Internet DRAFT - draft-hajduk-lfdedp

draft-hajduk-lfdedp







Network Working Group                                          M. Hajduk
Internet-Draft                                                Individual
Intended status: Standards Track                         21 October 2023
Expires: 23 April 2024


             Link failure detection by Ethernet data plane
                         draft-hajduk-lfdedp-00

Abstract

   This document describes a method to detect link failures which relies
   solely on Ethernet data plane.  An ordinary Ethernet frame can be
   modified and sent back to sender to signal a loss of connection.  No
   control plane protocol is utilized in the process which makes the
   method very simple and fast to react.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2024.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.




Hajduk                    Expires 23 April 2024                 [Page 1]

Internet-Draft                    NFFRR                     October 2023


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Layer 2 Point of Local Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Layer 3 Point of Local Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Updating FIB  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Activating FRR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Network convergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Interoperability considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  Implementation status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   To minimize packet loss after an unexpected failure it is crucial to
   detect the failure the shortest possible time after its occurrence.
   Ethernet is well-known example of L2 protocol without signaling loss
   of connection between two endpoints.  Various protocols have been
   proposed to address this drawback.  Traditional methods rely on
   periodic transmission of control plane messages.  Inability to
   receive such messages on time is interpreted as a link failure by
   receiver.  This method may and usually does fail to detect failure at
   the precise time it happened.  The event is detected with a varying
   delay during which significant number of packets may be lost.
   Attempts to minimize the delay lead to more frequent transmission of
   PDUs and more processor cycles consumed.  In the end, it results in
   higher energy consumption and higher carbon footprint.

   In this document a novel method based solely on existing Ethernet
   data plane is introduced.  It features near-to-zero packet loss and
   zero control plane overhead.  Data plane frame is used to signal the
   inability to reach a destination.  Moreover, Ethernet switches can
   save frames from dropping in a similar way routers save MPLS or IP
   packets by using FRR.











Hajduk                    Expires 23 April 2024                 [Page 2]

Internet-Draft                    NFFRR                     October 2023


2.  Overview

   Frame which cannot be forwarded by a switch is modified by the switch
   and sent back to the original sender.  The receiver of the frame
   understands the original frame could not be forwarded to the
   destination and may activate FRR for the encapsulated PDU.  Thus,
   such frame is signaling a failure and is also saved for further
   forwarding on a backup path.

   Switch which can react to a failure of its link in the way described
   in this document is L2PLR (Layer 2 Point of Local Repair).

   The end recipient of the returned frame, modified by L2PLR, is L3PLR
   (Layer 3 Point of Local Repair).  L3PLR is typically but not
   exclusively router.  The type of L3PLR depends on higher-layer PDU
   encapsulated in a frame.

3.  Layer 2 Point of Local Repair

   When a switch interface goes down, the associated MAC table entries
   are put into a transitional state meaning an unhandled failure event.
   If a frame cannot be delivered using that entry and its Ethertype
   value is supported, the process of returning of frame begins.  The
   L2PLR MUST modify the frame in this way:

   1.  Copy source MAC address to destination MAC address (or set
   destination MAC address to a predefined value).

   2.  Set source MAC address to MAC address of the switch interface.

   3.  Change the innermost Ethertype value to a reserved value
   associated with the original Ethertype value.

   4.  Recalculate FCS.

   Optionally, L2PLR MAY apply MACsec protection on the frame (details
   are provided in Security considerations).  After the modification,
   the L2PLR MUST send the frame in the VLAN of the original frame.  The
   receiver of the modified frame (L3PLR) MAY be the sender of the
   original frame.  Alternatively, it MAY be a different entity in the
   same broadcast domain configured to collect frames it has not sent.
   In the former case, new destination address is the original source
   address, in the latter, new destination address is taken from
   configuration.

   If a modified frame cannot be forwarded on its return path (because
   of another network failure), it MUST be dropped.




Hajduk                    Expires 23 April 2024                 [Page 3]

Internet-Draft                    NFFRR                     October 2023


4.  Layer 3 Point of Local Repair

4.1.  Updating FIB

   L3PLR MUST recognize the new Ethertype value of the received frame to
   understand the frame was returned.  The Ethertype value is used to
   find the associated higher-layer protocol.  The L3PLR MUST update FIB
   entry for the address from higher-layer PDU.  Updating FIB entry MAY
   mean invalidating ARP [RFC826] entry for destination IPv4 address or
   NDP [RFC4861] entry for destination IPv6 address in the received
   frame.  Transition to a new entry state MAY be delayed in order to
   dampen flapping.  New entry state and delay MAY be configurable by
   operator.

4.2.  Activating FRR

   Regardless the FIB entry state, if the L3PLR supports FRR and has a
   valid backup path, it MUST forward PDUs from all frames returned by
   L2PLR to the backup path.  If the FIB entry is invalid, FRR MUST be
   activated for all packets having their destination impacted by the
   entry, not only those from returned frames.  PDUs to be sent over
   backup path are encapsulated in an ordinary way.  If L3PLR does not
   have any valid backup path, the packet MUST be dropped.

5.  Network convergence

   L2PLR MUST stop returning frames when the respective MAC table entry
   is deleted or put into valid state.  Either change triggers normal
   operation for these frames.

   If a FIB entry (for a neighbor) has been invalid sufficiently long,
   the routing process declares the neighbor unreachable.  Time interval
   for such change is not defined in this document.  Before the
   expiration, L3PLR SHOULD be probing logical address from the FIB
   entry.  The entity being probed might reply either with the original
   MAC address (after L2 network converges), or with a new MAC address.
   Once FIB entry is valid again, reachability is considered renewed.
   Not receiving returned frames for a period of time MUST NOT be
   interpreted as renewal of reachability.

6.  Interoperability considerations

   Frames returned by L2PLR can be forwarded by switches which do not
   support the method.  However, such switches and other L1 or L2
   devices may prevent L2PLR from detecting link failure.  Operator
   should avoid using them if the full support of the method is
   required.




Hajduk                    Expires 23 April 2024                 [Page 4]

Internet-Draft                    NFFRR                     October 2023


   If L3PLR not supporting the method received frames returned by L2PLR,
   the frames would be discarded due to unrecognized Ethertype value.
   Advertising support of the method is not covered in this document.
   Operator must ensure frames are returned to an entity with can act as
   L3PLR.  Default behavior of returning a frame to its original sender
   is overridden when MAC address of L3PLR is used for destination MAC
   address of the returned frame.

7.  Implementation status

   The method described in this document has not been implemented.

8.  Security Considerations

   The method may be misused for malicious redirection of traffic.  If
   there are multiple paths from a L3PLR to a destination, secondary
   path may use a weaker encryption than the primary path.  Even worse,
   secondary path may use no encryption while the primary path does.  In
   such scenario, an attacker may intercept a frame on primary path,
   modify it to look like a returned frame and inject it back.  Thus,
   L3PLR which received such frame would be spoofed to believe the
   primary path failed.  The frame would be sent over the secondary path
   where the attacker might be able to eavesdrop its payload.

   To prevent from such attack, MACsec should be deployed on a link of
   the primary path.  This would make impossible for an unauthorized
   entity to modify a frame without a receiver being able to detect the
   spoofed frame.  The countermeasure presumes L2PLR is trusted by
   receiver of returned frame.  The trust establishment is specified by
   MACsec standard (IEEE 802.1AE) and is not covered in this document.
   If the frame not protected by MACsec must be returned, the L2PLR
   applies MACsec integrity protection on the modified frame.  If the
   frame protected by MACsec must be returned, the L2PLR may decrypt the
   frame, modifies it, re-encrypts it and applies the integrity
   protection.  In either case L3PLR should be able to detect a spoofed
   returned frame.

9.  IANA Considerations

   The method requires new Ethertype values.  For each higher-layer
   protocol which needs to be supported a unique value is needed.  This
   value would be used for returned frames of the respective protocol
   only.  Since IANA does not assign Ethertype values [RFC7042], the
   requirement is applicable for IEEE.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References



Hajduk                    Expires 23 April 2024                 [Page 5]

Internet-Draft                    NFFRR                     October 2023


   [IEEE802.1AE]
              Seaman, M., "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
              networks–Media Access Control (MAC) Security", September
              2018, <https://1.ieee802.org/security/802-1ae>.

   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.

   [RFC826]   Plummer, D., "An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or
              Converting Network Protocol Addresses to 48.bit Ethernet
              Address for Transmission on Ethernet Hardware", STD 37,
              RFC 826, DOI 10.17487/RFC0826, November 1982,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc826>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC5880]  Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
              (BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.

   [RFC7042]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and J. Abley, "IANA Considerations and
              IETF Protocol and Documentation Usage for IEEE 802
              Parameters", BCP 141, RFC 7042, DOI 10.17487/RFC7042,
              October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7042>.

Author's Address

   Martin Hajduk
   Individual
   Email: martin.hajduk.ietf@gmail.com



















Hajduk                    Expires 23 April 2024                 [Page 6]