Internet DRAFT - draft-huque-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec
draft-huque-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec
Internet Engineering Task Force S. Huque
Internet-Draft P. Aras
Intended status: Informational Salesforce
Expires: July 4, 2019 J. Dickinson
Sinodun
J. Vcelak
NS1
D. Blacka
Verisign
Jan 4, 2019
Multi Provider DNSSEC models
draft-huque-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec-04
Abstract
Many enterprises today employ the service of multiple DNS providers
to distribute their authoritative DNS service. Deploying DNSSEC in
such an environment may present some challenges depending on the
configuration and feature set in use. This document will present
several deployment models that may be suitable.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 4, 2019.
Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Deployment Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Multiple Signer models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1.1. Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider . . . . 4
2.1.2. Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider . . . . . . 4
3. Validating Resolver Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Signing Algorithm Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Authenticated Denial Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Single Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Mixing Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Key Rollover Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider . . . . . . 8
6.2. Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction and Motivation
RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH BEFORE PUBLISHING:
The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub at:
https://github.com/shuque/multi-provider-dnssec
Many enterprises today employ the service of multiple DNS providers
to distribute their authoritative DNS service. This allows the DNS
service to survive a complete failure of any single provider.
Additionally, enterprises or providers occasionally have requirements
that preclude standard zone transfer techniques [RFC1995] [RFC5936] :
either non-standardized DNS features are in use that are incompatible
with zone transfer, or operationally a provider must be able to
(re)sign DNS records using their own keys. This document outlines
some possible models of DNSSEC [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035]
deployment in such an environment.
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2. Deployment Models
If a zone owner is able to use standard zone transfer techniques,
then the presence of multiple providers does not present any need to
substantially modify normal deployment models. In these deployments
there is a single signing entity (which may be the zone owner, one of
the providers, or a separate entity), while the providers act as
secondary authoritative servers for the zone.
Occasionally, however, standard zone transfer techniques cannot be
used. This could be due to the use of non-standard DNS features, or
due to operational requirements of a given provider (e.g., a provider
that only supports "online signing".) In these scenarios, the
multiple providers each act like primary servers, independently
signing data received from the zone owner and serving it to DNS
queriers. This configuration presents some novel challenges and
requirements.
2.1. Multiple Signer models
In this category of models, multiple providers each independently
sign and serve the same zone. The zone owner typically uses
provider-specific APIs to update zone content at each of the
providers, and relies on the provider to perform signing of the data.
A key requirement here is to manage the contents of the DNSKEY and DS
RRset in such a way that validating resolvers always have a viable
path to authenticate the DNSSEC signature chain no matter which
provider is queried. This requirement is achieved by having each
provider import the public Zone Signing Keys (ZSKs) of all other
providers into their DNSKEY RRsets.
These models can support DNSSEC even for the non-standard features
mentioned previously, if the DNS providers have the capability of
signing the response data generated by those features. Since these
responses are often generated dynamically at query time, one method
is for the provider to perform online signing (also known as online
or on-the-fly signing). However, another possible approach is to
pre-compute all the possible response sets and associated signatures
and then algorithmically determine at query time which response set
needs to be returned.
In the first two of these models, the function of coordinating the
DNSKEY or DS RRset does not involve the providers communicating
directly with each other, which they are unlikely to do since they
typically have a contractual relationship only with the zone owner.
The following descriptions consider the case of two DNS providers,
but the model is generalizable to any number.
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2.1.1. Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider
o Zone owner holds the KSK, manages the DS record, and is
responsible for signing the DNSKEY RRset and distributing the
signed DNSKEY RRset to the providers.
o Each provider has their own ZSK which is used to sign data.
o Providers have an API that owner uses to query the ZSK public key,
and insert a combined DNSKEY RRset that includes both ZSKs and the
KSK, signed by the KSK.
o Key rollovers need coordinated participation of the zone owner to
update the DNSKEY RRset (for KSK or ZSK), and the DS RRset (for
KSK).
2.1.2. Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider
o Each provider has their own KSK and ZSK.
o Each provider offers an API that the Zone Owner uses to import the
ZSK of the other provider into their DNSKEY RRset.
o DNSKEY RRset is signed independently by each provider using their
own KSK.
o Zone Owner manages the DS RRset that includes both KSKs.
o Key rollovers need coordinated participation of the zone owner to
update the DS RRset (for KSK), and the DNSKEY RRset (for ZSK).
3. Validating Resolver Behavior
The central requirement for both of the Multiple Signer models
(Section 2.1) is to ensure that the ZSKs from all providers are
present in each provider's apex DNSEY RRset, and is vouched for by
either the single KSK (in model 1) or each provider's KSK (in model
2.) If this is not done, the following situation can arise (assuming
two providers A and B):
o The validating resolver follows a referral (delegation) to the
zone in question.
o It retrieves the zone's DNSKEY RRset from one of provider A's
nameservers.
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o At some point in time, the resolver attempts to resolve a name in
the zone, while the DNSKEY RRset received from provider A is still
viable in its cache.
o It queries one of provider B's nameservers to resolve the name,
and obtains a response that is signed by provider B's ZSK, which
it cannot authenticate because this ZSK is not present in its
cached DNSKEY RRset for the zone that it received from provider A.
o The resolver will not accept this response. It may still be able
to ultimately authenticate the name by querying other nameservers
for the zone until it elicits a response from one of provider A's
nameservers. But it has incurred the penalty of additional
roundtrips with other nameservers, with the corresponding latency
and processing costs. The exact number of additional roundtrips
depends on details of the resolver's nameserver selection
algorithm and the number of nameservers configured at provider B.
o It may also be the case that a resolver is unable to provide an
authenticated response because it gave up after a certain number
of retries or a certain amount of delay. Or that downstream
clients of the resolver that originated the query timed out
waiting for a response.
Zone owners will want to deploy a DNS service that responds as
efficiently as possible with validatable answers only, and hence it
is important that the DNSKEY RRset at each provider is maintained
with the active ZSKs of all participating providers. This ensures
that resolvers can validate a response no matter which provider's
nameservers it came from.
Details of how the DNSKEY RRset itself is validated differs. In
model 1 (Section 2.1.1), one unique KSK managed by the Zone Owner
signs an identical DNSKEY RRset deployed at each provider, and the
signed DS record in the parent zone refers to this KSK. In model 2
(Section 2.1.2), each provider has a distinct KSK and signs the
DNSKEY RRset with it. The Zone Owner deploys a DS RRset at the
parent zone that contains multiple DS records, each referring to a
distinct provider's KSK. Hence it does not matter which provider's
nameservers the resolver obtains the DNSKEY RRset from, the signed DS
record in each model can authenticate the associated KSK.
4. Signing Algorithm Considerations
It is RECOMMENDED that the providers use a common signing algorithm
(and common keysizes for algorithms that support variable key sizes).
This ensures that the multiple providers have identical security
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postures and no provider is more vulnerable to cryptanalytic attack
than the others.
It may however be possible to deploy a configuration where different
providers use different signing algorithms. The main impediment is
that current DNSSEC specifications require that if there are multiple
algorithms in the DNSKEY RRset, then RRsets in the zone need to be
signed with at least one DNSKEY of each algorithm, as described in
RFC 4035 [RFC4035], Section 2.2. However RFC 6781 [RFC6781],
Section 4.1.4, also describes both a conservative and liberal
interpretation of this requirement. When validating DNS resolvers
follow the liberal approach, they do not expect that zone RRsets are
signed by every signing algorithm in the DNSKEY RRset, and responses
with single algorithm signatures can be validated corectly assuming a
valid chain of trust exists. In fact, testing by the .BR Top Level
domain for their planned algorithm rollover [BR-ROLLOVER],
demonstrates that the liberal approach works.
5. Authenticated Denial Considerations
Authentiated denial of existence enables a resolver to validate that
a record does not exist. For this purpose, an authoritative server
presents in a response to the resolver special NSEC (Section 3.1.3 of
[RFC4035]) or NSEC3 (Section 7.2 of [RFC5155]) records. The NSEC3
method enhances NSEC by providing opt-out for signing insecure
delegations and also adds limited protection against zone enumeration
attacks.
An authoritative server response carrying records for authenticated
denial is always self-contained and the receiving resolver doesn't
need to send additional queries to complete the denial proof data.
For this reason, no rollover is needed when switching between NSEC
and NSEC3 for a signed zone.
Since authenticated denial responses are self-contained, NSEC and
NSEC3 can be used by different providers to serve the same zone.
Doing so however defeats the protection against zone enumeration
provided by NSEC3. A better configuration involves multiple
providers using different authenticated denial of existence
mechanisms that all provide zone enumeration defense, such as pre-
computed NSEC3, NSEC3 White Lies [RFC7129], NSEC Black Lies
[BLACKLIES], etc. Note however that having multiple providers
offering different authenticated denial mechanisms may impact how
effectively resolvers are able to make use of the caching of negative
responses.
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5.1. Single Method
Usually, the NSEC and NSEC3 methods are used exclusively (i.e. the
methods are not used at the same time by different servers). This
configuration is prefered because the behavior is well-defined and
it's closest to the current operational practice.
5.2. Mixing Methods
Compliant resolvers should be able to serve zones when different
authoritative servers for the same zone respond with different
authentiated denial methods because this is normally observed when
NSEC and NSEC3 are being switched or when NSEC3PARAM is updated.
Resolver software may be however designed to handle a single
transition between two authenticated denial configurations more
optimally than permanent setup with mixed authenticated denial
methods. This could make caching on the resolver side less efficient
and the authoritative servers may observe higher number of queries.
This aspect should be considered especially in context of Aggresive
Use of DNSSEC-Validated Cache [RFC8198].
In case all providers cannot be configured for a matching
authentiated denial, it is advised to find lowest number of possible
configurations possible across all used providers.
Note that NSEC3 configuration on all providers with different
NSEC3PARAM values is considered a mixed setup.
6. Key Rollover Considerations
The Multiple Signer (Section 2.1) models introduce some new
requirements for DNSSEC key rollovers. Since this process
necessarily involves coordinated actions on the part of providers and
the Zone Owner, one reasonable strategy is for the Zone Owner to
initiate key rollover operations. But other operationally plausible
models may also suit, such as a DNS provider initiating a key
rollover and signaling their intent to the Zone Owner in some manner.
The descriptions in this section assume that KSK rollovers employ the
commonly used Double Signature KSK Rollover Method, and that ZSK
rollovers employ the Pre-Publish ZSK Rollover Method, as described in
detail in [RFC6781]. With minor modifications, they can also be
easily adapted to other models, such as Double DS KSK Rollover or
Double Signature ZSK rollover, if desired.
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6.1. Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider
o Key Signing Key Rollover: In this model, the two managed DNS
providers share a common KSK which is held by the Zone Owner. To
initiate the rollover, the Zone Owner generates a new KSK and
obtains the DNSKEY RRset of each DNS provider using their
respective APIs. The new KSK is added to each provider's DNSKEY
RRset and the RRset is re-signed with both the new and the old
KSK. This new DNSKEY RRset is then transferred to each provider.
The Zone Owner then updates the DS RRset in the parent zone to
point to the new KSK, and after the necessary DS record TTL period
has expired, proceeds with updating the DNSKEY RRSet to remove the
old KSK.
o Zone Signing Key Rollover: In this model, each DNS provider has
separate Zone Signing Keys. Each provider can choose to roll
their ZSK independently by co-ordinating with the Zone Owner.
Provider A would generate a new ZSK and communicate their intent
to perform a rollover (note that Provider A cannot immediately
insert this new ZSK into their DNSKEY RRset because the RRset has
to be signed by the Zone Owner). The Zone Owner obtains the new
ZSK from Provider A. It then obtains the current DNSKEY RRset
from each provider (including Provider A), inserts the new ZSK
into each DNSKEY RRset, re-signs the DNSKEY RRset, and sends it
back to each provider for deployment via their respective key
management APIs. Once the necessary time period is elapsed (i.e.
all zone data has been re-signed by the new ZSK and propagated to
all authoritative servers for the zone, plus the maximum zone TTL
value of any of the data in the zone signed by the old ZSK),
Provider A and the zone owner can initiate the next phase of
removing the old ZSK.
6.2. Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider
o Key Signing Key Rollover: In Model 2, each managed DNS provider
has their own KSK. A KSK roll for provider A does not require any
change in the DNSKEY RRset of provider B, but does require co-
ordination with the Zone Owner in order to get the DS record set
in the parent zone updated. The KSK roll starts with Provider A
generating a new KSK and including it in their DNSKEY RRSet. The
DNSKey RRset would then be signed by both the new and old KSK.
The new KSK is communicated to the Zone Owner, after which the
Zone Owner updates the DS RRset to replace the DS record for the
old KSK with a DS record for the new KSK. After the necessary DS
RRset TTL period has elapsed, the old KSK can be removed from
provider A's DNSKEY RRset.
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o Zone Signing Key Rollover: In Model 2, each managed DNS provider
has their own ZSK. The ZSK roll for provider A would start with
them generating new ZSK and including it in their DNSKEY RRset and
re-signing the new DNSKEY RRset with their KSK. The new ZSK of
provider A would then be communicated to the Zone Owner, who will
initiate the process of importing this ZSK into the DNSKEY RRsets
of the other providers, using their respective APIs. Once the
necessary Pre-Publish key rollover time periods have elapsed,
provider A and the Zone Owner can initiate the process of removing
the old ZSK from the DNSKEY RRset of all providers.
7. IANA Considerations
This document includes no request to IANA.
8. Security Considerations
[TBD]
9. Acknowledgments
The initial version of this document benefited from discussions with
and review from Duane Wessels. Additional helpful comments were
provided by Steve Crocker, Ulrich Wisser, Tony Finch, and Olafur
Gudmundsson.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
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[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.
[RFC6781] Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC
Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6781, December 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6781>.
[RFC8198] Fujiwara, K., Kato, A., and W. Kumari, "Aggressive Use of
DNSSEC-Validated Cache", RFC 8198, DOI 10.17487/RFC8198,
July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8198>.
10.2. Informative References
[BLACKLIES]
Valsorda, F. and O. Gudmundsson, "Compact DNSSEC Denial of
Existence or Black Lies", <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-valsorda-dnsop-black-lies>.
[BR-ROLLOVER]
Neves, F., ".br DNSSEC Algorithm Rollover Update",
in ICANN 62 DNSSEC Workshop, June 2018,
<https://static.ptbl.co/static/
attachments/179548/1529933472.pdf>.
[RFC1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1995, August 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1995>.
[RFC5936] Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, Ed., "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol
(AXFR)", RFC 5936, DOI 10.17487/RFC5936, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5936>.
[RFC7129] Gieben, R. and W. Mekking, "Authenticated Denial of
Existence in the DNS", RFC 7129, DOI 10.17487/RFC7129,
February 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7129>.
Authors' Addresses
Shumon Huque
Salesforce
Email: shuque@gmail.com
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Pallavi Aras
Salesforce
Email: paras@salesforce.com
John Dickinson
Sinodun
Email: jad@sinodun.com
Jan Vcelak
NS1
Email: jvcelak@ns1.com
David Blacka
Verisign
Email: davidb@verisign.com
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