Internet DRAFT - draft-hares-i2rs-auth-trans
draft-hares-i2rs-auth-trans
I2RS working group S. Hares
Internet-Draft Huawei
Intended status: Standards Track D. Migault
Expires: February 28, 2016 J. Halpern
Ericsson
August 27, 2015
I2RS Security Related Requirements
draft-hares-i2rs-auth-trans-05
Abstract
This presents security-related requirements for the I2RS protocol for
mutual authentication, transport protocols, data transfer and
transactions.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on February 28, 2016.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Security-Related Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Mutual authentication of I2RS client and I2RS Agent . . . 5
2.2. Transport Requirements Based on Mutual Authentication . . 6
2.3. Data Confidentiality Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4. Data Integrity Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. Role-Based Data Model Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
The Interface to the Routing System (I2RS) provides read and write
access to information and state within the routing process. The I2RS
client interacts with one or more I2RS agents to collect information
from network routing systems.
This document describes the requirements for the I2RS protocol in the
security-related areas of mutual authentication of the I2RS client
and agent, the transport protocol carrying the I2RS protocol
messages, and the atomicity of the transactions. These requirements
align with the description of the I2RS architecture found in
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture] document.
[I-D.haas-i2rs-ephemeral-state-reqs] discusses I2RS roles-based write
conflict resolution in the ephemeral data store using the I2RS Client
Identity, I2RS Secondary Identity and priority. The draft
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability] describes the traceability framework and
its requirements for I2RS. The draft
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-requirements] describes the requirements for
I2RS to be able to publish information or have a remote client
subscribe to an information data stream.
1.1. Definitions
This document utilizes the definitions found in the following drafts:
[RFC4949], and [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture]
Specifically, this document utilizes the following definitions:
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access control
[RFC4949] defines access control as the following:
1)(I))protection of system resources against unauthorized use;
2)(I)process by which use of system resources is regulated
according to a security policy and is permitted only by
authorized entities (users, programs, processes, or other
systems) according to that policy;
3)(I) (formal model) Limitations on interactions between
subjects and objects in an information system;
4)(O) "The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource,
including the prevention of use of a resource in an
unauthorized manner.";
5.(O) /U.S. Government/ A system using physical, electronic,
or human controls to identify or admit personnel with properly
authorized access to a SCIF.
Authentication
[RFC4949] describes authentication as the process of verifying
(i.e., establishing the truth of) an attribute value claimed by or
for a system entity or system resource. Authentication has two
steps: identify and verify.
Data Confidentiality
[RFC4949] describes data confidentiality as having two properties:
a) data is not disclosed to system entities unless they have been
authorized to know, and b) data is not disclosed to unauthorized
individuals, entities or processes. The key point is that
confidentiality implies that the originator has the ability to
authorize where the information goes. Confidentiality is
important for both read and write scope of the data.
Data Integrity
[RFC4949] states data integrity includes
1. (I)The property that data has not been changed, destroyed,
or
2. (O) "The property that information has not been modified or
destroyed in an unauthorized manner."
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Data Privacy
[RFC4949] describes data privacy as a synonym for data
confidentiality. This I2RS document will utilize data privacy as
a synonym for data confidentiality.
Mutual Authentication
[RFC4949] implies that mutual authentication exists between two
interacting system entities. Mutual authentication in I2RS
implies that both sides move from a state of mutual suspicion to
mutually authenticated communication afte each system has been
identified and validated by its peer system.
role
[RFC4949] describes role as:
1) (I) A job function or employment position to which people or
other system entities may be assigned in a system. (See: role-
based access control. Compare: duty, billet, principal, user.)
2) (O) /Common Criteria/ A pre-defined set of rules
establishing the allowed interactions between a user and the
TOE.
The I2RS uses the common criteria definition.
role
[RFC4949] describes role-based access control as: (I) A form of
identity-based access control wherein the system entities that are
identified and controlled are functional positions in an
organization or process.
Security audit trail
[RFC4949] (page 254) describes a security audit trail as a
chronological record of system activities that is sufficient to
enable the reconstruction and examination of the sequence
environments and activities surrounding or leading to an
operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction
from inception to final results. Requirements to support a
security audit is not covered in this document. The draft
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability] describes traceability for I2RS
interface and protocol. Traceability is not equivalent to a
security audit trail.
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I2RS the following phrase that incorporates an [RFC4949] definition:
I2RS protocol data integrity
The transfer of data via the I2RS protocol has the property of
data integrity described in [RFC4949].
2. Security-Related Requirements
The security for the I2RS protocol requires mutually authenticated
I2RS clients and I2RS agents. The I2RS client and I2RS agent using
the I2RS protocol MUST be able to exchange data over a secure
transport, but some functions may operate on non-secure transport.
The I2RS protocol MUST BE able to provide atomicity of a transaction,
but it is not required to have multi-message atomicity and rollback
mechanism transactions. Multiple messages transactions may be
impacted by the interdependency of data. This section discusses
these details of these security requirements.
2.1. Mutual authentication of I2RS client and I2RS Agent
The I2RS architecture [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture] sets the following
requirements:
o SEC-REQ-01: All I2RS clients and I2RS agents MUST have at least
one unique identifier that uniquely identifies each party.
o SEC-REQ-02: The I2RS protocol MUST utilize these identifiers for
mutual identification of the I2RS client and I2RS agent.
o SEC-REQ-03:An I2RS agent, upon receiving an I2RS message from a
I2RS client, MUST confirm that the I2RS client has a valid
identifier.
o SEC-REQ-04: The I2RS client, upon receiving an I2RS message from
an I2RS agent, MUST confirm the I2RS agent's identifier .
o SEC-REQ-05: Identifier distribution and the loading of these
identifiers into I2RS agent and I2RS Client SHOULD occur outside
the I2RS protocol.
o SEC-REQ-06: The I2RS protocol SHOULD assume some mechanism (IETF
or private) will distribute or load identifiers so that the I2RS
client/agent has these identifiers prior to the I2RS protocol
establishing a connection between I2RS client and I2RS agent.
o SEC-REQ-07: Each Identifier MUST be linked to one priority
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o SEC-REQ-08: Each Identifier is associated with one secondary
identifier during a particular read/write sequence, but the
secondary identifier may vary during the time a connection between
the I2RS client and I2RS agent is active. The variance of the
secondary identifier allows the I2RS client to be associated with
multiple applications and pass along an identifier for these
applications in the secondary identifier.
2.2. Transport Requirements Based on Mutual Authentication
SEC-REQ-09: The I2RS protocol MUST be able to transfer data over a
secure transport and optionally be able to transfer data over a non-
secure transport. A secure transport MUST provide data
confidentiality, data integrity, and replay prevention.
Note:The non-secure transport be used for publishing telemetry data
that was specifically indicated to non-confidential in the data
model. The configuration of ephemeral data in the I2RS Agent by the
I2RS client SHOULD be done over a secure transport. It is
anticipated that the passing of most I2RS ephemeral state operational
status SHOULD be done over a secure transport. Data models SHOULD
clearly annotate what data nodes can be passed over an insecure
connection. The default transport is a secure transport.
SEC-REQ-10: A secure transport MUST be associated with a key
management solution that can guarantee that only the entities having
sufficient privileges can get the keys to encrypt/decrypt the
sensitive data. Per BCP107 [RFC4107] this key management system
SHOULD be automatic, but MAY BE manual if the following constraints
from BCP107:
a)environment has limited bandwidth or high round-trip times,
b)the information being protected has a low value and
c)the total volume over the entire lifetime of the long-term
session key will be very low,
d)the scale of the deployment is limited.
Most I2RS environments (I2RS Client - I2S Agents) will not have this
environment, but a few I2RS use case provide limited non-secure
light-weight telemetry messages that have these requirements. An
I2RS data model must indicate which portions can be served by manual
key management.
SEC-REQ-11: The I2RS protocol MUST be able to support multiple secure
transport sessions providing protocol and data communication between
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an I2RS Agent and an I2RS client. However, a single I2RS Agent to
I2RS client connection MAY elect to use a single secure transport
session or a single non-secure transport session.
SEC-REQ-12: The I2RS Client and I2RS Agent protocol SHOULD implement
mechanisms that mitigate DoS attacks
2.3. Data Confidentiality Requirements
SEC-REQ-13: In a critical infrastructure, certain data within routing
elements is sensitive and read/write operations on such data MUST be
controlled in order to protect its confidentiality. For example,
most carriers do not want a router's configuration and data flow
statistics known by hackers or their competitors. While carriers may
share peering information, most carriers do not share configuration
and traffic statistics. To achieve this, access control to sensitive
data needs to be provided, and the confidentiality protection on such
data during transportation needs to be enforced.
2.4. Data Integrity Requirements
SEC-REQ-14: An integrity protection mechanism for I2RS SHOULD be able
to ensure the following: 1) the data being protected is not modified
without detection during its transportation and 2) the data is
actually from where it is expected to come from 3) the data is not
repeated from some earlier interaction of the protocol. That is,
when both confidentiality and integrity of data is properly
protected, it is possible to ensure that encrypted data is not
modified or replayed without detection.
SEC-REQ-15: The integrity that the message data is not repeated means
that I2RS client to I2RS agent transport SHOULD protect against
replay attack
Requirements SEC-REQ-13 and SEC-REQ-14 are SHOULD requirements only
because it is recognized that some I2RS Client to I2RS agent
communication occurs over a non-secure channel. The I2RS client to
I2RS agent over a secure channel would implement these features. In
order to provide some traceability or notification for the non-secure
protocol, SEC-REQ-16 suggests traceability and notification are
important to include for any non-secure protocol.
SEC-REQ-17: The I2RS message traceability and notification
requirements requirements found in [I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability] and
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-requirements] SHOULD be supported in
communication channel that is non-secure to trace or notify about
potential security issues
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2.5. Role-Based Data Model Security
The [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture] defines a role or security role as
specifying read, write, or notification access by a I2RS client to
data within an agent's data model.
SEC-REQ-18: The rules around what role is permitted to access and
manipulate what information plus a secure transport (which protects
the data in transit) SHOULD ensure that data of any level of
sensitivity is reasonably protected from being observed by those
without permission to view it, so that privacy requirements are met.
SEC-REQ-19: Role security MUST work when multiple transport
connections are being used between the I2RS client and I2RS agent as
the I2RS architecture [I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture] states. These
transport message streams may start/stop without affecting the
existence of the client/agent data exchange. TCP supports a single
stream of data. SCTP [RFC4960] provides security for multiple
streams plus end-to-end transport of data.
SEC-REQ-20: I2RS clients MAY be used by multiple applications to
configure routing via I2RS agents, receive status reports, turn on
the I2RS audit stream, or turn on I2RS traceability. Application
software using I2RS client functions may host several multiple secure
identities, but each connection will use only one identifier with one
priority. Therefore, the security of each I2RS Client to I2RS Agent
connection is unique.
Please note the security of the application to I2RS client connection
is outside of the I2RS protocol or I2RS interface.
3. Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank Wes George, Ahmed Abro, Qin Wu, Eric
Yu, Joel Halpern, Scott Brim, Nancy Cam-Winget, DaCheng Zhang, Alia
Atlas, and Jeff Haas for their contributions to the I2RS security
requirements discussion and this document.
4. IANA Considerations
This draft includes no request to IANA.
5. Security Considerations
This is a document about security requirements for the I2RS protocol
and data modules. The whole document is security considerations.
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6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4107] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, DOI 10.17487/RFC4107,
June 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4107>.
6.2. Informative References
[I-D.haas-i2rs-ephemeral-state-reqs]
Haas, J., "I2RS Ephemeral State Requirements", draft-haas-
i2rs-ephemeral-state-reqs-00 (work in progress), May 2015.
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture]
Atlas, A., Halpern, J., Hares, S., Ward, D., and T.
Nadeau, "An Architecture for the Interface to the Routing
System", draft-ietf-i2rs-architecture-09 (work in
progress), March 2015.
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-problem-statement]
Atlas, A., Nadeau, T., and D. Ward, "Interface to the
Routing System Problem Statement", draft-ietf-i2rs-
problem-statement-06 (work in progress), January 2015.
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-requirements]
Voit, E., Clemm, A., and A. Prieto, "Requirements for
Subscription to YANG Datastores", draft-ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-
requirements-02 (work in progress), March 2015.
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-rib-info-model]
Bahadur, N., Folkes, R., Kini, S., and J. Medved, "Routing
Information Base Info Model", draft-ietf-i2rs-rib-info-
model-06 (work in progress), March 2015.
[I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability]
Clarke, J., Salgueiro, G., and C. Pignataro, "Interface to
the Routing System (I2RS) Traceability: Framework and
Information Model", draft-ietf-i2rs-traceability-03 (work
in progress), May 2015.
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[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.
Authors' Addresses
Susan Hares
Huawei
7453 Hickory Hill
Saline, MI 48176
USA
Email: shares@ndzh.com
Daniel Migault
Ericsson
8400 boulevard Decarie
Montreal, QC HAP 2N2
Canada
Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
Joel Halpern
Ericsson
US
Email: joel.halpern@ericsson.com
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