Internet DRAFT - draft-hunt-oauth-bound-config
draft-hunt-oauth-bound-config
OAuth Working Group P. Hunt
Internet-Draft Oracle
Intended status: Standards Track A. Nadalin
Expires: September 14, 2016 Microsoft
March 13, 2016
OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookup
draft-hunt-oauth-bound-config-00
Abstract
This specification defines a mechanism for the client of an OAuth 2.0
protected resource service to obtain the configuration details of an
OAuth 2.0 authorization server that is capable of authorizing access
to a specific resource service. The information includes the OAuth
2.0 component endpoint location URIs and as well as authorization
server capabilities.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Authorization Server WebFinger Discovery . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. String Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Compatibility Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2. Impersonation Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Registration of OAuth2 Relation Type . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. OAuth Discovery Metadata Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2.1. Metadata Registry Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2.2. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2.3. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.3. Updated Registration Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction
This specification generalizes the configuration metadata format
defined by "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0" [OpenID.Discovery] to
support a wider set of OAuth 2.0 use cases.
This is intentionally parallel to the way that the "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic
Client Registration Protocol" [RFC7591] specification generalized the
dynamic client registration mechanisms defined by "OpenID Connect
Dynamic Client Registration 1.0" [OpenID.Registration] in a way that
was compatible with it.
[[Editors note: This draft is intended as a replacement alternative
for consideration to draft-ietf-oauth-discovery-01 and as such it
contains the same metadata attribute definitions and registry
requirements rather than references the original draft.]]
This specification enables clients, having previously discovered an
OAuth 2.0 protected resource and an OAuth 2.0 Authorization service
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
(through other means such as an administrative process, a
configuration file, use of ".well-known" [RFC5785]), to discover the
OAuth 2.0 configuration metadata and to confirm the relationship
between the previously discovered authorization server and the
protected resource endpoints through the use of query mechanism.
This specification uses WebFinger [RFC7033] to query the
authorization server configuration discovery to locate the assigned
authorization server (if any) for a specified resource endpoint URI
and its configuration properties as an authoritative set. This
process is described in Section 2.
The use WebFinger serves the following purposes:
o To allow service providers to have some flexibility in the
relationship and number of authorization servers able to issue
access tokens for use with OAuth 2.0 protected resources.
o Is the resource that the client is requesting authorization for
supported by the authorization server?
o To inform clients about improperly discovered endpoints for valid
resources. For example, that would enable an attacker to insert a
proxy for a "man-in-the-middle" attack.
o To bind together the resource service endpoint as part of a valid
set alone with the endpoints described in the OAuth configuration
metadata.
Once the authorization server has been identified, this specification
provides the configuration information that is retrieved from a well-
known location as a JSON [RFC7159] document, including its OAuth 2.0
endpoint locations and authorization server capabilities. This
process is described in Section 2.
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119].
All uses of JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] and JSON Web Encryption
(JWE) [JWE] data structures in this specification utilize the JWS
Compact Serialization or the JWE Compact Serialization; the JWS JSON
Serialization and the JWE JSON Serialization are not used.
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
1.2. Terminology
This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Authorization
Code", "Authorization Endpoint", "Authorization Grant",
"Authorization Server", "Client", "Client Authentication", "Client
Identifier", "Client Secret", "Grant Type", "Protected Resource",
"Redirection URI", "Refresh Token", "Resource Owner", "Resource
Server", "Response Type", and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749], the terms "Claim Name", "Claim Value", and "JSON Web Token
(JWT)" defined by JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT], and the term "Response
Mode" defined by OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices
[OAuth.Responses].
This specification also defines the following terms:
Resource
Entity that is the target of a request in WebFinger.
Host
Server where a WebFinger service is hosted.
2. Authorization Server WebFinger Discovery
Authorization server WebFinger discovery is a means of determining
the location of the authorization server's configuration information.
WebFinger discovery is RECOMMENDED; if a client knows the
authorization server's configuration information location through an
out-of-band mechanism, it can skip this step and proceed to
Section 2.
WebFinger discovery uses the following information to make a
discovery request:
resource
A REQUIRED URI that represents the actual resource URL the client
intends to use to access the protected resource. This URL may be
for a specific sub-set of data (e.g. associated with a resource
owner), or it MAY be the base URL for a set of protected resources
accessible within the scope of the client's anticipated access
authorization. The URI also be the base URL for a service when
the end-user is a new user and no specific user-owned resource is
defined.
host
The server where the WebFinger service is hosted.
rel
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
The URI identifying the type of service whose location is being
requested.
OAuth 2.0 configuration discovery uses the following "rel" value in
WebFinger [RFC7033]:
+-------------------------------------+--------+
| Rel Type | URI |
+-------------------------------------+--------+
| OAuth 2.0 Configuration Information | oauth2 |
+-------------------------------------+--------+
To start discovery of OAuth 2.0 configuration information, the client
first discover's the resource endpoint and the associated OAuth URI
through a mechanism defined by the resource service provider. The
parameter "resource", whose value is the protected resource's
endpoint URL MUST be included.
The client then makes an HTTP "GET" request to the OAuth host's
WebFinger [RFC7033] endpoint using the URI as the "resource"
parameter value and the "rel" value "oauth2" to obtain the
authorization server's configuration information location.
Upon receiving a request, the WebFinger service MAY match the
specified "resource" value through specific value matches or the
service MAY match a subset of the URI such as the host name and an
initial path. For example, if the client is using a URI to a
specific subset of resources, the subset can be ignored.
In the response, one or more matches MAY be returned in the "links"
array element. Each array element MUST contain a "rel" attribute, an
"href" attribute, and a _properties_ attribute.
The value of the "href" shall contain a value equivalent to the OAuth
"issuer" (see Section 3). The value of "rel" is "oauth2".
The "properties" attribute contains the authorization server
configuration metadata (see Section 3) that corresponds to the OAuth
2.0 server identified in the "href" attribute. This information
includes a set of claims about the authorization server's
configuration, including all necessary endpoints and public key
location information that contains a set of claims as its members
that are a subset of the metadata values defined in Section 3. Other
claims MAY also be returned.
Claims that return multiple values are represented as JSON arrays.
Claims with zero elements MUST be omitted from the response.
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
An example WebFinger discovery request follows. To find the
authorization server's configuration information for the resource
"https://finance.example.com/abcpath"", the WebFinger parameters are
as follows:
+---------------------+-------------------------------------+
| WebFinger Parameter | Value |
+---------------------+-------------------------------------+
| resource | https://finance.example.com/abcpath |
| host | example.com |
| rel | oauth2 |
+---------------------+-------------------------------------+
The client would make the following WebFinger request to discover the
authorization server's configuration information location (with line
wraps within lines for display purposes only):
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
GET /.well-known/webfinger
?resource=https%3A%2F%2Ffinance.example.com%2Fabcpath
&rel=oauth2
HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/jrd+json
{
"subject": "https://finance.example.com",
"links":
[
{
"rel": "oauth2",
"href": "https://server.example.com",
"properties":
{
"issuer":
"https://server.example.com",
"authorization_endpoint":
"https://server.example.com/oauth/authorize",
"token_endpoint":
"https://server.example.com/oauth/token",
"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported":
["client_secret_basic", "private_key_jwt"],
"token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported":
["RS256", "ES256"],
"userinfo_endpoint":
"https://server.example.com/oauth/userinfo",
"jwks_uri":
"https://server.example.com/jwks.json",
"registration_endpoint":
"https://server.example.com/oauth/register",
"scopes_supported":
["openid", "profile", "email", "address",
"phone", "offline_access"],
"response_types_supported":
["code", "code token"],
"service_documentation":
"http://server.example.com/oauth/service_documentation.html",
"ui_locales_supported":
["en-US", "en-GB", "en-CA", "fr-FR", "fr-CA"]
}
}
]
}
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
The discovered authorization server is identified as
"https://server.example.com".
In the event that the authorization server does not support the
requested resource, the server MUST indicate that it was unable to
match the request as per Section 4.2 [RFC7033].
If any of the validation procedures defined in this specification
fail, any operations requiring the information that failed to
correctly validate MUST be aborted and the information that failed to
validate MUST NOT be used.
The "issuer" value returned MUST be identical to the configuration
information location URL that was directly used to retrieve the
configuration information.
3. Authorization Server Metadata
Authorization servers can have metadata describing their
configuration. These authorization server metadata values are used
by this specification:
issuer
REQUIRED. The authorization server's issuer identifier, which is
a URL that uses the "https" scheme and has no query or fragment
components. This is the location where ".well-known" RFC 5785
[RFC5785] resources containing information about the authorization
server are published. Using these well-known resources is
described in Section 2. The issuer identifier is used to prevent
authorization server mix-up attacks, as described in "OAuth 2.0
Mix-Up Mitigation" [I-D.jones-oauth-mix-up-mitigation].
authorization_endpoint
REQUIRED. URL of the authorization server's authorization
endpoint [RFC6749].
token_endpoint
URL of the authorization server's token endpoint [RFC6749]. This
is REQUIRED unless only the implicit grant type is used.
jwks_uri
RECOMMMENDED. URL of the authorization server's JWK Set [JWK]
document. This contains the signing key(s) the client uses to
validate signatures from the authorization server. The JWK Set
MAY also contain the Server's encryption key(s), which are used by
RPs to encrypt requests to the Server. When both signing and
encryption keys are made available, a "use" (public key use)
parameter value is REQUIRED for all keys in the referenced JWK Set
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
to indicate each key's intended usage. Although some algorithms
allow the same key to be used for both signatures and encryption,
doing so is NOT RECOMMENDED, as it is less secure. The JWK "x5c"
parameter MAY be used to provide X.509 representations of keys
provided. When used, the bare key values MUST still be present
and MUST match those in the certificate.
registration_endpoint
RECOMMENDED. URL of the authorization server's OAuth 2.0 Dynamic
Client Registration endpoint [RFC7591].
scopes_supported
RECOMMENDED. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] "scope" values that this authorization server supports.
Servers MAY choose not to advertise some supported scope values
even when this parameter is used.
response_types_supported
REQUIRED. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
"response_type" values that this authorization server supports.
response_modes_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
"response_mode" values that this authorization server supports, as
specified in OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices
[OAuth.Responses]. If omitted, the default is "["query",
"fragment"]". The response mode value "form_post" is also defined
in OAuth 2.0 Form Post Response Mode [OAuth.Post].
grant_types_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0 grant
type values that this authorization server supports. If omitted,
the default value is "["authorization_code", "implicit"]".
token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of client authentication
methods supported by this token endpoint. Client authentication
method values are used in the "token_endpoint_auth_method"
parameter defined in Section 2 of [RFC7591]. If omitted, the
default is "client_secret_basic" -- the HTTP Basic Authentication
Scheme specified in Section 2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing
algorithms ("alg" values) supported by the token endpoint for the
signature on the JWT [JWT] used to authenticate the client at the
token endpoint for the "private_key_jwt" and "client_secret_jwt"
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
authentication methods. Servers SHOULD support "RS256". The
value "none" MUST NOT be used.
service_documentation
OPTIONAL. URL of a page containing human-readable information
that developers might want or need to know when using the
authorization server. In particular, if the authorization server
does not support Dynamic Client Registration, then information on
how to register clients needs to be provided in this
documentation.
ui_locales_supported
OPTIONAL. Languages and scripts supported for the user interface,
represented as a JSON array of BCP47 [RFC5646] language tag
values.
op_policy_uri
OPTIONAL. URL that the authorization server provides to the
person registering the client to read about the authorization
server's requirements on how the client can use the data provided
by the authorization server. The registration process SHOULD
display this URL to the person registering the client if it is
given. As described in Section 5, despite the identifier
"op_policy_uri", appearing to be OpenID-specific, its usage in
this specification is actually referring to a general OAuth 2.0
feature that is not specific to OpenID Connect.
op_tos_uri
OPTIONAL. URL that the authorization server provides to the
person registering the client to read about authorization server's
terms of service. The registration process SHOULD display this
URL to the person registering the client if it is given. As
described in Section 5, despite the identifier "op_tos_uri",
appearing to be OpenID-specific, its usage in this specification
is actually referring to a general OAuth 2.0 feature that is not
specific to OpenID Connect.
revocation_endpoint
OPTIONAL. URL of the authorization server's OAuth 2.0 revocation
endpoint [RFC7009].
revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of client authentication
methods supported by this revocation endpoint. The valid client
authentication method values are those registered in the IANA
"OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters].
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
revocation_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing
algorithms ("alg" values) supported by the revocation endpoint for
the signature on the JWT [JWT] used to authenticate the client at
the revocation endpoint for the "private_key_jwt" and
"client_secret_jwt" authentication methods. The value "none" MUST
NOT be used.
introspection_endpoint
OPTIONAL. URL of the authorization server's OAuth 2.0
introspection endpoint [RFC7662].
introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of client authentication
methods supported by this introspection endpoint. The valid
client authentication method values are those registered in the
IANA "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] or those registered in the IANA "OAuth
Access Token Types" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]. (These
values are and will remain distinct, due to Section 7.3.)
introspection_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing
algorithms ("alg" values) supported by the introspection endpoint
for the signature on the JWT [JWT] used to authenticate the client
at the introspection endpoint for the "private_key_jwt" and
"client_secret_jwt" authentication methods. The value "none" MUST
NOT be used.
code_challenge_methods_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of PKCE [RFC7636] code
challenge methods supported by this authorization server. Code
challenge method values are used in the "code_challenge_method"
parameter defined in Section 4.3 of [RFC7636]. The valid code
challenge method values are those registered in the IANA "PKCE
Code Challenge Methods" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters].
Additional authorization server metadata parameters MAY also be used.
Some are defined by other specifications, such as OpenID Connect
Discovery 1.0 [OpenID.Discovery].
4. String Operations
Processing some OAuth 2.0 messages requires comparing values in the
messages to known values. For example, the member names in the
configuration information response might be compared to specific
member names such as "issuer". Comparing Unicode [UNICODE] strings,
however, has significant security implications.
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
Therefore, comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings
MUST be performed as specified below:
1. Remove any JSON applied escaping to produce an array of Unicode
code points.
2. Unicode Normalization [USA15] MUST NOT be applied at any point to
either the JSON string or to the string it is to be compared
against.
3. Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a
Unicode code point to code point equality comparison.
5. Compatibility Notes
The identifiers "op_policy_uri", and "op_tos_uri" contain strings
referring to the OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core] family of
specifications that were originally defined by "OpenID Connect
Discovery 1.0" [OpenID.Discovery]. Despite the reuse of these
identifiers that appear to be OpenID-specific, their usage in this
specification is actually referring to general OAuth 2.0 features
that are not specific to OpenID Connect.
6. Security Considerations
6.1. TLS Requirements
Implementations MUST support TLS. Which version(s) ought to be
implemented will vary over time, and depend on the widespread
deployment and known security vulnerabilities at the time of
implementation. The authorization server MUST support TLS version
1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support additional transport-layer security
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125
[RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations can be found in
Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS [BCP195].
To protect against information disclosure and tampering,
confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a
ciphersuite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection.
6.2. Impersonation Attacks
TLS certificate checking MUST be performed by the client, as
described in Section 6.1, when making an authorization server
configuration information request. Checking that the server
certificate is valid for the configuration information location URL
prevents man-in-middle and DNS-based attacks. These attacks could
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
cause a client to be tricked into using an attacker's keys and
endpoints, which would enable impersonation of the legitimate
authorization server. If an attacker can accomplish this, they can
access the resources that the affected client has access to using the
authorization server that they are impersonating.
An attacker may also attempt to impersonate an authorization server
by publishing a discovery document that contains an "issuer" claim
using the configuration information location URL of the authorization
server being impersonated, but with its own endpoints and signing
keys. This would enable it to impersonate that authorization server,
if accepted by the client. To prevent this, RPs MUST ensure that the
configuration information location URL they are using for the
configuration information request exactly matches the value of the
"issuer" metadata value in the authorization server configuration
information document received by the client.
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. Registration of OAuth2 Relation Type
This section registers the WebFinger link relation type "oauth2" as
per Section 6.2.1 of [RFC5988].
Relation Name: oauth2
Description: Refers to discovery of OAuth2 configuration metadata.
Reference: This specification.
7.2. OAuth Discovery Metadata Registry
This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Discovery Metadata"
registry for OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata names. The
registry records the authorization server metadata member and a
reference to the specification that defines it.
7.2.1. Metadata Registry Procedures
The following registration procedure is used for the registry
established by this specification.
Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis
after a two-week review period on the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org
mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts.
However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication,
the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are
satisfied that such a specification will be published.
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register OAuth Discovery
Metadata: example").
Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve
or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the
review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if
applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than
21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the
iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general
applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application,
and whether the registration makes sense.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list.
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other
Experts.
7.2.2. Registration Template
Discovery Metadata Name:
The name requested (e.g., "issuer"). This name is case-sensitive.
Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive
manner unless the Designated Experts state that there is a
compelling reason to allow an exception.
Discovery Metadata Description:
Brief description of the discovery metadata (e.g., "Issuer URL").
Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Specification Document(s):
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
included but is not required.
7.2.3. Initial Registry Contents
o Discovery Metadata Name: "issuer"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
configuration information location
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "authorization_endpoint"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
authorization endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "token_endpoint"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
token endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "jwks_uri"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
JWK Set document
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "registration_endpoint"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "scopes_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the OAuth 2.0 "scope" values that this authorization server
supports
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "response_types_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the OAuth 2.0 "response_type" values that this authorization
server supports
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "response_modes_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the OAuth 2.0 "response_mode" values that this authorization
server supports
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "grant_types_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the OAuth 2.0 grant type values that this authorization server
supports
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
client authentication methods supported by this token endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name:
"token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the JWS signing algorithms supported by the token endpoint for the
signature on the JWT used to authenticate the client at the token
endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "service_documentation"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of a page containing human-
readable information that developers might want or need to know
when using the authorization server
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "ui_locales_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: Languages and scripts supported
for the user interface, represented as a JSON array of BCP47
language tag values
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "op_policy_uri"
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL that the authorization server
provides to the person registering the client to read about the
authorization server's requirements on how the client can use the
data provided by the authorization server
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "op_tos_uri"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL that the authorization server
provides to the person registering the client to read about
authorization server's terms of service
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "revocation_endpoint"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
OAuth 2.0 revocation endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name:
"revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
client authentication methods supported by this revocation
endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name:
"revocation_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the JWS signing algorithms supported by the revocation endpoint
for the signature on the JWT used to authenticate the client at
the revocation endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "introspection_endpoint"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
OAuth 2.0 introspection endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name:
"introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
client authentication methods supported by this introspection
endpoint
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name:
"introspection_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the JWS signing algorithms supported by the introspection endpoint
for the signature on the JWT used to authenticate the client at
the introspection endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "code_challenge_methods_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: PKCE code challenge methods
supported by this authorization server
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
7.3. Updated Registration Instructions
This specification adds to the instructions for the Designated
Experts of the following IANA registries, both of which are in the
"OAuth Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]:
o OAuth Access Token Types
o OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods
IANA has added a link to this specification in the Reference sections
of these registries. [[ RFC Editor: The above sentence is written in
the past tense as it would appear in the final specification, even
though these links won't actually be created until after the IESG has
requested publication of the specification. Please delete this note
after the links are in place. ]]
For these registries, the designated experts must reject registration
requests in one registry for values already occurring in the other
registry. This is necessary because the
"introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" parameter allows for
the use of values from either registry. That way, because the values
in the two registries will continue to be mutually exclusive, no
ambiguities will arise.
8. References
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
8.1. Normative References
[BCP195] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195>.
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.
[JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518>.
[JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7516>.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517>.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515>.
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519>.
[OAuth.Post]
Jones, M. and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Form Post Response
Mode", April 2015, <http://openid.net/specs/
oauth-v2-form-post-response-mode-1_0.html>.
[OAuth.Responses]
de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M.
Jones, "OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding
Practices", February 2014, <http://openid.net/specs/
oauth-v2-multiple-response-types-1_0.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying
Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646,
September 2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC5988] Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 5988,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5988, October 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5988>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
August 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>.
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
[RFC7033] Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., Jones, M., and J. Smarr,
"WebFinger", RFC 7033, DOI 10.17487/RFC7033, September
2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7033>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7565] Saint-Andre, P., "The 'acct' URI Scheme", RFC 7565,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7565, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7565>.
[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[RFC7636] Sakimura, N., Ed., Bradley, J., and N. Agarwal, "Proof Key
for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients", RFC 7636,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7636, September 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7636>.
[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.
[UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard",
<http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>.
[USA15] Davis, M. and K. Whistler, "Unicode Normalization Forms",
Unicode Standard Annex 15, June 2015,
<http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr15/>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.jones-oauth-mix-up-mitigation]
Jones, M. and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mitigation",
draft-jones-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-01 (work in progress),
January 2016.
[OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 Bound Configuration Lookkup March 2016
[OpenID.Discovery]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID
Connect Discovery 1.0", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html>.
[OpenID.Registration]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect
Dynamic Client Registration 1.0", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-registration-1_0.html>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
This specification is an alternate proposal to the OAuth 2.0
Discovery working group draft (draft-ietf-oauth-discovery-01) and
contains substantial text from this draft. The author would like to
thank the original draft authors Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, and John
Bradley as well as the OAuth Working Group.
This specification is based in part on the OpenID Connect Discovery
1.0 specification, which was produced by the OpenID Connect working
group of the OpenID Foundation.
Appendix B. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-00
o Created the initial working group version based on draft-jones-
oauth-discovery-01, with no normative changes.
Authors' Addresses
Phil Hunt
Oracle
Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com
URI: http://www.independentid.com
Tony Nadalin
Microsoft
Email: tonynad@microsoft.com
Hunt & Nadalin Expires September 14, 2016 [Page 22]
