Internet DRAFT - draft-homburg-dnsop-igadp

draft-homburg-dnsop-igadp







DNSOP                                                       P.C. Homburg
Internet-Draft                                           17 October 2023
Intended status: Standards Track                                        
Expires: 19 April 2024


        Implementation Guidelines for Authoritative DNS Proxies
                      draft-homburg-dnsop-igadp-00

Abstract

   In some situations it be can attractive to have an authoritative DNS
   server that does not have a local copy of the zone or zones that it
   serves.  In particular in anycast operations, it is sensible to have
   a great geographical and topological diversity.  However, sometimes
   the expected use of a particular site does not warrant the cost of
   keeping local copies of the zones.  This can be the case if a zone is
   very large or if the anycast cluster serves many zones from which
   only a few are expected to receive significant traffic.  In these
   cases it can be useful to have a proxy serve some or all of the
   zones.  The proxy would not have a local copy of the zones it serves,
   instead it forwards request to another server that is authoritative
   for the zone.  The proxy may have a cache.  This document describes
   the details of such proxies.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 April 2024.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.





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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents

   1.  Discussion Venues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Basic Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Cache replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Aggressive negative caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  ENDS Client Subnet Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   9.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.  Source for
   this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/NLnetLabs/draft-homburg-dnsop-igadp.git
   (https://github.com/NLnetLabs/draft-homburg-dnsop-igadp.git) .

2.  Introduction

   In some situations it can be attractive to have an authoritative DNS
   server that does not have a local copy of the zone or zones that it
   serves.  In particular in anycast operations, it is sensible to have
   a great geographical and topological diversity.  Benefits of an extra
   site can be: reduced latency, DDoS protection by serving a zone
   locally and thus be protected from a DDoS that originates in other
   parts of the network, and DDoS mitigation by attracting local DDoS
   traffic.

   However, sometimes the expected use of a particular site does not
   warrant the cost of keeping local copies of the zones up-to-date.
   This can be the case if a zone is very large or if the anycast
   cluster serves many zones and only a few of them are expected to
   receive significant traffic.






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   In these cases it can be useful to have a proxy serve some or all of
   the zones.  Instead of having a local copy of the zones, such a proxy
   forwards requests to another server that is authoritative for the
   zone.  The proxy may have a cache.

   A proxy can operate with or without cache.  Without a cache, the
   proxy forwards each incoming request to a name server that is
   authoritative for the domain.  This is straight forward, but also
   provides limited benefits.

   Because we need the proxy to behave like an authoritative server and
   provide similar behavior with respect to TTLs and data consistency,
   proxy behavior _with a cache_ is more involved.

   Another issue that may complicate caching of responses is the EDNS
   Client Subnet option.

3.  Basic Requirements

   The proxy sends requests upstream with RD bit clear.

   The proxy sends replies to clients with the original TTL.  Caching is
   not controlled by TTL but by the parameters in the SOA record.

4.  Cache replacement

   The goal of the cache replacement strategy described here is to mimic
   the behavior of a standard secondary as much as possible.

   The proxy fetches SOA records just like a secondary would do based on
   the parameters in the SOA record in response to a NOTIFY, and takes
   the contents of the EXPIRE option [RFC7314].

   Cache entries are tagged with the zone serial number from the most
   recent SOA record.  A cache entry is valid only when the serial
   number in the cache entry matches the serial number of the current
   SOA record.

   When a new SOA record arrives with a higher serial number, there are
   two options.  The first option is to take this as the new current SOA
   record.  This has the effect of immediately invalidating the cache.

   The second option is to delay accepting this SOA and load new copies
   of hot cache items first.







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   Note that DNS replies may contain SOA records.  If a DNS replies
   contains a SOA record with a higher than the most recently seen
   serial number (taking into account Serial Number Arithmetic
   [RFC1982]), then the proxy updates its copy of the SOA records using
   one of the two techniques described above.

5.  Aggressive negative caching

   A caching proxy is allowed to generate negative responses (NODATA or
   NXDOMAIN) [RFC8198][RFC9077] based on information in NSEC or NSEC3
   records.  Obviously this can be done only for DNSSEC signed zones,
   and NXDOMAIN only for NSEC or NSEC3 without opt-out.

6.  ENDS Client Subnet Option

   A proxy MAY support [RFC7871] (Client Subnet in DNS Queries).

   If the proxy supports ECS, it SHOULD be disabled by default.  The
   reason is that ECS sends privacy sensitive data over the internet.

   A proxy that does not support ECS or where ECS support is disabled
   MUST not send queries upstream that contain the ECS option.  In
   addition, the proxy MUST NOT send replies that contain an ECS option.

7.  Acknowledgements

   Many thanks to Willem Toorop for his feedback.

8.  Normative References

   [RFC1982]  Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1982, August 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1982>.

   [RFC7314]  Andrews, M., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS) EXPIRE
              Option", RFC 7314, DOI 10.17487/RFC7314, July 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7314>.

   [RFC7871]  Contavalli, C., van der Gaast, W., Lawrence, D., and W.
              Kumari, "Client Subnet in DNS Queries", RFC 7871,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7871, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7871>.

   [RFC8198]  Fujiwara, K., Kato, A., and W. Kumari, "Aggressive Use of
              DNSSEC-Validated Cache", RFC 8198, DOI 10.17487/RFC8198,
              July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8198>.

9.  Informative References



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   [RFC9077]  van Dijk, P., "NSEC and NSEC3: TTLs and Aggressive Use",
              RFC 9077, DOI 10.17487/RFC9077, July 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9077>.

Author's Address

   Philip Homburg
   Email: philip@nlnetlabs.nl











































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