Internet DRAFT - draft-huitema-dnssd-tls-privacy
draft-huitema-dnssd-tls-privacy
Network Working Group C. Huitema
Internet-Draft Private Octopus Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track D. Kaiser
Expires: September 12, 2019 University of Luxembourg
March 11, 2019
Private Discovery with TLS-ESNI
draft-huitema-dnssd-tls-privacy-01
Abstract
DNS-SD (DNS Service Discovery) normally discloses information about
both the devices offering services and the devices requesting
services. This information includes host names, network parameters,
and possibly a further description of the corresponding service
instance. Especially when mobile devices engage in DNS Service
Discovery over Multicast DNS at a public hotspot, a serious privacy
problem arises.
We propose to solve this problem by developing a private discovery
profile for UDP based transports using TLS, such as DTLS and QUIC.
The profile is based on using the Encrypted SNI extension. We also
define a standalone private discovery service, that can be combined
with arbitrary applications in the same way as DNS-SD.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Discovery Service Using TLS and ESNI . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Discovery Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. ESNI Extension for Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Integration with DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Integration with QUIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Private Discovery DNS Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Optional Server Arrival Announce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Server Arrival Announce Specification . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Denial of Service by Spoofed Response . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Discovery Key Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. Private Discovery Key Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4. Tracking by Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Experimental use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
DNS-SD [RFC6763] over mDNS [RFC6762] enables configurationless
service discovery in local networks. It is very convenient for
users, but it requires the public exposure of the offering and
requesting identities along with information about the offered and
requested services. Parts of the published information can seriously
breach the user's privacy. These privacy issues and potential
solutions are discussed in [KW14a] and [KW14b].
When analyzing these scenarios in [I-D.ietf-dnssd-prireq], we find
that the DNS-SD messages leak identifying information such as the
instance name, the host name or service properties.
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In this document, we propose a discovery solution that can replace
DNS-SD in simple deployment scenarios, with the following
characteristics:
1. We only target discovery of peers on the same local network,
using multicast. We make no attempt at compatibility with the
server based solutions such as DNSSD over Unicast DNS [RFC6763].
2. We do not attempt to keep the same formats as mDNS [RFC6762].
3. We assume a solution that can be integrated in an application,
without dependency on system support.
The proposed solution aligns with TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], and specifically
with transports of TLS over UDP, such as DTLS [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
or QUIC [I-D.ietf-quic-transport]. The solution uses SNI encryption
[I-D.ietf-tls-esni].
The solution assumes that entities who want to be privately
discovered maintain an asymmetric discovery key pair. The public
component of that discovery key pair and the service name of the
entity are provisioned to authorized discovery clients. In this
document, we will refer to this public component as the "Discovery
Key" of the server. When needed, we will refer to the private
component of the key pair as the "Discovery Private Key".
1.1. Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Discovery Service Using TLS and ESNI
In the proposed solution, the first packet of a TLS-based UDP
transport is broadcast or multicast over the local network. This
packet carries the TLS 1.3 ClientHello message, including an
Encrypted SNI (ESNI) extension. The ESNI is encrypted with the
Discovery Key of the requested service.
Services that are ready to be discovered listen on the broadcast or
multicast address and check whether the received packets contain a
TLS 1.3 ClientHello Message and an ESNI extension. If the extension
can be decrypted with the Private Discovery Key of the local service,
they set up a connection.
This mechanism only works with TLS based protocols operating over
UDP, such as DTLS or QUIC.
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2.1. Discovery Key
Private discovery relies on the privacy of the server Discovery Key,
which is used to encrypt the target server name carried in the ESNI
extension. Clients can only discover a server if they know the
server's Discovery Key. Servers receiving a properly encrypted
discovery request do not know the identity of the client issuing the
request, but they know that the client belongs to a group authorized
to perform the discovery.
In the ESNI based specification, the server's Discovery Key plays the
same role as the ESNI Encryption Key of the client facing server, but
a major difference is that the Discovery Key is kept private.
According to standard ESNI, the client facing server publishes an
ESNI encryption key in the DNS. In contrast, the Discovery Key MUST
NOT be publicly available in the DNS.
The discovery key is passed to the peer in exactly the same format as
ESNI:
struct {
uint8 checksum[4];
KeyShareEntry keys<4..2^16-1>;
CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>;
uint16 padded_length;
uint64 not_before;
uint64 not_after;
Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
} ESNIKeys;
This document does not discuss how the Discovery Key is provisioned
to authorized discovery clients.
The ESNI extension design assumes that several services are available
through a single client facing server. These different services have
different SNI values and length. ESNI pads these SNI to a padded
length specified for the client facing server, ensuring that third
parties cannot infer the identity of the service from the length of
the extension. In our design, requests for multiple services are
sent over multicast. If different services used different padding
length, third parties could infer the service identity from the ESNI
length. To prevent this information leakage, services participating
in private discovery MUST set the padded length to exactly 128 bytes.
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2.2. ESNI Extension for Discovery
The ESNI extension is defined in [I-D.ietf-tls-esni] as:
struct {
CipherSuite suite;
KeyShareEntry key_share;
opaque record_digest<0..2^16-1>;
opaque encrypted_sni<0..2^16-1>;
} ClientEncryptedSNI;
In standard ESNI usage, the "record_digest" identifies the ESNI
Encryption Key. Clients using private discovery MUST leave the
"record_digest" empty, and encode it as a zero-length binary string.
The ESNI Encryption Key will be the Discovery Key of the target
server.
The KeyShareEntry is set in accordance with the ESNI specification.
It is combined with the server Discovery Key to encrypt the SNI.
According to the ESNI specification, the encrypted structure
contains:
struct {
ServerNameList sni;
opaque zeros[ESNIKeys.padded_length - length(sni)];
} PaddedServerNameList;
struct {
uint8 nonce[16];
PaddedServerNameList realSNI;
} ClientESNIInner;
Servers that receive the extension as part of private discovery
attempt to decrypt the value using their Private Discovery Key. If
the decryption succeeds, and if the decrypted SNI corresponds to the
expected value, the server will accept the discovery request.
2.3. Integration with DTLS
The message flows of DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] all start with
the client sending a TLS ClientHello message. The following figure
presents a simple DTLS flow using the ESNI extension for private
discovery:
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Client Server
ClientHello +----------+
+ key_share* | Flight 1 |
+ ESNI --------> +----------+
ServerHello
+ key_share* +----------+
{EncryptedExtensions} | Flight 2 |
{ESNI} +----------+
{Certificate*}
<-------- {Finished}
[Application Data*]
+----------+
| Flight 3 |
{Finished} --------> +----------+
[Application Data]
+----------+
<-------- [Ack] | Flight 4 |
[Application Data*] +----------+
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
The first flight consists of a single UDP packet. In classic DTLS,
this would be sent to the IP address and UDP port chosen for the
application. Instead, the client using private discovery MUST sent
this to the "private discovery" multicast address defined in
Section 6 and to the UDP port chosen for the application.
The multicast message sent by the client will be received by many
servers. The servers using private discovery MUST verify that the
ESNI extension is present. If it is present, each server attempts to
decrypt the ESNI extension using the local private discovery key, as
specified in Section 2.2. If the verification succeeds, the server
proceeds with the connection, and sends the second flight of DTLS
packets to the IP address and UDP port from which it received the
client's first flight.
The client receiving the second flight of messages processes them as
specified in DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]. The client MUST verify
that the ESNI extension is present, and matches the expected value as
specified in Section 2.2. If the ESNI extension is absent or does
not pass verification, the entire flight MUST be ignored. If the
verification succeeds, the client remembers the IP address and UDP
port of the server, and uses it for the reminder of the session.
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A successful ESNI exchange demonstrates to the server that the client
has knowledge of the server discovery key, and to the client that the
server is in possession of the corresponding private discovery key.
This is meant to restrict access to a subset of the client and server
population, but does not replace the need for server authentication
and optional client authentication as specified in TLS 1.3.
2.4. Integration with QUIC
The QUIC Transport uses TLS to negotiate encryption keys. The use of
TLS in QUIC is specified in [I-D.ietf-quic-tls], and can be
summarized as follow:
1. The QUIC connection starts with the client sending an Initial
message, carrying a TLS ClientHello and its extensions.
2. The server replies with its own Initial message, carrying the
server hello and establishing the "handshake" keys used to
protect the reminder of the TLS 1.3 exchange.
3. Server and client exchange encrypted Handshake messages to verify
that the session is properly established and to negotiate the
encryption keys of the application data.
4. Server and Client exchange encrypted application messages until
they decide to close the connection.
All messages are sent over UDP.
When using Private Discovery, the client adds an ESNI extension to
the ClientHello sent in the Initial message. The ESNI extension is
formatted a specified in Section 2.2. In classic QUIC, the Initial
message would be sent in a UDP packet to the IP address and UDP port
of the server. Instead, the client using private discovery MUST sent
this to the "private discovery" multicast address defined in
Section 6 and to the UDP port chosen for the application.
The multicast message sent by the client will be received by many
servers. The servers using private discovery MUST verify that the
ESNI extension is present. If it is present, each server attempts to
decrypt the ESNI extension using the local private discovery key, as
specified in Section 2.2. If the verification succeeds, the server
proceeds with the connection, and sends the next QUIC packets to the
IP address and UDP port from which it received the client's first
flight.
The client receiving the second flight of messages processes them as
specified in DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]. The client MUST verify
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that the ESNI extension is present, and matches the expected value as
specified in Section 2.2. If the ESNI extension is absent or does
not pass verification, the entire QUIC connection MUST be ignored.
If the verification succeeds, the client remembers the IP address and
UDP port of the server, and uses it for the reminder of the QUIC
connection.
3. Private Discovery DNS Service
The mechanisms discussed in Section 2 assume that an application
based on DTLS or QUIC is modified to enable private local discovery.
This does not cover all services. Further services can be supported
by a two-phase process in which each application is paired with an
implementation of the private discovery service.
The private discovery service is an implementation of DNS over QUIC,
as specified in [I-D.huitema-quic-dnsoquic], modified to also
implement the Private Discovery over Quic defined in Section 2.4.
The DNS implementation is solely for the purpose of providing a
service equivalent to DNS-SD.
The Private Discovery DNS Service is run by the service that wants to
be discovered. The name of the discovery service is the name of the
service that needs to be discovered. Clients are provisioned with
the associated Discovery Key. Clients discover the Private Discovery
DNS Service, and can then use it to obtain the DNS records associated
with the application service: SRV, TXT, A or AAAA records.
4. Optional Server Arrival Announce
The proposed design relies on active discovery of servers by the
clients. When a client arrives on a new network and wishes to
establish a connection to a server, it sends a multicast message that
tries to reach that server. This designs has two potential issues:
If the server is not present when a client tries to contact it,
the client may have to repeat the connection attempts over time.
If multiple clients connect to the same server, each client sends
a multicast message, which can translate in heavy multicast load
in some configurations.
The importance of these two issues is debatable. Many applications
have a peer-to-peer nature, in which peers can be either clients or
servers. When two peers are not present at the same time, the first
peer to arrive will fail to establish a connection, but the second
peer will succeed, without having to rely on time based repetitions.
Similarly, if we move from device oriented discovery to application
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oriented discovery, the number of client per server is likely to be
very small, so that there will be little difference between
"multicast per client" and "multicast per server".
However, there may be configurations where a "server arrival
announce" message would result in fast discovery and fewer multicast
messages.
4.1. Server Arrival Announce Specification
The server arrival announce message is a UDP packet sent to the
Discovery Multicast Address reserved in Section 6 and port %lt;TBD>.
The format of the message will be defined in a next draft version,
meeting the following requirements:
Multiplexing: should be easily demuxed from DTLS or QUIC traffic.
ESNI: should contain an ESNI extension, secured with the server's
discovery key.
Replay: should contain a timestamp and the global scope IPv6
address of the server.
5. Security Considerations
The use of TLS 1.3 and the ESNI extension provides robust defenses
against attacks. In particular, Private Discovery benefits from the
defenses against dictionary attacks and replay attacks built in the
ESNI design. Protections against a residual DOS attack is discussed
in Section 5.1.
The privacy of the discovery relies on keeping the discovery key of
the service secret. The consequences and partial mitigation of
leaking the discovery key are discussed in Section 5.2.
Compromising of the server's private discovery key will allow an
attacker to break the privacy of the discovery, as discussed in
Section 5.3.
5.1. Denial of Service by Spoofed Response
Attackers may try to disrupt a private discovery handshake by sending
a spoofed Server Hello (DTLS) or a spoofed Server Initial packet
(QUIC). The client will reject these attempts after noticing that
the encrypted extensions do not include a proper ESNI extension,
containing the expected copy of the ESNI nonce.
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Attackers will not succeed spoofing the server, but they could
succeed in denying the connection if the fake response arrives before
the response from the actual server, and if the implementation just
gave up the attempt after failing to validate the first response that
it received.
To defend against this attack, implementations SHOULD keep listening
for responses and attempting validation until they receive at least
one valid response from the expected server.
5.2. Discovery Key Compromise
The Discovery Key is known by all the authorized clients. If one of
these clients is compromised, the privacy of the server will be
compromised: attackers will be able to spoof the authorized client
and discover whether the server is present on a local network.
However, the leak can only be exploited in an active attack: the
attacker must actively set up a connection with the target server.
The attack is mitigated when the server migrates to a different
discovery key and restricts the availability of that key to non-
compromised clients.
Exploiting a compromised discovery key normally requires that the
attacker is present on the same link as the target. Attackers might
try to work around that limitation by sending unicast packet targeted
at plausible server locations. Servers participating in private
discovery MUST NOT accept discovery requests arriving from off-link
sources.
5.3. Private Discovery Key Compromise
The private component of the asymmetric key pair used for discovery
MUST be kept secret by the server. If it is compromised, attackers
can process discovery requests and verify that they can be decrypted
with the server's private discovery key. They could also process
logs of old discovery attempts.
The design provides two mitigations against the consequences of this
failure:
o The discovery requests do not uniquely identify the client, and
the attacker will only know that an attempt came from one of the
authorized clients.
o The actual communications are protected by TLS, and inherit the
forward secrecy properties of TLS 1.3.
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[[TODO: consider specifying a way to rotate the discovery key, so as
to mitigate the lack of forward secrecy. Maybe add that to ESNI. ]]
5.4. Tracking by Replay
Suppose that an attacker has identified a client, and is capable of
recording the multicast messages from that client. The attacker can
then replay the message, triggering a response from the target server
if present on the network.
The attacker will not be able to actually establish a connection with
the server -- the TSL and ESNI designs protect against that. But it
will be able to find out that the same server that responded to the
client before responds now, which is a way to track the server.
The attacker can mount two variations of the attack: replay over
time, and replay at different locations. In the current design, the
main protection against that attack is the implementation of a
"discovery window", so that servers only listen to multicast requests
when they are "ready to be discovered".
[[TODO: consider adding a time stamp in an extension to ESNI.]]
[[TODO: consider adding the IPv6 address of the sender in an
extension to ESNI.]]
[[TODO: special consideration for server arrival announce.]]
6. IANA Considerations
IANA is required to allocate the IPv6 multicast address FF02::<TBD>
for use as "Private Discovery Multicast Address" described in this
document.
6.1. Experimental use
**RFC Editor's Note:** Please remove this section prior to
publication of a final version of this document.
Early experiments MAY use the address FF02::60DB:F6C5. This address
is marked in the IANA registry as unassigned.
7. Acknowledgments
[[TODO]]
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.huitema-quic-dnsoquic]
Huitema, C., Shore, M., Mankin, A., Dickinson, S., and J.
Iyengar, "Specification of DNS over Dedicated QUIC
Connections", draft-huitema-quic-dnsoquic-06 (work in
progress), March 2019.
[I-D.ietf-quic-tls]
Thomson, M. and S. Turner, "Using TLS to Secure QUIC",
draft-ietf-quic-tls-18 (work in progress), January 2019.
[I-D.ietf-quic-transport]
Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic-transport-18 (work
in progress), January 2019.
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-30 (work in progress),
November 2018.
[I-D.ietf-tls-esni]
Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. Wood,
"Encrypted Server Name Indication for TLS 1.3", draft-
ietf-tls-esni-02 (work in progress), October 2018.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
8.2. Informative References
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[I-D.ietf-dnssd-prireq]
Huitema, C., "DNS-SD Privacy and Security Requirements",
draft-ietf-dnssd-prireq-00 (work in progress), September
2018.
[KW14a] Kaiser, D. and M. Waldvogel, "Adding Privacy to Multicast
DNS Service Discovery", DOI 10.1109/TrustCom.2014.107,
2014, <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/
articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=7011331>.
[KW14b] Kaiser, D. and M. Waldvogel, "Efficient Privacy Preserving
Multicast DNS Service Discovery",
DOI 10.1109/HPCC.2014.141, 2014,
<http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/
articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=7056899>.
[RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.
Authors' Addresses
Christian Huitema
Private Octopus Inc.
Friday Harbor, WA 98250
U.S.A.
Email: huitema@huitema.net
URI: http://privateoctopus.com/
Daniel Kaiser
University of Luxembourg
6, avenue de la Fonte
Esch-sur-Alzette 4364
Luxembourg
Email: daniel.kaiser@uni.lu
URI: https://secan-lab.uni.lu/
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