Internet DRAFT - draft-haddad-momipriv-threat-model
draft-haddad-momipriv-threat-model
Network Working Group W. Haddad
Internet-Draft Ericsson Research
Expires: December 28, 2006 E. Nordmark
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
F. Dupont
CELAR
M. Bagnulo
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
S. Soohong Daniel Park
Samsung Electronics
B. Patil
Nokia
H. Tschofenig
Siemens
June 26, 2006
Anonymous Identifiers (ALIEN): Privacy Threat Model for Mobile and
Multi-Homed Nodes
draft-haddad-momipriv-threat-model-02.txt
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
This memo describes threats violating the privacy based on
identifiers used at the MAC and IP layers, in the context of a mobile
and multi-homed environment.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Threat Model Applied to Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Threat Model Applied to Privacy on the MAC Layer . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Threats from Collecting Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.1. Discovering the Identity Presence . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.2. Determining the Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Threat Model Applied to Privacy on the IP Layer . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Threats Against Privacy in Mobile IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.1. Quick Overview of MIPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.2. Threats Related to MIPv6 BT Mode . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.3. Threats Related to MIPv6 RO Mode . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Threat Model Applied to a Static Multi-homed Node . . . . . . 13
6.1. Threats againt Privacy on the MAC Layer . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2. Threats against Privacy on the IP Layer . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Threats related to Network Access Authentication . . . . . . . 15
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 24
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1. Introduction
The MoMiPriv problem statement document [I-D.haddad-momipriv-problem-
statement] introduced new attributes related to the privacy and
described critical issues related to providing these attributes on
both the IP and MAC layers. In addition, MOMPS highlighted the
interdependency between issues on the MAC and IP layers and the need
to solve them all together.
This memo describes threats and possible attacks against privacy at
the MAC and IP layers, in the context of a mobile and multi-homed
environment.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
It would also be useful to clarify the following entities involved in
defining threats against privacy:
Target We use the term "target" to specify an entity who's privacy is
threatened by an adversary/malicious node.
Adversary/Malicious Node This term refers to the entity that is
trying to violate the privacy of its target.
In addition, this draft uses the terminology described in
[I-D.haddad-alien-privacy-terminology].
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3. Threat Model Applied to Privacy
Before listing threats against privacy, we start by describing the
privacy threat model, which will be applied on the MAC and IP layers
in order to perform our analysis. The location of adversaries
violating privacy must be taken into account when analyzing the
different threats.
In a mobile environment, the three main threats against privacy are
the following:
o Identifying
o Locating
o Tracing
In the MoMiPriv context, a malicious node can identify its target via
its device identifier(s), i.e., MAC address and/or its IPv6
address(es). Once the identification procedure is achieved, it
becomes by itself a threat against privacy, since a malicious node
located in one particular place will be able to claim with certain
confidence that its target was present in the same place at a
specific time, by just capturing its MAC address.
The next logic step after identifying a target is to locate it with
maximum accuracy. The third step consists on tracing the target
(possibly in real-time) while it is moving across the Internet.
Performing these three steps allow the malicious node to gradually
increase its knowledge about its target by gathering more and more
information about it. These information may allow, for example to
build a profile of the target and then to launch specific attacks or
to misuse the obtained information in other ways (e.g., marketing
purposes, statistics, etc). Data gathered may include higher-layer
identifiers (e.g., email addresses) or pseudonyms, location
information, temporal information, mobility patterns, etc.
In order to access the MAC address of a targeted node in a WLAN, the
malicious node needs to be either on the same link or within the
distributed system (DS). However, in other scenarios, especially in
the ongoing deployment of public outdoor WLAN technologies, more
complex attacks involving multiple malicious nodes need to be
considered.
Actually, taking a look at today's WLAN deployments in some cities
like Chicago and New York [WIGLE] gives a clear picture of the high
density of APs already deployed. These examples of today's WLAN
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deployment leads to the following conclusions:
o the high density of APs deployed nowadays greatly extends the
spatial and temporal coverage of the three main threats against
privacy mentioned above.
o the MAC address is becoming easier to detect and thus is causing a
growing privacy concern, in particular for mobility.
o in some existing public areas covered by WLAN technologies, any
efficient tracing of a designed target is greatly improved
whenever multiple co-operative malicious nodes are deployed in
different locations covered by WLAN technologies.
Based on the above, the suggested threat model when applied to the
MAC layer should take into consideration the classic scenario, where
one malicious node is collecting data on the link/DS and the scenario
where many malicious nodes are deployed in different locations,
within the WLAN covered area, and performing data collection while
collaborating together for identifying, locating and tracking
purposes.
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4. Threat Model Applied to Privacy on the MAC Layer
We start our analyze by applying the threat model to the MAC layer.
4.1. Threats from Collecting Data
4.1.1. Discovering the Identity Presence
The WLAN technologies discloses the user's device identifier, i.e.,
the MAC address, in each data frame sent/received by the mobile node
(MN) within the distribution system (DS) thus, making the device
identifier readable/available to any malicious eavesdropper located
on the link or in the same DS.
Based on this observation, collecting data on one particular link/DS,
coupled with prior knowledge of the targeted node's MAC address
allows the malicious node to check first if its target is located
within the covered area or not.
An eavesdropper can perform data collecting via two ways. The first
one is by positioning itself on the link/DS and sniffing packets
exchanged between the MNs and the APs. The second way consists on
deploying rogue access points in some particular areas. The ability
to deploy rogue access points requires a missing security protection
of the WLAN network.
In WLAN, the targeted MN does not even need to exchange data packets
with another node, to disclose its MAC address to a malicious node
eavesdropping on the same link than the MN. In fact, the target's
MAC address appears in control messages exchanged between the MN and
the AP(s) or between different MNs (adhoc mode).
In addition, identifying the target allows the malicious node to
learn the target's IPv6 address and the data sequence number.
On the other side, a malicious node collecting data from one
particular DS, may also try to conduct an active search for its
target within the DS by trying to connect to the target, using the
IPv6 address derived from the link local address, according to the
stateless address configuration protocol defined in [I-D.ietf-ipv6-
rfc2462bis]. In such scenario, if the targeted node replies to the
malicious node's request while being located within the same DS, then
its presence will immediately be detected.
A malicious node may also choose and add new targets to its list,
based on other criterias, which are learned from collecting data.
For example, the frequency, timing and the presence duration of one
particular node may encourage the malicious eavsedeopper to learn
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more in order to gradually build a profile for that node.
4.1.2. Determining the Location
After identifying its target within a DS, a malicious node may
attempt to determine its location. Such step can be performed by
different means.
But it should be noted first, that discovering the target's presence
on the MAC layer, implicitly maps its geographical location within a
specific area. Depending on the network topology and the link layer
technology, this area might be quite large or might have a fairly
irregular shape. Hence, the malicious node may want to learn the
most accurate location of its target.
It is also possible to determine the geographical location of the MN
with a certain accuracy at the physical layer. This is done by
identifying the Access Point (AP) to which, the MN is currently
attached and then trying to determine the geographical location of
the corresponding AP.
4.1.2.1. Tracing the Target
After identifying and locating its target, a malicious node located
in a particular DS, can use data collecting to trace its target in
real time within the entire ESS.
Tracing can be done either via the target's MAC address or its IPv6
address or via the data sequence number carried in each data frame or
through combining them.
On the other side, these information allow the malicious node to
break the unlinkability protection provided by changing the MAC
address, e.g., during a L2 handoff, since it will always be possible
to trace the MN by other tools than its MAC address.
4.1.2.2. Threats from Various Malicious Nodes
An efficient way to trace a target within an area covered by wireless
link layer technologies is by deploying many malicious nodes within
one specific area.
As it has been mentioned above, a malicious node located within a
specific DS can trace its target only within the DS. However, there
may be scenarios where tracing a particular target needs to go beyond
one specific DS boundaries. In addition, the target MN's MAC address
may change many times before the MN leaves the DS. Consequently,
even if the new DS is monitored by a malicious eavesdropper, it will
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not be possible for him/her to identify the target anymore.
If the malicious nodes collaborate with each other, it would be
possible to keep tracing the target within a specific region. In
fact, the main goals behind collaborative tracing is to break the
unlinkability protection when provided in a independent way at the
MAC and IP layers. In fact, changing the MAC address alone while
keeping using the same IP address will always make the target
identifiable and traceable through different DSs.
Note that in addition to using the MAC and IP addresses, the sequence
number can also be used for tracing purposes.
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5. Threat Model Applied to Privacy on the IP Layer
Learning the target's IP address discloses the topological location,
which may in turn reveal also geographical location information of
the target. For example, location specific extensions to the DNS
directory [LOC_DNS] can help to reveal further information about the
geographical location of a particular IP address. Tools are also
available [HEO] that allows everyone to querry this information using
a graphical interface. Note that the location information cannot be
always correct, for example due to state entries in the DNS, NATed IP
addresses, usage of tunnels (e.g., VPN, Mobile IP, etc.).
This information can be used to link the current target's location(s)
to the regular one and provide the eavesdropper more information
about its target's movements in real time.
5.1. Threats Against Privacy in Mobile IPv6
In Mobile IPv6, threats against privacy can originate from the
correspondent node (CN) and/or from a malicious node(s) located
either between the MN and the CN or between the MN and its home
agent.
5.1.1. Quick Overview of MIPv6
Mobile IPv6[MIP6] protocol allows a mobile node to switch between
different networks, while keeping ongoing session(s) alive. For this
purpose, MIPv6 offers two modes to handle the mobility problem. The
first mode is the bidirectional tunnelling (BT) mode, which hides the
MN's movements from the CN by sending all data packets through the
MN's HA. Consequently, the BT mode provides a certain level of
location privacy by hiding the MN's current location from the CN.
The other mode is the route optimization (RO) mode, which allows the
MN to keep exchanging data packets on the direct path with the CN,
while moving outside its home network. For this purpose, the MN
needs to update the CN with its current new location each time it
switches to a new network. This is done by sending a binding update
(BU) message to the CN to update its binding cache entry (BCE) with
the MN's new location, i.e., care-of address. In addition, the RO
mode requires the MN and the CN to insert the MN's home address in
each data packet exchanged between them.
5.1.2. Threats Related to MIPv6 BT Mode
As mentioned above, the BT mode keeps the CN totally unaware of the
MN's movements across the Internet. However, the MN must update its
HA with its new current location each time it switches to a new
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network, in order to enable the HA to encapsulate data packets to its
new location, i.e., new care-of address (CoA).
In the BT mode, tracing the MN can either be done via the MAC address
as described earlier, or by having a malicious node located somewhere
between the MN and the HA, and looking into the inner data packet
header.
On the other side, the MIPv6 protocol suggests that the tunnel
between the MN and the HA can be protected with ESP. In such case,
the malicious node won't be able anymore to identify its target (when
located between the mobile node and the home agent) thus making the
tracing impossible. However, tracing can always be possible at the
MAC layer.
5.1.3. Threats Related to MIPv6 RO Mode
The MIPv6 RO mode and all new optimizations, e.g., [I-D.arkko-
mipshop-cga-cba], [I-D.ietf-mip6-cn-ipsec] and [I-D.ietf-mip6-
precfgkbm], requires the MN to send a BU message to update the CN in
order to announce its new current location after each IP handover,
and to insert the MN's home address in each data packets sent to/from
the MN.
Consequently, threats against MN's privacy can emanate from a
malicious CN, which starts by establishing a session with the target,
i.e., by using its target's IPv6 home address, sending it enough data
packets and then waiting till its target switches to the RO mode.
But it should be noted that the MN may not decide to switch to the RO
mode but keep using instead the BT mode, in order to avoid disclosing
its current location to the CN.
On the other side, a malicious node may position itself somewhere on
the direct path between the MN and the CN and learn the MN's current
location from sniffing the BU message(s) and/or the data packets
exchanged between the two entities.
Another possibility is to do the tracing on the MAC address. As
mentioned above, this requires the malicious node to be located on
the same link/DS than the MN.
The MIPv6 RO mode requires protecting all signalling messages
exchanged between the MN and the HA by an ESP tunnel. In such case,
a malicious node located between the MN and the HA cannot identify
its target.
However, the IETF has recently adopted a new authentication protocol
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for MIPv6 [I-D.ietf-mip6-auth-protocol], which allows securing the
BU/BA signalling messages exchanged between the HA and the MN by
using an authentication option carried in the BU/BA messages.
MIPAUTH protocol may have a serious impact on the MN's privacy, since
it offers the malicious node a new location, i.e., the path between
the targeted MN and its HA, to identify, locate and trace its target.
This is in addition to positioning itself on the path between the
targeted MN and the CN. It should be noted also that the path
between the MN and the HA may be more interesting to use in order to
break the MN's privacy, since the MN may try to hide its real
identity (and consequently its location) from the CN, as proposed in
[MIPLOP] while still using the real IPv6 home address to exchange
signalling messages with its HA.
Furthermore, it would also be possible to learn the MN's pseudo-
identifier(s) used in exchanging data packets and signalling messages
between the MN and the CN on the direct path, by having two malicious
nodes located between the MN and the HA and between the MN and the CN
and collaborating together.
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6. Threat Model Applied to a Static Multi-homed Node
A multi-homed node can be described as being attached to more than
one Internet Service Provider (ISP). Consequently, the multiple
addresses available to a multi-homed node are pre-defined and known
in advance in most of the cases.
The main goals behind providing the multi-homing feature are to allow
the multi-homed node to use multiple attachments in parallel and the
ability to switch between these different attachments during an
ongoing session(s), e.g., in case of a failure.
For these purposes, the multi6 WG introduced recently a new proposal
to address multi-homing issues, based on using the Hash Based
Addresses [I-D.ietf-multi6-hba] and a Layer 3 Shim Approach
[I-D.ietf-multi6-l3shim].
The HBA technology offers a new mechanism to provide a secure binding
between multiple addresses with different prefixes available to a
host within a multihomed site. This is achieved by generating the
interface identifiers of the addresses of a host as hashes of the
available prefixes and a random number. Then, the multiple addresses
are generated by prepending the different prefixes to the generated
interface identifiers. The result is a set of addresses that are
inherently bound. In addition, the HBA technology allows the CN to
verify if two HBA addresses belong to the same HBA set.
The Layer 3 Shim approach aims to eliminate any impact on upper layer
protocols by ensuring that they can keep operating unmodified in a
multi-homed environment while still seeing a stable IPv6 address.
For a static multi-homed, the main privacy concern are the ability to
identify the multi-homed node by an untrusted party and to discover
its available addresses. The untrusted party can be the CN itself or
a third party located somewhere between the multi-homed node and the
CN.
6.1. Threats againt Privacy on the MAC Layer
A malicious node can identify the targeted multi-homed node via its
MAC address. The ability to identify the target at the MAC layer
allows the malicious node to learn part or all available locators
used by the targeted node. However, it should be noted that for a
static target, a successful identification of the MAC address may
probably require more precise information concerning the geographical
location of the target.
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6.2. Threats against Privacy on the IP Layer
In a multi-homed environment, threats against privacy on the IP layer
can emanate from the CN itself, in an attempt to learn part/all
multi-homed node's available locators [I-D.ietf-multi6-multihoming-
threats].
For example, a malicious CN can use one pre-identified locator
belonging to its target, to establish a session with the target.
After that, the CN can try to push its target to switch (i.e.,
disclose) to new locator(s) by stopping replying to packets sent with
the initial address, i.e., pretending a failure. In such scenario,
and in order to avoid interrupting ongoing session, the targeted node
may decide to switch to another (or more) locator(s), depending on
the CN willingness to re-start sending packets to the new locator.
On the other side, an untrusted third party located near its target
(e.g., based on prior knowledge of one of the target's locator) or
one particular CN, can correlate between different locators used by
the targeted node by eavesdropping on packets exchanged between the
two entities.
Depending on the final solution adopted, the attacker can also sniff
context establishment packets that will probably contain some or all
the locators available to the multi-homed node.
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7. Threats related to Network Access Authentication
This section talks about privacy aspect with the transmission of
identity information as part of network access authentication and the
problem of making location information available as part of this
procedure.
In many cases the location information of the network also reveals
the current location of the user with a certain degree of precision
depending on the mechanism used, the positioning system, update
frequency, where the location was generated, size of the network and
other mechanisms (such as movement traces or interpolation).
A number of parties might gain access to location information of the
user: the access network, the home network, eavesdroppers at the
wireless link, the AAA infrastructure (such as AAA proxies) and other
communication peers. If location information cannot be associated
with a particular long-term identifier then the ability to create
profiles might be limited but still there might be a problem (see,
for example, the usage of storing location information in the DNS
[RFC1876]). Tracing the location of a user to create a location-
profile of the movements is certainly a big concern.
For the envisioned usage scenarios, the identity of the user and his
device is tightly coupled to the transfer of location information.
If the identity can be determined by the visited network or AAA
brokers, then it is possible to correlate location information with a
particular user. As such, it allows the visited network and brokers
to learn movement patterns of users.
The home network might need to learn the location of the visited
network and the user in many cases, as motivated in [I-D.ietf-
geopriv-radius-lo]. Unlike work in other standardization
organizations, this work aims to incorporate the usage of
authorization policies and to avoid the transmission of location
information with every request. The success of this approach,
however, depends to some degree to the privacy policy of the home
network and laws.
Since the home network and the user share some form of business
relationship, it is more reasonable to assume that the home network
might act in a way that the user desires (e.g., by enforcing privacy
policies). The situation is different with the visited network. The
identity of the user can "leak" to the visited network or AAA brokers
in a number of ways:
o The user's device may employ a fixed MAC address or uses higher
layer identifiers that allows the visited network to re-recognize
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the user. This enables the correlation of the particular device
to its different locations. Techniques exist to avoid the use of
an IP address that is based on MAC address [I-D.ietf-ipv6-privacy-
addrs-v2]. Some link layers make it possible to avoid MAC
addresses or change them dynamically.
o Network access authentication procedures such as PPP CHAP
[RFC1994] or EAP [RFC3748] may reveal the user's identity as a
part of the authentication procedure to the eavesdropper on the
wireless link, to the visited network and to the AAA proxies.
Techniques exist to avoid this problem in EAP, for instance by
employing private Network Access Identifiers (NAIs) in the EAP
Identity Response message [I-D.ietf-radext-rfc2486bis] and by a
method-specific private identity exchange in the EAP method (e.g.,
[RFC4187] or [I-D.josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap]). Support for
identity privacy within CHAP is not available.
o AAA protocols may return information from the home network to the
visited in a manner that makes it possible to either identify the
user or at least correlate his session with other sessions, such
as the use of static data in a Class attribute [RFC2865] or in
some accounting attribute usage scenarios [RFC4372].
o Mobility mechanisms may reveal some permanent identifier (such as
a home address) in cleartext in the packets relating to mobility
signaling.
o Application protocols may reveal other permanent identifiers.
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8. Security Considerations
This document aims to formalize a privacy threat model for the MAC
and IP layers and does not suggest any solutions to counter these
threats. Based on that, the suggested threat model does not add nor
amplify any existing attacks against the mobile or multi-homed node.
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9. IANA Considerations
This document does not require actions by IANA.
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10. References
10.1. Normative References
[MIP6] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
in IPv6", June 2004.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997.
10.2. Informative References
[HEO] "High Earth Orbit", Febraury 2005.
[I-D.arkko-mipshop-cga-cba]
Arkko, J., "Applying Cryptographically Generated Addresses
and Credit-Based Authorization to Mobile IPv6",
draft-arkko-mipshop-cga-cba-03 (work in progress),
March 2006.
[I-D.haddad-alien-privacy-terminology]
Haddad, W. and E. Nordmark, "Privacy Terminology",
draft-haddad-alien-privacy-terminology-00 (work in
progress), October 2005.
[I-D.haddad-momipriv-problem-statement]
Haddad, W., "Privacy for Mobile and Multi-homed Nodes:
MoMiPriv Problem Statement",
draft-haddad-momipriv-problem-statement-02 (work in
progress), October 2005.
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-radius-lo]
Tschofenig, H., "Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS",
draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-06 (work in progress),
March 2006.
[I-D.ietf-ipv6-privacy-addrs-v2]
Narten, T., "Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration in IPv6",
draft-ietf-ipv6-privacy-addrs-v2-04 (work in progress),
December 2005.
[I-D.ietf-ipv6-rfc2462bis]
Thomson, S., "IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration",
draft-ietf-ipv6-rfc2462bis-08 (work in progress),
May 2005.
[I-D.ietf-mip6-auth-protocol]
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Leung, K., "Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6",
draft-ietf-mip6-auth-protocol-07 (work in progress),
September 2005.
[I-D.ietf-mip6-cn-ipsec]
Dupont, F. and J. Combes, "Using IPsec between Mobile and
Correspondent IPv6 Nodes", draft-ietf-mip6-cn-ipsec-02
(work in progress), December 2005.
[I-D.ietf-mip6-precfgkbm]
Perkins, C., "Securing Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization
Using a Static Shared Key", draft-ietf-mip6-precfgkbm-04
(work in progress), December 2005.
[I-D.ietf-multi6-hba]
Bagnulo, M., "Hash Based Addresses (HBA)",
draft-ietf-multi6-hba-00 (work in progress),
December 2004.
[I-D.ietf-multi6-l3shim]
Nordmark, E. and M. Bagnulo, "Multihoming L3 Shim
Approach", draft-ietf-multi6-l3shim-00 (work in progress),
January 2005.
[I-D.ietf-multi6-multihoming-threats]
Nordmark, E., "Threats relating to IPv6 multihoming
solutions", draft-ietf-multi6-multihoming-threats-03 (work
in progress), January 2005.
[I-D.ietf-radext-rfc2486bis]
Aboba, B., "The Network Access Identifier",
draft-ietf-radext-rfc2486bis-06 (work in progress),
July 2005.
[I-D.josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap]
Josefsson, S., Palekar, A., Simon, D., and G. Zorn,
"Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2",
draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-10 (work in progress),
October 2004.
[LOC_DNS] Davis, C., Vixie, P., Goodwin, T., and I. Dickinson, "A
Means for Expressing Location Information in the Domain
Name System", RFC 1876, January 1996.
[MIPLOP] Montenegro, G., Castelluccia, C., and F. Dupont, "A
Simple Privacy Extension for Mobile IPv6", Mobile and
Wireless Communication Networks", IEEE MCWN, October 2004.
Haddad, et al. Expires December 28, 2006 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft ALIEN June 2006
[RFC1876] Davis, C., Vixie, P., Goodwin, T., and I. Dickinson, "A
Means for Expressing Location Information in the Domain
Name System", RFC 1876, January 1996.
[RFC1994] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication
Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, June 2000.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4187] Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key
Agreement (EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, January 2006.
[RFC4372] Adrangi, F., Lior, A., Korhonen, J., and J. Loughney,
"Chargeable User Identity", RFC 4372, January 2006.
[WIGLE] "Wireless Geographic Logging Engine,
http://wigle.net/gps/gps/Map/", 2006.
Haddad, et al. Expires December 28, 2006 [Page 21]
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Authors' Addresses
Wassim Haddad
Ericsson Research
Torshamnsgatan 23
SE-164 80 Stockholm
Sweden
Phone: +46 8 4044079
Email: Wassim.Haddad@ericsson.com
Erik Nordmark
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
17 Network Circle
Mountain View, CA
USA
Email: Erik.Nordmark@sun.com
Francis Dupont
CELAR
Email: Francis.Dupont@point6.net
Marcelo Bagnulo
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Av. Universidad 30, leganes
Madrid 28911
Spain
Email: Marcelo@it.uc3m.es
Soohong Daniel Park
Samsung Electronics
416. Maetan-Dong, Yeongtong-Gu,
Suwon
Korea
Email: soohong.park@samsung.com
Haddad, et al. Expires December 28, 2006 [Page 22]
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Basavaraj Patil
Nokia
6000 Connection Drive
Irving, Tx 75039
USA
Email: HBasavaraj.Patil@nokia.com
Hannes Tschofenig
Siemens
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich, Bayern 81739
Germany
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
Haddad, et al. Expires December 28, 2006 [Page 23]
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Haddad, et al. Expires December 28, 2006 [Page 24]
