain
confidential, according to legal and business practice norms. It
will be important for the community and any future IASA function to
better define this in order to better meet well-defined, balanced
community expectations on transparency and information sharing.
IETFAdminOrg will be required to operated in a transparent fashion
per community expectations set as part of this IASA 2.0 process.
3.4. Funding/Operating Model Mismatch and Rising Costs
Meeting fees are currently an important source of revenue, but the
emergence of more viable remote participation tools and other factors
are likely responsible for declining in-person meeting attendance
going forward.
While there has been a lot of sponsor support for, e.g., meeting
hosting, getting support for the full costs of operating the IETF is
not easy. The costs are quite large, the value to sponsors is not
always obvious, the IETF community is sometimes critical or
unappreciative, and the same sponsors get tapped again and again for
many related but different opportunities.
At this point we have one part-time contractor responsible for
sponsorship fundraising, and volunteers on the finance and
sponsorship committees with limited cycles to spend on re-envisioning
the fundraising model for the IETF. They are all putting in good
efforts, but ultimately we are unlikely to be able to meet the
present funding challenges if we do not have people with the cycles
available to dedicate the necessary time to figuring out how to do
that.
In addition, relying heavily on meeting-based revenue is somewhat at
odds with the fact that much of the IETF's work takes place outside
of in-person meetings.
The IETF is increasingly relying on professional services to support
its activities -- in order to more efficiently operate the IETF's
activities and better enable IETF participants to contribute to the
IETF's core technical work rather than administrative and supporting
activities work -- which is also causing expenses to grow.
IETFAdminOrg must have appropriate authority and tools to adapt the
funding model of the IETF to evolving realities.
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4. Goals
The IASA redesign effort needs to address the main issues listed
above in Section 3. More specifically, the future organizational
structure needs to do at least the following:
o Protect the IETF's Culture and Technical Work: Ensure that the
future IASA organizational structure and processes preserve and
protect the IETF's unique culture of individual contribution,
clear separation of financial support from technical work, as well
as the "rough consensus and running code" approach to the
development of open Internet standards.
o Improve the IETF's Technical Environment: Undertake changes to
better enable technical contributors to focus more on that
technical work and less on administrative work or support
activities. This could for example mean directing more financial
resources towards the creation of new or improvement of existing
tools, which might be produced by contractors rather than solely
by volunteers. As a result, volunteers could instead focus on
developing the standards themselves. Thus, if the core competency
of IETF attendees and their reason for participating in the IETF
is to develop standards, then create an environment where they can
focus exclusively on that activity and delegate to contractors,
staff, or other resources the responsibility for creating and
maintaining tools and processes to support this activity.
o Clearly Define the IETF-ISOC Relationship: Define the roles of
IETF and ISOC in a way that helps the above structure be as clear
as possible, in terms of who does what, how are things accounted
for, and who is in charge of adjustments and control (e.g., staff
resources). This also includes consideration of a new funding
model that takes into account the historical responsibility for
the IETF that ISOC has had since its inception.
o Support a Re-Envisioned Funding Model: Provide the staff support
and resources needed to adapt the funding model of the IETF to
changes in the industry, participation, and expenses. The
structure should also allow for and be able to support new funding
streams or changes to the proportion of funds from various
sources.
o Provide Clarity About the IETF-ISOC Financial Arrangements: A
redesign needs to clear up ambiguities in the financial
arrangements between IETF and ISOC. It must also be clear to
people outside the IETF and ISOC organisations (e.g., sponsors)
what the arrangements are and what their contributions affect and
do not affect.
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o Clarify Overall Roles and Responsibilities: Ensure that all staff,
contractor, and volunteer roles are clearly documented. This
necessarily includes documenting how each of these parties may
interact or interface with one another in order to conduct and
support the business of the IETF. This also includes documenting
key work processes, decision-making processes and authority (such
as pertaining to meeting venue selection), etc. A key objective
is to minimize ambiguity and uncertainty so that it is clear who
is responsible for what and who has the power to make certain
decisions.
There also needs to be a clear definition of what issues belong to
the IESG vs. the IASA organisation or staff. In many cases that
is not clear today.
o Define Support Staff Roles and Responsibilities: Clearly define
the roles of the oversight entities and staff/contractors to match
the expanded work scope facing the IETF. Ensure that any changes
create a structure that can adapt flexibly to future growth and
other changes (including changes in IETF community expectations,
such as increased transparency or more rapid decision-making).
o Re-Define the Role of the IETF Community in Relation to
Administrative Activities: As the roles and responsibilities for
support staff and volunteer roles are clarified more precisely,
the role of the IETF community in relation to those staff and
volunteer roles must be better defined. This should acknowledge
the limited time and availability of IETF volunteers, better
defining expectations around oversight of and involvement in
strategic, operational, and execution tasks within the
administrative efforts.
The new design needs to ensure that volunteers are not overloaded
in such things as low level operational decisions, which can be
delegated to and handled by staff, and can instead focus on
strategic changes, critical decisions, and so on. In particular,
this should focus on clearly documenting the lines between
responsibility, representation, authority, and oversight.
o Define Improved Transparency Requirements: The general level of
operational transparency and information-sharing between IETF
administrative staff and groups to the IETF community must be kept
at an acceptable level, and improved where it makes sense in the
future. This includes ensuring the timeliness of sharing of
information and decisions, as well as seeking comment on
prospective decisions. At the same time, we need to reset
expectations around delegated authority so that once staff or an
administrative support organization has been delegated certain
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authority it is clear that they are empowered to proceed in a
particular area, so as to improve organizational efficiency,
reduce friction, and improve the pace of work and decision-making.
However, it is clear that enabling a group or staff to act within
their delegated authority depends upon a clearer definition of
roles and responsibilities, on improved transparency, on improved
communications, and on trust (which is built upon all of those
things over time).
o Define a Transition Plan: Determine what new IASA structure we
need and define a transition plan from the model the IETF has
today to the new structure.
5. Reorganization Options
The design team believes that there are three general approaches to
evolving the IASA function. The options generally focus on the
relationship between the IETF and ISOC. Changes to this relationship
directly affect how the IASA function gets carried out.
The first subsection that follows, Section 5.1, describes each of the
three re-organization options.
Section 5.2 discusses the relationship of the IETF administrative
organization to the IETF. Clear definition of this relationship is
particularly important in the reorganization options that involve the
creation of new entities (subsidiaries or independent organizations)
to house the administrative functions. The next section, Section 5.3
discusses the creation of appropriate oversight to a new entity.
Section 5.4 discusses the approach to transparency, which is largely
independent of other aspects of the reorganisation.
Section 5.5 outlines the needs for IASA staff, and Section 5.6
discusses what short term and long term funding arrangement changes
are needed. Both staffing and funding arrangements are relevant for
all reorganization options, but are of course affected by the chosen
option.
It should be noted that all three options require more administrative
budget per year than what is currently allocated for IASA functions.
In addition, they will most likely require a more predictable level
of ISOC funding, rather than the current model of a base funding
level combined with periodic infusions to cover shortfalls.
Section 6 highlights the pros and cons and effectiveness of the
options in comparison to the goals stated earlier.
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5.1. Overall Structure
5.1.1. IASA++
In the IASA++ option, IETFAdminOrg continues to be implemented as an
activity within ISOC. While addressing the requirements above, this
does mean that ISOC maintains funds and contracting authority on
behalf of the IETF, and all IASA staff are ISOC employees.
While the relationship remains the same, the IETF and ISOC will make
improvements to the relationship in order to enhance the
functionality of the IETF. The following are some potential
improvements that could be made under this approach:
o Provide clarity and transparency about authority, responsibility,
budgeting, and allocation of staff time for all IETF-related work
and activities.
o Add IASA staff to better reflect the increased workload on what is
now a single staff member.
o Provide clarity about authority of the IAOC in reviewing
performance of IASA staff.
o Re-structure the internal IETF organization and appointment
processes for the IAOC to address current challenges. IETF Trust
may be separated from IAOC.
o Drive IETF community consensus on roles and responsibilities for
administrative decision-making so it is completely clear what
people or group has authority to make decisions, and what type of
consultation, if any, should take place with the community in
advance so as to eliminate the current lack of clarity and
friction that exists today.
The key focus in implementing this option would be sorting out the
roles and responsibilities of the IAOC and ISOC. The IETF needs to
be able to make its own administrative decisions independent of ISOC.
Having a concrete separation of roles and responsibilities will allow
each organization to develop their own internal policies that meet
their different operational needs. It should be noted that the IETF
needs to keep abreast of changes to ISOC policies to ensure that the
working arrangement remains smooth. Some examples of where the IAOC
needs autonomy from ISOC policies include:
o Contract administration
o Spending authority limits
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o Personnel decisions, including compensation
Some specific changes to make these improvements are discussed in
Section 5.3 regarding board and staff work divisions. While in this
option there is no need for a formal board, there is still a need to
redefine the role of the IAOC. The necessary staff changes are
discussed in Section 5.5.
It would also be necessary to improve IAOC transparency. In the
IASA++ option, in addition to the general improvement needs in this
area, there is an added need to continue the improvements relating to
accurate accounting of resources and actions on the ISOC side. This
relates directly to the delineation of roles and responsibilities
necessary for the IAOC to operate independent of ISOC. Improved
transparency will allow the IETF community to be more aware of IAOC
operations and decisions. Such changes to the IAOC will require
changes to [RFC4071].
5.1.2. ISOC Subsidiary
In this option, IETFAdminOrg is implemented as an ISOC subsidiary,
which would be created as the new legal home of the IETF
administrative operation, similar to how the Public Interest Registry
(PIR) is an organized subsidiary within ISOC. A subsidiary can have
its own bank account, by-laws, charter, board, staff, and corporate
identity. As a subsidiary of ISOC, the IETF and ISOC can share
overhead and resources. The IETF would likely continue to rely
heavily on contractors for most administrative tasks.
In the subsidiary model, IETFAdminOrg would carry out the function in
ISOC's role of administratively supporting the IETF. ISOC itself
would no longer undertake specific actions to that end, other than
supporting IETFAdminOrg. In this model, ISOC's role would consist
primarily of committing to stable financial support for IETFAdminOrg.
Outside administrative matters, in this model ISOC may of course
still run other IETF-related programs, such as the IETF journal or
the IETF Fellows program. If this model is chosen, the detailed
design would have decide what current activities constitute
"administration" and are moved to the subsidiary.
As a subsidiary of ISOC, the IETF could eliminate the IAOC and
replace it with a board (see Section 5.3). Administrative decision-
making authority would rest primarily with the administrative staff,
with oversight provided by the board (see Section 5.3 and
Section 5.5.) Exception cases could be developed where board
approval would be required to authorize strategic decisions.
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As IETFAdminOrg would be a subsidiary of ISOC, ISOC would retain the
ability to shut it down and re-absorb the functions at some future
date. The founding agreements would need to include provisions to
clarify the steps required in order to consult with the IETF
community, provide an opportunity for the organization to become
independent, etc.
During the transition between the current model and this model, we
would need to transfer all existing IETF administrative relationships
from ISOC to IETFAdminOrg:
o Transfer existing IETF-related contracts between ISOC and
contractors to be between the subsidiary and contractors.
o Transfer existing ISOC funds earmarked for the IETF to the
subsidiary's bank account(s), and have future IETF income held in
that subsidiary's bank account(s).
5.1.3. Independent Organization
In this option, a new non-profit organization (IETFAdminorg) is
created independent from ISOC as the new legal home of the IETF.
IETFAdminOrg would have its own bank account, by-laws, charter,
board, staff, and corporate identity. The administrative staff for
IETFAdminOrg could be kept lean and would likely rely on contractors
for the bulk of administrative tasks. Minimally, the IETFAdminOrg
staff would be responsible for administration, development/
fundraising, communications, and personnel management.
In the independent organization model, IETFAdminOrg's continued
existence would not depend on the ISOC organization's choices about
its future. However, IETFAdminOrg would still depend on the ISOC's
support, for two reasons:
o ISOC's role in supporting the IETF, and
o As a practical matter, IETFAdminOrg is not financially viable
without ISOC's support.
In order to establish this model, IETFAdminOrg and ISOC would need an
explicit agreement that outlined expected levels of financial support
going forward, both in terms of founding endowments and in terms of
ongoing support. These agreements might also cover IETFAdminOrg's
obligations to ISOC, such as the level of reporting from IETFAdminOrg
to ISOC, and the expected structure of any liaisons.
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As in the ISOC Subsidiary model, it would be necessary to transfer
the existing relationships to IETFAdminOrg. See the previous section
for details on this.
5.2. IETFAdminOrg and the Relationship with IETF
As noted above, currently the business side of the IETF is basically
done by ISOC with the only formal entity being the IAD, which is
itself a position within ISOC. In both the ISOC Subsidiary and the
Independent Organization models, we would create a new organization
("IETFAdminOrg"), which would encapsulate the administrative
responsibilities of the IETF organization in a new business entity.
Its sole mission would be to ensure the IETF (standards) activities
are appropriately supported and administered.
"The IETF" would remain pretty much just as we know it today, i.e.,
the IETF at large would not form any new organization, nor would
IETFAdminOrg take over any current IETF functions. The relationship
between IETF and IETFAdminOrg would be a more formalized version of
the relationship between IETF and the parts of ISOC which support
IETF.
Optionally, under the independent organization option, IETF Trust,
holding IPR on behalf of the IETF, could be kept separate from the
operational IETF administration aspects. This would provide some
separation between the copyright ownership functions from other
administrative functions, but both would still have to be funded from
the same sources.
o IETFAdminOrg would have as its mission the administrative support
of the IETF and would exist for the benefit of the IETF.
o The IETF would provide oversight into the governance of
IETFAdminOrg, including seating part of the board.
o IETFAdminOrg would not have a say over the material direction or
content of the IETF, except insofar as IETF Trust-related legal
implications and requirements, such as RFC boilerplates.
Beyond negotiation, administering and managing the contracts
necessary for the work to support the IETF, IETFAdminOrg would also
start with sponsorship and communications functions. Different
functions and services might be needed as the IETF evolves. The
implementation would be determined by the IETFAdminOrg Executive
Director, but the need and direction has to be provided by the IETF
(currently, through the IETF Chair, but one hopes the IETF might
evolve a broader base for making the kind of strategic determination
needed).
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IETFAdminOrg would be staffed. It would be signatory to all IETF-
supporting contracts. It would collect financial support for the
IETF, and administer the financial resources. Its annual budgets
would be reviewed and approved by its own Board of Trustees, which
would be populated pretty much as any Board of Trustees (with the
additional requirements in the notes below). In all regards, it
would be a self-contained organization, evolving to meet its mission
based on its best governance choices to evolve, staff and execute.
5.3. Oversight for IETFAdminOrg
While IASA++ could continue to have an oversight structure populated
by members of the IETF community, either the Subsidiary or
Independent models involve the creation of an IETFAdminOrg which
would need to have its governance structure defined. This structure
needs to include the involvement of members with significant
nonprofit governance experience, while also ensuring accountability
to and involvement from the IETF Community.
In order to achieve these objectives, the design team proposes a
model similar to other nonprofits, in which IETFAdminOrg would be
governed by a Board of Trustees. This board, the IASA Board (IB),
acts to set strategic direction for IETF administrative matters, sets
budgets, provides fiscal oversight, provides high-level oversight
about major new projects, and so on. The board is also responsible
for hiring and assessing the performance of the Executive Director
(the highest-level staff director (see Section 5.5).
The board works with staff who is empowered to carry out the
operations as directed by the board. The staff is responsible for
operating within the limits set by the board, and are accountable to
the board. Including being hired and fired as needed. The staff's
responsibilities include:
o preparing for and making decisions on their agreed and budgeted
areas (for example, meeting venue decisions)
o operational execution of these decisions, including contracting
with vendors
o communicating with the community
o development of the IETF's administrative operation, in
consultation with the community
The general structure is that the board is responsible for setting
general policies about how the staff functions and making decisions
for the organization as a whole. For instance, the board would be
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expected to sign off on the meeting locations and schedule, based on
recommendations from the staff. For some activities, the board would
organize subcommittees which would do work directly. Typical
examples would be auditing, hiring, and firing. The board might, for
instance, decide meetings were so important that it needed more
direct involvement. The board is accountable to the community and
would be expected to regularly consult with the advisory council (see
below) and consult with the community directly on especially
important matters.
By contrast, the staff is responsible for making day-to-day
operational decisions subject to the board's general policies.
Examples here would be vendor selection for smaller contracts, and
hiring of lower-level staff. These decisions are of course subject
to board oversight and matters over a given size (e.g., money limit)
would need board approval though would likely be recommended by the
staff. In no case would the staff or board have any input on
standards activities.
The composition of the board needs careful attention. It is
important to have regular IETF participants in the board, but at
least some of the board members need to have skills and experience
less common among IETF participants, namely non-profit management,
budget experience, and ability to help make connections to raise
money or provide advice about fundraising (all of which are typical
for a non-profit board).
5.3.1. Board Selection
Experience with selection for the IAOC and the ISOC Board shows the
difficulty of using the nomcom process to select a board with the
kind of business skills necessary to supervise an operation like
IETFAdminOrg. These skills are not common -- though also not non-
existent -- within the IETF community, which makes it hard to find
candidates as well as reducing the chance that nomcom members will
have the personal contacts to identify external candidates with the
appropriate skills. For this reason, the design team does not
believe that direct nomcom selection of the whole board will be
successful. In the ISOC Subsidiary model, ISOC might also nominate
some board members. Below we present two alternative mechanisms for
selecting the remaining board members, though there are others that
would perhaps be successful. Regardless of the nomination mechanism,
the entire board should be subject to confirmation by the IETF
leadership.
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5.3.1.1. Self-Perpetuating Board
One common way to select board members is to have the existing board
select new members. The advantage of this structure is that the
existing members have the skills and connections to identify other
people with similar skills. For this reason, this is a common
structure for nonprofits. The design team recognizes that there are
concerns about the board drifting away from the IETF Community
interest, but believes these concerns would be adequately addressed
by having some of the board directly selected by nomcom and all
members subject to IETF confirmation. The details of how the initial
board is to be constituted would need to be determined, but one
possibility would be to draw from the existing IAOC and IETF-selected
ISOC BOT members, with the board replacing itself within a short
period.
5.3.1.2. Nomcom-Selected Nomcom
An alternative design would be to have the IETF nomcom select a
separate nominating committee which would then select the board
members. This suffers from some of the problems with direct nomcom
selection, but allows us to expand the scope of the pool to anyone at
the IETF with business skills or business contacts, not just those
who have time to be a board member. As before, the output of this
process would need to be confirmed in the IETF.
5.3.2. Advisory Council
The board and staff are also supported by an Advisory Council (AC).
The AC provides an interface to the community on matters that require
assessing community opinion. For instance, the current polling of
community feedback relating to potential future meeting locations
could be one such matter. An advisory council canvassing and pulling
for this information is expected to be a better approach than either
free-form mailing list discussion, or the relatively opaque process
that is currently used.
5.3.3. Board Changes in IASA++
IASA++ continues to have an oversight structure populated by members
of the IETF community, but as discussed previously, the current IAOC
model has a number of weaknesses. Detailed design for this
alternative would have to specify how the board changes, but as a
starting point, it would be desirable to increase the number of board
members (particularly those without other roles) and re-specify the
role of the board vs. staff and other committees. With increased
number of staff, implementation would be more in the hands of the
staff than today, and the role of the board would be more on actual
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oversight, budget and hiring decisions than the detailed daily
operations.
5.4. Transparency
Regardless of the chosen reorganization model, transparency deserves
attention. As discussed in Section 4, this includes improving the
timeliness of sharing of information and decisions, seeking comment
on forthcoming decisions, and a a "reset" of expectations around
delegated authority.
In addition, there needs to be an agreement between the IETF
community and the administrative entity about the where to draw the
line between community's need for information, and the need to keep
some business (or personnel) data confidential.
5.5. Staff Structure
The design team believes that staff resources need to increase and/or
be reorganized in order to move from one director to a few more
specialized roles (see growth in Section 3). In addition, the team
believes that future organization for IASA may benefit from
organizing all resources under the more clear and direct control of
the IETF (see division of responsibilities in Section 3 and roles in
Section 4).
The current arrangement involves one officially designated IASA
employee, but there are also many supporting employees. They are
less clearly assigned for the IETF, working as contractors or at
ISOC.
This document suggests a structure that involves the following roles:
o Executive Director. The person in this role is in charge of the
overall IASA effort, but can rely on other staff members below as
well as contractors. The Executive Director is accountable to the
Board.
o Director of Operations. This person is responsible for meeting
arrangements, IT, tools, managing contracts (including RFC Editor
and IANA), and day-to-day budget management.
o Director of Fundraising. This person is responsible for working
with IETF's sponsors and other partners, and his or her primary
responsibility is fundraising for the IETF.
o Director of Communications. This person is responsible for
working with IETF leadership (including the IETF Chair, IESG, and
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IAB) on communications matters (primarily but not exclusively
external communications), assisting them in efficient
communication and dealing with ongoing communications matters.
Note: The Executive Director likely needs to be a full-time employee,
as is likely the case for the other Director-level positions.
These persons also need to rely on a number of contractors and
outside specialists. For instance, a Legal Counsel, to assist the
IASA on legal matters as well as contracting.
It should be noted that we expect to retain the secretariat on
contract for more or less the same responsibilities that they
presently have.
5.6. Funding
This section discusses the overall changes to IETF funding sources,
the level of funding, and how the level of funding is agreed with
ISOC. And how the IETF can further develop its funding strategies
over time.
None of the administrative arrangements proposed in this document
suggest that the fundamental funding arrangements change as a part of
reorganization. ISOC will continue to support the IETF, though
perhaps with means that provide better budgetary stability. There
are also factors that affect the level of funding. Also, a better
administrative organization will be more capable of adjusting its
strategies in the future in all areas, including funding. Any
significant future changes require a capability of the IASA to focus
on such strategic initiatives, which IASA 2.0 will help enable.
It is important to ensure that IETF funding is arranged in a manner
that is satisfactory to the IETF and ISOC communities. Any changes
to arrangements are something that should be mutually agreed with
both organizations. Further comments and observations are welcome.
5.6.1. One-time costs
There are one time costs associated with an administrative change,
regardless of which of the options discussed in this document are
chosen. All the models in the draft will have associated costs -
e.g., to hire additional staff, cover legal fees, etc.
Transition expenses should be considered separately from ongoing
expenses/funding needs. It should be noted that ISOC has promised to
cover those costs [Camarillo].
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5.6.2. Sources and Stability
The key sources of IETF funding are unlikely to radically change in
the short or medium term. This document suggests that ISOC continues
as one of our primary funding sources, as it has been. Other primary
sources of funding for an organization like the IETF are well known,
and we are already tapping into all of the most common ones:
corporations, individuals, and funds derived from the registration of
domain names. It is possible that we could develop additional
funding sources in the future (e.g., charitable foundations), but
those will require strategic planning and staffing, for which we need
to get IASA 2.0 in place first.
It's worth considering short-term (3-5 years) and long-term (5-10+
years) plans differently. In the short term, we can continue to rely
on our existing funding sources regardless of which organizational
model we end up with for IASA 2.0, including the independent
organization model. The role of ISOC as providing the funding to the
IETF and agreeing to help us if we get to trouble should stay under
all of the options, until or if a future funding model change changes
that.
While ISOC continues to support IETF financially as they have
previously, the different reorganization options affect the legal,
contractual, and accounting related details. While continuing as-is
is possible, adopting a a more predictable allocation of funding is
desirable (see Section 5.6.3), and in the subsidiary and independent
options formal contracts about the funding are also necessary. The
exact details of those contracts and contracting parties are for
further study, but they do not need to change the fundamental
arrangement that is in place today.
More long-term, developing a sustainable funding plan for the IETF
will be a key project during the early months and years post-IASA
2.0. Ultimately a healthier funding model will require raising more
funds from the organizations that benefit from IETF standards and
whose employees participate in the IETF, and may result in less
reliance on ISOC funds. Such a model might incorporate meeting-based
sponsorships as we have traditionally had, other kinds of
sponsorships, a fully funded endowment, a different registration fee
structure, or other funding vehicles. But we are not in a position
at present to develop such a model and carry out the fundraising. We
do not have sufficient staff, skills, or resources to do it. We need
to complete IASA 2.0 in order to be in a position to do it. We are
fortunate that we can rely on additional funds from ISOC in the short
term in order to bootstrap that process. As the old saying goes, you
have to spend money to make money.
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This isn't to say that the IETF not already considering how to make
the funding model more sustainable. The IAOC has new sponsorship
staff this year, the the IAOC sponsorship committee was recently
chartered, and it has been discussing new ideas for raising
sponsorship funds. Changes to the present model will be adopted as
those ideas mature. IETF can cut some costs. But we can not expect
volunteers and folks working part-time on current fundraising targets
to also take on the additional substantial project of revamping the
entire funding model and having the additional funds show up on short
order.
5.6.3. Level
Outside the discussion of sources, the level of funding has also been
an issue. The IETF is well supported by ISOC who have ultimately
also been the backstop when income has fallen below expectations.
The IETF is also supported by a number of other sponsors, whose
significant contributions provide a big part of the income.
However, at the same time there is an overall rising cost level that
affects the services IETF uses, there is community desire for
supporting important new services, technology that enables more
participants to choose to participate remotely, and industry
pressures on optimizing their costs. As the organization matures,
and as more of the services that IETF provides come from professional
sources, it becomes more difficult to rely on significant fraction of
any individual volunteer time. This is visible, for instance, in our
tools efforts, which have become more commercially driven in the last
years.
It is fair to say that IETF continues to be underfunded in the face
of these trends. In addition, IETF budgets have in recent years been
relatively optimistic. IETF is fortunate that ISOC has been there to
provide a backstop against surprises and the cost trends, but
ideally, budgets should be realistic and exceptions more exceptional
than they are today.
To correct this, four things are needed:
1. Improve the accounting of IETF-related costs
The process that has gone on for several years to better reflect
actual IETF-related costs in the IETF (and ISOC) budget will
continue, and depending on the chosen model, reach a much more
concrete and clear structure. This will not as such, however,
change the actual amount of expenditure or income.
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Note that the IETF already accounts for the expenses related to
key IETF support staff (e.g., IAD, communications, etc).
2. Ensure realism in the budget.
For a budget to be realistic, it must be based on correctly
anticipated income and expenses. Since crystal balls are in
short supply, flexibility and responsiveness are required in the
process, as industry changes can impact both available
contributions and number of participants at meetings (i.e.,
registration fee income).
Further decisions may be necessary to be more conservative in
future budgets, including appropriate decisions about what
services are essential for the IETF community and which are not.
Documenting and discussing the IETF financial model (expectations
of sources of income, levels of support, as well as requirements
for expenses and levels of service) has been a goal for 2018 and
will continue to be a priority going forward.
3. ISOC as a funder and backstop.
ISOC continues to be the major IETF funding source, as well as
the backstop against emergencies. But a different arrangement
regarding these two roles would make the situation better
manageable.
Dedicated, realistically sufficient funds allocated to the IETF
would allow the normal operations to be run based on that, and
would leave only true emergencies such as cancellation of
meetings due to local emergencies for the backstop.
4. Appropriate funding level.
The IETF operations and funding level obviously need to match.
The specific level is, however, not related to the IASA 2.0
related organizational changes. Those organizational changes
only make it hopefully easier to manage both the IETF operations
and the funding.
6. Analysis
This section provides a basic analysis of the effects of the
different options.
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6.1. Comparison to Goals
In the following, we analyze how the different options compare with
respect to goals set in Section 4:
o Protect the IETF's Culture and Technical Work:
The changes under the IASA++ option are small enough that they
clearly cannot have any undue effect on culture or actual IETF
work.
The ISOC subsidiary and independent organization models are bigger
changes, but, still contained within the administrative support
part. To be exact, the IETF will not become an organization even
if the administrative support for it may. While one may have an
opinion that administrative functions may grow or acquire more
staff over time (and there is always some danger of that), keeping
the IETF out of the organization for administration does provide a
level of separation. This separation ensures that participant,
working group, IESG, IETF Chair, and other similar roles should
continue to operate as they are operating now.
Sometimes even administrative decisions can impact the nature or
culture of the IETF, such as when improvements in remote
attendance support are adopted. A clear interface between the
community and the IETFAdminOrg is helpful in specifying what role
the community and other parts of the system play. The nomcom-
appointed board members and the Advisory Council have clearer
role, and have a more community-focused role in the new
arrangements to ensure that the community has a strong voice.
o Improve the IETF's Technical Environment:
All organization options target improvements in this area. The
options may differ in how much freedom or organization agility
they provide. Clearly, in the independent organization option the
IETF has most of these.
o Clearly Define the IETF-ISOC Relationship:
Again, all options are forced to define this relationship in a
clearer way than it is defined today.
However, the subsidiary and independent organization models have a
better ability to reach a clear definition. A clear definition is
not merely a matter of specification, it is also affected by
practical and even legal constraints and organizations' goals.
For instance, for obvious privacy and legal reasons, IETF may not
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have quite as much control and information about ISOC employees as
it would on its own administrative unit's employees.
o Support a Re-Envisioned Funding Model:
The changes to the funding model are on purpose modest for the
reorganization, with the intent provide more ability and freedom
for the IETF to adjust its model later. However, the subsidiary
and independent organization models also clearly provide more
freedom for further evolution.
In IASA++, leaving the responsibility for sponsorship fundraising
up to ISOC, as BCP 101 does, means we will always be constrained
by however ISOC is willing to staff and support IETF-specific
fundraising. While ISOC has and wants to support the IETF, it is
often the case that knowledge of what strategies work and the
direct contacts to sponsoring organisations are on the IETF side.
In the independent organization model, the ability for the IETF to
rely on ISOC in the event of budget shortfalls may be more
limited. This is a double-edged sword, however, as the current
arrangements complicate planning and perceptions by the sponsors.
o Provide Clarity About the IETF-ISOC Financial Arrangements:
All reorganization options aim to provide clarity. But the
subsidiary and independent organisation options provide an
opportunity to define exactly what kind of agreements exist
between the IETF and the new organization, in the form of a formal
agreement between organizations or parts thereof. This is
important in conveying the role of different parties to potential
sponsors, for instance.
In the IASA++ option, there is limited improvement on clarity of
the financial arrangements.
o Clarify Overall Roles and Responsibilities:
The reorganization is an opportunity to rethink what staff roles
are needed, staff levels, whether to organize a function as a
staff function or as contracted service to a vendor. All options
are likely to provide clarified roles and responsibilities.
However, in IASA++, some of lack of clarity may remain, as lack of
clarity inherent in two organizations controlling resources may
remain. In general the subsidiary and independent organisation
models ensure better tha the IETF community and the IETF
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administrative functions have authority to perform exactly the
kind of adminstration they want.
The independent organization model eliminates all ambiquity about
the IETF having authority independent from ISOC over staff, funds,
and decisions.
o Define Support Staff Roles and Responsibilities:
As above.
o Re-Define the Role of the IETF Community in Relation to
Administrative Activities:
Again, this is necessary in all the reorganization options. It is
particularly important for the discussion of transparency.
o Improve Transparency:
An improvement can be provided in any chosen option, but it will
require (a) adopting the by default open model, (b) agreeing on a
list of exceptions, as well as obviously clear definition of
roles.
These changes are easier on the subsidiary and independent
organisation models, however, because we can start with more of a
fresh slate. The IAOC and committees have been operating with
their current structure, and, in some cases, current volunteers/
personnel, for a long time. It will be harder for them to change
than to make staff-driven changes in an org with new staff.
o Define a Transition Plan:
This will also be necessary in all options.
The IASA++ option is the easiest one to get going, and minimal
transition cost, although of course it may not provide as much
value in return, creating risk that the challenges present in
current IASA structures will not be sufficiently solved.
6.2. Financial Impacts
There are several different classes of financially-relevant changes.
Funding-related changes have been covered in Section 5.6, as have
transition costs.
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All the suggested models imply some actual increases in expenditure
and financial resources on an ongoing basis. The following applies
generally to all chosen models:
The increases are due to, for instance, shifting more work to staff
and contractors. For the staff changes, the primary position
actually being added is having both Executive Director and Operations
Director, instead of one IAD. We've already had a Legal Counsel and
roles similar to the Director of Fundraising and Communications
Director. These chances coincide with other personnel changes in
IASA, as the experienced, long-term IAD is retiring and a long-term
IETF Legal Counsel is also changing.
It is also expected that the role of the Legal Counsel will also
increase, e.g., in terms of reviewing contracts.
For both the subsidiary model or the independent organization model,
there can be additional and potentially significant costs. For
example, having a full-time communications director on staff means
paying the person's full salary, health insurance, worker's
compensation, sick pay, etc. In general, while under the ISOC model
the IETF may have been able to take a particular percentage of a
person's predicted base costs, under a more independent arrangements
the IETF is an employer and liable for all associated costs at 100%.
Similarly, some current contracted or volunteer roles, if turned to
staff positions, can increase costs.
Audits, payroll, HR, office space, equipment - these are things we do
not currently account for in the IETF budget, that we wouldn't have
to pay for as a subsidiary (assuming we can share overhead with ISOC,
since that's part of the point), but that we would have to pay for as
an independent org.
6.3. Other Impacts
Depending on the chosen option, volunteers are needed for either
different roles than today (the board) or for both different roles
and more volunteers (the board and the advisory council).
It is for further study whether current IETF leadership (e.g., IAB
Chair) should continue to be part of these boards or councils.
7. Conclusions
While there are some initial conclusions in the analysis in the
previous sections, clearly more work is needed. In particular, we
request and welcome thoughts and contributions from the IETF
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community, particularly regarding any potential missed options or the
implications of options being considered here.
7.1. Transition Plan
Following feedback we receive before and during the IETF-100 meeting,
we will develop a detailed transition plan and include that here.
The transition plan should address items such as the following (and
we seek suggestions on areas we may have missed):
o Volunteer organization transition plan and timeframe
o Legal, financial, and administrative actions
o Staffing actions (e.g. job descriptions)
o Documentation actions (e.g. roles and responsibilities, updates to
RFCs)
o Near-term goals for the new board (e.g. develop and release a
budget within 90 days of formation)
o Other
8. Acknowledgments
This text is the work of the design team, but greatly influenced by
discussions in the IETF community. The team would in particular like
to thank Alissa Cooper, Andrew Sullivan, Ray Pelletier, Ted Hardie,
Gonzalo Camarillo, Brian Carpenter, Lucy Lynch, Stephen Farrell, Dave
Crocker, Jon Peterson, Alexa Morris, Jonne Soininen, Michael
Richardson, Olaf Kolkman, Kathy Brown, and Melinda Shore for
interesting discussions in this problem space.
9. Informative References
[Camarillo]
Camarillo, G., "ISOC to cover potential re-structuring
costs related to IASA 2.0", September 2017
(https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf/current/
msg104265.html).
[I-D.arkko-ietf-iasa-thoughts]
Arkko, J., "Thoughts on IETF Administrative Support
Activities (IASA)", draft-arkko-ietf-iasa-thoughts-00
(work in progress), March 2017.
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[I-D.daigle-iasa-retrospective]
Daigle, L., "After the first decade: IASA Retrospective",
draft-daigle-iasa-retrospective-01 (work in progress),
June 2017.
[I-D.hall-iasa20-workshops-report]
Hall, J. and J. Mahoney, "Report from the IASA 2.0 Virtual
Workshops", draft-hall-iasa20-workshops-report-00 (work in
progress), March 2017.
[RFC4071] Austein, R., Ed. and B. Wijnen, Ed., "Structure of the
IETF Administrative Support Activity (IASA)", BCP 101,
RFC 4071, DOI 10.17487/RFC4071, April 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4071>.
Authors' Addresses
Brian Haberman (editor)
Johns Hopkins University
Email: brian@innovationslab.net
Jari Arkko
Ericsson Research
Email: jari.arkko@piuha.net
Leslie Daigle
Thinking Cat Enterprises LLC
Email: ldaigle@thinkingcat.com
Jason Livingood
Comcast
Email: Jason_Livingood@comcast.com
Joseph Lorenzo Hall
CDT
Email: joe@cdt.org
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Eric Rescorla
RTFM, Inc.
Email: ekr@rtfm.com
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