Internet DRAFT - draft-hollenbeck-weirds-rdap-openid
draft-hollenbeck-weirds-rdap-openid
Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft Verisign Labs
Intended status: Standards Track January 7, 2016
Expires: July 10, 2016
Federated Authentication for the Registration Data Access Protocol
(RDAP) using OpenID Connect
draft-hollenbeck-weirds-rdap-openid-05
Abstract
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access
control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes
support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Identification methods that require
clients to obtain and manage credentials from every RDAP server
operator present management challenges for both clients and servers,
whereas a federated authentication system would make it easier to
operate and use RDAP without the need to maintain server-specific
client credentials. This document describes a federated
authentication system for RDAP based on OpenID Connect.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 10, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Federated Authentication for RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps . . . . . 6
3.1.3.1. Provider Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3.2. Authentication Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3.3. End-User Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.3.4. Authorization Response and Validation . . . . . . 7
3.1.3.5. Token Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.3.6. Delivery of User Information . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.4. Specialized Parameters for RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.4.1. Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Protocol Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Client Authentication Request and Response . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Token Request and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Parameter Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Non-Browser Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Additional Questions and Discussion Topics . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Authentication and Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access
control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes
support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [RFC7230].
RDAP is specified in multiple documents, including "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7480], "Security
Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7481],
"Registration Data Access Protocol Query Format" [RFC7482], and "JSON
Responses for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)"
[RFC7483]. RFC 7481 describes client identification and
authentication services that can be used with RDAP, but it does not
specify how any of these services can (or should) be used with RDAP.
1.1. Problem Statement
The traditional "user name and password" authentication method does
not scale well in the RDAP ecosystem. Assuming that all domain name
and address registries will eventually provide RDAP service, it is
impractical and inefficient for users to secure login credentials
from the hundreds of different server operators. Authentication
methods based on user names and passwords do not provide information
that describes the user in sufficient detail (while protecting the
personal privacy of the user) for server operators to make fine-
grained access control decisions based on the user's identity. The
authentication system used for RDAP needs to address all of these
needs.
1.2. Proposal
A basic level of RDAP service can be provided to users who possess an
identifier issued by a recognized provider who is able to
authenticate and validate the user. The identifiers issued by social
media services, for example, can be used. Users who require higher
levels of service (and who are willing to share more information
about them self to gain access to that service) can secure
identifiers from specialized providers who are or will be able to
provide more detailed information about the user. Server operators
can then make access control decisions based on the identification
information provided by the user.
A federated authentication system would make it easier to operate and
use RDAP by re-using existing identifiers to provide a basic level of
access. It can also provide the ability to collect additional user
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identification information, and that information can be shared with
the consent of the user. This document describes a federated
authentication system for RDAP based on OpenID Connect [OIDC] that
meets all of these needs.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Federated Authentication for RDAP
RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP
relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to
provide needed security services including access control,
authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
data integrity, and identification. A description of each of these
security services can be found in "Internet Security Glossary,
Version 2" [RFC4949]. This document focuses on a federated
authentication system for RDAP that provides services for
authentication, authorization, and identification, allowing a server
operator to make access control decisions. Section 3 of RFC 7481
[RFC7481] describes general considerations for RDAP access control,
authentication, and authorization.
The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients
to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This
situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers
increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use
one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client
credential management complexity.
3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect
OpenID Connect 1.0 [OIDCC] is a decentralized, single sign-on (SSO)
federated authentication system that allows users to access multiple
web resources with one identifier instead of having to create
multiple server-specific identifiers. Users acquire identifiers from
OpenID Providers, or OPs. Relying Parties, or RPs, are applications
(such as RDAP) that outsource their user authentication function to
an OP. OpenID Connect is built on top of the authorization framework
provided by the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] protocol.
The OAuth authorization framework describes a method for users to
access protected web resources without having to hand out their
credentials. Instead, clients are issued Access Tokens by
authorization servers with the permission of the resource owners.
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Using OpenID Connect and OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a
federation and clients can access any server in the federation by
providing one credential registered with any OP in that federation.
The OAuth authorization framework is designed for use with HTTP and
thus can be used with RDAP.
3.1.1. Terminology
This document uses the terms "client" and "server" defined by RDAP
[RFC7480]. An RDAP client performs the role of an OpenID Connect
Core [OIDCC] Entity or End-User. An RDAP server performs the role of
an OpenID Connect Core Relying Party (RP). Additional terms from
Section 1.2 of the OpenID Connect Core specification are incorporated
by reference.
3.1.2. Overview
At a high level, RDAP authentication of a browser-based client using
OpenID Connect requires completion of the following steps:
1. An RDAP client (acting as an OpenID End-User) sends an HTTP (or
HTTPS) query containing OAuth 2.0 request parameters to an RDAP
server.
2. The RDAP server (acting as an OpenID Relying Party (RP)) prepares
an Authentication Request containing the desired request
parameters.
3. The RDAP server sends the RDAP client and Authentication Request
to an Authorization Server operated by an OpenID Provider (OP)
using an HTTP redirect.
4. The Authorization Server authenticates the RDAP Client.
5. The Authorization Server obtains RDAP Client consent/
authorization.
6. The Authorization Server sends the RDAP Client back to the RDAP
server with an Authorization Code using an HTTP redirect.
7. The RDAP server requests a response using the Authorization Code
at the Token Endpoint.
8. The RDAP server receives a response that contains an ID Token and
Access Token in the response body.
9. The RDAP server validates the ID Token and retrieves the RDAP
client's Subject Identifier.
The RDAP server can then make identification, authorization, and
access control decisions based on local policies, the ID Token
received from the OP, and the received Claims. Note that OpenID
Connect describes different process flows for other types of clients,
such as script-based or command line clients.
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3.1.3. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps
End-Users MUST possess an identifier (an OpenID) issued by an OP to
use OpenID Connect with RDAP. The OpenID Foundation maintains a list
of OPs on its web site [1]. Additional OPs are almost certainly
needed to fully realize the potential for federated authentication
with RDAP because RDAP has authorization and access control
requirements that go beyond the end-user authentication requirements
of a typical web site.
OpenID Connect requires RPs to register with OPs to use OpenID
Connect services for an End-User. That process is REQUIRED and is
described by the "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration"
protocol [OIDCR].
3.1.3.1. Provider Discovery
An RDAP server/RP needs to receive an identifier from an End-User
that can be used to discover the End-User's OP. That process is
REQUIRED and is documented in the "OpenID Connect Discovery" protocol
[OIDCD].
3.1.3.2. Authentication Request
Once the OP is known, an RP MUST form an Authentication Request and
send it to the OP as described in Section 3 of the OpenID Connect
Core protocol [OIDCC]. The authentication path followed
(authorization, implicit, or hybrid) will depend on the
Authentication Request response_type set by the RP. The remainder of
the processing steps described here assume that the Authorization
Code Flow is being used by setting "response_type=code" in the
Authentication Request.
The benefits of using the Authorization Code Flow for authenticating
a human user are described in Section 3.1 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol. The Implicit Flow is more commonly used by clients
implemented in a web browser using a scripting language; it is
described in Section 3.2 of the OpenID Connect Core protocol. The
Hybrid Flow (described in Section 3.3 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol) combines elements of the Authorization and Implicit Flows
by returning some tokens from the Authorization Endpoint and others
from the Token Endpoint.
An Authentication Request can contain several parameters. REQUIRED
parameters are specified in Section 3.1.2.1 of the OpenID Connect
Core protocol [OIDCC]. Other parameters MAY be included.
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The OP receives the Authentication Request and attempts to validate
it as described in Section 3.1.2.2 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol [OIDCC]. If the request is valid, the OP attempts to
authenticate the End-User as described in Section 3.1.2.3 of the
OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC]. The OP returns an error
response if the request is not valid or if any error is encountered.
3.1.3.3. End-User Authorization
After the End-User is authenticated, the OP MUST obtain authorization
information from the End-User before releasing information to the
RDAP Server/RP. This process is described in Section 3.1.2.4 of the
OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC].
3.1.3.4. Authorization Response and Validation
After the End-User is authenticated, the OP will send a response to
the RP that describes the result of the authorization process in the
form of an Authorization Grant. The RP MUST validate the response.
This process is described in Sections 3.1.2.5 - 3.1.2.7 of the OpenID
Connect Core protocol [OIDCC].
3.1.3.5. Token Processing
The RP sends a Token Request using the Authorization Grant to a Token
Endpoint to obtain a Token Response containing an Access Token, ID
Token, and an OPTIONAL Refresh Token. The RP MUST validate the Token
Response. This process is described in Sections 3.1.3 - 3.1.3.8 of
the OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC].
3.1.3.6. Delivery of User Information
The set of Claims can be retrieved by sending a request to a UserInfo
Endpoint using the Access Token. The Claims MAY be returned in the
ID Token. The process of retrieving Claims from a UserInfo Endpoint
is described in Sections 5.3 - 5.3.4 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol [OIDCC].
OpenID Connect specified a set of standard Claims in Section 5.1.
Additional Claims for RDAP are described in Section 3.1.4.1.
3.1.4. Specialized Parameters for RDAP
3.1.4.1. Claims
OpenID Connect claims are pieces of information used to make
assertions about an entity. Section 5 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol [OIDCC] describes a set of standard claims that can be used
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to identify a person. Section 5.1.2 notes that additional claims MAY
be used, and it describes a method to create them.
3.1.4.1.1. Stated Purpose
There are communities of RDAP users and operators who wish to make
and validate claims about a user's "need to know" when it comes to
requesting access to a resource. For example, a law enforcement
agent or a trademark attorney may wish to be able to assert that they
have a legal right to access a protected resource, and a server
operator will need to be able to receive and validate that claim.
These needs can be met by defining and using an additional "purpose"
claim.
The "purpose" claim identifies the purpose for which access to a
protected resource is being requested. The processing of this claim
is subject the server acceptance of the purpose and successful
authentication of the End-User. The "purpose" value is a case-
sensitive string containing a StringOrURI value as specified in
Section 2 of the JSON Web Token (JWT) specification ([RFC7519]). Use
of this claim is OPTIONAL.
4. Protocol Parameters
This specification adds the following protocol parameters to RDAP:
1. A query parameter to request authentication for a specific end-
user identity.
2. A path segment to request an ID Token and an Access Token for a
specific end-user identity.
3. A query parameter to deliver an ID Token and an Access Token for
use with an RDAP qeury.
4.1. Client Authentication Request and Response
Client authentication is requested by adding a query component to an
RDAP request URI using the syntax described in Section 3.4 of RFC
3986 [RFC3986]. The query used to request client authentication is
represented as a "key=value" pair using a key value of "id" and a
value component that contains the client identifier issued by an OP.
An example:
https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com?id=user.idp.example
The response to an authenticated query MUST use the response
structures specified in RFC 7483 [RFC7483]. Information that the
end-user is not authorized to receive MUST be omitted from the
response.
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4.2. Token Request and Response
Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to authenticate an end-
user and return an ID Token and an Access Token from an OP that can
be then be passed to the RP/RDAP server to authenticate and process
subsequent queries. Identity provider authentication is requested
using a "tokens" path segment and a query parameter with key value of
"id" and a value component that contains the client identifier issued
by an OP. An example:
https://example.com/rdap/tokens?id=user.idp.example
The response to this query MUST contain a JSON object that contains
two name-value pairs, in any order, representing the returned ID
Token and Access Token. The ID Token is represented using a key
value of "id_token". The Access Token is represented using a key
value of "access_token". The token values returned in the RDAP
server response MUST be Base64url encoded as described in RFCs 7515
[RFC7515] and 7519 [RFC7519].
An example (the encoded tokens have been abbreviated for clarity):
{
"access_token" : "eyJ0...NiJ9",
"id_token" : "eyJ0...EjXk"
}
Figure 1
An RDAP server that processes this type of query MUST determine if
the identifier is associated with an OP that is recognized and
supported by the server. Servers MUST reject queries that include an
identifier associated with an unsupported OP with an HTTP 501 (Not
Implemented) response. An RDAP server that receives a query
containing an identifier associated with a recognized OP MUST perform
the steps required to authenticate the user with the OP using a
browser or browser-like client and return encoded tokens to the
client. Note that tokens are typically valid for a limited period of
time and new tokens will be required when an existing token's
validity period has expired.
The tokens can then be passed to the server for use with an RDAP
query using a query parameter with key values of "id_token" and
"access_token" and values that represent the encoded tokens. An
example (the encoded tokens have been abbreviated and the URI split
across multiple lines for clarity):
https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com
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?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk
&access_token=eyJ0...NiJ9
The response to an authenticated query MUST use the response
structures specified in RFC 7483 [RFC7483]. Information that the
end-user is not authorized to receive MUST be omitted from the
response.
4.3. Parameter Processing
An RDAP server that receives a query containing tokens associated
with a recognized OP and authenticated end user MUST process the
query and return an RDAP response that is appropriate for the end
user's level of authorization and access. Errors based on processing
the token MUST be signaled with an appropriate HTTP status code as
described in Section 3.1 of RFC 6750 [RFC6750].
Unrecognized query parameters MUST be ignored. An RDAP request that
does not include an "id" query component MUST be processed as an
unauthenticated query. An RDAP server that processes an
authenticated query MUST determine if the identifier is associated
with an OP that is recognized and supported by the server. Servers
MUST reject queries that include an identifier associated with an
unsupported OP with an HTTP 501 (Not Implemented) response. An RDAP
server that receives a query containing an identifier associated with
a recognized OP MUST perform the steps required to authenticate the
user with the OP, process the query, and return an RDAP response that
is appropriate for the end user's level of authorization and access.
5. Non-Browser Clients
The flow described in Section 3.1.3 requires a client to interact
with a server using a web browser. This will not work well in
situations where the client is automated or an end-user is using a
command-line client such as curl [2] or wget [3]. This is a known
issue with OpenID Connect, and is typically addressed using a two-
step process:
1. Authenticate with the OP using a browser or browser-like client
and store the ID Token and Access Token locally.
2. Send a request to the content provider/RP along with the ID Token
and Access Token received from the OP.
The Access Token MAY be passed to the RP in an HTTP "Authorization"
header [RFC7235] or as a query parameter. The Access Token MUST be
specified using the "Bearer" authentication scheme [RFC6750] if it is
passed in an "Authorization" header. The ID Token MUST be passed to
the RP as a query parameter.
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Here are two examples using the curl and wget utilities. Start by
authenticating with the OP:
https://example.com/rdap/tokens?id=user.idp.example
Save the token information and pass it to the RP along with the URI
representing the RDAP query. Using curl (encoded tokens have been
abbreviated for clarity:
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJ0...NiJ9"\
-k https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com\
?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk
curl -k https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com\
?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk&access_token=eyJ0...NiJ9
Using wget:
wget --header="Authorization: Bearer eyJ0...NiJ9"\
https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com\
?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk
wget https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com\
?id_token=eyJ0...EjXk&access_token=eyJ0...NiJ9
6. Additional Questions and Discussion Topics
For the time being this section will serve as a place to capture
unanswered questions, topics for future discussion, and anything else
that might deserve additional text in the future.
Recursive or proxy RDAP servers: how might federated authentication
work in a model where a subset of RDAP servers act as proxies to
other RDAP servers? Is it possible to cache user credentials in such
a way that authentication process latency can be reduced?
Additional claims: are there any other claims that need to be defined
and registered?
Implementations: does it make sense to add text describing existing
implementations that can be used for experimentation?
7. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to register the following value in the JSON Web
Token Claims Registry:
Claim Name: "purpose"
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Claim Description: The stated purpose for submitting a request to
access a protected RDAP resource.
Change Controller: Scott Hollenbeck, shollenbeck@verisign.com
Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.4.1.1 of this document.
8. Security Considerations
Security considerations for RDAP can be found in RFC 7481 [RFC7481].
Security considerations for OpenID Connect Core [OIDCC] and OAuth
[RFC6749] can be found in their reference specifications. OpenID
Connect defines optional mechanisms for robust signing and encryption
that can be used to provide data integrity and data confidentiality
services as needed. Security services for ID Tokens and Access
Tokens (with references to the JWT specification) are described in
the OpenID Connect Core protocol.
8.1. Authentication and Access Control
Having completed the client identification, authorization, and
validation process, an RDAP server can make access control decisions
based on a comparison of client-provided information and local
policy. For example, a client who provides an email address (and
nothing more) might be entitled to receive a subset of the
information that would be available to a client who provides an email
address, a full name, and a stated purpose. Development of these
access control policies is beyond the scope of this document.
9. Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
their contributions to the development of this document: Rhys Smith,
Jaromir Talir, and Alessandro Vesely. In addition, the Verisign
Registry Services Lab development team of Sai Mogali, Swapneel Sheth,
and Nitin Singh provided critical "proof of concept" implementation
experience that helped demonstrate the validity of the concepts
described in this document.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[OIDC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect",
<http://openid.net/connect/>.
[OIDCC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Core incorporating
errata set 1", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
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[OIDCD] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0
incorporating errata set 1", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html>.
[OIDCR] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client
Registration 1.0 incorporating errata set 1", November
2014, <http://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-registration-1_0.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
[RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7480,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>.
[RFC7481] Hollenbeck, S. and N. Kong, "Security Services for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7481, March 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7481>.
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[RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7482>.
[RFC7483] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7483,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7483, March 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7483>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
10.3. URIs
[1] http://openid.net/get-an-openid/
[2] http://curl.haxx.se/
[3] https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/
Appendix A. Change Log
00: Initial version.
01: Updated flow description (Section 3.1.2) and description of the
registration process (Section 3.1.3). Thanks to Jaromir Talir.
02: Updated flow description.
03: Added description of query parameters and non-browser clients.
Updated security considerations to note issues associated with
access control.
04: Updated references for JSON Web Token, OpenID Connect Core, and
OpenID Connect Discovery. Added acknowledgement to the Verisign
Labs developers. Changed intended status to Standards Track.
Added text to describe protocol parameters and processing. Other
minor edits.
05: Added examples for curl and wget. Added a reference to RFC
7235.
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Author's Address
Scott Hollenbeck
Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190
USA
Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/
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