Internet DRAFT - draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk
draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk
Network Working Group R. Housley
Internet-Draft Vigil Security
Intended status: Standards Track November 8, 2018
Expires: May 12, 2019
TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based Authentication with an External
Pre-Shared Key
draft-housley-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk-03
Abstract
This document specifies a TLS 1.3 extension that allows a server to
authenticate with a combination of a certificate and an external pre-
shared key (PSK).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 12, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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1. Introduction
The TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] handshake protocol provides two mutually
exclusive forms of server authentication. First, the server can be
authenticated by providing a signature certificate and creating a
valid digital signature to demonstrate that it possesses the
corresponding private key. Second, the server can be authenticated
by demonstrating that it possesses a pre-shared key (PSK) that was
established by a previous handshake. A PSK that is established in
this fashion is called a resumption PSK. A PSK that is established
by any other means is called an external PSK. This document
specifies a TLS 1.3 extension permitting certificate-based server
authentication to be combined with an external PSK as an input to the
TLS 1.3 key schedule.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Motivation and Design Rationale
The invention of a large-scale quantum computer would pose a serious
challenge for the cryptographic algorithms that are widely deployed
today, including the digital signature algorithms that are used to
authenticate the server in the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol. It is an
open question whether or not it is feasible to build a large-scale
quantum computer, and if so, when that might happen. However, if
such a quantum computer is invented, many of the cryptographic
algorithms and the security protocols that use them would become
vulnerable.
The TLS 1.3 handshake protocol employs key agreement algorithms that
could be broken by the invention of a large-scale quantum computer
[I-D.hoffman-c2pq]. These algorithms include Diffie-Hellman (DH)
[DH] and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [IEEE1363]. As a
result, an adversary that stores a TLS 1.3 handshake protocol
exchange today could decrypt the associated encrypted communications
in the future when a large-scale quantum computer becomes available.
In the near-term, this document describes TLS 1.3 extension to
protect today's communications from the future invention of a large-
scale quantum computer by providing a strong external PSK as an input
to the TLS 1.3 key schedule while preserving the authentication
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provided by the existing certificate and digital signature
mechanisms.
4. Extension Overview
This section provides a brief overview of the
"tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension.
The client includes the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension in the
ClientHello message. The "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension MUST
accompanied by the "key_share", "psk_key_exchange_modes", and
"pre_shared_key" extensions. The "pre_shared_key" extension MUST be
the last extension in the ClientHello message, and it provides a list
of external PSK identifiers that the client is willing to use with
this server. Since tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is intended
to be used only with initial handshakes, it MUST NOT be sent
alongside the "early_data" extension. These extension are all
described in Section 4.2 of [RFC8446].
If the server is willing to use one of the external PSKs listed in
the "pre_shared_key" extension and perform certificate-based
authentication, then the server includes the
"tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension in the ServerHello message. The
"tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension MUST accompanied by the
"key_share" and "pre_shared_key" extensions. If none of the external
PSKs in the list provided by the client is acceptable to the server,
then the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is omitted from the
ServerHello message.
The successful negotiation of the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk"
extension requires the TLS 1.3 key schedule processing to include
both the selected external PSK and the (EC)DHE shared secret value.
As a result, the Early Secret, Handshake Secret, and Master Secret
values all depend upon the value of the selected external PSK.
The authentication of the server and optional authentication of the
client depend upon the ability to generate a signature that can be
validated with the public key in their certificates. The
authentication processing is not changed in any way by the selected
external PSK.
Each external PSK is associated with a single Hash algorithm. The
hash algorithm MUST be set when the PSK is established, with a
default of SHA-256 if no hash algorithm is specified during
establishment.
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5. Certificate with External PSK Extension
This section specifies the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension,
which MAY appear in the ClientHello message and ServerHello message.
It MUST NOT appear in any other messages. The
"tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension MUST NOT appear in the
ServerHello message unless "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension
appeared in the preceding ClientHello message. If an implementation
recognizes the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension and receives it
in any other message, then the implementation MUST abort the
handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
The general extension mechanisms enable clients and servers to
negotiate the use of specific extensions. Clients request extended
functionality from servers with the extensions field in the
ClientHello message. If the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest
message, then the client sends another ClientHello message as
described in Section 4.1.2 of [RFC8446], and it MUST include the same
"tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension as the original ClientHello
message or abort the handshake.
Many server extensions are carried in the EncryptedExtensions
message; however, the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is carried
in the ServerHello message. It is only present in the ServerHello
message if the server recognizes the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk"
extension and the server possesses one of the external PSKs offered
by the client in the "pre_shared_key" extension in the ClientHello
message.
The Extension structure is defined in [RFC8446]; it is repeated here
for convenience.
struct {
ExtensionType extension_type;
opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
} Extension;
The "extension_type" identifies the particular extension type, and
the "extension_data" contains information specific to the particular
extension type.
This document specifies the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension,
adding one new type to ExtensionType:
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enum {
tls_cert_with_extern_psk(TBD), (65535)
} ExtensionType;
The "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is relevant when the client
and server possess an external PSK in common that can be used as an
input to the TLS 1.3 key schedule.
To use an external PSK with certificates, clients MUST provide the
"tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension, and it MUST be accompanied by
the "key_share", "psk_key_exchange_modes", and "pre_shared_key"
extensions in the ClientHello. If clients offer a
"tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension without all of these other
extensions, servers MUST abort the handshake. The client MAY also
find it useful to include the the "supported_groups" extension. Note
that Section 4.2 of [RFC8446] allows extensions to appear in any
order, with the exception of the "pre_shared_key" extension, which
MUST be the last extension in the ClientHello. Also, there MUST NOT
be more than one instance of each extension in the ClientHello
message.
The "key_share" extension is defined in Section 4.2.8 of [RFC8446].
The "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension is defined in Section 4.2.9 of
[RFC8446]. The "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension restricts both the
use of PSKs offered in this ClientHello and those which the server
might supply via a subsequent NewSessionTicket. As a result, clients
MUST include the psk_dhe_ke mode, and clients MAY also include the
psk_ke mode to support a subsequent NewSessionTicket. Servers MUST
select the psk_dhe_ke mode for the initial handshake. Servers MUST
select a key exchange mode that is listed by the client for
subsequent handshakes that include the resumption PSK from the
initial handshake.
The "supported_groups" extension is defined in Section 4.2.7 of
[RFC8446].
The "pre_shared_key" extension is defined in Section 4.2.11 of
[RFC8446]. the syntax is repeated below for convenience. All of the
listed PSKs MUST be external PSKs.
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struct {
opaque identity<1..2^16-1>;
uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
} PskIdentity;
opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>;
struct {
PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>;
PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>;
} OfferedPsks;
struct {
select (Handshake.msg_type) {
case client_hello: OfferedPsks;
case server_hello: uint16 selected_identity;
};
} PreSharedKeyExtension;
The OfferedPsks contains the list of PSK identities and associated
binders for the external PSKs that the client is willing to use with
the server.
The identities are a list of external PSK identities that the client
is willing to negotiate with the server. Each external PSK has an
associated identity that is known to the client and the server. (The
identity is also referred to as an identifier or a label.)
The obfuscated_ticket_age is not used for external PSKs; clients
SHOULD set this value to 0, and servers MUST ignore the value.
The binders are a series of HMAC values, one for each external PSK
offered by the client, in the same order as the identities list. The
HMAC value is computed using the binder_key, which is derived from
the external PSK, and a partial transcript of the current handshake.
Generation of the binder_key from the external PSK is described in
Section 7.1 of [RFC8446]. The partial transcript of the current
handshake includes a partial ClientHello up to and including the
PreSharedKeyExtension.identities field as described in
Section 4.2.11.2 of [RFC8446].
The selected_identity contains the external PSK identity that the
server selected from the list offered by the client. If none of the
offered external PSKs in the list provided by the client are
acceptable to the server, then the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk"
extension MUST be omitted from the ServerHello message. The server
MUST validate the binder value that corresponds to the selected
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external PSK as described in Section 4.2.11.2 of [RFC8446]. If the
binder does not validate, the server MUST abort the handshake with an
"illegal_parameter" alert. Servers SHOULD NOT attempt to validate
multiple binders; rather they SHOULD select one of the offered
external PSKs and validate only the binder that corresponds to that
external PSK.
When the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is successfully
negotiated, authentication of the server depends upon the ability to
generate a signature that can be validated with the public key in the
server's certificate. This is accomplished by the server sending the
Certificate and CertificateVerify messages as described in Sections
4.4.2 and 4.4.3 of [RFC8446].
TLS 1.3 does not permit the server to send a CertificateRequest
message when a PSK is being used. This restriction is removed when
the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension is negotiated, allowing the
certificate-based authentication for both the client and the server.
If certificate-based client authentication is desired, this is
accomplished by the client sending the Certificate and
CertificateVerify messages as described in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3
of [RFC8446].
Section 7.1 of [RFC8446] specifies the TLS 1.3 Key Schedule. The
successful negotiation of the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension
requires the key schedule processing to include both the external PSK
and the (EC)DHE shared secret value.
If the client and the server have different values associated with
the selected external PSK identifier, then the client and the server
will compute different values for every entry in the key schedule,
which will lead to the termination of the connection with a
"decrypt_error" alert.
6. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to update the TLS ExtensionType Registry to include
"tls_cert_with_extern_psk" with a value of TBD and the list of
messages "CH, SH" in which the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension
may appear.
7. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations in [RFC8446] remain relevant.
TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] does not permit the server to send a
CertificateRequest message when a PSK is being used. This
restriction is removed when the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension
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is offered by the client and accepted by the server. However, TLS
1.3 does not permit an external PSK to be used in the same fashion as
a resumption PSK, and this extension does not alter those
restrictions. Thus, a certificate MUST NOT be used with a resumption
PSK.
Implementations must protect the external pre-shared key (PSK).
Compromise of the external PSK will make the encrypted session
content vulnerable to the future invention of a large-scale quantum
computer.
Implementers should not transmit the same content on a connection
that is protected with an external PSK and a connection that is not.
Doing so may allow an eavesdropper to correlate the connections,
making the content vulnerable to the future invention of a large-
scale quantum computer.
Implementations must choose external PSKs with a secure key
management technique, such as pseudo-random generation of the key or
derivation of the key from one or more other secure keys. The use of
inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate
external PSKs can result in little or no security. An attacker may
find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced
the external PSKs and searching the resulting small set of
possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key space.
The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. [RFC4086]
offers important guidance in this area.
TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] takes a conservative approach to PSKs; they are
bound to a specific hash function and KDF. By contrast, TLS 1.2
[RFC5246] allows PSKs to be used with any hash function and the TLS
1.2 PRF. Thus, the safest approach is to use a PSK with either TLS
1.2 or TLS 1.3. However, any PSK that might be used with both TLS
1.2 and TLS 1.3 must be used with only one hash function, which is
the one that is bound for use in TLS 1.3. This restriction is less
than optimal when users want to provision a single PSK. While the
constructions used in TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 are both based on HMAC
[RFC2104], the constructions are different, and there is no known way
in which reuse of the same PSK in TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 that would
produce related outputs.
8. Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos, Nick Sullivan, Martin
Thomson, and Peter Yee for their review and comments; their efforts
have improved this document.
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9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
9.2. Informative References
[DH] Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, "New Directions in
Cryptography", IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory V.IT-22 n.6, June 1977.
[I-D.hoffman-c2pq]
Hoffman, P., "The Transition from Classical to Post-
Quantum Cryptography", draft-hoffman-c2pq-04 (work in
progress), August 2018.
[IEEE1363]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography", IEEE
Std 1363-2000, 2000.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
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Author's Address
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
Email: housley@vigilsec.com
Housley Expires May 12, 2019 [Page 10]
