Internet DRAFT - draft-hayashi-dots-telemetry-use-cases
draft-hayashi-dots-telemetry-use-cases
DOTS Y. Hayashi
Internet-Draft NTT
Intended status: Informational M. Chen
Expires: September 3, 2020 CMCC
March 2, 2020
Use Cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
draft-hayashi-dots-telemetry-use-cases-00
Abstract
Denial-of-service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry enriches the
base DOTS protocols to assist the mitigator in using efficient DDoS-
attack-mitigation techniques in a network. This document presents
sample use cases for DOTS Telemetry: what components are deployed in
the network, how they cooperate, and what information is exchanged to
effectively use these techniques.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 3, 2020.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. DDoS Mitigation Based on Attack Traffic Bandwidth . . . . 3
3.1.1. Mitigating Attack Flow of Top-talker Preferentially . 3
3.1.2. Optimal DMS Selection for Mitigation . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. Best-path Selection for Redirection . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.4. Short but Extreme Volumetric Attack Mitigation . . . 8
3.2. DDoS Mitigation Based on Attack Type . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Selecting Mitigation Technique . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Training Flow Collector Using Supervised Machine Learning 11
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
Denial-of-Service (DDoS), attacks such as volumetric attacks and
resource-consumption attacks, are critical threats to be handled by
service providers. When such DDoS attacks occur, service providers
have to mitigate them immediately to protect or recover their
services.
Therefore, for service providers to immediately protect their network
services from DDoS attacks, DDoS mitigation needs to be automated.
To automate DDoS-attack mitigation, multi-vendor components involved
in DDoS-attack detection and mitigation should cooperate and support
standard interfaces to communicate.
DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) is a set of protocols for real-time
signaling, threat-handling requests, and data filtering between the
multi-vendor elements
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel][I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel].
Furthermore, DOTS Telemetry enriches the DOTS protocols with various
telemetry attributes allowing optimal DDoS-attack mitigation
[I-D.ietf-dots-telemetry]. This document presents sample use cases
for DOTS Telemetry: what components are deployed in the network, how
they cooperate, and what information is exchanged to effectively use
attack-mitigation techniques.
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2. Terminology
The readers should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC8612]
In addition, this document uses the following terms:
Top-talker: A top N list of attackers who attack the same target or
targets. The list is ordered in terms of a two-tuple bandwidth
such as bps or pps.
Supervised Machine Learning: A machine-learning technique that maps
an input to an output based on example input-output pairs
3. Use Cases
This section describes DOTS-Telemetry use cases that use attributes
included in DOTS Telemetry specifications.
3.1. DDoS Mitigation Based on Attack Traffic Bandwidth
3.1.1. Mitigating Attack Flow of Top-talker Preferentially
Large-scale DDoS attacks, such as amplification attacks, often occur.
Some transit providers have to mitigate large-scale DDoS attacks
using DMS with limited resources, which is already deployed in their
network.
The aim of this use case is to enable transit providers to use their
DMS efficiently under volume-based DDoS attacks whose bandwidth is
more than the available capacity of the DMS. To enable this, attack
traffic of top talkers is redirected to the DMS preferentially by
cooperation among forwarding nodes, flow collectors, and
orchestrators. Figure 1 gives an overview of this use case.
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(Internet Transit Provider)
+-----------+ +--------------+ e.g., SNMP
e.g., IPFIX +-----------+| DOTS | |<---
--->| Flow ||C<-->S| Orchestrator | e.g., BGP Flowspec
| collector |+ | |---> (Redirect)
+-----------+ +--------------+
+-------------+
e.g., IPFIX +-------------+| e.g., BGP Flowspec
<---| Forwarding ||<--- (Redirect)
| nodes ||
| || DDoS Attack
[ Target ]<============|===============================
[ or ] | ++=========================[top talker]
[ Targets ] | || ++======================[top talker]
+----|| ||---+
|| ||
|| ||
|/ |/
+----x--x----+
| DDoS | e.g., SNMP
| mitigation |<---
| system |
+------------+
* C is for DOTS client functionality
* S is for DOTS client functionality
Figure 1: Mitigating DDoS Attack Flow of Top-talker Preferentially
In this use case, the forwarding nodes always send statistics of
traffic flow to the flow collectors by using monitoring functions
such as IPFIX[RFC7011]. When DDoS attacks occur, the flow collectors
detect attack traffic and send (src_ip, dst_ip, bandwidth)-tuple
information of the top talker to the orchestrator using the top-
talkers attribute of DOTS Telemetry. The orchestrator then checks
the available capacity of DMS by using a network management protocol
such as SNMP[RFC3413]. After that, the orchestrator orders
forwarding nodes to redirect as much of the top taker's traffic to
the DMS as possible by dissemination of flow-specification-rule
protocols such as BGP Flowspec[RFC5575].
In this case, the flow collector implements a DOTS client while the
orchestrator implements a DOTS server.
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3.1.2. Optimal DMS Selection for Mitigation
Transit providers, which have a number of DMSs, usually deploy a DMS
in various forms to satisfy their requirements; individual or
clustered. In both forms, they can identify attributes of the DMSs
such as total capacity, available capacity, and the last hop
bandwidth.
The aim of this use case is to enable transit providers to select an
optimal DMS for mitigation based on the bandwidth of attack traffic,
capacity of a DMS, and the last hop bandwidth. Figure 2 gives an
overview of this use case.
(Internet Transit Provider)
+-----------+ +--------------+ e.g., SNMP
e.g., IPFIX +-----------+| DOTS | |<---
--->| Flow ||C<-->S| Orchestrator | e.g., BGP
| collector |+ | |---> (Redirect)
+-----------+ +--------------+
+------------+
e.g., IPFIX +------------+| e.g., BGP
<---| Forwarding ||<--- (Redirect)
| nodes ||
| || DDoS Attack
[Target] | ++============================
[Target] | || ++========================
+-||--||-----+
|| ||
++====++ || (congested DMS)
|| || +-----------+
|| |/ | DMS3 |
|| +-----x------+ |<--- e.g., SNMP
|/ | DMS2 |--------+
+--x---------+ |<--- e.g., SNMP
| DMS1 |------+
| |<--- e.g., SNMP
+------------+
* C is for DOTS client functionality
* S is for DOTS client functionality
Figure 2: Optimal DMS selection for Mitigation
In this use case, the forwarding nodes always send statistics of
traffic flow to the flow collectors by using monitoring functions
such as IPFIX[RFC7011]. When DDoS attacks occur, the flow collectors
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detect attack traffic and send (dst_ip, bandwidth)-tuple information
to the orchestrator using the total-attack-traffic attribute of DOTS
Telemetry. The orchestrator then checks the available capacity of
the DMSs by using a network management protocol such as
SNMP[RFC3413]. After that, the orchestrator chooses optimal DMS
which each attack traffic should be redirected. The orchestrator
then orders forwarding nodes to redirect the attack traffic to the
optimal DMS by a routing protocol such as BGP[RFC4271]. The
algorithm of selecting a DMS is out of the scope of this draft.
In this case, the flow collector implements a DOTS client while the
orchestrator implements a DOTS server.
3.1.3. Best-path Selection for Redirection
A transit-provider network, which adopts a mesh network, has multiple
paths to convey attack traffic to a DMS. In this network, attack
traffic can be conveyed while avoiding congested links by selecting
an available path.
The aim of this use case is to enable transit providers to select an
optimal path for redirecting attack traffic to a DMS according to the
bandwidth of the attack traffic, total traffic, and total pipe
capability. Figure 3 gives an overview of this use case.
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(Internet Transit Provider)
+-----------+ +--------------+ DOTS
e.g., +-----------+| | |S<---
IPFIX | Flow || DOTS | Orchestrator |
-->| collector ||C<-->S| | e.g., BGP Flow spec
| |+ | |---> (Redirect)
+-----------+ +--------------+
DOTS +------------+ DOTS +------------+ e.g., IPFIX
--->C| Forwarding | --->C| Forwarding |--->
e.g., BGP Flow spec | node | | node |
(Redirect) --->| | | | DDoS Attack
[Target] | ++====================================
+-------||---+ +------------+
|| /
|| / (congested link)
|| /
DOTS +-||----------------+ e.g., BGP Flow spec
--->C| || Forwarding |<--- (Redirect)
| ++=== node |
+----||-------------+
|/
+--x-----------+
| DMS |
+--------------+
* C is for DOTS client functionality
* S is for DOTS client functionality
Figure 3: Best-path Selection for Redirection
In this use case, the forwarding nodes always send statistics of
traffic flow to the flow collectors by using monitoring functions
such as IPFIX[RFC7011]. When DDoS attacks occur, the flow collectors
detect attack traffic and send (dst_ip, bandwidth)-tuple information
to the orchestrator using a total-attack-traffic attribute of DOTS
Telemetry. On the other hands, forwarding nodes send bandwidth of
total traffic passing the node and total pipe capability to the
orchestrator using total-traffic and total-pipe-capability attributes
of DOTS Telemetry. The orchestrator then selects an optimal path to
which each attack-traffic flow should be redirected. After that, the
orchestrator orders forwarding nodes to redirect the attack traffic
to the optimal DMS by dissemination of flow-specification-rules
protocols such as BGP Flowspec[RFC5575]. The algorithm of selecting
a path is out of the scope of this draft.
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3.1.4. Short but Extreme Volumetric Attack Mitigation
Short but extreme volumetric attacks, such as pulse wave DDoS
attacks, are threats to internet transit provider networks. It is
difficult for them to mitigate an attack by DMS by redirecting attack
flows because it may cause route flapping in the network. The
practical way to mitigate short but extreme volumetric attacks is to
offload a mitigation actions to a forwarding node.
The aim of this use case is to enable transit providers to mitigate
short but extreme volumetric attacks and estimate the network-access
success rate based on the bandwidth of attack traffic and total pipe
capability. Figure 4 gives an overview of this use case.
(Internet Transit Provider)
+------------+ +----------------+
e.g., | Network | DOTS | Administrative |
Alert --->| Management |C<--->S| System | e.g., BGP Flow spec
| System | | |---> (Rate-Limit)
+------------+ +----------------+
+------------+ +------------+ e.g., BGP Flow spec
| Forwarding | | Forwarding |<--- (Rate-Limit X bps)
| node | | node |
| | | | DDoS & Normal traffic
[Target]<------------------------------------================
Pipe +------------+ +------------+ Attack Traffic
Capability Bandwidth
e.g., X bps e.g., Y bps
Network access success rate
e.g., X / (X + Y)
* C is for DOTS client functionality
* S is for DOTS client functionality
Figure 4: Short but Extreme Volumetric Attack Mitigation
In this use case, when DDoS attacks occur, the network management
system receives alerts. It then sends the target ip address, pipe
capability of the target's link, and bandwidth of the DDoS attack
traffic to the administrative system using the target, total-pipe-
capability and total-attack-traffic attributes of DOTS Telemetry.
After that, the administrative system orders upper forwarding nodes
to carry out rate-limit all traffic destined to the target based on
the pipe capability by the dissemination of the flow -specification-
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rules protocols such as BGP Flowspec[RFC5575]. In addition, the
administrative system estimates the network-access success rate of
the target, which is calculated by total pipe capability / (total
pipe capability + total attack traffic).
3.2. DDoS Mitigation Based on Attack Type
3.2.1. Selecting Mitigation Technique
Some volumetric attacks, such as amplification attacks, can be
detected with high accuracy by checking the layer-3 or layer-4
information of attack packets. These attacks can be detected and
mitigated through cooperation among forwarding nodes and flow
collectors using IPFIX[RFC7011]. On the other hand, it is necessary
to inspect the layer-7 information of attack packets to detect
attacks such as DNS Water Torture Attacks. Such attack traffic
should be detected and mitigated at a DMS.
The aim of this use case is to enable transit providers to select a
mitigation technique based on the type of attack traffic:
amplification attack or not. To use such a technique, attack traffic
is blocked at forwarding nodes or redirected to a DMS based on attack
type through cooperation among forwarding nodes, flow collectors, and
an orchestrator. Figure 5 gives an overview of this use case.
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(Internet Transit Provider)
+-----------+ DOTS +--------------+ e.g.,
e.g., +-----------+|<---->| | BGP (Redirect)
IPFIX | Flow ||C S| Orchestrator | BGP Flowspec (Drop)
--->| collector |+ | |--->
+-----------+ +--------------+
+------------+ e.g., BGP (Redirect)
e.g., IPFIX +------------+| BGP Flowspec (Drop)
<---| Forwarding ||<---
| nodes || DDoS Attack
| ++=====||================
| || ||x<==============[e.g.,DNS Amp]
| || |+x<==============[e.g.,NTP Amp]
+-----||-----+
||
|/
+-----x------+
| DDoS |
| mitigation |
| system |
+------------+
* C is for DOTS client functionality
* S is for DOTS server functionality
Figure 5: DDoS Mitigation Based on Attack Type
In this use case, the forwarding nodes send statistics of traffic
flow to the flow collectors by using a monitoring function such as
IPFIX[RFC7011]. When DDoS attacks occur, the flow collectors detect
attack traffic and send (dst_ip, src_port, attack_type)-tuple
information to the orchestrator the using attack-name attribute of
DOTS Telemetry. The orchestrator then orders forwarding nodes to
block the (dst_ip, src_port)-tuple flow of amp attack traffic by
dissemination of flow-specification-rule protocols such as BGP
Flowspec[RFC5575]. On the other hand, the orchestrator orders
forwarding nodes to redirect other traffic than the amp attack
traffic by a routing protocol such as BGP[RFC4271].
In this case, the flow collector implements a DOTS client while the
orchestrator implements a DOTS server.
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3.3. Training Flow Collector Using Supervised Machine Learning
DDoS detection based on monitoring functions, such as IPFIX[RFC7011],
is a lighter weight method of detecting DDoS attacks than DMSs in
internet transit provider networks. On the other hand, DDoS
detection based on the DMSs is a more accurate method of detecting
DDoS attacks than DDoS detection based on flow monitoring.
The aim of this use case is to increases flow collector's detection
accuracy by carrying out supervised machine-learning techniques based
on the detection results of the DMSs. To use such a technique,
forwarding nodes, flow collector, and a DMS should cooperate.
Figure 5 gives an overview of this use case.
+-----------+
+-----------+| DOTS
e.g., IPFIX | Flow ||S<---
--->| collector ||
+-----------++
+------------+
e.g., IPFIX +------------+|
<---| Forwarding ||
| nodes || DDoS Attack
[ Target ] | ++==============================
| || ++===========================
| || || ++========================
+---||-|| ||-+
|| || ||
|/ |/ |/
DOTS +---X--X--X--+
--->C| DDoS |
| mitigation |
| system |
+------------+
* C is for DOTS client functionality
* S is for DOTS client functionality
Figure 6: Training Flow Collector Using Supervised Machine Learning
In this use case, the forwarding nodes always send statistics of
traffic flow to the flow collectors by using monitoring functions
such as IPFIX[RFC7011]. When DDoS attacks occur, DDoS orchestration
use case[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] is carried out and the DMS
mitigates all attack traffic destined for a target. The DDoS-
mitigation system reports the (src_ip, dst_ip)-tuple information of
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the top talker to the orchestrator the using top-talkers attribute of
DOTS Telemetry.
After mitigating a DDoS attack, the flow collector attaches teacher
labels to the statistics of traffic flow based on the reports. The
label shows normal traffic or attack name. The flow collector then
carries out supervised machine learning to increase its detection
accuracy, setting the statistics as an explanatory variable and
setting the labels as an objective variable.
In this case, the DMS implements a DOTS client while the flow
collector implements a DOTS server.
4. Security Considerations
TBD
5. IANA Considerations
This document does not require any action from IANA.
6. Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank among others brabra...
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-telemetry]
Boucadair, M., Reddy.K, T., Doron, E., and c. chenmeiling,
"Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) Telemetry", draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-02 (work in
progress), February 2020.
[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]
Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Moskowitz, R., Teague, N., Xia,
L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS Open Threat
Signaling", draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-20 (work in
progress), September 2019.
[RFC3413] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications", STD 62,
RFC 3413, DOI 10.17487/RFC3413, December 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3413>.
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[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC5575] Marques, P., Sheth, N., Raszuk, R., Greene, B., Mauch, J.,
and D. McPherson, "Dissemination of Flow Specification
Rules", RFC 5575, DOI 10.17487/RFC5575, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5575>.
[RFC7011] Claise, B., Ed., Trammell, B., Ed., and P. Aitken,
"Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)
Protocol for the Exchange of Flow Information", STD 77,
RFC 7011, DOI 10.17487/RFC7011, September 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7011>.
[RFC8612] Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open
Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8612, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8612>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]
Boucadair, M. and T. Reddy.K, "Distributed Denial-of-
Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
Specification", draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-31 (work in
progress), July 2019.
[I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]
Reddy.K, T., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A., and
N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", draft-
ietf-dots-signal-channel-41 (work in progress), January
2020.
Authors' Addresses
Yuhei Hayashi
NTT
3-9-11, Midori-cho
Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585
Japan
Email: yuuhei.hayashi@gmail.com
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Meiling Chen
CMCC
32, Xuanwumen West
BeiJing, BeiJing 100053
China
Email:
chenmeiling@chinamobile.com
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