Internet DRAFT - draft-hohendorf-secure-sctp
draft-hohendorf-secure-sctp
Network Working Group C. Hohendorf
Internet-Draft University of Duisburg-Essen
Intended status: Experimental E. Unurkhaan
Expires: 29 March 2024 Mongolian University
T. Dreibholz
SimulaMet
26 September 2023
Secure SCTP
draft-hohendorf-secure-sctp-36
Abstract
This document explains the reason for the integration of security
functionality into SCTP, and gives a short description of S-SCTP and
its services. S-SCTP is fully compatible with SCTP defined in
RFC4960, it is designed to integrate cryptographic functions into
SCTP.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 29 March 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. A brief description of S-SCTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Key terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Additional chunks and parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. New type chunks and definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1.1. Secure Session Open request chunk (SSOpReq) . . . . . 5
5.1.2. Secure Session Certificate chunk: (SSCert) . . . . . 9
5.1.3. Secure Session Open Acknowledge chunk
(SSOpReq_Ack) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.4. Secure Session Server Key chunk (SSSerKey) . . . . . 11
5.1.5. Secure Session Client Key chunk (SSCliKey) . . . . . 14
5.1.6. Secure Session Open Complete chunk (SSOpCom) . . . . 16
5.1.7. Secure Session Close chunk (SSClose) . . . . . . . . 17
5.1.8. Secure Session Close Acknowledge chunk
(SSClose_Ack) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1.9. Security Level Changed chunk (SecLevCHD) . . . . . . 18
5.1.10. Security Level Changed Acknowledged chunk
(SecLevCHD_Ack) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1.11. Encrypted Data Chunk (EncData) . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1.12. Padding chunk (PADDING) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1.13. Authentication chunk (AUTH) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. New Error Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.1. Secure Session failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.2. Secure Session Certificate failure . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.3. Decryption failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.4. Authentication failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.5. Decompression failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7. S-SCTP packet format and security levels . . . . . . . . . . 25
8. S-SCTP data format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.1. Establishment of a secure session . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.2. Choice of cipher suite and compression method . . . . . . 28
9.3. Data transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
9.4. Closing of a secure session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9.5. Generation of the Master secret key . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9.6. Update of the master secret key . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
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9.7. Random number generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.8. HMAC algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
10. HMAC algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
11. S-SCTP to ULP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12. Transmission Control Block (TCB) extension . . . . . . . . . 35
13. Socket API extensions for Secure SCTP . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
14. Testbed Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
16. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1. Introduction
SCTP is a message oriented reliable transmission protocol which works
on top of the IP-based network. It provides several advantages over
other transmission protocols, such as TCP and UDP over IP. One of
the advantages is multistreaming -- user data transported by
individual streams. When multistreaming is used, network blocking
can be avoided in certain cases (e.g. network loss). Also, SCTP
supports multihoming -- the endpoints support multiple IP addresses.
SCTP provides unordered delivery, so that a receiver immediately
delivers user data to the upper layers upon receipt. For more
details, see RFC4960 [6].
2. Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [2] [8] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
here.
3. A brief description of S-SCTP
S-SCTP provides security functionalities in the transport layer
without the need for any other security protocols (e.g. TLS or IP-
sec). Normally, a data transport over SCTP can either be secured
with TLS or can be protected by IPsec. As both TLS over SCTP and
SCTP over IPsec have disadvantages in certain scenarios, it is
preferable to integrate cryptographic functions into SCTP.
The main issues for the security solutions TLS over SCTP RFC3436 [3]
and SCTP over IPSec RFC3554 [4] is scalability with the number of
streams. For N secure streams, N TLS connections have to be created,
and N handshakes have to be performed. If N is small, this is not a
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big issue, but as N grows larger, it becomes a problem because a
handshake is a slow and expensive process. So, when an application
performs N handshakes, the load in terms of memory use, CPU use etc.
increases linearly over time. This problem could be overcome by
using IPsec. However, IPsec is not so flexible and on the other hand
SCTP over IPsec has to establish new security associations (SA) for
newly added IP addresses in dynamic address reconfiguration scenario.
In this case, the application has to configure a new SA and to
negotiate a new key exchange.
4. Key terms
This part gives the definitions of the key terms, which are used in
this draft:
* Secure session: This is the session, which provides the security
functionalities for an established SCTP association.
* Master secret key: S-SCTP uses two kinds of secret keys. One is
the secret key for the S-SCTP packet authentication, and the other
is the secret key for the data encryption and decryption.
* Cipher suite: This is the suite of cryptographic algorithms, which
are used for key exchange, data encryption/decryption and the
packet authentication.
* Pre-enc-data: This is the collection of the data chunks, which
requires encryption. The data chunks are concatenated together
and create pre-enc-data. Pre-enc-data may include the padding
chunk.
* Cipher suite sequence: This is the bundle of cipher suites chosen
by an endpoint from the supported cipher suites.
5. Additional chunks and parameters
Several new chunks and parameters are defined in S-SCTP. This
section explains those chunks and parameters. All new chunks can be
bundled with other chunks. The new parameters follow the Type-
Length-Value format as defined in section 3.2.1 of RFC4960.
5.1. New type chunks and definitions
The following table shows the new chunks. All new chunks, except for
the Encrypted Data (EncData) chunk, Authentication (AUTH) chunk and
Padding (PADDING) chunk, are used for building the secure session and
to update the master secret key. The new chunks are to be
interpreted as described in Section 3.2 of RFC 4960, by the receiver.
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Chunktype Chunk name
--------- ---------------------
0xD0 Secure Session Open Request Chunk
0xD1 Secure Session Certificate Chunk
0xD2 Secure Session Acknowledge Chunk
0xD3 Secure Session Server Key Chunk
0xD4 Secure Session Client Key Chunk
0xD5 Secure Session Open Complete Chunk
0xD6 Secure Session Close Chunk
0xD7 Secure Session Close Acknowledge Chunk
0xD8 Security Level Change Chunk
0xD9 Security Level Change Acknowledge Chunk
0x10 Encrypted Data Chunk
0x11 Authentication Chunk
0x12 Padding Chunk
The new parameters are defined in this section.
5.1.1. Secure Session Open request chunk (SSOpReq)
An endpoint creates the Secure Session Open Request chunk (see next
table)when it wishes to establish a secure session. The chunk can be
bundled with other chunks. The SSOpReq chunk can also be used to
update the master secret key or cipher suite after a secure session
establishment. During the association lifetime, both associated
endpoints can request an update of the master secret key or cipher
suite; in this case, the requesting endpoint sends the SSSOpReq chunk
immediately to the other endpoint.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD0 | Reserved=0 |CF| Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version | Key material length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Optional parameters /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
CF: Certificate flag: 1 bit
This flag indicates whether or not the client will send a
certificate. It is set to 1 when the client sends a certificate. If
a receiver receives SSOpReq chunk with CF=1 and does not receive a
certificate it raises an error and terminates the secure session
initialisation.
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Length: 16 bits unsigned integer
The length field contains the size of the chunk in bytes, including
the chunk header, version, random number length and optional
parameter(s).
Version: 16 bits unsigned integer
This field indicates the S-SCTP version 1.0. The high eight bits
indicate the major version, the low eight bits indicate minor
version.
Key material length: 16 bits unsigned integer
This number has two meanings:
* when the handshake is made using the RSA key exchange protocol,
the key material length defines the random number length, which is
generated by the server and client to calculate a master secret
key (see RSA parameters of the SSSerKey and SSCliKey chunks)
* when the handshake is made using the DH key exchange protocol, the
key material length defines the DH prime number length (see DH
parameters of the SSSerKey and SSCliKey chunks). For security
reasons, the key material length MUST be 512 bits (default) or
longer when the key exchange mechanism uses RSA, and 1024 bits
(default) or longer when the key exchange mechanism uses DH. The
key material length is increased in steps of 64 bits. If a user
defines the key material length to be shorter than the default
value, S-SCTP automatically sets it to the default.
Parameter(S):
SSOpReq chunk includes the cipher suite and compression method
parameters, which are described below:
Cipher suite parameter:
This parameter contains the cipher suites, which are chosen from all
supported cipher suites by the client. One of them is used for the
secure session. The user can choose certain cipher suites from the
cipher suites supported by the client.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=30 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cipher suite 1 | Cipher suite 2 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| .............. | .............. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cipher suite N-1 | Cipher suite N |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Cipher suite: 16 bits unsigned integer:
This field indicates a cipher suite, which is supported by the
client. The next table includes cipher suites supported in S-SCTP.
Additional cipher suites can be specified.
Value Cipher suite Key exchange Encryption Hash
----- ------------------------- ------------ ---------- ---------
1 RSA_with_DES_CBC_MD5 RSA DES_CBC MD5
2 RSA_with_DES_CBC_SHA-1 RSA DES_CBC SHA-1
3 RSA_with_3DES_CBC_MD5 RSA 3DES_CBC MD5
4 RSA_with_3DES_CBC_SHA-1 RSA 3DES_CBC SHA-1
5 RSA_with_AES-128_CBC_MD5 RSA AES-128 MD5
6 RSA_with_AES-128_CBC_SHA-1 RSA AES-128 SHA-1
7 DH_with_DES_CBC_MD5 DH DES_CBC MD5
8 DH_with_DES_CBC_SHA-1 DH DES_CBC SHA-1
9 DH_with_3DES_CBC_MD5 DH 3DES_CBC MD5
10 DH_with_3DES_CBC_SHA-1 DH 3DES_CBC SHA-1
11 DH_with_AES-128_CBC_MD5 DH AES-128 MD5
12 DH_with_AES-128_CBC_SHA-1 DH AES-128 SHA-1
13 RSA_with_NULL_MD5 RSA NULL MD5
14 RSA_with_NULL_SHA-1 RSA NULL SHA-1
15 DH_with_NULL_MD5 DH NULL MD5
16 DH_with_NULL_SHA-1 DH NULL SHA-1
17 RSA_with_AES-192_CBC_MD5 RSA AES-192 MD5
18 RSA_with_AES-192_CBC_SHA-1 RSA AES-192 SHA-1
19 RSA_with_AES-256_CBC_MD5 RSA AES-256 MD5
20 RSA_with_AES-256_CBC_SHA-1 RSA AES-256 SHA-1
21 DH_with_AES-192_CBC_MD5 DH AES-192 MD5
22 DH_with_AES-192_CBC_SHA-1 DH AES-192 SHA-1
23 DH_with_AES-256_CBC_MD5 DH AES-256 MD5
24 DH_with_AES-256_CBC_SHA-1 DH AES-256 SHA-1
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The hash algorithms, defined in cipher suites, are used only for the
S-SCTP packet authentication, and not for the signature of the
handshake messages. An S-SCTP implementation MUST at least support
the default cipher suite, DH_with_3DES_CBC_SHA-1 (value=0). If the
SSOpReq chunk does not contain a cipher suite parameter, then:
a.) S-SCTP will use the default, or:
b.) S-SCTP will use the old cipher suite.
The case "a" will be used at the beginning of the secure session.
The case "b" will be used when the SSOpReq chunk is created after a
secure session establishment. The signature schemes are derived from
both the client and server certificates, and may be different.
Compression method parameter
This parameter contains compression methods, which are used for data
compression. The data compression uses lossless compression methods.
The user chooses several compression methods and sends it to the
receiver. The receiver chooses one compression method.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Compression | Compression | Compression | Compression |
| method 1 | method 2 | method 3 | method 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| .... | .... | Compression | Compression |
| | | method N-1 | method N |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Compression method: 8 bits unsigned char
This field indicates a compression method, which is supported by the
client. The next table includes compression methods supported in
S-SCTP. Additional compression methods can be specified.
Value Compression method
----- ---------------------
1 Huffman Code
2 Lempel-Ziv Code
The secure session uses null compression when the SSOpReq chunk
contains no compression parameters.
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5.1.2. Secure Session Certificate chunk: (SSCert)
This chunk can be sent by both endpoints. The certificate helps to
authenticate the endpoint, that establishes a S-SCTP session. This
chunk contains only one parameter, the certificate parameter. The
SSCert chunk is optional. For security reasons, both endpoints
SHOULD use a certificate to authenticate each other.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD1 | Reserved=0 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Certificate /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Optional parameter /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Length: 16 bits unsigned integer
The length field contains the size of the chunk in bytes, including
the chunk header and parameter.
Certificate: Variable length
The certificate field contains the certificate of the endpoint.
S-SCTP uses the X.509v3 certificate which is defined in RFC5280 [7].
Optional parameter
SSCert chunk has only one optional parameter.
Certificate parameter
The SSCert chunk uses the certificate parameter for additional
certificates, when the endpoint has two or more certificates.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=33 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Certificate /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Certificate: Variable length
The endpoint can send two or more certificates. In this case the
certificate field contains the endpoint's additional certificate.
S-SCTP uses the X.509v3 certificate, which is defined in RFC5280 [7].
5.1.3. Secure Session Open Acknowledge chunk (SSOpReq_Ack)
The Secure Session Open Acknowledge chunk is sent by the server to
tell the client that the secure session open request is accepted.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD2 | Reserved=0 |CF| Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version | Cipher suite |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Compression method | Reserved = 0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
CF: Certificate flag: 1 bit
This flag indicates whether or not the server has a certificate.
This flag is set to 1 when the server has a certificate, else it is
zero.
Length: 16 bits unsigned integer
The chunk length is 8 bytes, including the chunk header, version and
cipher suite field.
Version: 16 bits unsigned integer
This field indicates the S-SCTP version 1.0. The high eight bits
indicate the major version, the low eight bits indicate the minor
version.
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Cipher suite: 16 bits unsigned integer
This field indicates the cipher suite, which is used for a secure
session. The cipher suite includes necessary information for the key
derivation, message encoding and MAC computation. The server uses
the following rules to choose the cipher suite:
* Client and Server do not have a certificate: Use DH key exchange.
* Client or Server has a certificate: Use DH key exchange.
* Client and Server have a RSA certificate: Use RSA key exchange.
* Client and Server have a DSS certificate: Use DH key exchange.
Compression method: 16 bits unsigned char
This field indicates the compression method, which is used for data
compression in the secure session.
5.1.4. Secure Session Server Key chunk (SSSerKey)
This chunk includes the parameter which is used for the key exchange
algorithm. The Server Key Exchange chunk consists of the chunk
header and one parameter. The parameter type depends on the key
exchange algorithm.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD3 | Reserved=0 |SL| Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Parameter /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Security level (SL): 2 bits
This 2-bit value indicates a server's security level of the reserved
flags.
Length: 16 bit unsigned integer
The length field contains the size of the chunk in bytes, including
the chunk header and parameter.
Parameters:
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The following two parameters define the key exchange protocols.
Their parameter formats are shown in the next two tables. When a
user specifies a new cipher suite with a new key exchange algorithm,
then they must define a new parameter.
Diffie-Hellman parameter
The SSSerKey chunk uses this parameter when the handshake is done via
the DH key exchange algorithm.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD001 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length of DH prime number, P | Length of DH prmitive root, R |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length of DH public key, Y | Reserved=0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ DH prime number, P /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ DH primitive root, R /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ DH value, Y /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Signature /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Length: 16 bit unsigned integer
The length field contains the size of the parameter in bytes,
including the parameter header, length of DH prime number, length of
DH primitive root, length of DH public key, reserved, DH prime
number, DH primitive root, DH public key and signature.
Length of DH prime number, P: 16 bits unsigned integer
This field contains the size of the DH prime number.
Length of DH primitive root, Q: 16 bits unsigned integer
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This field contains the size of the DH primitive root. The size of
the prime number is equal R, where R is a random number defined in
the SSOpReq chunk.
Length of DH value, Y: 16 bits unsigned integer
This field contains the size of the DH public key.
DH value, P: Variable length
This is the prime number of the DH key exchange protocol.
DH value, Q: Variable length
This is the primitive root of the prime number P.
DH value, Y: Variable length
This is the public key of the DH key exchange protocol.
Signature: Variable length
The field contains the signature which is derived from the chunk
header and the whole parameter except the signature field. The
signature computation uses the signature algorithm which is defined
in the server certificate. If the server does not have a
certificate, this field does not exist in the parameter.
RSA parameter
The SSSerKey chunk uses this parameter when the handshake uses the
RSA key exchange algorithm.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD002 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Encrypted (random number, R) /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Signature /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Length: 16 bits unsigned integer
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The length field contains the size of the parameter in bytes,
including the parameter header, the encrypted random number and the
signature.
Encrypted (Random number, R): Variable length
The random number is used to generate the secret keys for user data
encryption and authentication. The random number encryption uses the
client public key.
Signature: Variable length
The field contains the signature, which is derived from the chunk
header and the whole parameter except the signature field. The
signature computation uses the signature algorithm which is defined
in the server certificate.
5.1.5. Secure Session Client Key chunk (SSCliKey)
This chunk includes the parameters which are used for the key
exchange algorithm. The Secure Session Client Key Exchange chunk
consists of the chunk header and one parameter. The parameter format
depends on the key exchange algorithm.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD4 | Reserved=0 |SL| Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Parameter /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Security level (SL): 2 bits
This 2-bit value indicates a client's security level.
Length: 16 bit unsigned integer
The length field contains the size of the chunk in bytes, including
the chunk header and parameter.
Parameters:
Two new parameters are defined here that can appear in the SSCliKey
chunk. Their parameter formats are shown in the next two tables.
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Diffie-Hellman parameter
The SSCliKey chunk uses this parameter when the handshake uses the DH
key exchange algorithm.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD003 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ DH value, Y /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Signature /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Length: 16 bit unsigned integer
The length field contains the size of the parameter in bytes,
including the parameter header, the DH public key and the signature.
DH value, Y: Variable length
This field contains the public key of the DH key exchange protocol.
Signature: Variable length
The field contains a signature which is derived from the chunk header
and the whole parameter except the signature field. The signature
computation uses the signature algorithm defined in the client
certificate. If the client does not have a certificate, then this
field does not exist in the parameter.
RSA parameter
The SSCliKey chunk uses this parameter when the handshake uses RSA
key exchange algorithm.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD003 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Encrypted (random number, R) /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Signature /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Length: 16 bits unsigned integer
The length field contains the size of the parameter in bytes,
including the parameter header, the encrypted random number and a
signature.
Encrypted (Random number): Variable length
This field contains the random number, encrypted by the server's
public key, which is used to generate the master secret key for
encryption and authentication.
Signature: Variable length
The field contains the signature which is derived from the chunk
header and the whole parameter except the signature field. The
signature computation uses the signature algorithm defined in the
server certificate.
5.1.6. Secure Session Open Complete chunk (SSOpCom)
This chunk is the last chunk of the handshake and it indicates the
completion of the secure session establishment. After receiving this
chunk the endpoint verifies the verification data which is contained
in the chunk. The secure session procedure is complete when the
verification is successful. Otherwise the secure session will be
closed.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD5 | Reserved=0 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Verification data /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Length: 16 bits unsigned integer
The length field contains the size of the chunk in bytes, including
the chunk header and verification data.
Verification data: Variable length
The verification data contains a hashed value which is an output of
the HMAC function. The HMAC uses the authentication secret key,
which is individually generated by the endpoints. The HMAC input
contains all received secure session handshake chunks of the current
endpoint. Both endpoints compute the hash value individually and
exchange it using the SSOpCom chunk. The receiver computes the hash
value using the same algorithm as the sender, and compares it with
the verification data. If the receiver's computed value is the same
as the sender's verification data, then the receiver assures that the
secure session open is successfully completed. If it is not the
same, then the receiver sends an ERROR message to the sender, and
immediately closes the secure session.
5.1.7. Secure Session Close chunk (SSClose)
This chunk indicates a request to close the current secure session.
The sender MUST NOT send any encrypted or authenticated chunks after
it has sent this chunk.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD6 | Reserved=0 |OF| Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TSN |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Outstanding flag (OF): 1 bit
This flag indicates that the endpoint has sent the SSClose chunk and
has no outstanding secured data.
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Length: 16 bits unsigned integer
The length field contains the size of the chunk in bytes, including
the chunk header and TSN.
Transmission sequence number (TSN): 16 bits unsigned integer
This is the transmission sequence number of the data chunk that was
last encrypted and sent. The TSN helps the server to detect
outstanding EncData chunks.
5.1.8. Secure Session Close Acknowledge chunk (SSClose_Ack)
This chunk is used to acknowledge the receipt of the secure session
close chunk. When the endpoint receives the secure session close
chunk, it immediately stops sending encrypted or authenticated
chunks. The Secure Session Close Acknowledge chunk only consists of
the chunk header.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD7 | Reserved=0 | Length=4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
5.1.9. Security Level Changed chunk (SecLevCHD)
This chunk is used to convey the other associated endpoint of the
endpoint's new security level. The endpoint sends SecLevCHD chunk
every time it selects a new security level. The endpoint uses the
new selected security level when it receives the Security Level
Changed Acknowledged chunk. The sender MUST NOT send a new SecLevCHD
chunk when an unacknowledged SecLevCHD chunk exists.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD8 | Reserved=0 |SL| Length=4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Security level (SL): 2 bits
This 2-bit value indicates the sender's new security level.
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5.1.10. Security Level Changed Acknowledged chunk (SecLevCHD_Ack)
This chunk is used to acknowledge the receipt of the SecLevCHD chunk.
When the endpoint receives the SecLevCHD chunk, it immediately sends
the SecLevCHD_Ack chunk.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0xD9 | Reserved=0 | Length=4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
5.1.11. Encrypted Data Chunk (EncData)
Each S-SCTP packet includes at most one encrypted data chunk, and the
packet could also include several (normal, unencrypted) data chunks.
The encrypted data chunk may contain one or several data chunks. The
EncData chunk includes a padding chunk when it is needed.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0x10 | Reserved=0 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Master secret key reference # | Random number length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Random number /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ Encrypted data /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Length: 16 bits unsigned integer
The length field contains the size of the chunk in bytes,including
the chunk header and encrypted data.
Master secret key reference number: 16 bits unsigned integer
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The association can be updated by changing the master secret key
several times during the association lifetime. The association keeps
old secret keys. The number of the kept old secret keys depends on
the implementation. This field helps to identify which key (old or
new) has been used for encryption. That means the endpoint is able
to receive messages, which were encrypted with an old key, after the
update of a master secret key.
Random number length: 16 bits unsigned integer
This field contains the size of the random number which is defined
below.
Random number: Variable length
This field indicates the random number which is used as
initialisation vector of the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode for
encryption.
Encrypted data: Variable length
Contains a byte vector that consists of the encrypted data chunks.
Before encryption, the chunk(s) MUST fulfil the following conditions.
If encryption is performed using the DES or 3DES algorithm, the total
size of the chunk(s) MUST be a multiple of 8 bytes. If encryption is
performed using the AES algorithm, the total size of the chunk(s)
MUST be a multiple of 16 bytes. If the total size of the chunk(s) is
not a multiple of 8 bytes or 16 bytes, the sender MUST add
appropriate padding at the chunk's end.
5.1.12. Padding chunk (PADDING)
This padding chunk is used with an EncData chunk. The symmetric
encryption algorithms use a block oriented encryption of the user
data. For example DES uses 64 bit blocks, and AES uses 128 bit
blocks. Before encryption, the user data which has to be encrypted
has to be formatted according to the required block size. If the
last block is not completely full, padding has to be added. If less
than 4 bytes padding are required, the block is filled up will all
zeros. The receiver can calculate the number of padding bytes based
on the length field of the original data chunks. If 4 bytes or more
are required, a padding chunk of appropriate length is added.
The algorithms split user data into blocks when the data length is
greater than the block size. The blocks MUST be full. If 104 bits
are to be encrypted using DES algorithm with 64 bit block size, user
data is split into two blocks of 64 and 40 bits. The second block
must be padded with 24 bits up to the full block size of 64 bits.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0x12 | Reserved=0 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Length: Variable length
This field indicates the padding size. The padding follows the
padding chunk. The length includes the padding chunk and padding.
Padding: Variable length
The padding is a random number. The random number generation is
implementation specific.
5.1.13. Authentication chunk (AUTH)
This chunk is dedicated to the authentication of an S-SCTP packet.
S-SCTP inserts this chunk into the packet when the security level
requires authentication.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=0x11 | Reserved=0 | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Master secret key reference # | Reserved=0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ \
/ HMAC /
\ \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Length: 16 bits unsigned integer
The length field contains the size of the chunk in bytes, including
the chunk header, master secret key reference, reserved field and
MAC.
Master secret key reference number: 16 bits unsigned integer
The association can update the secret keys several times during the
association lifetime. The association keeps old secret keys. The
number of the kept old secret keys depends on the implementation.
This field identifies the key which is used for authentication. If
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the endpoint receives a message which was authenticated by an old
key, this message can still be authenticated after an update of the
master secret key.
HMAC: Variable length
This field contains the authentication code for the SCTP packet. The
message authentication uses the HMAC algorithm defined in RFC 2104.
The hash function used in the HMAC algorithm is derived from the
negotiated cipher suite, which was chosen by the server.
6. New Error Cause
This part explains the new error causes defined for S-SCTP. When a
secure session or certificate failure is detected in the secure
session open process, the S-SCTP association immediately stops the
process. However, the association continues (without any security
functionality). When the secure session failure happens during an
update of the master secret key the association stops the update
operation and closes the secure session. The following table shows
four general failure groups.
Cause Code Value Cause Code
---------------- ---------------------------------------
0x20 Secure Session failure
0x21 Secure Session Certificate failure
0x22 Secure Session Decryption failure
0x23 Secure Session Authentication failure
0x24 Secure Session Decompression failure
6.1. Secure Session failure
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cause Code=0x20 | Cause length = 8 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Code | Reserved=0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
If any error happens in the secure session open and update process,
endpoints alert their peers with these error codes. The next table
shows error codes for what can happen.
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Error Code Value Error Code
---------------- -------------------------------------
0 Timer expired
1 Signature failure
2 Secure Session Open Complete failure
* Timer expired: The sender starts a timer when it sends the secure
session message. When the sender receives no response from the
receiver before the timer expires, it sends this error code.
* Signature failure: Some secure session chunks include a signature,
which identifies and protects the secure session message. If the
receiver checks the signature and cannot identify the chunk, this
error code is used in the error chunk.
* Secure Session Open Complete failure: This chunk is a very
important part of the secure session. Both server and client
individually compute the master secret and HMAC secret keys. Both
sides check these secret keys and parameters (i.e. secure session
chunks exchanged before, source and destination ports). If these
keys are not identical, an error chunk is sent containing this
error code.
6.2. Secure Session Certificate failure
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cause Code=0x21 | Cause length = 8 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Code | Reserved=0 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The certificate failure signals that an error has occurred in
processing the certificates. The next table shows error codes for
what can happen.
Error Code Value Error Code
---------------- -------------------------------------
0 No certificate
1 Bad certificate
2 Certificate expired
3 Unknown certificate
* No certificate: This error happens when the sender sets the CF
flag and the receiver does not receive the certificate.
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* Bad certificate: The signature of the certificate is bad and the
certificate could not be verified.
* Certificate expired: The certificate is no longer valid.
* Unknown certificate: The received certificate a X.509v3
certificate.
6.3. Decryption failure
This error happens when the EncData chunk cannot be decrypted or the
data chunk(s) cannot be identified after decryption. The receiver
discards the EncData and increases a counter by 1. This counter
counts errors. If the number of errors reaches a limit, the secure
session is terminated. The limit of the errors depends on the
implementation.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cause Code=0x22 | Cause length = 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
6.4. Authentication failure
In the event of a HMAC error, the packet is discarded by the
receiver. To check for an error, the receiver computes the HMAC and
compares it to the HMAC field of the packet. If they do not match,
an error is reported back.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cause Code=0x23 | Cause length = 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
6.5. Decompression failure
This error happens when the compressed chunk(s) cannot be
decompressed or the data chunk(s) cannot be identified after
decompression. The receiver discards the decompressed chunk(s).
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cause Code=0x24 | Cause length = 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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7. S-SCTP packet format and security levels
S-SCTP has four different security levels, which cover privacy
settings of an S-SCTP association. The S-SCTP application can change
the security levels at any time during the security session lifetime.
* Security level 0: This is the null security level. S-SCTP does
use neither data chunk encryption nor authentication. The S-SCTP
packet is the same as the SCTP packet (this level is fully
compatible to SCTP).
* Security level 1: This security level requires packet
authentication but does not use encryption. Every outgoing packet
(including the SCTP common header) is authenticated.
* Security level 2: In this security level, data chunks may be
encrypted. When an S-SCTP packet contains an encrypted data
chunk, it MUST include an AUTH chunk as well. That means every
chunk and the packet header are authenticated. When a packet
includes only unencrypted data chunks or control chunks or both
unencrypted data chunks and control chunks, the packet will not be
authenticated.
* Security level 3: This is the highest security level. S-SCTP
requires both encryption and authentication. Every outgoing chunk
is encrypted and the packet is authenticated.
Both endpoints can use different security levels, e.g. the
association can use security functions only for one direction, e.g.
from server to client. In this case the server uses security level 3
and the client uses security level 0. The transmission control block
(TCB) of the association includes the security level as a new
parameter.
8. S-SCTP data format
S-SCTP sorts data chunks before bundling them into the outgoing SCTP
packet. The data chunks are sorted according to whether they have to
be encrypted or not. The chunks belonging to the encryption group
are concatenated and encrypted into an EncData chunk. May be a
PADDING chunk is inserted into the encryption group. Insertion of a
PADDING chunk is done depending on data length and encryption block
size.
An assortment of encrypted and non-encrypted chunks are bundled in
the packet. The control chunk(s) are placed first in the packet when
bundled with other chunks. Finally, an AUTH chunk may be added to
the packet.
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HMAC computation is performed over all chunks and the SCTP common
header with a 0 checksum. The checksum is then computed over the
complete packet (including AUTH chunk). The HMAC length depends on
the hash function in the cipher suite. In every security level, the
SCTP packet construction is slightly different. In security level 0
the packet format is same as the SCTP packet format.
9. Procedures
In this section an explanation of the procedures of secure session:
initialisation, termination, update and etc., is given.
9.1. Establishment of a secure session
The following process is used to establish the S-SCTP secure session.
The handshake process runs in parallel with the data transmission.
The secure session start and close is controlled by the user. The
user can establish and close a secure session at any time during the
association lifetime. Each time a secure session is established, a
new set of keys is generated. It is not possible to create a new
secure session when a secure session already exists. The following
describes secure session establishment, which makes use of a
handshake timer and retransmissions in case packets are lost during
transmission. S-SCTP uses a four-way handshake. After all messages
of one of the connection "legs" have been sent, client or server
starts a RTO.hand (handshake retransmission time out) timer. For
example, the secure session certificate is the last handshake message
of the first leg. The sender waits for a response from the receiver
until the RTO.hand timer expires. The sender stops the RTO.hand
timer when it receives the expected message(s). If the RTO.hand
timer expires before all expected messages have been received, the
sender retransmits the handshake message(s).
The retransmission uses the following algorithm. The RTO.hand timer
gets a value from RTO of the path where the message is sent to, which
is defined in RFC4960. Before a retransmission, the sender checks
RTN.hand.max (handshake maximum retransmission number). This initial
value is dependent upon specific implementations. The suggested
value for RTN.hand.max is Path.Max.Retrans (see RFC 4960).
RTN.hand.max should be a constant parameter. We introduce a counter
for the number of retransmissions, and if that counter exceeds the
parameter RTN.hand.max, the timer expired error message is sent to
the peer. If a retransmission is required then S-SCTP uses the same
retransmission rules as defined in RFC4960. If the receiver receives
a retransmission of a handshake message that was already received,
the message last received MUST be dropped. The endpoint discards the
message(s) when they are unexpected. A secure session initialisation
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begins when one of the associated endpoints sets the security level
to a value higher than 0. The endpoint starting a secure session
initialisation is called client and the other associated endpoint is
called server.
* The client sends the SSOpReq chunk to the server. If the client
has a certificate, it sets the CF flag of the SSOPReq chunk to 1.
The client sends the SSCert chunk immediately after the SSOpReq
chunk. The SSCert chunk can be bundled with the SSOpReq chunk or
with other chunk(s). When the CF flag is set to 0, the client
sends only the SSOpReq chunk.
* The server receives a SSOpReq chunk and checks the CF flag. If
the CF flag is set to 1, the server waits for the SSCert chunk.
Upon receipt, the server checks the certificate and if there is a
problem with it, the server stops the handshake and goes to an
error state, aborts secure session setup and reports the cause to
its peer. It there is no error, the server chooses the cipher
suite and sends the SSOpReq_Ack chunk with CF=1 flag to the client
when the server has a certificate. The server immediately sends
the certificate and the SSSerKey chunks after the SSOpReq_Ack
chunk. All three chunks may be bundled together or with other
chunks. The server sends only the SSOpReq_Ack chunk with the
SSSerKey chunk if CF=0. Before sending the server key exchange
chunk, the server generates key material. The server starts the
update master secret key operation when it receives the SSOpReq
chunk after secure session establishment. If the server receives
the SSCert chunk before the SSOpReq chunk, it stores the SSCert
chunk and waits until it receives the SSOpReq chunk. But the
server drops a second SSCert chunk.
* The client receives the handshake messages and checks the
certificate in the SSSerKey chunk. If the client detects any
errors, it stops the handshake and goes to an error state, aborts
secure session setup and reports the cause to its peer. The
client generates key material and sends the SSCliKey chunk to the
server. The client sends the SSOpCom chunk immediately after the
client key exchange chunk. Before sending the handshake-finished
chunk, the client computes the encryption secret and MAC secret
keys.
* The server receives the SSCliKey chunk and computes the master
secret and the MAC secret keys. It then computes the SSOpCom
chunk and sends it to the client. Finally, the server checks the
SSOpCom chunk of the client. If the server detects any error, it
reports a secure session open complete error and closes the
handshake. The secure session is established only when both sides
detect no errors. The server is ready for secure transmission
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when it detects no errors, but the client must wait for the
SSOpCom chunk of the server. When this is received, the client
checks it and reports to the peer a secure session open complete
error if any error is detected before aborting secure session
setup. The handshake may run simultaneously with normal SCTP data
transmission. If the client receives encrypted or authenticated
data chunks before it receives the server's SSOpCom chunk, then
those chunks MUST be discarded.
When both associated endpoints request the initialisation of a secure
session simultaneously (both endpoints send an SSOpReq message), both
ignore the received SSOpReq message and wait a random time before
resending the SSOpReq message. Each endpoint generates the random
time independently. The random number must be small, e.g. 120
seconds maximum.
9.2. Choice of cipher suite and compression method
This section explains how to choose the cipher suite and compression
method which are used for the secure session. Each endpoint
maintains an ordered list of supported cipher suites (cipher suite
list). The ordering in the list indicates the preference with which
a cipher suite should be used (first in the list have higher
preference). The order in the list is defined by the retrospective
S-SCTP user.
S-SCTP users on both sides can allow all cipher suited in the list
when establishing a secure session or limit the allowed cipher suites
to a subset. The complete list or the selected subset can be
indicated to the server in the SSOpReq. If the complete list is
sent, the default cipher suite list must be located first in the
list. The server uses the following rules to choose the cipher suite
to be used for the secure session:
The server chooses the default cipher suite, if the SSOpReq chunk
does not contain any cipher suite.
The server gets the first cipher suites from SSOpReq chunk and
server's cipher suite sequence. When both cipher suites are
identical the server chooses this cipher suite for the secure
session. Otherwise, the server takes its first cipher suite and
looks for a match in the cipher suite sequence of the client. When
there is no matche, the server takes the client's first cipher suite
and searches for match in its cipher suite sequence. S-SCTP checks
the first cipher suite in the SSOpReq chunk against all cipher suites
in the cipher suite list of the server. If no match is found, all
subsequent cipher suites in the SSOpReq are checked sequentially in
the order they appear in the SSOPReq until a match is found. The
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first cipher suite supported by both endpoints is chosen. When two
cipher suites match each other then this cipher suite is selected for
the secure session. If not, the server looks, its second cipher
suite, for a match in the cipher suite sequence of the client.
Furthermore, the server uses the same mechanism to look a cipher
suite for the secure session.
The server chooses the default cipher suite, when the cipher suites
in the SSOpReq chunk are not supported by the server.
Both client and server also maintain a list of compression methods.
The choice of the compression mechanism works similarly to the cipher
suite selection mechanism described above. S-SCTP uses a NULL
compression method as default compression method.
9.3. Data transfer
Before transporting the packet over the network, S-SCTP takes the
following steps. First, it checks the security level. If the
security level is:
* 0, jump to step "d"
* 1, jump to step "c"
* 2, check the user data. If the user data requires encryption,
jump to step "a" . If the user data does not require encryption,
jump to step "c"
* 3, jump to step "a"
a) S-SCTP sorts data chunks in two groups, which are encrypted and
unencrypted. The encrypted group consists of those data chunks
requiring encryption. The unencrypted group consists of those
data chunks not requiring encryption. If the secure session's
security level is set to 3, all chunks are sorted into the
encrypted group.
b) The data chunks in the encrypted group are concatenated. After
this, S-SCTP calculates the padding chunk and inserts the padding
chunk on the last position into pre-enc-data if necessary. The
Pre-enc-data size MUST be smaller than the current MTU. If the
pre-enc-data is bigger than the current MTU, S-SCTP must create
two pre-enc-datas. Every pre-enc-data is encrypted and stored in
the encryption data field of the EncData chunk.
c) SCTP builds the packet according to the security level and
inserts the AUTH chunk in the last position in the packet.
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d) S-SCTP sends the packet.
9.4. Closing of a secure session
The termination of a secure session begins when one of the endpoints
sends the secure session close chunk. This chunk includes the last
encrypted data TSN and OF. The endpoint (sender) stops the
encryption or authentication of all chunks or packets after it has
sent the secure session close chunk. But normal (unsecured) data
transfer will continue. The endpoint then waits until it receives
the SSClose_Ack chunk. After receiving the SSClose_Ack chunk, the
association clears the TCB parameters belonging to the secure
session. The receiver (other endpoint) immediately stops encryption
and authentication of all chunks or packets after it receives the
secure session close chunk. Before sending the SSClose_Ack, the
receiver waits for outstanding data (encrypted or authenticated
data), which are the receiver's unacknowledged data chunks and
sender's data chunks that have a TSN less than the last encrypted
data TSN in the SSClose chunk. If the receiver does not receive the
outstanding data chunks before RTO.hand timer expires, the S-SCTP
association closes the secure session and outstanding data chunks
will be dropped. The receiver ignores the last TSN of SSClose chunk
and waits only for the receiver's unacknowledged data chunks when
SSClose chunk's OF=1. The SSClose and SSClose_Ack chunks may be
bundled with other chunks. If the sender does not receive the
acknowledge chunk, the client follows the standard retransmission
rule for messages. After the termination of the secure session, the
TCB parameters belonging to the secure session MUST be set to zero.
If the SCTP association begins to close the current association, the
SSClose chunk is sent. If the SCTP association creates an ABORT
chunk, the secure session closes immediately and the TCB parameters
belonging to the secure session MUST be set to zero.
9.5. Generation of the Master secret key
Secret key generation uses the 3DES_CBC algorithm. Both server and
client compute the master secret key separately. The key material is
split into 64 bit blocks. Every block will be input to the 3DES_CBC
encryption. The key material is as follows:
* If the secure session key exchange algorithm uses DH, the key
material consists of the DH's secret key.
* If the secure session key exchange algorithm uses RSA, the key
material consists of random numbers of both client and server.
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9.6. Update of the master secret key
A secure update mechanism of the secret keys is a very important
requirement for a secure session. The secret keys consist of the
master secret key, which is used for data chunk encryption, and the
HMAC secret key, which is used for packet authentication. If an
association exists for a long time, the S-SCTP association needs to
update the secret keys. Both the client and the server can request
an update of the secret keys. A three way handshake, called an
abbreviated handshake, is used to update the master secret keys. All
actions of the handshake are encrypted by the current master secret
key. The current security level does not affect the packets, which
contain the handshake messages. The key update handshake works
similar to the first establishment handshake (e.g. the endpoints
start an RTO.hand timer when sending handshake chunks). Format and
function of the chunks used to update keys are the same as for the
handshake. When an endpoint receives a SSOpReq chunk (after a secure
session establishment) it begins to update secret keys. Both the
server and client key exchange chunks always use the RSA key exchange
algorithm. The random numbers in SSSerKey and SSCliKey chunks are
encrypted by the current master secret key. The following describes
the method used to update the master secret key:
The client generates a random number and sends the SSopReq chunk with
the SSCliKey chunk. The key material length in the handshake request
chunk may be equal to 0. If not, the number indicates the size of
the new key material. If 0, both sides will use the key material
length which was used in the last handshake. The server sends the
SSop_Ack, the SSSerKey and the SSOpCom chunks immediately after
receiving the SSOpReq and the SSCliKey chunks. After receiving the
handshake messages from the server, the client computes a new master
secret key and checks the SSOpCom chunk of the server. If it detects
any error, the client closes the secure session and reports an error
to the peer. The client computes the SSOpCom chunk and sends it to
the server. After sending the SSOpCom chunk the client is ready to
use the new master secret key. The server receives the SSOpCom chunk
of the client and checks the new keys. If it detects any error, the
server closes the secure session and reports an error to the peer.
Before receiving the client's SSOpCom chunk, the server discards any
encrypted or authenticated chunk that make use of the new master
secret key.
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The encrypted and unencrypted user data transmission works in
parallel with the update operation. After the update operation, the
new master secret key is used for data encryption and authentication.
When both client and server receive an SSOpReq chunk simultaneously,
the client ignores the server's SSopReq chunk and the server accepts
the client's SSOpReq chunk. The next steps are the same as for the
secure session initialisation.
The new master secret key generation uses the same algorithm as
described above. The secure session includes one parameter which is
called secure session lifetime. This parameter is used to initialise
a timer which indicates the secure session secret key's lifetime in
seconds. When the timer expires, the association automatically
updates the secret keys. The user can define this parameter. If the
user does not define it, the parameter assumes a default value. This
default value depends on the implementation. The implementation MUST
define secure session's lifetime initial value. We suggest a value
of 600 seconds for the lifetime as a compromise between security and
overhead.
9.7. Random number generation
As the security of S-SCTP depends on the quality of the random number
generator, we suggest to use one according to RFC4086 [5].
9.8. HMAC algorithm
S-SCTP uses the HMAC algorithm which is defined in RFC2104 [1] for
the packet authentication.
10. HMAC algorithm
ULP-to-SCTP primitives deliver upper layer requests to S-SCTP. The
following part describes new ULP-to-SCTP primitives and thus enhances
the section 10 of RFC4960. All new ULP-to-SCTP primitives described
below are defined in the ssctp.h header file.
INITSECSESS: This primitive initialises a new secure session.
Format: {initSecSess(secure session ID, key material length, cipher
suites list, compression methods list, certiticate(s) ) --> result}
* secure session ID: This parameter identifies a secure session.
* key material length: This defines the key material length which is
used in the SSOPReq chunk.
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* cipher suite list: Eligible cipher suites for a new secure
session.
* compression method list: Eligible compression methods for a new
secure session.
* certificate(s): Local endpoint certificate(s).
SETSECLEVEL: This primitive sets a new security level for an existing
secure session.
Format: {setSecLevel(secure session ID, security level) --> result}
* secure session ID: local handle to the secure session
* security level: This parameter indicates the new security level
GETSECLEVEL: This primitive gets the current security level of a
secure session.
Format: {getSecLevel(secure session ID) --> security level}
* secure session ID: local handle to the secure session
SENDSEC: This primitive sends secure data via S-SCTP.
Format: {sctp_send_enc(association id, buffer address, byte count,
context, stream id, life time, destination transport address, unorder
flag, no-bundle flag, payload protocol-id, encryption flag,
compression flag) --> result}
Every parameter, except the encryption and compression flags, defined
in this function is the same as the corresponding parameter defined
in the SEND function of RFC4960 section 10.
* encryption flag: This flag defines if a current user data message
needs encryption or not.
* compression flag: This flag defines if a current user data message
needs compression or not.
GETSECSTATUS: This primitive gets the security status of an
association. The security status indicates if the SCTP association
is using a secure session or not.
Format: {setSecStatus(association ID) --> status}
* association ID: local handle to the SCTP association.
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SETSECSESSTTL: This primitive sets a new lifetime for a secure
session.
Format: {setSecSessTTL(secure session ID, Time) --> result}
* secure session ID: local handle to the secure session.
* time: The new lifetime in seconds.
SHUTSECSESS: This primitive deletes a secure session.
Format: {shutSecSess(secure session ID) --> result}
* secure session ID: local handle to the secure session.
* security level: This parameter indicates the new security level.
11. S-SCTP to ULP
S-SCTP defines new notifications to deliver information to the upper
layer. The notifications extend the section 10.2 of RFC4960 [6].
All new notifications are defined in the ssctp.h header file.
SECSESSUP:
This notification indicates that S-SCTP is ready to send or receive
secure data ({secsessUpNotif()}).
SECSESSDOWN:
This notification indicates that an association has lost a secure
session ({secsessdownNotif()}).
SECSESSREKEY:
This notification indicates that a secure session updated the secret
keys ({secsessrekeyNotif()}).
Additional changes had to be made in the socket API implementation to
access the new sctplib functions described above. A user calls the
same socket API functions as in standard SCTP to send and receive
user data, but has to set an additional encryption flag (MSG_ENC) to
request encryption of user data. Also, a compression flag (MSG_COMP)
has to be set in ext_send, ext_sendto, ext_sendmsg to request
compression of user data. S-SCTP compression performs per user
message not per chunk or per packet. In the SCTP DATA chunk, a new
flag is defined, which indicates if the data is compressed or not.
On the receiver side there are no changes.
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12. Transmission Control Block (TCB) extension
A SCTP TCB contains parameters which are related to an association
(e.g. an association id, port number, IP address list...). S-SCTP
defines several parameters which are related to a secure session and
it extends the TCB defined in section 12 of RFC4960.
Security level:
This parameter contains the association's current security level.
Second security level:
This is the security level of the associated second endpoint.
Key material length:
The size of the key material, which was last used for key generation.
Secure session status:
This parameter indicates whether the association is using a secure
session or not.
Secure session lifetime:
This parameter indicates the lifetime of the secret keys of a secure
session.
Server indication:
This parameter indicates if an endpoint is server or client. If the
parameter is equal to 1 then it is a server, otherwise it is a
client.
Secure session ID:
This parameter indicates the local secure session ID.
Master secret key reference:
This is an "array of secret data" collection and every array element
includes the following parameters.
* Selected cipher suite: This parameter indicates the encryption and
authentication algorithms that are used in a secure session.
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* Selected compression: This parameter indicates the compression
method that is used in a secure session.
* Encryption key: This is a secret key which is used for encryption.
* Authentication key: This is a secret key which is used for
authentication.
This information is used in EncData and AUTH chunks.
13. Socket API extensions for Secure SCTP
S-SCTP defines new socket options for the ext_setsockopt() and
ext_getsockopt() socket functions to initialise, delete and rekey a
secure session. A user calls the ext_setsockopt or ext_getsockopt
functions with a new option. It is not necessary to define new
socket API functions, as this is a more standard socket API fashion.
The following paragraphs describe the new socket options.
SSCTP-INIT:
This socket option is used to initialise or update a secure session.
The following structure is used to access these parameters.
struct ssctp_init {
uint16_t secsessID;
uint16_t key_length;
uint8_t num_cipher;
uint8_t *cipher_suites;
uint8_t num_comp;
uint8_t *comp_methods;
uint8_t *certificate;
};
* secsessID: This parameter indicates a current secure session ID.
* key_length: This parameter defines the length of a key material.
* num_cipher: This parameter defines the number of cipher suites.
* cipher_suites: This parameter includes a list of cipher suites.
* num_comp: This parameter defines the number of compression
methods.
* comp_methods: This parameter includes a list of compression
methods.
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* certificate: This parameter includes a certificate of the
endpoint.
SSCTP-SECLEVEL:
This socket option is used to set and get a secure session security
level. The following structure is used to access and modify these
parameters.
struct ssctp_seclevel {
uint16_t secsessID;
uint8_t seclevel;
};
* secsessID: This parameter indicates a current secure session ID.
This parameter MUST be zero when beginning a secure session
initialisation.
* seclevel: This parameter contains a new security level before
socket write access or contains the current security level after
socket read access.
SSCTP-SECSTATUS:
This socket option is used to get the secure session status and
secure session ID when a secure session exists. The following
structure is used to access these parameters.
struct ssctp_secstatus {
uint16_t secsessID;
uint8_t sec_status;
};
* secsessID: This parameter contains the current secure session ID.
This parameter MUST be zero when a secure session does not exist.
* sec_status: This parameter contains a security status. This
parameter MUST be zero when a secure session does not exist. This
parameter is equal to 1 when a secure session exists.
SSCTP-SECSESSTTL:
This socket option is used to set and get the secure session
lifetime. The following structure is used to access and modify these
parameters.
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struct ssctp_secsessTTL {
uint16_t secsessID;
uint16_t secsessTTL;
};
* secsessID: This parameter indicates the current secure session ID.
* secsessTTL (seconds): This parameter contains a new secure session
lifetime before socket write access or contains a current secure
session lifetime after socket read access.
SSCTP-CLOSE:
This socket option is used to close an existing secure session. The
following structure is used to access these parameters.
struct ssctp_secclose {
uint16_t secsessID;
};
* secsessID: This parameter contains the current secure session ID.
14. Testbed Platform
A large-scale and realistic Internet testbed platform with support
for the multi-homing feature of the underlying SCTP protocol is
NorNet. A description of NorNet is provided in [9], some further
information can be found on the project website [10].
15. Security Considerations
Security has been described in the previous sections.
16. IANA Considerations
This document introduces no additional considerations for IANA.
17. References
17.1. Normative References
[1] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
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[2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[3] Jungmaier, A., Rescorla, E., and M. Tuexen, "Transport
Layer Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
RFC 3436, DOI 10.17487/RFC3436, December 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3436>.
[4] Bellovin, S., Ioannidis, J., Keromytis, A., and R.
Stewart, "On the Use of Stream Control Transmission
Protocol (SCTP) with IPsec", RFC 3554,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3554, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3554>.
[5] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[6] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.
[7] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[8] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
17.2. Informative References
[9] Dreibholz, T. and E. G. Gran, "Design and Implementation
of the NorNet Core Research Testbed for Multi-Homed
Systems", Proceedings of the 3nd International Workshop on
Protocols and Applications with Multi-Homing
Support (PAMS) Pages 1094-1100, ISBN 978-0-7695-4952-1,
DOI 10.1109/WAINA.2013.71, 27 March 2013,
<https://www.simula.no/file/
threfereedinproceedingsreference2012-12-207643198512pdf/
download>.
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[10] Dreibholz, T., "NorNet – A Real-World, Large-Scale Multi-
Homing Testbed", 2022, <https://www.nntb.no/>.
Authors' Addresses
Carsten Hohendorf
University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute for Experimental Mathematics
Ellernstraße 29
45326 Essen
Germany
Email: hohend@iem.uni-due.de
Esbold Unurkhaan
Mongolian University of Science and Technology
Bayanzurkh duureg, 2-nd khoroo
313/49 Ulaanbaatar
Mongolia
Email: esbold@csms.edu.mn
Thomas Dreibholz
Simula Metropolitan Centre for Digital Engineering
Pilestredet 52
0167 Oslo
Norway
Email: dreibh@simula.no
URI: https://www.simula.no/people/dreibh
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