Internet DRAFT - draft-hsharma-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update

draft-hsharma-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update







Internet Engineering Task Force                           H. Sharma, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                              Netskope Inc
Updates: 8954 (if approved)                              29 January 2024
Intended status: Standards Track                                        
Expires: 1 August 2024


       Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension
                draft-hsharma-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06

Abstract

   This document updates the Nonce extension section of RFC-8954.  Nonce
   extension is an optional extension for Online Certificate Status
   Protocol (OCSP) request and response messages.  OCSP is used for
   checking the status of a certificate, and the Nonce extension is used
   to cryptographically bind an OCSP response message to a particular
   OCSP request message.  Some environments use cryptographic algorithms
   that generate a Nonce that is longer than 32 octets.  This document
   updates the maximum allowed length of Nonce to 128 octets.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 August 2024.

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   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  OCSP Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.1.  Nonce Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Changes to Appendix B of RFC 6960.  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.1.  Changes to Appendix B.1 OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax . . .   4
     5.2.  Changes to Appendix B.2 OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax . . .   4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   Nonce extension was previously defined in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC6960]
   and updated in [RFC8954].  [RFC8954] enforces the maximum Nonce
   length to 32 octets.  To support cryptographic algorithms that
   generate a Nonce that is longer than 32 octets, this document updates
   the maximum allowed size of the Nonce to 128 octets.  In addition,
   this document recommends that the OCSP client and responder use a
   Nonce with a minimum length of 32 octets.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  OCSP Extensions

   The message formats for OCSP requests and responses are defined in
   [RFC6960] and Nonce extension was updated in [RFC8954].  [RFC6960]
   also defines the standard extensions for OCSP messages based on the
   extension model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates (see
   [RFC5280]).  [RFC8954] replaces this section to enforce the minimum
   and maximum length for the Nonce value.  This document extends the
   maximum allowed nonce length to 128 octets and does not change the
   specifications of any of the other standard extensions defined in



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   [RFC6960].

2.1.  Nonce Extension

   This section replaces the entirety of Section 2.1 of [RFC8954], which
   describes the OCSP Nonce extension.

   The Nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent
   replay attacks.  The Nonce is included as one of the
   requestExtensions in requests; in responses, it would be included as
   one of the responseExtensions.In both the request and the response,
   the Nonce will be identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-
   Nonce, while the extnValue is the value of the Nonce.  If the Nonce
   extension is present, then the length of the Nonce MUST be at least 1
   octet and can be up to 128 octets.

   An OCSP client that implements this document SHOULD use a minimum
   length of 32 octets for Nonce in the Nonce extension.  RFC
   8954-compliant implementations will be unable to process nonces
   generated per the new specification with sizes in excess of what was
   permitted by RFC 8954.

   OCSP resonder that implements this document MUST reject any OCSP
   request that has a Nonce in the Nonce extension with a length of
   either 0 octets or more than 128 octets, with the malformedRequest
   OCSPResponseStatus as described in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6960].
   Responders, supporting the Nonce extension, MUST accept lengths of at
   least 16 octets and MAY choose to ignore the Nonce extension for
   requests where the length of the nonce is less than 16 octets or more
   than 32 octets.

   The value of the Nonce MUST be generated using a cryptographically
   strong pseudorandom number generator (see [RFC4086]).  The minimum
   Nonce length of 1 octet is defined to provide backward compatibility
   with older clients that follow [RFC6960].

       id-pkix-ocsp           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
       id-pkix-ocsp-Nonce     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
       Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))

3.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of OCSP, in general, are described in
   [RFC6960].  During the interval in which the previous OCSP response
   for a certificate is not expired but the responder has a changed
   status for that certificate, a copy of that OCSP response can be used
   to indicate that the status of the certificate is still valid.
   Including a client's nonce value in the OCSP response makes sure that



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   the response is the latest response from the server and not an old
   copy.

3.1.  Replay Attack

   The Nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks.  Since the OCSP
   responder may choose not to send the Nonce extension in the OCSP
   response even if the client has sent the Nonce extension in the
   request [RFC5019], an on-path attacker can intercept the OCSP request
   and respond with an earlier response from the server without the
   Nonce extension.  This can be mitigated by configuring the server to
   use a short time interval between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate
   fields in the OCSP response.

4.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

5.  Changes to Appendix B of RFC 6960.

   This section updates the ASN.1 definitions of the OCSP Nonce
   extension in Appendices B.1 and B.2 of [RFC6960].  Appendix B.1
   defines OCSP using ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax; Appendix B.2 defines OCSP
   using ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax.

5.1.  Changes to Appendix B.1 OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax

   OLD Syntax:

   The definition of OCSP Nonce extension is not provided in
   Appendix B.1 of [RFC6960] for the ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax.

   NEW Syntax:

        Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))

5.2.  Changes to Appendix B.2 OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax

   OLD Syntax:

        re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED
                                       BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce }

   NEW Syntax:

        re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))
                                     IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce }




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6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.

   [RFC8954]  Sahni, M., Ed., "Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
              Nonce Extension", RFC 8954, DOI 10.17487/RFC8954, November
              2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8954>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC5019]  Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
              Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
              Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September
              2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019>.

Author's Address

   Himanshu Sharma (editor)
   Netskope Inc
   2445 Augustine Dr 3rd floor
   Santa Clara, California 95054
   United States of America
   Email: himanshu@netskope.com
   URI:   www.netskope.com



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