Internet DRAFT - draft-hallambaker-omnibroker
draft-hallambaker-omnibroker
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Phillip Hallam-Baker
Internet-Draft Comodo Group Inc.
Intended Status: Standards Track May 19, 2014
Expires: November 20, 2014
OmniBroker Protocol
draft-hallambaker-omnibroker-08
Abstract
An Omnibroker is an agent chosen and trusted by an Internet user to
provide information such as name and certificate status information
that are in general trusted even if they are not trustworthy. Rather
than acting as a mere conduit for information provided by existing
services, an Omnibroker is responsible for curating those sources to
protect the user.
The Omnibroker Protocol (OBP) provides an aggregated interface to
trusted Internet services including DNS, OCSP and various forms of
authentication service. Multiple transport bindings are supported to
permit efficient access in virtually every common deployment scenario
and ensure access in any deployment scenario in which access is not
being purposely denied.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Omnibroker Discovery and Publication Services . . . . . . 4
2.2. Omnibroker Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.1. Establishing service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.2. Protocol Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. OmniDiscovery Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Walled Gardens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Censorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Trust Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Censorship Bypass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Connection Broker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.1. Service Connection Broker . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.2. Peer Connection Broker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.3. Credential Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.4. Message: QMessage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1.5. Message: QRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1.6. Message: QResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1.7. Structure: Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1.8. Structure: Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.9. Structure: Credential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.10. Structure: CertificateID . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.11. Structure: Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.12. Structure: Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. OBPQuery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. QueryConnect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1.1. Message: QueryConnectRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1.2. Message: QueryConnectResponse . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. Validate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2.1. Message: ValidateRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2.2. Message: ValidateResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Transport Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. JSON Payload Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.1. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.2. Breach of Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.3. Coercion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11. Example Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.1. Ticket A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.2. Ticket B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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1. Definitions
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Purpose
Today, a network client is required to make queries against multiple
information sources to establish a secure connection to a network
resource. A DNS query is required to translate network names to
Internet addresses. If TLS transport is used, an OSCP query may be
required to validate the server certificate. Support for client
authentication may require interaction with another service.
Servers require similar support when accepting Internet connections.
Even though most networking infrastructure supports some form of
network administration, it is left to the network administrator to
fill in the gap between server applications and network
infrastructure. Making use of such facilities is rarely cost
effective except at the very largest installations.
An Omnibroker is a trusted agent that acts as a single point of
service for client queries requesting a connection to a named network
resource and server advertisements accepting connections to a named
network resource.
2.1. Omnibroker Discovery and Publication Services
The Omnibroker protocol is a meta-directory access protocol. As with
any directory protocol, the two principal functions supported by
Omnibroker are discovery and publication. These functions are
supported by the OmniDiscover and OmniPublish Web Services.
This specification document describes the architectural approach
shared by both protocols and the OmniDiscover protocol. The
OmniPublish protocol is described separately in [I-D.hallambaker-
omnipublish].
2.2. Omnibroker Implementation
Omnibroker Discovery and Omnibroker Publication make use of the
following mechanisms defined in other specifications:
Service Connection Service (SXS) [!I-D.hallambaker-wsconnect]
To establish and manage the long term trust relationship with
the Omnibroker provider.
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HTTP Session Authentication [!I-D.hallambaker-httpsession]
To provide message authentication in the HTTP/REST transport.
UDP Framed Messaged (UYFM) described in [!I-D.hallambaker-
wsconnect]
For low latency transactions.
JSON Encoding [!RFC4627]
For encoding messages in the HTTP transport.
JSON Binary and Compressed encodings described in [!I-
D.hallambaker-jsonbcd]
For efficient encoding messages in the low latency UYFM
transport.
2.2.1. Establishing service
In normal use, an omnibroker client receives service from a single
Omnibroker service provider. For performance and reliability reasons,
an Omnibroker service provider is expected to provide multiple
Omnibroker service instances.
An Omnibroker client acquires the network address information and
credentials necessary to access an omnibroker service using the JCX
Web Service to establish a connection binding. To ensure reliabilty
and the ability to access the service in all circumstances, an
Omnibroker connection binding SHOULD specify multiple service
instances.
2.2.2. Protocol Bindings
Due to the need for low latency and the need to function in a
compromised network environment, two protocol bindings are defined:
* A HTTP binding using HTTP [!RFC2616] for session layer framing
and HTTP Session Continuation [!I-D.hallambaker-httpsession]
for message authentication and JSON encoding [!RFC4627] of
protocol messages.
* A UDP Binding using UYFM framing [!I-D.hallambaker-wsconnect]
and JSON-B encoding [!I-D.hallambaker-jsonbcd] for framing and
encoding of protocol messages.
The implementation overhead of support for three different protocol
bindings is reduced by the choice of a binary encoding for JSON
(JSON-B) that is very close in structure to JSON encoding allowing
encoders and decoders to support both encodings with minimal
additional code.
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Regardless of the protocol binding used, all Omnibroker messages are
authenticated with protection against replay attack under the
cryptographic credentials established in the connection binding
service instance.
3. OmniDiscovery Service
Directing queries through a single point of contact has performance,
relability and security advantages. Directing queries to multiple
network information sources degrades performance and may cause a
connection request to fail if an information resource is not
available. This has led many application providers to limit the
information sources they consult. Directing queries through an
Omnibroker allows as many information sources to be brought to bear
as the broker has local cached data for without loss of performance
or reliability.
Making use of additional data sources allows the broker to 'curate'
the response. If the broker knows that a Web site always returns a
redirect to a TLS secured version of the same site, it can tell a Web
Browser to go straight to the secure version. If a Web Server is
hosted on a known botnet, the Omnibroker can tell the client that it
really does not want to visit that location.
Unlike the traditional DNS configuration, an Omnibroker client
decides which source(s) of trusted information to use rather than
relying on whatever happens to be the nearest source to hand.
The traditional DNS approach creates an obvious security risk as DNS
is a trusted service and deciding to choose a random DNS service
advertised by the local DHCP service is clearly a poor decision
process for a trusted service. Further the DNS protocol does not
protect the confidentiality or integrity of messages exchanged.
3.1. Related Work
Omnibroker provides security for interactions with a DNS service by
replacing the DNS protocol with a new protocol that provides a higher
level abstract service. [I-D.hallambaker-privatedns] applies the same
approach and platforms to provide confidentiality and integrity for
legacy DNS protocol messages.
4. Walled Gardens
IETF culture has traditionally resisted attempts to establish
partitions within the open Internet with restricted access to network
resources or compromised security. Such 'Walled Gardens' models
typically exist for the benefits of those who own the walls rather
than those forced to live inside them.
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While virtually all residential Internet users reject such controls,
most find them acceptable, if not desirable in workplaces and
schools.
Omnibroker simplifies the process of establishing such a walled
garden but does not make the walls any easier to defend.
4.1. Censorship
From a censorship point of view, the censorship concerns of running
an Omnibroker are essentially the same as those of running a DNS
service. The party who decides which discovery service to use can
determine which content is visible to the users.
4.2. Trust Substitution
Like SCVP [RFC5055] /> and XKMS [TBS], Omnibroker permits an Internet
client to delegate some or all aspects of PKIX [RFC5280] certificate
path chain discovery and validation.
In the normal mode of operation, the Omnibroker service performs only
path chain discovery, leaving the client to re-check the PKIX
certificate path before relying on it. This gives the Omnibroker the
power to veto a client connection to a server that it considers to be
unsafe but not the power to tell the client to trust a site of its
own choosing.
This ability to veto but not assert trust is appropriate and
sufficient for the vast majority of network applications. It allows
the broker to make use of additional path validation checks that are
not supported in the client such as DANE [RFC6698] or Certificate
Transparency [RFC6962] />.
There are however some workplace environments where the ability to
access external network resources with strong encryption is not
permissible by enterprise policy or in some cases by law. An
intelligence analyst working at the NSA may have a need to access
external Web sites that contain important information but must on no
account have access to a covert channel that could be used to
exfiltrate information. Certain Financial institutions with access to
valuable commercial information are required to monitor and record
all communications into and out of the company to deter insider
trading.
The traditional response to such needs has been to tell the parties
affected to look elsewhere for support. As a consequence the
techniques used to satisfy such requirements are generally unfriendly
to network applications in general and have in some cases put the
public Web PKI trust infratructure at risk.
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There is an argument to be made that rather than attempting to
prohibit such activities entirely, it would be better to provide a
principled method of achieving those ends and for mainstream software
providers to support it in such a fashion that ensures that network
applications configured for that mode of use can be readilly
identified as such by end users.
4.3. Censorship Bypass
As the preceeding examples demonstrate, a party with control over the
Omnibroker service chosen by a user has full control over the network
activities of that user. An important corrolary of this fact is that
all a user need do to achieve full control over their network
activities is to run their own Omnibroker service and connect to
that.
For example such an Omnibroker service might be configured to return
connection data for permitted domestic Web sites as normal but direct
attempts to connect to forbidden foreign news or social media through
a privacy network such as TOR.
5. Use
For illustrative purposes, all the examples in this section are shown
using the Web Services Transport binding. The security connection has
already been established as described in [I-D.hallambaker-wsconnect].
5.1. Connection Broker
The OBP service connection broker answers the query 'what connection
parameters should be used to establish the best connection to
interract with party X according to protocol Y. Where 'best' is
determined by the Omnibroker which MAY take into account parameters
specified by the relying party.
5.1.1. Service Connection Broker
The OBP service connection broker supports and extends the
traditional DNS resolution service that resolves a DNS name (e.g.
www.example.com) to return an IP address (e.g. 10.1.2.3).
When using an Omnibroker as a service connection broker, a client
specifies both the DNS name (e.g. www.example.com) and the Internet
protocol to be used (e.g. _http._tcp). The returned connection
parameters MAY include:
The IP protocol version, address and port number to establish a
connection to. If appropriate, a security transport such as TLS or
IPSEC. If appropriate, a description of a service credential such as
a TLS certificate or a constraint on the type of certificates that
the client should consider acceptable. If appropriate, application
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protocol details such as version and protocol options.
If an attempt to connect with the parameters specified fails, a
client MAY report the failure and request a new set of parameters.
5.1.1.1. Service Connection Broker Example
Alice uses her Web browser to access the URL http://www.example.com/.
The Web browser sends a QueryConnectRequest request to obtain the
best connection parameters for the http protocol at www.example.com:
POST /.well-known/omni-query/ HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Cache-Control: no-store
Session: Value=5_AlS4yMTeE82T6ZP9qAZN7TOhXtvqZ__zsLOmCxNrQ;
Id=o7znkpTHfrqcwsI1eHkPghCj7YsGUCp0KV2DcV1qXGlCt9wzmr2T6UcO_0YI
AcEqVdTsqRsYBtVNGs9SJyTCnMvjIlU1xQ9ZzoUtqtJsT4A
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Length: 123
Expect: 100-continue
{
"QueryConnectRequest": {
"Identifier": {
"Name": "Example.com",
"Service": "_http",
"Port": 80}}}
The service responds with an ordered list of possible connections. In
this case the site is accessible via plain TCP transport or with TLS.
Since TLS is the preferred protocol, that connection is listed first.
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HTTP/1.1 OK Success
Content-Length: 371
Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 17:17:43 GMT
Server: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
{
"QueryConnectResponse": {
"Status": 200,
"StatusDescription": "Success",
"Connection": [{
"IPAddress": "10.3.2.1",
"IPPort": 443,
"Transport": "TLS",
"TransportPolicy": "TLS=Optional",
"ProtocolPolicy": "Strict"},
{
"IPAddress": "10.3.2.1",
"IPPort": 80,
"ProtocolPolicy": "Strict"}]}}
5.1.2. Peer Connection Broker
Each OBP request identifies both the account under which the request
is made and the device from which it is made. An OBP broker is thus
capable of acting as a peer connection broker service or providing a
gateway to such a service.
When using Omnibroker as a peer connection broker, a client specifies
the account name and DNS name of the party with which a connection is
to be established (e.g. alice@example.com) and the connection
protocol to be used (e.g. _xmpp-client._tcp)
The returned connection parameters are similar to those returned in
response to a service broker query.
5.1.2.1. Service Connection Broker Example
Although the QueryConnectResponse returned the hash of a PKIX
certificate considered valid for that connection, the server returns
a different certificate which the client verifies using the
ValidateRequest query.
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[POST /.well-known/omni-query/ HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Cache-Control: no-store
Session: Value=ebgTLvWjZFeTMnowmomslUu9rPvzAPAciO11QK26NQg;
Id=o7znkpTHfrqcwsI1eHkPghCj7YsGUCp0KV2DcV1qXGlCt9wzmr2T6UcO_0YI
AcEqVdTsqRsYBtVNGs9SJyTCnMvjIlU1xQ9ZzoUtqtJsT4A
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Length: 1126
Expect: 100-continue
{
"ValidateRequest": {
"Service": {
"Identifier": [{
"Name": "example.com"}]},
"Credential": [{
"Data": "
MIIC0DCCAbigAwIBAgIQQut6m1F0PodIjIzop_d1uDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADAR
MQ8wDQYDVQQDEwZWb29kb28wHhcNMTMwNjI2MTczOTQyWhcNMTQwNjI2MDAwMDAw
WjARMQ8wDQYDVQQDEwZWb29kb28wggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEK
AoIBAQCdc7Qgx71o6Tq5dFUUhcCn8Nt-2Y9SGhm3WvsMYIqOIcHq3gjIKN9FWvXz
pBbTjz4lCwx-CJT82RBLNDFtsysfc0G7K_RsNKosYaM-L-DshO6R_314tptn9gnT
9tjTPXuiiICQlAP83BuTI148iEJWL36vbmv5AG6vrtk3T6ah5r2hBXQjt46sLQYw
eiM-peYIhPTIy9OYugogfqdzPvaJpDfAukqJBXqMxfscagKPYAGPaICKhobKr11a
Pam1Tchk2cBbtuYgSDz6ZGttsKE2omDbcmhbF7gBpRug-E2OH79Q4EVlSSoO9gZ6
AF4Km1A9uK9W_Pg8EPugY3Mgns6lAgMBAAGjJDAiMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIEMDATBgNV
HSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOCAQEACK9LQNkewOOugaYh
s4LfE3xdrRzrcaR0w5cf3wVcgR0ZZo98rDOtu3FAexpdh6vNaIdU4zAzNJPKKSso
3XF2LpQZovKIpUuN9pkZqslqZ0TLXqlyXMbheShcqIP1-m6qjZOp95N7jwgxBlEm
i_ne-rg1DicXFtAu90LpAZludaQGAyrj-LC37gzeMo2AG7BAuyFURXJFfxjpGmnu
euYfzZIMIQY-lNl6qm_vSMIz4uUKqq4lWndahnkJAwI2p5zUM0z3O6OMr_zr8eyr
dAL__H4NnG3gVyBbNoSbvbkxUt_C3oBwFFTupzRMQqJVjzbApyw5H0OzJPJKKkxx
hmIYTg"}]}}
The service validates the certificate according to the Omnibroker
service policy.
[HTTP/1.1 OK Success
Content-Length: 81
Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 17:17:43 GMT
Server: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
{
"ValidateResponse": {
"Status": 200,
"StatusDescription": "Success"}}
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5.1.3. Credential Validation
The credential validation query provides certificate path validation
and status checking.
The service provided by OBP is similar to that provided by OCSP and
SCVP. Like SCVP, OBP is an agent selected by the relying party to
validate certificates and/or construct trust paths on its behalf.
5.1.4. Message: QMessage
5.1.5. Message: QRequest
Every query request contains the following common elements:
Index :
Integer [0..1] Index used to request a specific response when
multiple responses are available.
5.1.6. Message: QResponse
Every Query Response contains the following common elements:
Status :
Integer [1..1] Status return code value
StatusDescription :
String [0..1] Describes the status code (ignored by processors)
Index :
Integer [0..1] Index of the current response.
Count :
Integer [0..1] Number of responses available.
5.1.7. Structure: Identifier
Specifies an Internet service by means of a DNS address and either a
DNS service prefix, an IP port number or both. An Internet peer
connection MAY be specified by additionally specifying an account.
Name :
Name [1..1] The DNS name of the service to connect to.
Internationalized DNS names MUST be encoded in punycode
encoding.
Account :
Label [0..1] Identifies the account to connect to in the case
that a peer connection is to be established.
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Service :
Name [0..1] The DNS service prefix defined for use with DNS
records that take a service prefix including SRV.
Port :
Integer [0..1] IP Port number. A service identifier MUST
specify either a service or a port or both.
5.1.8. Structure: Connection
IPAddress :
String [0..1] IP address in string representation
IPPort :
Integer [0..1] IP port. 1-65535
Transport :
String [0..1] Transport (RAW, TLS, IPSEC)
TransportPolicy :
String [0..1] Transport security policy as specified in [TBS]
ProtocolPolicy :
String [0..1] Application security policy specification as
specified by the application protocol.
Advice :
Advice [0..1] Additional information that a service MAY return
to support a service connection identification.
5.1.9. Structure: Credential
Type :
String [0..1] [TBS]
Data :
Binary [0..1] [TBS]
5.1.10. Structure: CertificateID
Type :
String [0..1] [TBS]
Data :
Binary [0..1] [TBS]
5.1.11. Structure: Advice
Additional information that a service MAY return to support a service
connection identification. For example, DNSSEC signatures chains,
SAML assertions, DANE records, Certificate Transparency proof chains,
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etc.
Type :
Label [0..1] The IANA MIME type of the content type
Data :
Binary [0..1] The advice data.
5.1.12. Structure: Service
Describes a service connection
Identifier :
Identifier [0..Many] Internet addresses to which the service is
to be bound.
Connection :
Connection [0..1] Service connection parameters.
6. OBPQuery
6.1. QueryConnect
Requests a connection context to connect to a specified Internet
service or peer.
6.1.1. Message: QueryConnectRequest
Specifies the Internet service or peer that a connection is to be
established to and the acceptable security policies.
Identifier :
Identifier [0..1] Identifies the service or peer to which a
connection is requested.
Policy :
Label [0..Many] Acceptable credential validation policy.
ProveIt :
Boolean [0..1] If set the broker SHOULD send advice to permit
the client to validate the proposed connection context.
6.1.2. Message: QueryConnectResponse
Returns one or more connection contexts in response to a
QueryConnectRequest Message.
Connection :
Connection [0..Many] An ordered list of connection contexts
with the preferred connection context listed first.
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Advice :
Advice [0..1] Proof information to support the proposed
connection context.
Policy :
Label [0..Many] Policy under which the credentials have been
verified.
6.2. Validate
The Validate query requests validation of credentials presented to
establish a connection. For example credentials presented by a server
in the process of setting up a TLS session.
6.2.1. Message: ValidateRequest
Specifies the credentials to be validated and the purpose for which
they are to be used.
Service :
Service [0..1] Describes the service for which the credentials
are presented for access.
Credential :
Credential [0..Many] Credentials for which validation is
requested.
CertificateID :
CertificateID [0..Many] OCSP Certificate Identifiers for which
validation is requested.
Policy :
Label [0..Many] Policy under which the credentials have been
verified.
6.2.2. Message: ValidateResponse
Reports the status of the credential presented.
Policy :
Label [0..Many] Policy under which the credentials have been
verified.
7. Transport Bindings
To achieve an optimal balance of efficiency and availability, two
transport bindings are defined:
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Internet-Draft OmniBroker Discovery Protocol May 2014
JSON over HTTP (TLS or TCP)
Supports all forms of OBP transaction in all network
environments.
JSON-B over UYFM (UDP)
Provides efficient support for all OBP query transactions and
is accessible in most network environments.
Support for the HTTP binding is REQUIRED.
An OBP message consists of three parts:
Ticket [If required]
If specified, identifies the cryptographic key and algorithm
parameters to be used to secure the message payload.
Payload [Required]
If the ticket context does not specify use of an encryption
algorithm, contains the message data. Otherwise contains the
message data encrypted under the encryption algorithm and key
specified in the ticket context.
Authenticator [If required]
If the ticket context specifies use of a Message Authentication
Code (MAC), contains the MAC value calculated over the payload
data using the authentication key bound to the ticket.
Note that although each of the transport bindings defined in this
specification entail the use of a JSON encoding for the message data,
this is not a necessary requirement for a transport binding.
7.1. JSON Payload Binding
Integer
Data of type Integer is encoded using the JSON number encoding.
Name
Data of type Name is encoded using the JSON string encoding.
String
Data of type String is encoded using the JSON string encoding.
Binary
Data of type Binary is converted to strings using the Base64url
encoding specified in [!RFC4648] /> and encoded using the JSON
string type.
DateTime
Data of type DateTime is converted to string using the UTC time
conversion specified in [!RFC3339] /> with a UTC offset of
00:00.
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8. Acknowledgements
Rob Stradling, Robin Alden...
9. Security Considerations
9.1. Denial of Service
9.2. Breach of Trust
9.3. Coercion
10. IANA Considerations
[TBS list out all the code points that require an IANA registration]
11. Example Data
11.1. Ticket A
11.2. Ticket B
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P.,Schlyter, J., "The DNS-Based Authentication of
Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, August 2012.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D.,Santesson, S.,Farrell, S.,Boeyen, S.,Housley,
R.,Polk, W., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5055] Freeman, T.,Housley, R.,Malpani, A.,Cooper, D.,Polk, W.,
"Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)", RFC
5055, December 2007.
[RFC6962] Laurie, B.,Langley, A.,Kasper, E., "Certificate
Transparency", RFC 6962, June 2013.
[I-D.hallambaker-omnipublish] , "[Reference Not Found!]".
[RFC3339] ,Klyne, G.,Newman, C., "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
Hallam-Baker November 20, 2014 [Page 17]
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[I-D.hallambaker-httpsession] Hallam-Baker, P, "HTTP Session
Management", Internet-Draft draft-hallambaker-httpsession-
02, 21 January 2014.
[I-D.hallambaker-wsconnect] Hallam-Baker, P, "JSON Service Connect
(JCX) Protocol", Internet-Draft draft-hallambaker-
wsconnect-05, 21 January 2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[I-D.hallambaker-privatedns] Hallam-Baker, P, "Private-DNS",
Internet-Draft draft-hallambaker-privatedns-00, 9 May
2014.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R.,Gettys, J.,Mogul, J.,Frystyk, H.,Masinter,
L.,Leach, P.,Berners-Lee, T., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
-- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[I-D.hallambaker-jsonbcd] Hallam-Baker, P, "Binary Encodings for
JavaScript Object Notation: JSON-B, JSON-C, JSON-D",
Internet-Draft draft-hallambaker-jsonbcd-01, 21 January
2014.
Author's Address
Phillip Hallam-Baker
Comodo Group Inc.
philliph@comodo.com
Hallam-Baker November 20, 2014 [Page 18]
