Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm
draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm
ANIMA WG S. Fries
Internet-Draft T. Werner
Intended status: Standards Track Siemens
Expires: 5 September 2024 E. Lear
Cisco Systems
M. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
4 March 2024
BRSKI with Pledge in Responder Mode (BRSKI-PRM)
draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm-12
Abstract
This document defines enhancements to Bootstrapping a Remote Secure
Key Infrastructure (BRSKI, RFC8995) to enable bootstrapping in
domains featuring no or only limited connectivity between a pledge
and the domain registrar. It specifically changes the interaction
model from a pledge-initiated mode, as used in BRSKI, to a pledge-
responding mode, where the pledge is in server role. For this, BRSKI
with Pledge in Responder Mode (BRSKI-PRM) introduces a new component,
the Registrar-Agent, which facilitates the communication between
pledge and registrar during the bootstrapping phase. To establish
the trust relation between pledge and registrar, BRSKI-PRM relies on
object security rather than transport security. The approach defined
here is agnostic to the enrollment protocol that connects the domain
registrar to the domain CA.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/anima-wg/anima-brski-prm.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Scope of Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Supported Environments and Use Case Examples . . . . . . 8
3.1.1. Building Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.2. Infrastructure Isolation Policy . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.3. Less Operational Security in the Target-Domain . . . 9
3.2. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Requirements Discussion and Mapping to Solution-Elements . . 9
5. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. Nomadic Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3. Co-located Registrar-Agent and Domain Registrar . . . . . 17
5.4. Agent-Proximity Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. System Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1. Domain Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1.1. Domain Registrar with Combined Functionality . . . . 19
6.2. Registrar-Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.2.1. Discovery of the Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.2.2. Discovery of the Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.3. Pledge in Responder Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.3.1. Pledge with Combined Functionality . . . . . . . . . 24
7. Exchanges and Artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.1. Trigger Pledge Voucher-Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
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7.1.1. Request Artifact: Pledge Voucher-Request Trigger
(tPVR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.1.2. Response Artifact: Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR) . . . 32
7.2. Trigger Pledge Enroll-Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.2.1. Request Artifact: Pledge Enroll-Request Trigger
(tPER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.2.2. Response Artifact: Pledge Enroll-Request (PER) . . . 36
7.3. Supply PVR to Registrar (including backend
interaction) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.3.1. Request Artifact: Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR) . . . 40
7.3.2. Supply RVR to MASA (backend interaction) . . . . . . 41
7.3.3. Issue Voucher by MASA (backend interaction) . . . . . 45
7.3.4. Supply Voucher to Registrar (backend interaction) . . 46
7.3.5. Response Artifact: Voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.4. Supply PER to Registrar (including backend
interaction) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.4.1. Request Artifact: Pledge Enroll-Request (PER) . . . . 51
7.4.2. Enroll Pledge by Domain CA (backend interaction) . . 51
7.4.3. Response Artifact: Enroll-Response (Enroll-Resp) . . 52
7.5. Request CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.5.1. Request Artifact: cACert-Request (cACert-Req) . . . . 53
7.5.2. Response Artifact: cACert-Response (cACert-Resp) . . 53
7.6. Supply Voucher to Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.6.1. Request Artifact: Voucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.6.2. Response Artifact: Voucher Status (vStatus) . . . . . 56
7.7. Supply CA Certificates to Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7.7.1. Request Artifact: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7.7.2. Response (no artifact) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
7.8. Supply Enroll-Response to Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
7.8.1. Request Artifact: Enroll-Response (Enroll-Resp) . . . 61
7.8.2. Response Artifact: Enroll Status (eStatus) . . . . . 61
7.9. Voucher Status Telemetry (including backend
interaction) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.9.1. Request Artifact: Voucher Status (vStatus) . . . . . 64
7.9.2. Response (no artifact) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.10. Enroll Status Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.10.1. Request Artifact: Enroll Status (eStatus) . . . . . 66
7.10.2. Response (no artifact) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7.11. Query Pledge Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
7.11.1. Request Artifact: Status Trigger (tStatus) . . . . . 68
7.11.2. Response Artifact: Pledge Status (pStatus) . . . . . 69
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.1. BRSKI .well-known Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.2. DNS Service Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
10.1. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack on Pledge . . . . . . . . 75
10.2. Misuse of acquired PVR and PER by Registrar-Agent . . . 75
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10.3. Misuse of Registrar-Agent Credentials . . . . . . . . . 76
10.4. Misuse of DNS-SD with mDNS to obtain list of pledges . . 76
10.5. YANG Module Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 77
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
A.1. Example Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR) - from Pledge to
Registrar-Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
A.2. Example Parboiled Registrar Voucher-Request (RVR) - from
Registrar to MASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.3. Example Voucher - from MASA to Pledge, via Registrar and
Registrar-Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
A.4. Example Voucher, MASA issued Voucher with additional
Registrar signature (from MASA to Pledge, via Registrar and
Registrar-Agent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Appendix B. HTTP-over-TLS operations between Registrar-Agent and
Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Appendix C. History of Changes [RFC Editor: please delete] . . . 92
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
1. Introduction
BRSKI as defined in [RFC8995] specifies a solution for secure zero-
touch (automated) bootstrapping of devices (pledges) in a customer
domain, which may be associated to a specific installation location.
This includes the discovery of the BRSKI registrar in the customer
domain and the exchange of security information necessary to
establish trust between a pledge and the domain.
Security information about the customer domain, specifically the
customer domain certificate, are exchanged and authenticated
utilizing voucher-request and voucher-response artifacts as defined
in [RFC8995]. Vouchers are signed objects from the Manufacturer
Authorized Signing Authority (MASA). The MASA issues the voucher and
provides it via the domain registrar to the pledge.
[I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis] specifies the format of the voucher
artifacts including the voucher-request.
For the certificate enrollment of devices, BRSKI relies on EST
[RFC7030] to request and distribute customer domain specific device
certificates. EST in turn relies for the authentication and
authorization of the certification request on the credentials used by
the underlying TLS between the EST client and the EST server.
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BRSKI addresses scenarios in which the pledge initiates the
bootstrapping acting as client (referred to as initiator mode by this
document). BRSKI with Pledge in Responder Mode (BRSKI-PRM) defined
in this document allows the pledge to act as server, so that it can
be triggered externally and at a specific time to generate
bootstrapping requests in the customer domain. For this approach,
this document:
* introduces the Registrar-Agent as new component to facilitate the
communication between the pledge and the domain registrar. The
Registrar-Agent may be implemented as an integrated functionality
of a commissioning tool or be co-located with the domain registrar
itself. BRSKI-PRM supports the identification of the Registrar-
Agent that was performing the bootstrapping allowing for
accountability of the pledges installation, when the Registrar-
Agent is a component used by an installer and not co-located with
the domain registrar.
* specifies the interaction (data exchange and data objects) between
a pledge acting as server, the Registrar-Agent acting as client,
and the domain registrar.
* enables the usage of arbitrary transports between the pledge and
the domain registrar via the Registrar-Agent; security is
addressed at the application layer, and both IP-based and non-IP
connectivity can be used between pledge and Registrar-Agent.
* allows the application of Registrar-Agent credentials to establish
TLS connections to the domain registrar; these are different from
the IDevID of the pledge.
The term endpoint used in the context of this document is equivalent
to resource in HTTP [RFC9110] and CoAP [RFC7252]; it is not used to
describe a device. Endpoints are accessible via Well-Known URIs
[RFC8615]. For the interaction with the domain registrar, the
Registrar-Agent will use existing BRSKI [RFC8995] endpoints as well
as additional endpoints defined in this document. To utilize the EST
server endpoints on the domain registrar, the Registrar-Agent will
act as client toward the registrar.
The Registrar-Agent also acts as a client when communicating with a
pledge that is in responder mode. Here, TLS with server-side,
certificate-based authentication is only optionally supported. If
TLS is optionally used between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge,
the Registrar-Agent needs to identify the pledge based on its
product-serial-number rather than the hostname, as the latter is not
set in an IDevID certificate.
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BRSKI-PRM is designed to rely on object security to support also for
alternative transports for which TLS may not be available, e.g.,
Bluetooth or NFC. This is achieved through an additional signature
wrapping of the exchanged data objects involving the Registrar-Agent
for transport.
To utilize EST [RFC7030] for enrollment, the domain registrar
performs pre-processing of the wrapping signature before actually
using EST as defined in [RFC7030].
There may be pledges that can support both modes, initiator and
responder mode. In these cases BRSKI-PRM can be combined with BRSKI
as defined in [RFC8995] or BRSKI-AE [I-D.ietf-anima-brski-ae] to
allow for more bootstrapping flexibility.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document relies on the terminology defined in Section 1.2 of
[RFC8995]. The following terms are defined in addition:
authenticated self-contained object: Describes an object, which is
cryptographically bound to the end entity (EE) certificate. The
binding is assumed to be provided through a digital signature of
the actual object using the corresponding private key of the
certificate.
CA: Certification Authority, issues certificates.
Commissioning tool: Tool to interact with devices to provide
configuration data.
CSR: Certificate Signing Request.
EE: End entity, as defined in [RFC9483]. Typically a device or
service that owns a public-private key pair for which it manages a
public key certificate.
EE certificate: Either IDevID certificate or LDevID certificate of
the EE.
endpoint: Term equivalent to resource in HTTP [RFC9110] and CoAP
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[RFC7252]. Endpoints are accessible via Well-Known URIs
[RFC8615].
mTLS: mutual Transport Layer Security.
PER: Pledge Enroll-Request is a signature wrapped CSR, signed by the
pledge that requests enrollment to a domain.
POI: Proof-of-Identity, as defined in [RFC5272].
POP: Proof-of-Possession (of a private key), as defined in
[RFC5272].
PVR: Pledge Voucher-Request is a request for a voucher sent to the
domain registrar. The PVR is signed by the Pledge.
RA: Registration Authority, an optional system component to which a
CA delegates certificate management functions such as
authorization checks. In BRSKI-PRM this is a functionality of the
domain registrar, as in BRSKI [RFC8995].
RER: Registrar Enroll-Request is the CSR of a PER sent to the CA by
the domain registrar (in its role as PKI RA).
RVR: Registrar Voucher-Request is a request for a voucher signed by
the domain registrar to the MASA. It may contain the PVR received
from the pledge.
This document uses the following encoding notations in the given JWS-
signed artifact examples:
BASE64URL(OCTETS): Denotes the base64url encoding of OCTETS, per
Section 2 of [RFC7515].
UTF8(STRING): Denotes the octets of the UTF-8 [RFC3629]
representation of STRING, per Section 1 of [RFC7515].
This document includes many examples that would contain many long
sequences of base64-encoded objects with no content directly
comprehensible to a human reader. In order to keep those examples
short, they use the token "base64encodedvalue==" as a placeholder for
base64 data. The full base64 data is included in the appendices of
this document.
3. Scope of Solution
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3.1. Supported Environments and Use Case Examples
BRSKI-PRM is applicable to scenarios where pledges may have no direct
connection to the domain registrar, may have no continuous
connection, or require coordination of the pledge requests to be
provided to a domain registrar.
This can be motivated by pledges deployed in environments not yet
connected to the operational customer domain network, e.g., at a
building construction site, or environments intentionally
disconnected from the Internet, e.g., critical industrial facilities.
Another example is the assembly of electrical cabinets, which are
prepared in advance before the installation at a customer domain.
3.1.1. Building Automation
In building automation a typical use case exists where a detached
building or the basement is equipped with sensors, actuators, and
controllers, but with only limited or no connection to the central
building management system. This limited connectivity may exist
during installation time or also during operation time.
During the installation, for instance, a service technician collects
the device-specific information from the basement network and
provides them to the central building management system. This could
be done using a laptop, common mobile device, or dedicated
commissioning tool to transport the information. The service
technician may successively collect device-specific information in
different parts of the building before connecting to the domain
registrar for bulk bootstrapping.
A domain registrar may be part of the central building management
system and already be operational in the installation network. The
central building management system can then provide operational
parameters for the specific devices in the basement or other detached
areas. These operational parameters may comprise values and settings
required in the operational phase of the sensors/actuators, among
them a certificate issued by the operator to authenticate against
other components and services. These operational parameters are then
provided to the devices in the basement facilitated by the service
technician's laptop. The Registrar-Agent, defined in this document,
may be run on the technician's laptop to interact with pledges.
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3.1.2. Infrastructure Isolation Policy
This refers to any case in which the network infrastructure is
normally isolated from the Internet as a matter of policy, most
likely for security reasons. In such a case, limited access to a
domain registrar may be allowed in carefully controlled short periods
of time, for example when a batch of new devices are deployed, but
prohibited at other times.
3.1.3. Less Operational Security in the Target-Domain
The registration authority (RA) performing the authorization of a
certificate request is a critical PKI component and therefore
requires higher operational security than other components utilizing
the issued certificates. CAs may also require higher security in the
registration procedures. There may be situations in which the
customer domain does not offer enough physical security to operate a
RA/CA and therefore this service is transferred to a backend that
offers a higher level of operational security.
3.2. Limitations
The mechanism described in this document presumes the ability of the
pledge and the Registrar-Agent to communicate with another. This may
not be possible in constrained environments where, in particular,
power must be conserved. In these situations, it is anticipated that
the transceiver will be powered down most of the time. This presents
a rendezvous problem: the pledge is unavailable for certain periods
of time, and the Registrar-Agent is similarly presumed to be
unavailable for certain periods of time. To overcome this situation,
the pledges may need to be powered on, either manually or by sending
a trigger signal.
4. Requirements Discussion and Mapping to Solution-Elements
Based on the intended target environment described in Section 3.1,
the following requirements are derived to support bootstrapping of
pledges in responder mode (acting as server):
* To facilitate the communication between a pledge in responder mode
and the registrar, additional functionality is needed either on
the registrar or as a stand-alone component. This new
functionality is defined as Registrar-Agent and acts as an agent
of the registrar to trigger the pledge to generate requests for
voucher and enrollment. These requests are then provided by the
Registrar-Agent to the registrar. This requires the definition of
pledge endpoints to allow interaction with the Registrar-Agent.
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* The security of communication between the Registrar-Agent and the
pledge must not rely on Transport Layer Security (TLS) to enable
application of BRSKI-PRM in environments, in which the
communication between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge is done
over other technologies like BTLE or NFC, which may not support
TLS protected communication. In addition, the pledge does not
have a certificate that can easily be verified by [RFC9525]
methods.
* The use of authenticated self-contained objects addresses both,
the TLS challenges and the technology stack challenge.
* By contrast, the Registrar-Agent can be authenticated by the
registrar as a component, acting on behalf of the registrar. In
addition the registrar must be able to verify, which Registrar-
Agent was in direct contact with the pledge.
* It would be inaccurate for the voucher-request and voucher-
response to use an assertion with value "proximity" in the
voucher, as the pledge was not in direct contact with the
registrar for bootstrapping. Therefore, a new Agent-Proximity
Assertion value {#agt_prx} is necessary for distinguishing
assertions the MASA can state.
At least the following properties are required for the voucher and
enrollment processing:
* POI: provides data-origin authentication of a data object, e.g., a
voucher-request or an Enroll-Request, utilizing an existing
IDevID. Certificate updates may utilize the certificate that is
to be updated.
* POP: proves that an entity possesses and controls the private key
corresponding to the public key contained in the certification
request, typically by adding a signature computed using the
private key to the certification request.
Solution examples based on existing technology are provided with the
focus on existing IETF RFCs:
* Voucher-Requests and Vouchers as used in [RFC8995] already provide
both, POP and POI, through a digital signature to protect the
integrity of the voucher, while the corresponding signing
certificate contains the identity of the signer.
* Enroll-Requests are data structures containing the information
from a requester for a CA to create a certificate. The
certification request format in BRSKI is PKCS#10 [RFC2986]. In
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PKCS#10, the structure is signed to ensure integrity protection
and POP of the private key of the requester that corresponds to
the contained public key. In the application examples, this POP
alone is not sufficient. A POI is also required for the
certification request and therefore the certification request
needs to be additionally bound to the existing credential of the
pledge (IDevID). This binding supports the authorization decision
for the certification request and may be provided directly with
the certification request. While BRSKI uses the binding to TLS,
BRSKI-PRM aims at an additional signature of the PKCS#10 using
existing credentials on the pledge (IDevID). This allows the
process to be independent of the selected transport.
5. Architecture
5.1. Overview
For BRSKI with Pledge in Responder Mode (BRSKI-PRM), the base system
architecture defined in BRSKI [RFC8995] is enhanced to facilitate new
use cases in which the pledge acts as server. The responder mode
allows delegated bootstrapping using a Registrar-Agent instead of a
direct connection between the pledge and the domain registrar.
Necessary enhancements to support authenticated self-contained
objects for certificate enrollment are kept at a minimum to enable
reuse of already defined architecture elements and interactions. The
format of the bootstrapping objects produced or consumed by the
pledge is usually based on JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] and
further specified in Section 7 to address the requirements stated in
Section 4 above. In constrained environments, it may be based on
COSE [RFC9052].
An abstract overview of the BRSKI-PRM protocol can be found on slide
8 of [BRSKI-PRM-abstract].
To support mutual trust establishment between the domain registrar
and pledges not directly connected to the customer domain, this
document specifies the exchange of authenticated self-contained
objects with the help of a Registrar-Agent.
This leads to extensions of the logical components in the BRSKI
architecture as shown in Figure 1.
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Note that the Join Proxy is not shown in the figure. In certain
situations the Join Proxy may still be present and could be used by
the Registrar-Agent to connect to the Registrar. For example, a
Registrar-Agent application on a smartphone often can connect to
local Wi-Fi without giving up their cellular network connection
[androidnsd], but only can make link-local connections.
The Registrar-Agent interacts with the pledge to transfer the
required data objects for bootstrapping, which are then also
exchanged between the Registrar-Agent and the domain registrar. The
addition of the Registrar-Agent influences the sequences of the data
exchange between the pledge and the domain registrar described in
[RFC8995]. To enable reuse of BRSKI defined functionality as much as
possible, BRSKI-PRM:
* uses existing endpoints where the required functionality is
provided.
* enhances existing endpoints with new supported media types, e.g.,
for JWS voucher.
* defines new endpoints where additional functionality is required,
e.g., for wrapped certification request, CA certificates, or new
status information.
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+---------------------------+
..... Drop Ship .....| Vendor Services |
: +---------------+-----------+
: | M anufacturer | |
: | A uthorized | Ownership |
: | S igning | Tracker |
: | A uthority | |
: +---------------+-----------+
: ^
: | BRSKI-
: | MASA
: ...............................|.........
V . v .
+--------+ . +------------+ +-----------+ .
| | . | | | | .
| Pledge | BRSKI- | Registrar- | BRSKI- | Domain | .
| | PRM | Agent | PRM | Registrar | .
| |<------>| |<------>| (PKI RA) | .
| | . | EE cert | | | .
| | . +------------+ +-----+-----+ .
| IDevID | . | .
| | . +------------------+-----+ .
+--------+ . | Key Infrastructure | .
. | (e.g., PKI CA) | .
. +------------------------+ .
.........................................
Customer Domain
Figure 1: BRSKI-PRM architecture overview using Registrar-Agent
Figure 1 shows the relations between the following main components:
* Pledge: Is expected to respond with the necessary data objects for
bootstrapping to the Registrar-Agent. The protocol used between
the pledge and the Registrar-Agent is assumed to be HTTP in the
context of this document. Any other protocols (including HTTPS)
can be used as long as they support the exchange of the necessary
data objects. This includes CoAP or protocol to be used over
Bluetooth or NFC connections A pledge acting as a server during
bootstrapping leads to the following differences compared to
BRSKI:
- The pledge is discovered by the Registrar-Agent as defined in
{#discovery_uc2_ppa}.
- The pledge offers additional endpoints as defined in
Section 6.3, so that the Registrar-Agent can request data
required for bootstrapping the pledge.
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- The pledge includes additional data in the PVR, which is
provided by the Registrar-Agent in the voucher-request trigger
as defined in Section 7.1. This allows the registrar to
identify, with which Registrar-Agent the pledge was in contact.
- The order of exchanges in the BRSKI-PRM call flow is different
from those in BRSKI [RFC8995], as the PVR and PER are collected
simultaneously and provided to the registrar. This enables
bulk bootstrapping of several devices.
- The data objects utilized for the data exchange between the
pledge and the registrar are self-contained authenticated
objects (signature-wrapped objects).
* Registrar-Agent: Provides a store and forward communication path
to exchange data objects between the pledge and the domain
registrar. The Registrar-Agent acts as a broker in situations in
which the domain registrar is not directly reachable by the
pledge. This may be due to a different technology stack or due to
missing connectivity.
- The Registrar-Agent triggers one or more pledges to create
bootstrapping artifacts such as the voucher-request and the
Enroll-Request. It can then perform a (bulk) bootstrapping
based on the collected data.
- The Registrar-Agent is expected to possess information about
the domain registrar: the registrar EE certificate, LDevID(CA)
certificate, and IP address, either by configuration or by
using the discovery mechanism defined in [RFC8995].
- There is no trust assumption between the pledge and the
Registrar-Agent as only authenticated self-contained objects
are used, which are transported via the Registrar-Agent and
provided either by the pledge or the domain registrar.
- The trust assumption between the Registrar-Agent and the domain
registrar may be based on an LDevID, which is provided by the
PKI responsible for the customer domain.
- The Registrar-Agent may be realized as stand-alone component
supporting nomadic activities of a service technician moving
between different installation sites.
- Alternatively, the Registrar-Agent may also be realized as co-
located functionality for a registrar, to support pledges in
responder mode.
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* Join Proxy (not shown): Has the same functionality as described in
[RFC8995] if needed. Note that a Registrar-Agent may use a join
proxy to facilitate the TLS connection to the registrar in the
same way that a BRSKI pledge would use a join proxy. This is
useful in cases where the Registrar-Agent does not have full IP
connectivity via the domain network or cases where it has no other
means to locate the registrar on the network.
* Domain Registrar: In general fulfills the same functionality
regarding the bootstrapping of the pledge in a customer domain by
facilitating the communication of the pledge with the MASA service
and the domain key infrastructure (PKI). In contrast to
[RFC8995], a BRSKI-PRM domain registrar does not interact with a
pledge directly, but through the Registrar-Agent.
* Vendor Services: Encompass MASA and Ownership Tracker and are used
as defined in [RFC8995]. A MASA is able to support enrollment via
Registrar-Agent without changes unless it checks the vouchers
proximity indication, in which case it would need to be enhanced
to support BRSKI-PRM to also accept the Agent-Proximity Assertion
{#agt_prx}.
5.2. Nomadic Connectivity
In one example instance of the PRM architecture as shown in Figure 2,
there is no connectivity between the location in which the pledge is
installed and the location of the domain registrar. This is often
the case in the aforementioned building automation use case
(Section 3.1.1).
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+---------------------------+
..... Drop Ship .....| Vendor Services |
: +---------------------------+
: ^
........................................ |
. v . |
. +--------+ .-.-.-.-.-.-.-. . |
. | | : Registrar- : . |
. | Pledge |<--------->: Agent : . |
. +--------+ L2 or L3 :-.-.-.-.-.-.-: . |
. connectivity ^ . |
..........................!............. |
Pledge Installation ! |
Location ! Nomadic |
! connectivity |
! |
...........!...................|.........
. v v .
. .-.-.-.-.-.-.-. +-----------+ .
. : Registrar- : | Domain | .
. : Agent :<----->| Registrar | .
. :-.-.-.-.-.-.-: +-----+-----+ .
. | .
. +------------------+-----+ .
. | Key Infrastructure | .
. | (e.g., PKI CA) | .
. +------------------------+ .
.........................................
Customer Domain
Figure 2: Registrar-Agent nomadic connectivity example
PRM enables support of this case through nomadic connectivity of the
Registrar-Agent. To perform enrollment in this setup, multiple round
trips of the Registrar-Agent between the pledge installation location
and the domain registrar are required.
1. Connectivity to domain registrar: preparation tasks for pledge
bootstrapping not part of the BRSKI-PRM protocol definition, like
retrieval of list of pledges to enroll.
2. Connectivity to pledge installation location: retrieve
information about available pledges (IDevID), collect request
objects (i.e., Pledge Voucher-Requests and Pledge Enroll-Requests
using the BRSKI-PRM approach described in Section 7.1 and
Section 7.2.
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3. Connectivity to domain registrar, submit collected request
information of pledges, retrieve response objects (i.e., Voucher
and Enroll-Response) using the BRSKI-PRM approach described in
Section 7.3 and Section 7.4.
4. Connectivity to pledge installation location, provide retrieved
objects to the pledges to enroll pledges and collect status using
the BRSKI-PRM approach described in Section 7.6, Section 7.7, and
Section 7.8.
5. Connectivity to domain registrar, submit Voucher Status and
Enrollment Status using the BRSKI-PRM approach described in
Section 7.9 and Section 7.10.
Variations of this setup include cases where the Registrar-Agent uses
for example WiFi to connect to the pledge installation network, and
mobile network connectivity to connect to the domain registrar. Both
connections may also be possible in a single location at the same
time, based on installation building conditions.
5.3. Co-located Registrar-Agent and Domain Registrar
Compared to [RFC8995] BRSKI, pledges supporting BRSKI-PRM can be
completely passive and only need to react when being requested to
react by a Registrar-Agent. In [RFC8995], pledges instead need to
continuously request enrollment from a domain registrar, which may
result in undesirable communications pattern and possible overload of
a domain registrar.
+---------------------------+
..... Drop Ship .....| Vendor Service |
: +---------------------------+
: ^
: |
: ...............................|.........
: . v .
v . +-------------------------+ .
+--------+ . |.............. | .
| | . |. Registrar- . Domain | .
| Pledge |<------------->|. Agent . Registrar | .
+--------+ L2 or L3 |.............. | .
connectivity +-------------------+-----+ .
. | .
. +------------------+-----+ .
. | Key Infrastructure | .
. +------------------------+ .
.........................................
Customer Domain
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Figure 3: Registrar-Agent integrated into Domain Registrar example
The benefits of BRSKI-PRM can be achieved even without the
operational complexity of standalone Registrar-Agents by integrating
the necessary functionality of the Registrar-Agent as a module into
the domain registrar as shown in Figure 3 so that it can support the
BRSKI-PRM communications to the pledge.
5.4. Agent-Proximity Assertion
"Agent-proximity" is a statement in the PVR and in the voucher, that
the registrar certificate was provided via the Registrar-Agent as
defined in Section 7 and not directly to the pledge. Agent-proximity
is therefore a different assertion than "proximity", which is defined
in Section 4 of [RFC8366]. Agent-proximity is defined as additional
assertion type in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis]. This assertion can be
verified by the registrar and also by the MASA during the voucher-
request processing.
In BRSKI, the pledge verifies POP of the registrar via the TLS
handshake and pins that public key as the "proximity-registrar-cert"
into the voucher request. This allows the MASA to verify the
proximity of the pledge and registrar, facilitating a decision to
assign the pledge to that domain owner. In BRSKI, the TLS connection
is considered provisional until the pledge receives the voucher.
In contrast, in BRSKI-PRM, the pledge has no direct connection to the
registrar and MUST accept the registrar certificate provisionally
until it receives the voucher as described in Section 7.6. In a
similar fashion, the pledge MUST accept the Registrar-Agent EE
certificate provisionally. See also Section 5 of [RFC8995] on
"provisional state".
For agent-proximity, the EE certificate of the Registrar-Agent MUST
be an LDevID certificate signed by the domain owner. Akin to the
proximity assertion in the BRSKI case, the agent-proximity provides
pledge proximity evidence to the MASA. But additionally, agent-
proximity allows the domain registrar to be sure that the PVR
collected by the Registrar-Agent was in fact collected by the
Registrar-Agent, to which the registrar is connected to.
The provisioning of the Registrar-Agent LDevID certificate is out of
scope for this document, but may be done in advance using a separate
BRSKI run or by other means like configuration. It is recommended to
use short lived Registrar-Agent LDevIDs in the range of days or weeks
as outlined in Section 10.3.
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6. System Components
6.1. Domain Registrar
In BRSKI-PRM, the domain registrar provides the endpoints already
specified in [RFC8995] (derived from EST [RFC7030]) where suitable.
In addition, it MUST provide the endpoints defined in Table 1 within
the BRSKI-defined "/.well-known/brski/" URI path. These endpoints
accommodate for the signature-wrapped objects used by BRSKI-PRM for
the Pledge Enroll-Request (PER) and the provisioning of CA
certificates.
+================+=========================+========================+
| Endpoint | Operation | Exchange and Artifacts |
+================+=========================+========================+
| requestenroll | Supply PER | Section 7.4 |
| | to Registrar | |
+----------------+-------------------------+------------------------+
| wrappedcacerts | Request CA | Section 7.5 |
| | Certificates | |
+----------------+-------------------------+------------------------+
Table 1: Additional Well-Known Endpoints on a BRSKI-PRM Registrar
According to Section 5.3 of [RFC8995], the domain registrar performs
the pledge authorization for bootstrapping within his domain based on
the Pledge Voucher-Request. This behavior is retained in BRSKI-PRM.
The domain registrar MUST possess and trust the IDevID (root or
issuing) CA certificate of the pledge vendor/manufacturer.
Further, the domain registrar MUST have its own EE credentials.
6.1.1. Domain Registrar with Combined Functionality
A registrar with combined BRSKI and BRSKI-PRM functionality MAY
detect if the bootstrapping is performed by the pledge directly
(BRSKI case) or by a Registrar-Agent (BRSKI-PRM case) based on the
utilized credential for client authentication during the TLS session
establishment and switch switch the operational mode from BRSKI to
BRSKI-PRM.
This may be supported by a specific naming in the SAN (subject
alternative name) component of the EE certificate of the Registrar-
Agent.
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Alternatively, this may be supported by using an LDevID certificate
signed by the domain owner for the client authentication of the
Registrar-Agent. Using an LDevID certificate also allows the
registrar to verify that a Registrar-Agent is authorized to perform
the bootstrapping of a pledge. See also agent-proximity assertion in
Section 5.4.
Using an LDevID certificate for TLS client authentication of the
Registrar-Agent is a deviation from [RFC8995], in which the IDevID
credential of the pledge is used to perform TLS client
authentication.
6.2. Registrar-Agent
The Registrar-Agent is a new component in BRSKI-PRM that provides a
secure message passing service between pledges in responder mode and
the domain registrar.
It requires the EE certificate of the domain registrar for TLS server
authentication when establishing a TLS session with the domain
registrar and to provide the registrar EE certificate to the pledge
for creating the Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR).
The Registrar-Agent uses its own EE certificate for TLS client
authentication when establishing a TLS session with the domain
registrar and for signing agent-signed data. This EE certificate
MUST include a SubjectKeyIdentifier (SKID), which is used as
reference in the context of an agent-signed-data object as defined in
Section 7.1.
Note that this is an additional requirement for issuing the
certificate, as [IEEE-802.1AR] only requires the SKID to be included
for intermediate CA certificates. [RFC8995] has a similar
requirement. In BRSKI-PRM, the SKID is used in favor of providing
the complete EE certificate of the Registrar-Agent to accommodate
also constrained environments and reduce bandwidth needed for
communication with the pledge. In addition, it follows the
recommendation from BRSKI to use SKID in favor of a certificate
fingerprint to avoid additional computations.
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In addition to the EE certificates, the Registrar-Agent is provided
with the product serial number(s) of the pledge(s) to be
bootstrapped. This is necessary to allow the discovery of pledge(s)
by the Registrar-Agent using DNS-SD with mDNS (see Section 6.2.2).
The list may be provided by prior administrative means or the
Registrar-Agent may get the information via an interaction with the
pledge. For instance, [RFC9238] describes scanning of a QR code,
where the product serial number would be initialized from the 12N
B005 Product Serial Number.
In summary, the following information MUST be available at the
Registrar-Agent before interaction with a pledge:
* Domain registrar EE certificate: certificate of the domain
registrar to be provided to the pledge.
* Registrar-Agent EE certificate and corresponding private key: own
operational key pair to sign agent-signed-data.
* Serial number(s): product serial number(s) of pledge(s) to be
bootstrapped for discovery.
Further, the Registrar-Agent SHOULD have synchronized time.
Finally, the Registrar-Agent MAY possess the IDevID (root or issuing)
CA certificate of the pledge vendor/manufacturer to validate the
IDevID certificate on returned PVR or in case of TLS usage for pledge
communication. The distribution of IDevID CA certificates to the
Registrar-Agent is out of scope of this document and may be done by a
manual configuration.
6.2.1. Discovery of the Registrar
As a Registrar-Agent acts as representative of the domain registrar
towards the pledge or may even be collocated with the domain
registrar, a separate discovery of the registrar is likely not needed
as Registrar-Agent and registrar are domain components and have a
trust relation. Moreover, other communication (not part of this
document) between the Registrar-Agent and the registrar is assumed,
e.g., to exchange information about product-serial-number(s) of
pledges to be discovered as outlined in Section 5.2. Moreover, as
the standard discovery described in Section 4 of [RFC8995] and the
Appendix A.2 of [RFC8995] does not support of registrars with an
enhanced feature set (like the support of BRSKI-PRM), this standard
discovery is not applicable.
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As a more general solution, the BRSKI discovery mechanism can be
extended to provide upfront information on the capabilities of
registrars, such as the mode of operation (pledge-responder-mode or
registrar-responder-mode). Defining discovery extensions is out of
scope of this document. This may be provided in
[I-D.eckert-anima-brski-discovery].
6.2.2. Discovery of the Pledge
The discovery of the pledge by Registrar-Agent in the context of this
document describes the minimum discovery approach to be supported. A
more general discovery mechanism, also supporting GRASP besides DNS-
SD with mDNS may be provided in [I-D.eckert-anima-brski-discovery].
Discovery in BRSKI-PRM uses DNS-based Service Discovery [RFC6763]
over Multicast DNS [RFC6762] to discover the pledge. Note that
[RFC6762] Section 9 provides support for conflict resolution in
situations when an DNS-SD with mDNS responder receives a mDNS
response with inconsistent data. Note that [RFC8990] does not
support conflict resolution of mDNS, which may be a limitation for
its application.
The pledge constructs a local host name based on device local
information (product-serial-number), which results in "product-
serial-number._brski-pledge._tcp.local". The product-serial-number
composition is manufacturer dependent and may contain information
regarding the manufacturer, the product type, and further information
specific to the product instance. To allow distinction of pledges,
the product-serial-number therefore needs to be sufficiently unique.
In the absence of a more general discovery as defined in
[I-D.eckert-anima-brski-discovery] the Registrar-Agent MUST use
* "<product-serial-number>._brski-pledge._tcp.local", to discover a
specific pledge, e.g., when connected to a local network.
* "_brski-pledge._tcp.local" to get a list of pledges to be
bootstrapped.
A manufacturer may allow the pledge to react on DNS-SD with mDNS
discovery without his product-serial-number contained. This allows a
commissioning tool to discover pledges to be bootstrapped in the
domain. The manufacturer support this functionality as outlined in
Section 10.4.
Establishing network connectivity of the pledge is out of scope of
this document but necessary to apply DNS-SD with mDNS. For Ethernet
it is provided by simply connecting the network cable. For WiFi
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networks, connectivity can be provided by using a pre-agreed SSID for
bootstrapping, e.g., as proposed in
[I-D.richardson-emu-eap-onboarding]. The same approach can be used
by 6LoWPAN/mesh using a pre-agreed PAN ID. How to gain network
connectivity is out of scope of this document.
6.3. Pledge in Responder Mode
The pledge is triggered by the Registrar-Agent to create the PVR and
PER. It is also triggered for processing of the responses and the
generation of status information once the Registrar-Agent has
received the responses from the registrar later in the process.
To enable interaction as responder with the Registrar-Agent, pledges
in responder mode MUST act as servers and MUST provide the endpoints
defined in Table 2 within the BRSKI-defined "/.well-known/brski/" URI
path. The endpoints are defined with short names to also accommodate
for resource-constrained devices.
+==========+========================+========================+
| Endpoint | Operation | Exchange and Artifacts |
+==========+========================+========================+
| tpvr | Trigger Pledge | Section 7.1 |
| | Voucher-Request | |
+----------+------------------------+------------------------+
| tper | Trigger Pledge Enroll- | Section 7.2 |
| | Request | |
+----------+------------------------+------------------------+
| svr | Supply Voucher to | Section 7.6 |
| | Pledge | |
+----------+------------------------+------------------------+
| scac | Supply CA Certificates | Section 7.7 |
| | to Pledge | |
+----------+------------------------+------------------------+
| ser | Supply Enroll-Response | Section 7.8 |
| | to Pledge | |
+----------+------------------------+------------------------+
| qps | Query Pledge Status | Section 7.11 |
+----------+------------------------+------------------------+
Table 2: Well-Known Endpoints on a Pledge in Responder Mode
Section 7.2 of [RFC9110] makes the Host header field mandatory, so it
will always be present. The pledge MUST respond to all queries
regardless of the Host header field provided by the client.
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For instance, when the Registrar-Agent reaches out to the "tpvr"
endpoint on a pledge in responder mode with the full URI
"http://pledge.example.com/.well-known/brski/tpvr", it sets the Host
header field to "pledge.example.com" and the absolute path "/.well-
known/brski/tpbr". In practice, however, the pledge often is only
known by its IP address as returned by a discovery protocol, which
will be included in the Host header field.
As BRSKI-PRM uses authenticated self-contained data objects between
the pledge and the domain registrar, the binding of the pledge
identity to the requests is provided by the data object signature
employing the IDevID of the pledge. Hence, pledges MUST have an
Initial Device Identifier (IDevID) installed in them at the factory.
6.3.1. Pledge with Combined Functionality
Pledges MAY support both initiator and responder mode.
A pledge in initiator mode should listen for announcement messages as
described in Section 4.1 of [RFC8995]. Upon discovery of a potential
registrar, it initiates the bootstrapping to that registrar. At the
same time (so as to avoid the Slowloris-attack described in
[RFC8995]), it SHOULD also respond to the triggers for responder mode
described in this document.
Once a pledge with combined functionality has been bootstrapped, it
MAY act as client for enrollment of further certificates needed,
e.g., using the enrollment protocol of choice. If it still acts as
server, the defined BRSKI-PRM endpoints to trigger a Pledge Enroll-
Request (PER) or to provide an Enroll-Response can be used for
further certificates.
7. Exchanges and Artifacts
The interaction of the pledge with the Registrar-Agent may be
accomplished using different transports (i.e., protocols and/or
network technologies). This specification utilizes HTTP as default
transport. Other specifications may define alternative transports
such as CoAP, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), or Near Field Communication
(NFC). These transports may differ from and are independent of the
ones used between the Registrar-Agent and the registrar.
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Transport independence is realized through data objects that are not
bound to specific transport security and stay the same along the
communication path from the pledge via the Registrar-Agent to the
registrar. Therefore, authenticated self-contained artifacts (e.g.,
JWS-signed JSON structures or COSE-signed CBOR structures) are used
for the data exchanges between the pledge and the registrar via the
Registrar-Agent.
Figure 4 provides an overview of the exchanges detailed in the
following subsections.
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| Pledge | | Registrar- | | Domain | | Domain | | MASA |
| | | Agent | | Registrar | | CA | | |
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| | | | Internet |
| discover | | | |
| pledge | | | |
| mDNS query | | | |
|<-----------------| | | |
|----------------->| | | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(1) Trigger Pledge Voucher-Request
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
|<----opt. TLS---->| | | |
|<------tPVR-------| | | |
|--------PVR------>| | | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(2) Trigger Pledge Enroll-Request
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
|<----opt. TLS---->| | | |
|<------tPER-------| | | |
|--------PER------>| | | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(3) Supply PVR to Registrar (including backend interaction)
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
| |<-----mTLS------>| | |
| | [Registrar-Agent | |
| | authenticated&authorized?] | |
| |-------PVR------>| | |
| | [accept device?] | |
| | [contact vendor] | |
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| | | | |
| | |<------------mTLS------------>|
| | |--------------RVR------------>|
| | | [extract DomainID]
| | | [update audit log]
| | |<-----------Voucher-----------|
| |<----Voucher-----| | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(4) Supply PER to Registrar (including backend interaction)
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
| |<----(mTLS)----->| | |
| |-------PER------>| | |
| | |<-----mTLS------>| |
| | |-------RER------>| |
| | |<--Enroll-Resp---| |
| |<--Enroll-Resp---| | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(5) Request CA Certificates
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
| |<----(mTLS)----->| | |
| |---cACert-Req--->| | |
| |<--cACert-Resp---| | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(6) Supply Voucher to Pledge
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
|<----opt. TLS---->| | | |
|<-----Voucher-----| | | |
|------vStatus---->| | | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(7) Supply CA Certificates to Pledge
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
|<----opt. TLS---->| | | |
|<-----cACerts-----| | | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(8) Supply Enroll-Response to Pledge
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
|<----opt. TLS---->| | | |
|<---Enroll-Resp---| | | |
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|-----eStatus----->| | | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(9) Voucher Status Telemetry (including backend interaction)
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
| |<----(mTLS)----->| | |
| |-----vStatus---->| | |
| | |<-----------(mTLS)----------->|
| | |-----req device audit log---->|
| | |<------device audit log-------|
| | [verify audit log] | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(10) Enroll Status Telemetry
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
| |<----(mTLS)----->| | |
| |-----eStatus---->| | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(11) Query Pledge Status
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
|<----opt. TLS---->| | | |
|<-----tStatus-----| | | |
|------pStatus---->| | | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Figure 4: Overview pledge-responder-mode exchanges
The following sub sections split the interactions shown in Figure 4
between the different components into:
1. Section 7.1 describes the acquisition exchange for the Pledge
Voucher-Request initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the pledge.
2. Section 7.2 describes the acquisition exchange for the Pledge
Enroll-Request initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the pledge.
3. Section 7.3 describes the issuing exchange for the Voucher
initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the registrar, including the
interaction of the registrar with the MASA using the RVR
Section 7.3.2, as well as the artifact processing by these
entities.
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4. Section 7.4 describes the enroll exchange initiated by the
Registrar-Agent to the registrar including the interaction of
the registrar with the CA using the PER as well as the artifact
processing by these entities.
5. Section 7.5 describes the retrival exchange for the optional CA
certificate provisioning to the pledge initiated by the
Registrar-Agent to the CA.
6. Section 7.6 describes the Voucher exchange initiated by the
Registrar-Agent to the pledge and the returned status
information.
7. Section 7.7 describes the certificate provisioning exchange
initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the pledge.
8. Section 7.8 describes the Enroll-Response exchange (containing
the LDevID (Pledge) certificate) initiated by the Registrar-
Agent to the pledge and the returned status information.
9. Section 7.9 describes the Voucher status telemetry exchange
initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the registrar, including the
interaction of the registrar with the MASA.
10. Section 7.10 describes the Enroll Status telemetry exchange
initiated by the Registrar-Agent to the registrar.
11. Section 7.11 describes the Pledge Status exchange about the
general bootstrapping state initiated by the Registrar-Agent to
the pledge.
7.1. Trigger Pledge Voucher-Request
This exchange assumes that the Registrar-Agent has already discovered
the pledge. This may be done as described in Section 6.2.2 and
Figure 4 based on DNS-SD or similar.
Optionally, TLS MAY be used to provide privacy for this exchange
between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge, see Appendix B.
Figure 5 shows the acquisition of the Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR)
and the following subsections describe the corresponding artifacts.
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+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| Pledge | | Registrar- | | Domain | | Domain | | MASA |
| | | Agent | | Registrar | | CA | | |
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| | | | Internet |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(1) Trigger Pledge Voucher-Request
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
|<----opt. TLS---->| | | |
|<------tPVR-------| | | |
|--------PVR------>| | | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Figure 5: PVR acquisition exchange
The Registrar-Agent triggers the pledge to create the PVR via HTTP
POST on the well-known pledge endpoint /.well-known/brski/tpvr. The
request body MUST contain the JSON-based Pledge Voucher-Request
Trigger (tPVR) artifact. The request header MUST set the Content-
Type field to application/json.
Upon receiving a valid tPVR, the pledge MUST reply with the PVR
artifact in the body of a 200 OK response. The Content-Type field
header of the response MUST be set to application/voucher-jws+json as
defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher].
If the pledge is unable to create the PVR, it SHOULD respond with an
HTTP error code. The following client error responses MAY be used:
* 400 Bad Request: if the pledge detected an error in the format of
the request, e.g. missing field, wrong data types, etc. or if the
request is not valid JSON even though the PVR media type was set
to application/json.
* 406 Not Acceptable: if the Accept request header field indicates a
type that is unknown or unsupported, e.g., a type other than
application/jose+json.
* 415 Unsupported Media Type: if the Content-Type request header
field indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported, e.g., a
type other than application/json.
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7.1.1. Request Artifact: Pledge Voucher-Request Trigger (tPVR)
The Pledge Voucher-Request Trigger (tPVR) artifact is an unsigned
JSON structure providing the trigger parameters. The following CDDL
[RFC8610] explains the Pledge Voucher-Request Trigger structure.
<CODE BEGINS>
pledgevoucherrequesttrigger = {
"agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert": bytes,
"agent-signed-data": bytes
}
<CODE ENDS>
Figure 6: CDDL for Pledge Voucher-Request Trigger
The fields contained in the pledgevoucherrequesttrigger are:
* agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert: X.509 v3 certificate
structure of the domain registrar EE certificate (base64-encoded
value); may be configured at the Registrar-Agent or may be fetched
by the Registrar-Agent based on a prior TLS connection with this
domain registrar
* agent-signed-data: base64-encoded JWS structure containing the
SubjectKeyIdentifier of the EE (RegAgt) certificate and signing
Data including the creation date and serial number of the pledge.
Note that [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis] defines an opaque binary
element for agent-signed data, for which the structure is defined
in BRSKI-PRM.
{
"payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(prmasd)),
"signatures": [
{
"protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
"signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
}
]
}
Figure 7: JWS structure for the agent-signed-data member in
General JWS Serialization syntax
The BRSKI-PRM Agent Signed Data structure MUST be encoded in JSON as
defined in [RFC8259] following the CDDL definition Figure 8. The JWS
Payload is further base64url-encoded to become the string value of
the payload member as described in Section 3.2 of [RFC7515].
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The following CDDL [RFC8610] explains the BRSKI-PRM Agent Signed Data
structure.
<CODE BEGINS>
prmasd = {
"created": tdate,
"serial-number": text
}
<CODE ENDS>
Figure 8: CDDL for BRSKI-PRM Agent Signed Data
The fields contained in the prmasd are:
* created-on: creation date and time as standard date/time string as
defined in [RFC3339]
* serial-number: product-serial-number in the X520SerialNumber field
of the IDevID certificate of the pledge as string as defined in
Section 2.3.1 of [RFC8995]
Figure 9 below shows an example for unsigned BRSKI-PRM Agent Signed
Data in JSON syntax.
{
"created-on": "2021-04-16T00:00:01.000Z",
"serial-number": "callee4711"
}
Figure 9: Data example for prmasd
The JWS Protected Header of the agent-signed-data JWS structure MUST
contain the following parameters (see Figure 10 for an example):
* alg: algorithm type used to create the signature, e.g., ES256 as
defined in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7515]
* kid: base64-encoded bytes of the SubjectKeyIdentifier (the
"KeyIdentifier" OCTET STRING value) of the EE (RegAgt)
certificate.
{
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
Figure 10: Protected Header example inside agent-signed-data
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Note that at the time of receiving the PVR trigger, the pledge cannot
verify the registrar LDevID certificate and has no proof-of-
possession of the corresponding private key for the certificate.
Hence, the tPVR is an unsigned artifact and the pledge only accepts
the registrar LDevID certificate provisionally until it receives the
voucher as described in Section 7.6.
The pledge will also be unable to verify the agent-signed-data itself
as it does not possess the EE (RegAgt) certificate and the domain
trust has not been established at this point of the communication.
Verification SHOULD be done, after the voucher has been received.
The trigger for the pledge to create a PVR is depicted in the
following figure:
{
"agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
"agent-signed-data": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
Figure 11: Representation of trigger to create PVR
7.1.2. Response Artifact: Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR)
The Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR) artifact is a JWS Voucher Request as
defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher]. Its unsigned data SHALL be
constructed similar to the Voucher-Request artifact defined in
[RFC8995]. It will contain additional data provided by the
Registrar-Agent as specified in the following.
The payload of the PVR MUST contain the following parameters as part
of the ietf-voucher-request:voucher as defined in
[I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis] and thus makes optional leaves in the
YANG definition mandatory:
* created-on: SHALL contain the current date and time in yang:date-
and-time format. If the pledge does not have synchronized time,
it SHALL use the created-on time from the agent-signed-data,
received in the trigger to create a PVR.
* nonce: SHALL contain a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
number.
* serial-number: SHALL contain the pledge product-serial-number as
X520SerialNumber.
* assertion: SHALL contain the requested voucher assertion "agent-
proximity" (different value as in RFC 8995)..
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The ietf-voucher-request:voucher data is extended with two additional
parameters that MUST be included:
* agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert: base64-encoded registrar
EE certificate (provided in tPVR by the Registrar-Agent); enables
the registrar to verify that it is the desired registrar for
handling the PVR
* agent-signed-data: base64-encoded agent-signed-data (provided in
tPVR by the Registrar-Agent); enables the registrar to verify and
log, which Registrar-Agent was in contact with the pledge, when
verifying the PVR
The enhancements of the YANG module for the ietf-voucher-request with
these new leaves are defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis].
The PVR is signed using the pledge's IDevID credential contained as
x5c parameter of the JOSE header.
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# The PVR in General JWS Serialization syntax
{
"payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(ietf-voucher-request:voucher)),
"signatures": [
{
"protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
"signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
}
]
}
# Example: Decoded Payload "ietf-voucher-request:voucher"
representation in JSON syntax
{
"ietf-voucher-request:voucher": {
"created-on": "2021-04-16T00:00:02.000Z",
"nonce": "eDs++/FuDHGUnRxN3E14CQ==",
"serial-number": "callee4711",
"assertion": "agent-proximity",
"agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
"agent-signed-data": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
}
# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
in JSON syntax
{
"alg": "ES256",
"typ": "voucher-jws+json",
"x5c": [
"base64encodedvalue==",
"base64encodedvalue=="
]
}
Figure 12: Representation of PVR
7.2. Trigger Pledge Enroll-Request
Once the Registrar-Agent has received the PVR it can trigger the
pledge to generate a Pledge Enroll-Request (PER).
Optionally, TLS MAY be used to provide privacy for this exchange
between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge, see Appendix B.
Figure 13 shows the the acquisition of the PER and the following
subsections describe the corresponding artifacts.
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+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| Pledge | | Registrar- | | Domain | | Domain | | MASA |
| | | Agent | | Registrar | | CA | | |
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| | | | Internet |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(2) Trigger Pledge Enroll-Request
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
|<----opt. TLS---->| | | |
|<------tPER-------| | | |
|--------PER------>| | | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Figure 13: PER acquisition exchange
The Registrar-Agent triggers the pledge to create the PER via HTTP
POST on the well-known pledge endpoint /.well-known/brski/tper. As
the initial enrollment aims to request a generic certificate, no
certificate attributes are provided to the pledge. To avoid an empty
request body an artifact is provided containing the description of
the requested operation.
Upon receiving a valid tPER, the pledge MUST reply with the PER
artifact in the body of a 200 OK response. The response header MUST
have the Content-Type field set to application/jose+json.
If the pledge is unable to create the PER, it SHOULD respond with an
HTTP error code. The following 4xx client error codes MAY be used:
* 400 Bad Request: if the pledge detected an error in the format of
the request.
* 406 Not Acceptable: if the Accept request header field indicates a
type that is unknown or unsupported. For example, a type other
than application/jose+json.
* 415 Unsupported Media Type: if the Content-Type request header
field indicates a type that is unknown or unsupported, e.g., a
type other than application/json.
7.2.1. Request Artifact: Pledge Enroll-Request Trigger (tPER)
This document specifies the trigger for a generic certificate with no
CSR attributes provided to the pledge. If specific attributes in the
certificate are required, they have to be inserted by the issuing RA/
CA.
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The Pledge Enroll-Request Trigger (tPVR) artifact is an unsigned JSON
structure providing the trigger parameters (tPER-data). The
following CDDL [RFC8610] explains the Pledge Enroll-Request Trigger
structure.
<CODE BEGINS>
pledgeenrollrequesttrigger = {
"enroll-type": "enroll-generic-cert"
}
<CODE ENDS>
Figure 14: CDDL for Pledge Enroll-Request Trigger
The enroll-type field is an enum, identifying what is being enrolled.
Currently only "enroll-generic-cert" for the LDevID certificate is
defined.
Figure 15 below shows an example for unsigned Pledge Enroll-Request
Trigger in JSON syntax.
{
"enroll-type" : "enroll-generic-cert"
}
Figure 15: Data example for pledgeenrollrequesttrigger
The Pledge Enroll-Request Trigger (tPER) artifact MUST be encoded in
JSON as defined in [RFC8259] following the CDDL definition Figure 14.
The Pledge Enroll-Request Trigger (tPER) artifact MAY be used to
provide additional data, like CSR attributes. How to provide and use
such additional data is out of scope for this specification.
7.2.2. Response Artifact: Pledge Enroll-Request (PER)
The Pledge Enroll-Request (PER) artifact is a JWS-signed PKCS#10
Certificate Signing Request (CSR) utilizing the csr-grouping of the
ietf-ztp-types YANG module as defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr].
The CSR already assures POP of the private key corresponding to the
contained public key. In addition, based on the PER signature using
the IDevID, POI is provided.
The pledge constructs the Pledge Enroll-Request (PER) artifact as a
JWS structure containing the PKCS#10 request wrapped in ietf-ztp-
types YANG structrue as JWS payload. Note,
[I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr] also allows for inclusion of
certification requests in different formats used by CMP or CMC.
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The pledge MUST construct the PER as PKCS#10 and MUST sign it
additionally with its IDevID credentials to provide proof-of-identity
bound to the PKCS#10 as described below.
A successful enrollment will result in a generic LDevID certificate
for the pledge in the new domain. This generic LDevID certificate
can be used to request further (application specific) LDevID
certificates if necessary for operation. The Registrar-Agent SHALL
use the enrollment endpoint requestenroll specified in this document
to provide the Pledge Enroll-Request artifact to the Registrar.
The JWS Protected Header of the PER MUST contain the following
parameters as defined in [RFC7515]:
* alg: algorithm type used to create the signature, e.g., ES256 as
defined in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7515]
* x5c: base64-encoded pledge IDevID certificate; it MAY optionally
contain the certificate chain for this certificate; if the
certificate chain is not included, it MUST be available at the
registrar for verification of the IDevID certificate
The body of the Pledge Enroll-Request SHOULD contain a P10 parameter
(for PKCS#10) as defined for ietf-ztp-types:p10-csr in
[I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr]:
* p10-csr: base64-encoded PKCS#10 of the pledge.
The JOSE object is signed using the pledge's IDevID credential, which
corresponds to the certificate signaled in the JOSE header.
While BRSKI-PRM targets the initial enrollment, re-enrollment SHOULD
be supported as described in a similar way as for enrollment in this
document, if no other re-enrollment mechanism is supported. Note
that in this case the current LDevID credential is used instead of
the IDevID credential to create the signature of the PKCS#10 request.
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# The PER in General JWS Serialization syntax
{
"payload": "BASE64URL(ietf-ztp-types)",
"signatures": [
{
"protected": "BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))",
"signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
}
]
}
# Example: Decoded Payload "ietf-ztp-types" Representation
in JSON Syntax
{
"ietf-ztp-types": {
"p10-csr": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
}
# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" Representation
in JSON Syntax
{
"alg": "ES256",
"x5c": [
"base64encodedvalue==",
"base64encodedvalue=="
],
"crit":["created-on"],
"created-on": "2022-09-13T00:00:02.000Z"
}
Figure 16: Representation of PER
With the collected PVR and PER, the Registrar-Agent starts the
interaction with the domain registrar.
The new protected header field "created-on" is introduced to reflect
freshness of the PER. The field is marked critical "crit" to ensure
that it must be understood and validated by the receiver (here the
domain registrar) according to Section 4.1.11 of [RFC7515]. It
allows the registrar to verify the timely correlation between the PER
and previously exchanged messages, i.e., created-on of PER >=
created-on of PVR >= created-on of PVR trigger. The registrar MAY
consider to ignore any but the newest PER from the same pledge in the
case the registrar has at any point in time more than one pending PER
from the pledge.
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As the Registrar-Agent is intended to facilitate communication
between the pledge and the domain registrar, a collection of requests
from more than one pledge is possible. This allows bulk
bootstrapping of several pledges using the same connection between
the Registrar-Agent and the domain registrar.
7.3. Supply PVR to Registrar (including backend interaction)
Similar to BRSKI "requestvoucher" endpoint in Section 5.2 of
[RFC8995].
The Registrar-Agent has acquired one or more PVR and PER object pairs
The Registrar-Agent establishes a TLS connection to the registrar.
As already stated in [RFC8995], the use of TLS 1.3 (or newer) is
encouraged. TLS 1.2 or newer is REQUIRED on the Registrar-Agent
side. TLS 1.3 (or newer) SHOULD be available on the registrar, but
TLS 1.2 MAY be used. TLS 1.3 (or newer) SHOULD be available on the
MASA, but TLS 1.2 MAY be used.
In contrast to BRSKI [RFC8995] TLS client authentication to the
registrar is achieved by using Registrar-Agent EE credentials instead
of pledge IDevID credentials. Consequently BRSKI (pledge-initiator-
mode) is distinguishable from BRSKI-PRM (pledge-responder-mode) by
the registrar. The registrar SHOULD verify that the Registrar-Agent
is authorized to establish a connection to the registrar based on the
TLS client authentication. If the connection from Registrar-Agent to
registrar is established, the authorization SHOULD be verified again
based on agent-signed-data contained in the PVR. This ensures that
the pledge has been triggered by an authorized Registrar-Agent.
With BRSKI-PRM, the pledge generates PVR and PER as JSON-in-JWS
objects and the Registrar-Agent forwards them to the registrar. In
[RFC8995], the pledge generates PVR as CMS-signed JSON and PER as
PKCS#10 or PKCS#7 according to [RFC7030] and inherited by [RFC8995].
Figure 17 shows the exchanges for the Voucher Request processing and
the following subsections describe the corresponding artifacts.
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+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| Pledge | | Registrar- | | Domain | | Domain | | MASA |
| | | Agent | | Registrar | | CA | | |
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| | | | Internet |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(3) Supply PVR to Registrar (including backend interaction)
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
| |<-----mTLS------>| | |
| | [Registrar-Agent | |
| | authenticated&authorized?] | |
| |-------PVR------>| | |
| | [accept device?] | |
| | [contact vendor] | |
| | | | |
| | |<------------mTLS------------>|
| | |--------------RVR------------>|
| | | [extract DomainID]
| | | [update audit log]
| | |<-----------Voucher-----------|
| |<----Voucher-----| | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Figure 17: Voucher issuing exchange
The HTTP request Content-Type header field for JSON-in-JWS PVR is:
application/voucher-jws+json (see Section 7.1 for the content
definition), as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher].
The Registrar-Agent sets the Accept field in the request-header
indicating the acceptable Content-Type for the Voucher.
The HTTP response Content-Type header field is set to application/
voucher-jws+json as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher] if no
content negotiation is used.
7.3.1. Request Artifact: Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR)
For BRSKI-PRM, the Registrar-Agent sends the PVR by HTTP POST to the
same registrar endpoint as introduced by BRSKI: "/.well- known/brski/
requestvoucher", but with a Content-Type header field for JSON-in-
JWS"
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7.3.2. Supply RVR to MASA (backend interaction)
The registrar needs to convert the PVR to an RVR and supply it to the
MASA.
If the MASA address/URI is learned from the IDevID MASA URI extension
(Section 2.3 of [RFC8995]), then the MASA on that URI MUST support
the procedures defined in this document if the PVR used JSON-JWS
encoding. If the MASA is only configured on the registrar, then a
registrar supporting BRKSI-PRM and other voucher encoding formats
(such as those in [RFC8995]) SHOULD support per-message-format MASA
address/URI configuration for the same IDevID trust anchor."
The registrar SHALL construct the payload of the RVR as defined in
[RFC8995], Section 5.5. The RVR encoding SHALL be JSON-in-JWS as
defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher].
The header of the RVR SHALL contain the following parameter as
defined for JWS [RFC7515]:
* alg: algorithm used to create the object signature
* x5c: base64-encoded registrar LDevID certificate(s) (It optionally
contains the certificate chain for this certificate)
The payload of the RVR MUST contain the following parameter as part
of the voucher-request as defined in [RFC8995]:
* created-on: current date and time in yang:date-and-time format of
RVR creation
* nonce: copied from the PVR
* serial-number: product-serial-number of pledge. The registrar
MUST verify that the IDevID certificate subject serialNumber of
the pledge (X520SerialNumber) matches the serial-number value in
the PVR. In addition, it MUST be equal to the serial-number value
contained in the agent-signed data of PVR.
* assertion: voucher assertion requested by the pledge (agent-
proximity). The registrar provides this information to assure
successful verification of Registrar-Agent proximity based on the
agent-signed-data.
* prior-signed-voucher-request: PVR as received from Registrar-
Agent, see Section 7.1
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The RVR MUST be extended with the following parameter, when the
assertion "agent-proximity" is requested, as defined in
[I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis]:
* agent-sign-cert: EE (RegAgt) certificate or the EE (RegAgt)
certificate including certificate chain. In the context of this
document it is a JSON array of base64encoded certificate
information and handled in the same way as x5c header objects. If
only a single object is contained in the x5c it MUST be the
base64-encoded EE (RegAgt) certificate. If multiple certificates
are included in the x5c, the first MUST be the base64-encoded EE
(RegAgt) certificate.
The MASA uses this information for verification that the Registrar-
Agent is in proximity to the registrar to state the corresponding
assertion "agent-proximity".
The object is signed using the registrar LDevID credentials, which
corresponds to the certificate referenced in the JOSE header.
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# The RVR in General JWS Serialization syntax
{
"payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(ietf-voucher-request:voucher)),
"signatures": [
{
"protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
"signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
}
]
}
# Example: Decoded payload "ietf-voucher-request:voucher"
representation in JSON syntax
{
"ietf-voucher-request:voucher": {
"created-on": "2022-01-04T02:37:39.235Z",
"nonce": "eDs++/FuDHGUnRxN3E14CQ==",
"serial-number": "callee4711",
"assertion": "agent-proximity",
"prior-signed-voucher-request": "base64encodedvalue==",
"agent-sign-cert": [
"base64encodedvalue==",
"base64encodedvalue==",
"..."
]
}
}
# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
in JSON syntax
{
"alg": "ES256",
"x5c": [
"base64encodedvalue==",
"base64encodedvalue=="
],
"typ": "voucher-jws+json"
}
Figure 18: Representation of RVR
The registrar SHALL send the RVR to the MASA endpoint by HTTP POST:
"/.well-known/brski/requestvoucher"
The RVR Content-Type header field is defined in
[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher] as: application/voucher-jws+json
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The registrar SHOULD set the Accept header of the RVR indicating the
desired media type for the voucher-response. The media type is
application/voucher-jws+json as defined in
[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher].
This document uses the JSON-in-JWS format throughout the definition
of exchanges and in the examples. Nevertheless, alternative
encodings of the voucher as used in BRSKI [RFC8995] with JSON-in-CMS
or CBOR-in-COSE_Sign [RFC9052] for constraint environments are
possible as well. The assumption is that a pledge typically supports
a single encoding variant and creates the PVR in the supported
format. To ensure that the pledge is able to process the voucher,
the registrar MUST use the media type for Accept header in the RVR
based on the media type used for the PVR.
Once the MASA receives the RVR it SHALL perform the verification as
described in Section 5.5 of [RFC8995].
In addition, the following processing SHALL be performed for PVR
contained in RVR "prior-signed-voucher-request" field:
* agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert: The MASA MAY verify that
this field contains the registrar LDevID certificate. If so, it
MUST correspond to the registrar LDevID credentials used to sign
the RVR. Note: Correspond here relates to the case that a single
registrar LDevID certificate is used or that different registrar
LDevID certificates are used, which are issued by the same CA.
* agent-signed-data: The MASA MAY verify this data to issue "agent-
proximity" assertion. If so, the agent-signed-data MUST contain
the pledge product-serial-number, contained in the "serial-number"
field of the PVR (from "prior-signed-voucher-request" field) and
also in "serial-number" field of the RVR. The EE (RegAgt)
certificate to be used for signature verification is identified by
the "kid" parameter of the JOSE header. If the assertion "agent-
proximity" is requested, the RVR MUST contain the corresponding EE
(RegAgt) certificate data in the "agent-sign-cert" field of the
RVR. It MUST be verified by the MASA to the same domain CA as the
registrar LDevID certificate. If the "agent-sign-cert" field is
not set, the MASA MAY state a lower level assertion value, e.g.:
"logged" or "verified". Note: Sub-CA certificate(s) MUST also be
carried by "agent-sign-cert", in case the EE (RegAgt) certificate
is issued by a sub-CA and not the domain CA known to the MASA. As
the "agent-sign-cert" field is defined as array (x5c), it can
handle multiple certificates.
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If validation fails, the MASA SHOULD respond with an HTTP 4xx client
error status code to the registrar. The HTTP error status codes are
kept the same as defined in Section 5.6 of [RFC8995] and comprise the
codes: 403, 404, 406, and 415.
The registrar provides the EE certificate of the Registrar-Agent
identified by the SubjectKeyIdentifier (SKID) in the header of the
"agent-signed-data" from the PVR in its RVR (see also Section 7.3.2).
The MASA in turn verifies the registrar LDevID certificate is
included in the PVR (contained in the "prior-signed-voucher-request"
field of RVR) in the "agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert" leaf
and may assert the PVR as "verified" or "logged".
In addition, the MASA may issue the assertion "agent-proximity" as
follows: The MASA verifies the signature of the "agent-signed-data"
contained in the "prior-signed-voucher-request", based on the
provided EE certificate of the Registrar-Agent in the "agent-sign-
cert" leaf of the RVR. If both can be verified successfully, the
MASA can assert "agent-proximity" in the voucher. The assertion of
"agent-proximity" is similar to the proximity assertion by the MASA
when using BRSKI. Note that the different assertions do not provide
a metric of strength as the security properties are not comparable.
Depending on the MASA verification policy, it may also respond with a
suitable 4xx or 5xx response status codes as described in Section 5.6
of [RFC8995]. When successful, the Voucher will then be supplied via
the registrar to the Registrar-Agent.
7.3.3. Issue Voucher by MASA (backend interaction)
The MASA creates a voucher with Media-Type of application/voucher-
jws+json as defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher]. If the MASA
detects that the Accept header of the PVR does not match application/
voucher-jws+json it SHOULD respond with the HTTP status code "406 Not
Acceptable" as the pledge will not be able to parse the response.
The voucher is according to [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis] but uses the
new assertion value specified Section 5.4.
Figure 19 shows an example of the contents of a voucher.
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# The MASA issued voucher in General JWS Serialization syntax
{
"payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(ietf-voucher:voucher)),
"signatures": [
{
"protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
"signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
}
]
}
# Example: Decoded payload "ietf-voucher:voucher" representation
in JSON syntax
{
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
"assertion": "agent-proximity",
"serial-number": "callee4711",
"nonce": "base64encodedvalue==",
"created-on": "2022-01-04T00:00:02.000Z",
"pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
}
# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
in JSON syntax
{
"alg": "ES256",
"x5c": [
"base64encodedvalue==",
"base64encodedvalue=="
],
"typ": "voucher-jws+json"
}
Figure 19: Representation of MASA issued voucher
The pinned-domain certificate to be put into the voucher is
determined by the MASA as described in Section 5.5 of [RFC8995]. The
MASA returns the voucher-response (voucher) to the registrar.
7.3.4. Supply Voucher to Registrar (backend interaction)
After receiving the voucher the registrar SHOULD evaluate it for
transparency and logging purposes as outlined in Section 5.6 of
[RFC8995]. The registrar MUST add an additional signature to the
MASA provided voucher using its registrar EE credentials.
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The signature is created by signing the original "JWS Payload"
produced by MASA and the registrar added "JWS Protected Header" using
the registrar EE credentials (see [RFC7515], Section 5.2 point 8.
The x5c component of the "JWS Protected Header" MUST contain the
registrar EE certificate as well as potential subordinate CA
certificates up to (but not including) the pinned domain certificate.
The pinned domain certificate is already contained in the voucher
payload ("pinned-domain-cert").
(For many installations, with a single registrar credential, the
registrar credential is what is pinned)
In [RFC8995], the Registrar proved possession of the it's credential
when the TLS session was setup. While the pledge could not, at the
time, validate the certificate truly belonged the registrar, it did
validate that the certificate it was provided was able to
authenticate the TLS connection.
In the BRSKI-PRM mode, with the Registrar-Agent mediating all
communication, the Pledge has not as yet been able to witness that
the intended Registrar really does possess the relevant private key.
This second signature provides for the same level of assurance to the
pledge, and that it matches the public key that the pledge received
in the trigger for the PVR (see Figure 11).
The registrar MUST use the same registrar EE credentials used for
authentication in the TLS handshake to authenticate towards the
Registrar-Agent. This has some operational implications when the
registrar may be part of a scalable framework as described in
[I-D.richardson-anima-registrar-considerations], Section 1.3.1.
The second signature MUST either be done with the private key
associated with the registrar EE certificate provided to the
Registrar-Agent, or the use of a certificate chain is necessary.
This ensures that the same registrar EE certificate can be used to
verify the signature as transmitted in the voucher-request as also
transferred in the PVR in the "agent-provided-proximity-registrar-
cert".
Figure 20 below provides an example of the voucher with two
signatures.
# The MASA issued voucher with additional registrar signature in
General JWS Serialization syntax
{
"payload": BASE64URL(ietf-voucher:voucher),
"signatures": [
{
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"protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header (MASA))),
"signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
},
{
"protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header (Reg))),
"signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
}
]
}
# Example: Decoded payload "ietf-voucher:voucher" representation in
JSON syntax
{
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
"assertion": "agent-proximity",
"serial-number": "callee4711",
"nonce": "base64encodedvalue==",
"created-on": "2022-01-04T00:00:02.000Z",
"pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
}
# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header (MASA)" representation
in JSON syntax
{
"alg": "ES256",
"typ": "voucher-jws+json",
"x5c": [
"base64encodedvalue==",
"base64encodedvalue=="
]
}
# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header (Reg)" representation
in JSON syntax
{
"alg": "ES256",
"x5c": [
"base64encodedvalue==",
"base64encodedvalue=="
]
}
Figure 20: Representation of MASA issued voucher with additional
registrar signature
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Depending on the security policy of the operator, this signature can
also be interpreted by the pledge as explicit authorization of the
registrar to install the contained trust anchor. The registrar sends
the voucher to the Registrar-Agent.
7.3.5. Response Artifact: Voucher
After receiving the PVR from Registrar-Agent, the registrar SHALL
perform the verification as defined in Section 5.3 of [RFC8995]. In
addition, the registrar SHALL verify the following parameters from
the PVR:
* agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert: MUST contain registrar's
own registrar LDevID certificate to ensure the registrar in
proximity of the Registrar-Agent is the desired registrar for this
PVR.
* agent-signed-data: The registrar MUST verify that the Registrar-
Agent provided data has been signed with the private key
corresponding to the EE (RegAgt) certificate indicated in the
"kid" JOSE header parameter. The registrar MUST verify that the
LDevID(ReAgt) certificate, corresponding to the signature, is
still valid. If the certificate is already expired, the registrar
SHALL reject the request. Validity of used signing certificates
at the time of signing the agent-signed-data is necessary to avoid
that a rogue Registrar-Agent generates agent-signed-data objects
to onboard arbitrary pledges at a later point in time, see also
Section 10.3. The registrar MUST fetch the EE (RegAgt)
certificate, based on the provided SubjectKeyIdentifier (SKID)
contained in the "kid" header parameter of the agent-signed-data,
and perform this verification. This requires, that the registrar
has access to the EE (RegAgt) certificate data (including
intermediate CA certificates if existent) based on the SKID.
Note, the registrar may have stored the EE (RegAgt) certificate if
used during TLS establishment between Registrar-Agent and
registrar or it may be provided via a repository.
If the registrar is unable to validate the PVR, it SHOULD respond
with a HTTP 4xx/5xx error code to the Registrar-Agent.
The following 4xx client error codes SHOULD be used:
* 403 Forbidden: if the registrar detected that one or more security
related parameters are not valid or if the pledge-provided
information could not be used with automated allowance.
* 406 Not Acceptable: if the Content-Type indicated by the Accept
header is unknown or unsupported.
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If the validation succeeds, the registrar performs pledge
authorization according to Section 5.3 of [RFC8995] followed by
obtaining a voucher from the pledge's MASA according to Section 5.4
of [RFC8995] with the modifications described below in Section 7.3.2.
7.4. Supply PER to Registrar (including backend interaction)
After receiving the voucher, the Registrar-Agent sends the PER to the
registrar in the same HTTP-over-TLS connection. Which is similar to
the PER processing described in Section 5.2 of [RFC8995]. In case
the PER cannot be send in the same HTTP-over-TLS connection the
Registrar-Agent may send the PER in a new HTTP-over-TLS connection.
The registrar is able to correlate the PVR and the PER based on the
signatures and the contained product-serial-number information.
Note, this also addresses situations in which a nonceless voucher is
used and may be pre-provisioned to the pledge.
Figure 21 depicts exchanges for the PER request handling and the
following subsections describe the corresponding artifacts.
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| Pledge | | Registrar- | | Domain | | Domain | | MASA |
| | | Agent | | Registrar | | CA | | |
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| | | | Internet |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(4) Supply PER to Registrar (including backend interaction)
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
| |<----(mTLS)----->| | |
| |-------PER------>| | |
| | |<-----mTLS------>| |
| | |-------RER------>| |
| | |<--Enroll-Resp---| |
| |<--Enroll-Resp---| | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Figure 21: Enroll exchange
In case the TLS connection to the registrar is already closed, the
Registrar-Agent opens a new TLS connection with the registrar as
stated in Section 7.3.
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7.4.1. Request Artifact: Pledge Enroll-Request (PER)
As specified in Section 7.2 deviating from BRSKI the PER is not a raw
PKCS#10. As the Registrar-Agent is involved in the exchange, the
PKCS#10 is wrapped in a JWS object by the pledge and signed with
pledge's IDevID to ensure proof-of-identity as outlined in Figure 16.
EST [RFC7030] standard endpoints (/simpleenroll, /simplereenroll,
/serverkeygen, /cacerts) on the registrar cannot be used for BRSKI-
PRM. This is caused by the utilization of signature wrapped-objects
in BRSKI-PRM. As EST requires to sent a raw PKCS#10 request to e.g.,
"/.well-known/est/simpleenroll" endpoint, this document makes an
enhancement by utilizing EST but with the exception to transport a
signature wrapped PKCS#10 request. Therefore a new endpoint for
BRSKI-PRM on the registrar is defined as "/.well-known/brski/
requestenroll"
The Registrar-Agent SHALL send the PER to the registrar by HTTP POST
to the endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/requestenroll"
The Content-Type header of PER is: application/jose+json.
This is a deviation from the Content-Type header values used in
[RFC7030] and results in additional processing at the domain
registrar (as EST server). Note, the registrar is already aware that
the bootstrapping is performed in a pledge-responder-mode due to the
use of the EE (RegAgt) certificate for TLS and the provided PVR as
JSON-in-JWS object.
* If the registrar receives a PER with Content-Type header:
application/jose+json, it MUST verify the wrapping signature using
the certificate indicated in the JOSE header.
* The registrar verifies that the pledge's certificate (here
IDevID), carried in "x5c" header field, is accepted to join the
domain after successful validation of the PVR.
7.4.2. Enroll Pledge by Domain CA (backend interaction)
If both succeed, the registrar utilizes the PKCS#10 request contained
in the JWS object body as "P10" parameter of "ietf-sztp-csr:csr" for
further processing of the Enroll-Request with the corresponding
domain CA. It creates a Registrar Enroll-Request (RER) by utilizing
the protocol expected by the domain CA.
The domain registrar may either directly forward the provided PKCS#10
request to the CA or provide additional information about attributes
to be included by the CA into the requested LDevID certificate.
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The approach of sending this information to the CA depends on the
utilized certificate management protocol between the RA and the CA
and is out of scope for this document.
7.4.3. Response Artifact: Enroll-Response (Enroll-Resp)
The registrar SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 OK in the success case
or fail with HTTP 4xx/5xx status codes as defined by the HTTP
standard.
A successful interaction with the domain CA will result in a pledge
LDevID certificate, which is then forwarded by the registrar to the
Registrar-Agent using the Content-Type header: application/
pkcs7-mime.
Note while BRSKI-PRM targets the initial enrollment, re-enrollment
may be supported in a similar way with the exception that the current
LDevID certificate is used instead of the IDevID certificate to
verify the wrapping signature of the PKCS#10 request (see also
Section 7.2).
7.5. Request CA Certificates
As the pledge will verify it own certificate LDevID certificate when
received, it also needs the corresponding CA certificates. This is
done in EST [RFC7030] using the "/.well-known/est/cacerts" endpoint,
which provides the CA certificates over a TLS protected connection.
BRSKI-PRM requires a signature wrapped CA certificate object, to
avoid that the pledge can be provided with arbitrary CA certificates
in an authorized way. The registrar signed CA certificate object
will allow the pledge to verify the authorization to install the
received CA certificate(s). As the CA certificate(s) are provided to
the pledge after the voucher, the pledge has the required information
(the domain certificate) to verify the wrapped CA certificate object.
Figure 22 shows the request and provisioning of CA certificates in
the infrastructure. The following subsections describe the
corresponding artifacts.
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+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| Pledge | | Registrar- | | Domain | | Domain | | MASA |
| | | Agent | | Registrar | | CA | | |
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| | | | Internet |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(5) Request CA Certificates
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
| |<----(mTLS)----->| | |
| |---cACert-Req--->| | |
| |<--cACert-Resp---| | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Figure 22: CA certificates retrival exchange
In case the TLS connection to the registrar is already closed, the
Registrar-Agent opens a new TLS connection with the registrar as
stated in Section 7.3.
7.5.1. Request Artifact: cACert-Request (cACert-Req)
To support Registrar-Agents requesting a signature wrapped CA
certificate(s) object, a new endpoint for BRSKI-PRM is defined on the
registrar: "/.well-known/brski/wrappedcacerts"
The Registrar-Agent SHALL requests the EST CA trust anchor database
information (in form of CA certificates) by HTTP GET.
7.5.2. Response Artifact: cACert-Response (cACert-Resp)
The Content-Type header of the response SHALL be: application/
jose+json.
This is a deviation from the Content-Type header values used in EST
[RFC7030] and results in additional processing at the domain
registrar (as EST server). The additional processing is to sign the
CA certificate(s) information using the registrar LDevID credentials.
This results in a signed CA certificate(s) object (JSON-in-JWS), the
CA certificates are provided as base64-encoded "x5bag" (see
definition in [RFC9360]) in the JWS payload.
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# The CA certificates data with registrar signature in
# General JWS Serialization syntax
{
"payload": BASE64URL(certs),
"signatures": [
{
"protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
"signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
}
]
}
# Example: Decoded payload "certs" representation in JSON syntax
{
"x5bag": [
"base64encodedvalue==",
"base64encodedvalue=="
]
}
# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
in JSON syntax
{
"alg": "ES256",
"x5c": [
"base64encodedvalue==",
"base64encodedvalue=="
]
}
Figure 23: Representation of CA certificate(s) data with
registrar signature
7.6. Supply Voucher to Pledge
It is assumed that the Registrar-Agent already obtained the
bootstrapping response objects from the domain registrar and can
supply them to the pledge:
* voucher-response - Voucher (from MASA via Registrar)
* wrapped-CA-certificate(s)-response - CA certificates
* enrollment-response - LDevID (Pledge) certificate (from CA via
registrar)
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To deliver these response objects, the Registrar-Agent will re-
connect to the pledge. To contact the pledge, it may either discover
the pledge as described in Section 6.2.2 or use stored information
from the first contact with the pledge.
Preconditions in addition to Section 7.3:
* Registrar-Agent: obtained voucher and LDevID certificate and
optionally IDevID CA certificates. The IDevID CA certificate is
necessary, when the connection between the Registrar-Agent and the
pledge is established using TLS to enable the Registrar-Agent to
validate the pledges' IDevID certificate during the TLS handshake
as described in Section 7.1.
The Registrar-Agent MAY optionally use TLS to protect the
communication as outlined in Section 7.1.
The Registrar-Agent provides the information via distinct pledge
endpoints as following. Figure 24 shows the provisioning of the
voucher to the pledge. The following subsections describe the
corresponding artifacts.
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| Pledge | | Registrar- | | Domain | | Domain | | MASA |
| | | Agent | | Registrar | | CA | | |
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| | | | Internet |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(6) Supply Voucher to Pledge
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
|<----opt. TLS---->| | | |
|<-----Voucher-----| | | |
|------vStatus---->| | | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Figure 24: Voucher exchange
7.6.1. Request Artifact: Voucher
The Registrar-Agent SHALL send the voucher-response to the pledge by
HTTP POST to the endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/svr".
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The Registrar-Agent voucher-response Content-Type header is
application/voucher-jws+json and contains the voucher as provided by
the MASA. An example is given in Figure 19 for a MASA signed voucher
and in Figure 20 for the voucher with the additional signature of the
registrar.
A nonceless voucher may be accepted as in [RFC8995] and may be
allowed by a manufacture's pledge implementation.
To perform the validation of several signatures on the voucher
object, the pledge SHALL perform the signature verification in the
following order:
1. Verify MASA signature as described in Section 5.6.1 of [RFC8995],
against pre-installed manufacturer trust anchor (IDevID).
2. Install trust anchor contained in the voucher ("pinned-domain-
cert") provisionally
3. Validate the LDevID(Reg) certificate received in the agent-
provided-proximity-registrar-cert in the Pledge-Voucher-Request
trigger request (in the field "agent-provided-proximity-
registrar-cert")
4. Verify registrar signature of the voucher similar as described in
Section 5.6.1 of [RFC8995], but take the registrar certificate
instead of the MASA certificate for the verification
Step3 and step 4 have been introduced in BRSKI-PRM to enable
verification of LDevID(Reg) certificate and also the proof-of-
possession of the corresponding private key by the registrar, which
is done in BRSKI based on the established TLS channel. If all steps
stated above have been performed successfully, the pledge SHALL
terminate the "PROVISIONAL accept" state for the domain trust anchor
and the registrar LDevID certificate.
If an error occurs during the verification and validation of the
voucher, this SHALL be reported in the reason field of the pledge
voucher status.
7.6.2. Response Artifact: Voucher Status (vStatus)
After voucher verification and validation the pledge MUST reply with
a status telemetry message as defined in Section 5.7 of [RFC8995].
The pledge generates the voucher-status and provides it as signed
JSON-in-JWS object in response to the Registrar-Agent.
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The response has the Content-Type application/jose+json and is signed
using the IDevID of the pledge as shown in Figure 25. As the reason
field is optional (see [RFC8995]), it MAY be omitted in case of
success.
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# The "pledge-voucher-status" telemetry in general JWS
serialization syntax
{
"payload": BASE64URL(pledge-voucher-status),
"signatures": [
{
"protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
"signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
}
]
}
# Example: Decoded payload "pledge-voucher-status" representation
in JSON syntax for success case
{
"version": 1,
"status": true,
"reason": "Voucher successfully processed",
"reason-context": {
"pvs-details": "JSON"
}
}
# Example: Decoded payload "pledge-voucher-status" representation
in JSON syntax for error case
{
"version": 1,
"status": false,
"reason": "Failed to authenticate MASA certificate because
it starts in the future (1/1/2023).",
"reason-context": {
"pvs-details": "Current date: 1/1/1970"
}
}
# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
in JSON syntax
{
"alg": "ES256",
"x5c": [
"base64encodedvalue==",
"base64encodedvalue=="
]
}
Figure 25: Representation of pledge voucher status telemetry
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If the pledge did not did not provide voucher status telemetry
information after processing the voucher, the Registrar-Agent MAY
query the pledge status explicitly as described in Section 7.11 and
MAY resent the voucher depending on the Pledge status following the
procedure described in Section 7.6.
7.7. Supply CA Certificates to Pledge
Figure 26 shows the provisioning of the CA certificates aquired by
the pledge-agent to the pledge. The following subsections describe
the corresponding artifacts.
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| Pledge | | Registrar- | | Domain | | Domain | | MASA |
| | | Agent | | Registrar | | CA | | |
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| | | | Internet |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(7) Supply CA Certificates to Pledge
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
|<----opt. TLS---->| | | |
|<-----cACerts-----| | | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Figure 26: Certificate provisioning exchange
7.7.1. Request Artifact:
The Registrar-Agent SHALL provide the set of CA certificates
requested from the registrar to the pledge by HTTP POST to the
endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/scac".
As the CA certificate provisioning is crucial from a security
perspective, this provisioning SHOULD only be done, if the voucher-
response has been successfully processed by pledge as reflected in
the voucher status telemetry.
The CA certificates message has the Content-Type application/
jose+json and is signed using the credential of the registrar as
shown in Figure 23.
The CA certificates are provided as base64-encoded "x5bag". The
pledge SHALL install the received CA certificates as trust anchor
after successful verification of the registrar's signature.
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7.7.2. Response (no artifact)
The verification comprises the following steps the pledge MUST
perform. Maintaining the order of versification steps as indicated
allows to determine, which verification has already been passed:
1. Check content-type of the CA certificates message. If no
Content-Type is contained in the HTTP header, the default
Content-Type utilized in this document (JSON-in-JWS) is used. If
the Content-Type of the response is in an unknown or unsupported
format, the pledge SHOULD reply with a 415 Unsupported media type
error code.
2. Check the encoding of the payload. If the pledge detects errors
in the encoding of the payload, it SHOULD reply with 400 Bad
Request error code.
3. Verify that the wrapped CA certificate object is signed using the
registrar certificate against the pinned-domain certificate.
This MAY be done by comparing the hash that is indicating the
certificate used to sign the message is that of the pinned-domain
certificate. If the validation against the pinned domain-
certificate fails, the client SHOULD reply with a 401
Unauthorized error code. It signals that the authentication has
failed and therefore the object was not accepted.
4. Verify signature of the received wrapped CA certificate object
using the domain certificate contained in the voucher. If the
validation of the signature fails, the pledge SHOULD reply with a
403 Forbidden. It signals that the object could not be verified
and has not been accepted.
5. If the received CA certificates are not self-signed, i.e., an
intermediate CA certificate, verify them against an already
installed trust anchor, as described in section 4.1.3 of
[RFC7030].
In case of success, the pledge SHOULD reply with HTTP 200 OK without
a response body.
7.8. Supply Enroll-Response to Pledge
Figure 27 shows the supply of the Enroll-Response to the pledge. The
following subsections describe the corresponding artifacts.
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+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| Pledge | | Registrar- | | Domain | | Domain | | MASA |
| | | Agent | | Registrar | | CA | | |
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| | | | Internet |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(8) Supply Enroll-Response to Pledge
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
|<----opt. TLS---->| | | |
|<---Enroll-Resp---| | | |
|-----eStatus----->| | | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Figure 27: Enroll-Response exchange
7.8.1. Request Artifact: Enroll-Response (Enroll-Resp)
The Registrar-Agent SHALL send the Enroll-Response to the pledge by
HTTP(S) POST to the endpoint: "/.well-known/brski/ser".
The Content-Type header when using EST [RFC7030] as enrollment
protocol between the Registrar-Agent and the infrastructure is
application/pkcs7-mime. Note: It only contains the LDevID
certificate for the pledge, not the certificate chain.
Upon reception, the pledge SHALL verify the received LDevID
certificate. The pledge SHALL generate the enroll status and provide
it in the response to the Registrar-Agent. If the verification of
the LDevID certificate succeeds, the status property SHALL be set to
"status": true, otherwise to "status": false
7.8.2. Response Artifact: Enroll Status (eStatus)
After enrollment processing the pledge MUST reply with a enrollment
status telemetry message as defined in Section 5.9.4 of [RFC8995].
The enroll-status is also a signed object in BRSKI-PRM and results in
form of JSON-in-JWS here. If the pledge verified the received LDevID
certificate successfully it SHALL sign the enroll-status using its
new LDevID credentials as shown in Figure 29. In failure case, the
pledge SHALL use its IDevID credentials. Section 5.9.4 of [RFC8995]
specifies the enrollment status telemetry message with two optional
fields for "reason" and "reason-context". In BRSKI-PRM the optional
fields are mandated to have a clear distinction between other status
messages and MUST be provided therefore. This distinction is
intended for better error handling on registrar side, as a status
object could be send to a wrong status endpoint.
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The following CDDL [RFC8610] explains enroll-status response
structure. It is similar as defined in Section 5.9.4 of [RFC8995]
with the optional fields set to mandatory as described above.
<CODE BEGINS>
enrollstatus-trigger = {
"version": uint,
"status": bool,
"reason": text,
"reason-context" : { $$arbitrary-map }
}
<CODE ENDS>
Figure 28: CDDL for pledge-enrollment-status response
The response has the Content-Type application/jose+json.
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# The "pledge-enroll-status" telemetry in General JWS Serialization
syntax
{
"payload": BASE64URL(pledge-enroll-status),
"signatures": [
{
"protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
"signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
}
]
}
# Example: Decoded payload "pledge-enroll-status" representation
in JSON syntax for success case
{
"version": 1,
"status": true,
"reason": "Enroll-Response successfully processed",
"reason-context": {
"pes-details": "JSON"
}
}
# Example: Decoded payload "pledge-voucher-status" representation
in JSON syntax for error case
{
"version": 1,
"status": false,
"reason": "Enroll-Response could not be verified.",
"reason-context": {
"pes-details": "no matching trust anchor"
}
}
# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
in JSON syntax
{
"alg": "ES256",
"x5c": [
"base64encodedvalue==",
"base64encodedvalue=="
]
}
Figure 29: Representation of pledge enroll status telemetry
Once the Registrar-Agent has collected the information, it can
connect to the registrar to provide it with the status responses.
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7.9. Voucher Status Telemetry (including backend interaction)
The following description requires that the Registrar-Agent has
collected the status information from the pledge. It SHALL provide
the status information to the registrar for further processing.
Preconditions in addition to Section 7.3:
* Registrar-Agent: obtained voucher status (vStatus) and enroll
status (eStatus) from pledge.
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| Pledge | | Registrar- | | Domain | | Domain | | MASA |
| | | Agent | | Registrar | | CA | | |
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| | | | Internet |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(9) Voucher Status Telemetry (including backend interaction)
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
| |<----(mTLS)----->| | |
| |-----vStatus---->| | |
| | |<-----------(mTLS)----------->|
| | |-----req device audit log---->|
| | |<------device audit log-------|
| | [verify audit log] | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
{: #exchangesfig_uc2_9 title="Voucher Status telemetry exchange"
artwork-align="center"}~~~~ aasvg
In case the TLS connection to the registrar is already closed, the
Registrar-Agent opens a new TLS connection with the registrar as
stated in Section 7.3.
The Registrar-Agent MUST provide the collected pledge voucher status
to the registrar. This status indicates if the pledge could process
the voucher successfully or not.
7.9.1. Request Artifact: Voucher Status (vStatus)
The Registrar-Agent sends the pledge voucher status without
modification to the registrar with an HTTP-over-TLS POST using the
registrar endpoint "/.well-known/brski/voucher_status". The Content-
Type header is kept as application/jose+json as depicted in the
example in Figure 25.
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The registrar SHOULD log the transaction provided for a pledge via
Registrar-Agent and include the identity of the Registrar-Agent in
these logs. For log analysis the following may be considered:
* The registrar knows the interacting Registrar-Agent from the
authentication of the Registrar-Agent towards the registrar using
LDevID (RegAgt) and can log it accordingly.
* The telemetry information from the pledge can be correlated to the
voucher response provided from the registrar to the Registrar-
Agent and further to the pledge.
* The telemetry information, when provided to the registrar is
provided via the Registrar-Agent and can thus be correlated.
The registrar SHALL verify the signature of the pledge voucher status
and validate that it belongs to an accepted device of the domain
based on the contained "serial-number" in the IDevID certificate
referenced in the header of the voucher status.
7.9.2. Response (no artifact)
According to Section 5.7 of [RFC8995], the registrar SHOULD respond
with an HTTP 200 OK without a response body in the success case or
fail with HTTP 4xx/5xx status codes. The Registrar-Agent may use the
response status code to signal success/failure to the service
technician operating the Registrar-Agent. Within the server logs the
server SHOULD capture this telemetry information.
The registrar SHOULD proceed with collecting and logging status
information by requesting the MASA audit-log from the MASA service as
described in Section 5.8 of [RFC8995].
7.10. Enroll Status Telemetry
The Registrar-Agent MUST provide the pledge's enroll status to the
registrar. The status indicates the pledge could process the Enroll-
Response (certificate) and holds the corresponding private key.
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+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| Pledge | | Registrar- | | Domain | | Domain | | MASA |
| | | Agent | | Registrar | | CA | | |
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| | | | Internet |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(10) Enroll Status Telemetry
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
| |<----(mTLS)----->| | |
| |-----eStatus---->| | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Figure 30: Enroll Status telemetry exchange
In case the TLS connection to the registrar is already closed, the
Registrar-Agent opens a new TLS connection with the registrar as
stated in Section 7.3.
7.10.1. Request Artifact: Enroll Status (eStatus)
The Registrar-Agent sends the pledge enroll status without
modification to the registrar with an HTTP-over-TLS POST using the
registrar endpoint "/.well-known/brski/enrollstatus". The Content-
Type header is kept as application/jose+json as depicted in the
example in Figure 29.
The registrar MUST verify the signature of the pledge enroll status.
Also, the registrar SHALL validate that the pledge is an accepted
device of the domain based on the contained product-serial-number in
the LDevID certificate referenced in the header of the enroll status.
The registrar SHOULD log this event. In case the pledge enroll
status indicates a failure, the pledge was unable to verify the
received LDevID certificate and therefore signed the enroll status
with its IDevID credential. Note that the signature verification of
the status information is an addition to the described handling in
Section 5.9.4 of [RFC8995], and is replacing the pledges TLS client
authentication by DevID credentials in [RFC8995].
7.10.2. Response (no artifact)
According to Section 5.9.4 of [RFC8995], the registrar SHOULD respond
with an HTTP 200 OK in the success case or fail with HTTP 4xx/5xx
status codes.
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Based on the failure case the registrar MAY decide that for security
reasons the pledge is not allowed to reside in the domain. In this
case the registrar MUST revoke the certificate. An example case for
the registrar revoking the issued LDevID for the pledge is when the
pledge was not able to verify the received LDevID certificate and
therefore did send a 406 (Not Acceptable) response. In this case the
registrar may revoke the LDevID certificate as the pledge did no
accepted it for installation.
The Registrar-Agent may use the response to signal success / failure
to the service technician operating the Registrar-Agent. Within the
server log the registrar SHOULD capture this telemetry information.
7.11. Query Pledge Status
The following assumes that a Registrar-Agent may need to query the
status of a pledge. This information may be useful to solve errors,
when the pledge was not able to connect to the target domain during
the bootstrapping. The pledge MAY provide the dedicated endpoint for
the Query Pledge Status operation.
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| Pledge | | Registrar- | | Domain | | Domain | | MASA |
| | | Agent | | Registrar | | CA | | |
+--------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +--------+ +------+
| | | | Internet |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
(11) Query Pledge Status
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| | | | |
|<----opt. TLS---->| | | |
|<-----tStatus-----| | | |
|------pStatus---->| | | |
| | | | |
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Figure 31: Pledge Status exchange
The Registrar-Agent queries the Pledge Status via HTTP POST request
on the well-known pledge endpoint /.well-known/brski/qps. The
request body MUST contain the JWS-signed Status Trigger (tStatus)
artifact. The request header MUST set the Content-Type field
application/jose+json.
If the pledge provides the Query Pledge Status endpoint, it MUST
reply to this request with the Pledge Status (pStatus) artifact in
the body of a 200 OK response. The response header MUST have the
Content-Type field set to application/jose+json.
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7.11.1. Request Artifact: Status Trigger (tStatus)
The Status Query artifact is a JWS structure signing information on
the requested status-type, the time and date the request is created,
and the product serial-number of the pledge contacted as shown in
Figure 32. The following Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL)
[RFC8610] defines the structure of the unsigned Status Query data
(i.e., JWS payload):
<CODE BEGINS>
statustrigger = {
"version": uint,
"created-on": tdate,
"serial-number": text,
"status-type": text
}
<CODE ENDS>
Figure 32: CDDL for unsigned Status Trigger data (statustrigger)
The version field is included to permit significant changes to the
pledge status artifacts in the future. The format and semantics in
this document follow the status telemetry definitions of [RFC8995].
Hence, the version MUST be set to 1. A pledge (or Registrar-Agent)
that receives a version larger than it knows about SHOULD log the
contents and alert a human.
The created-on field contains a standard date/time string following
[RFC3339].
The serial-number field takes the product-serial-number corresponding
to the X520SerialNumber field of the IDevID certificate of the
pledge.
The status-type value defined for BRSKI-PRM Status Query is
bootstrap. This indicates the pledge to provide current status
information regarding the bootstrapping status (voucher processing
and enrollment of the pledge into the new domain).
As the Status Query artifact is defined generic, it may be used by
other specifications to request further status information using
other status types, e.g., for onboarding to get further information
about enrollment of application specific LDevIDs or other parameters.
This is out of scope for this specification.
Figure 33 below shows an example for unsigned Status Query data in
JSON syntax using status-type bootstrap.
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{
"version": 1,
"created-on": "2022-08-12T02:37:39.235Z",
"serial-number": "pledge-callee4711",
"status-type": "bootstrap"
}
Figure 33: Example of unsigned Status Query data in JSON syntax
using status- type bootstrap for the Status Query artifact
The Status Query data MUST be signed by the Registrar-Agent using its
private key corresponding to the EE (RegAgt) certificate. When using
a JWS signature, the Status Query artifact looks as shown in
Figure 34 and the Content-Type response header MUST be set to
application/jose+json:
{
"payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(status-query)),
"signatures": [
{
"protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
"signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
}
]
}
Figure 34: Status Query Representation in General JWS JSON
Serialization Syntax
For details on JWS Protected Header and JWS Signature see
[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher] or [RFC7515].
7.11.2. Response Artifact: Pledge Status (pStatus)
When the pledge receives a Status Query with status-type bootstrap it
SHALL respond with previously collected telemetry information (see
Section 7.9 and Section 7.10) in a single Pledge Status artifact.
The pledge-status response message is signed with IDevID or LDevID,
depending on bootstrapping state of the pledge.
The following CDDL defines the structure of the Pledge Status
(pStatus) data:
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<CODE BEGINS>
pledgestatus = {
"version": uint,
"status":
"factory-default" /
"voucher-success" /
"voucher-error" /
"enroll-success" /
"enroll-error" /
"connect-success" /
"connect-error",
?"reason" : text,
?"reason-context": { $$arbitrary-map }
}
<CODE ENDS>
Figure 35: CDDL for unsigned Pledge Status data (pledgestatus)
Different cases for pledge bootstrapping status may occur, which
SHOULD be reflected using the status enumeration. This document
specifies the status values in the context of the bootstrapping
process and credential application. Other documents may enhance the
above enumeration to reflect further status information.
* "factory-default": Pledge has not been bootstrapped. Additional
information may be provided in the reason or reason-context. The
pledge signs the response message using its IDevID(Pledge).
* "voucher-success": Pledge processed the voucher exchange
successfully. Additional information may be provided in the
reason or reason-context. The pledge signs the response message
using its IDevID(Pledge).
* "voucher-error": Pledge voucher processing terminated with error.
Additional information may be provided in the reason or reason-
context. The pledge signs the response message using its
IDevID(Pledge).
* "enroll-success": Pledge has processed the enrollment exchange
successfully. Additional information may be provided in the
reason or reason-context. The pledge signs the response message
using its LDevID(Pledge).
* "enroll-error": Pledge enrollment-response processing terminated
with error. Additional information may be provided in the reason
or reason-context. The pledge signs the response message using
its IDevID(Pledge).
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As the pledge is assumed to utilize its bootstrapped credentials
(LDevID) in communication with other peers, additional status
information is provided for the connectivity to other peers, which
may be helpful in analyzing potential error cases.
* "connect-success": Pledge could successfully establish a
connection to another peer. Additional information may be
provided in the reason or reason-context. The pledge signs the
response message using its LDevID(Pledge).
* "connect-error": Pledge connection establishment terminated with
error. Additional information may be provided in the reason or
reason-context. The pledge signs the response message using its
LDevID(Pledge).
The pledge-status responses are cumulative in the sense that connect-
success implies enroll-success, which in turn implies voucher-
success.
Figure 36 provides an example for the bootstrapping-status
information.
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# The pledge "status-response" in General JWS Serialization syntax
{
"payload": BASE64URL(UTF8(status-response)),
"signatures": [
{
"protected": BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)),
"signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
}
]
}
# Example: Decoded payload "status-response" representation
in JSON syntax
{
"version": 1,
"status": "enroll-success",
"reason-context": {
"additional" : "JSON"
}
}
# Example: Decoded "JWS Protected Header" representation
in JSON syntax
{
"alg": "ES256",
"x5c": [
"base64encodedvalue==",
"base64encodedvalue=="
],
"typ": "jose+json
}
Figure 36: Example of pledge-status response
* In case "factory-default" the pledge does not possess the domain
certificate resp. the domain trust-anchor. It will not be able to
verify the signature of the Registrar-Agent in the bootstrapping-
status request.
* In cases "vouchered" and "enrolled" the pledge already possesses
the domain certificate (has domain trust-anchor) and can therefore
validate the signature of the Registrar-Agent. If validation of
the JWS signature fails, the pledge SHOULD respond with the HTTP
403 Forbidden status code.
* The HTTP 406 Not Acceptable status code SHOULD be used, if the
Accept header in the request indicates an unknown or unsupported
format.
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* The HTTP 415 Unsupported Media Type status code SHOULD be used, if
the Content-Type of the request is an unknown or unsupported
format.
* The HTTP 400 Bad Request status code SHOULD be used, if the
Accept/Content-Type headers are correct but nevertheless the
status-request cannot be correctly parsed.
The pledge SHOULD by default only respond to requests from nodes it
can authenticate (such as registrar agent), once the pledge is
enrolled with CA certificates and a matching domain certificate.
8. IANA Considerations
This document requires the following IANA actions.
8.1. BRSKI .well-known Registry
IANA is requested to enhance the Registry entitled: "BRSKI Well-Known
URIs" with the following endpoints:
+================+==================================+===========+
| Path Segment | Description | Reference |
+================+==================================+===========+
| requestenroll | Supply PER to registrar | [THISRFC] |
+----------------+----------------------------------+-----------+
| wrappedcacerts | Request wrapped CA certificates | [THISRFC] |
+----------------+----------------------------------+-----------+
| tpvr | Trigger Pledge Voucher-Request | [THISRFC] |
+----------------+----------------------------------+-----------+
| tper | Trigger Pledge Enroll-Request | [THISRFC] |
+----------------+----------------------------------+-----------+
| svr | Supply Voucher to pledge | [THISRFC] |
+----------------+----------------------------------+-----------+
| scac | Supply CA certificates to pledge | [THISRFC] |
+----------------+----------------------------------+-----------+
| ser | Supply Enroll-Response to pledge | [THISRFC] |
+----------------+----------------------------------+-----------+
| qps | Query Pledge Status | [THISRFC] |
+----------------+----------------------------------+-----------+
Table 3: BRSKI Well-Known URIs Additions
8.2. DNS Service Names
IANA has registered the following service names:
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*Service Name:* brski-pledge
*Transport Protocol(s):* tcp
*Assignee:* IESG iesg@ietf.org (mailto:iesg@ietf.org)
*Contact:* IESG iesg@ietf.org (mailto:iesg@ietf.org)
*Description:* The Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure
Pledge
*Reference:* [THISRFC]
9. Privacy Considerations
In general, the privacy considerations of [RFC8995] apply for BRSKI-
PRM also. Further privacy aspects need to be considered for:
* the introduction of the additional component Registrar-Agent
* potentially no transport layer security between Registrar-Agent
and pledge
Section 7.1 describes to optional apply TLS to protect the
communication between the Registrar-Agent and the pledge. The
following is therefore applicable to the communication without the
TLS protection.
The credential used by the Registrar-Agent to sign the data for the
pledge SHOULD NOT contain any personal information. Therefore, it is
recommended to use an LDevID certificate associated with the
commissioning device instead of an LDevID certificate associated with
the service technician operating the device. This avoids revealing
potentially included personal information to Registrar and MASA.
The communication between the pledge and the Registrar-Agent is
performed over plain HTTP. Therefore, it is subject to disclosure by
a Dolev-Yao attacker (an "oppressive observer")[onpath]. Depending
on the requests and responses, the following information is
disclosed.
* the Pledge product-serial-number is contained in the trigger
message for the PVR and in all responses from the pledge. This
information reveals the identity of the devices being bootstrapped
and allows deduction of which products an operator is using in
their environment. As the communication between the pledge and
the Registrar-Agent may be realized over wireless link, this
information could easily be eavesdropped, if the wireless network
is unencrypted. Even if the wireless network is encrypted, if it
uses a network-wide key, then layer-2 attacks (ARP/ND spoofing)
could insert an on-path observer into the path.
* the Timestamp data could reveal the activation time of the device.
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* the Status data of the device could reveal information about the
current state of the device in the domain network.
10. Security Considerations
In general, the security considerations of [RFC8995] apply for BRSKI-
PRM also. Further security aspects are considered here related to:
* the introduction of the additional component Registrar-Agent
* the reversal of the pledge communication direction (push mode,
compared to BRSKI)
* no transport layer security between Registrar-Agent and pledge
10.1. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack on Pledge
Disrupting the pledge behavior by a DoS attack may prevent the
bootstrapping of the pledge to a new domain. Because in BRSKI-PRM,
the pledge responds to requests from real or illicit Registrar-
Agents, pledges are more subject to DoS attacks from Registrar-Agents
in BRSKI-PRM than they are from illicit registrars in [RFC8995],
where pledges do initiate the connections.
A DoS attack with a faked Registrar-Agent may block the bootstrapping
of the pledge due changing state on the pledge (the pledge may
produce a voucher-request, and refuse to produce another one). One
mitigation may be that the pledge does not limited the number of
voucher-requests it creates until at least one has finished. An
alternative may be that the onboarding state may expire after a
certain time, if no further interaction has happened.
In addition, the pledge may assume that repeated triggering for PVR
are the result of a communication error with the Registrar-Agent. In
that case the pledge MAY simply resent the PVR previously sent. Note
that in case of resending, a contained nonce and also the contained
agent-signed-data in the PVR would consequently be reused.
10.2. Misuse of acquired PVR and PER by Registrar-Agent
A Registrar-Agent that uses previously requested PVR and PER for
domain-A, may attempt to onboard the device into domain-B. This can
be detected by the domain registrar while PVR processing. The domain
registrar needs to verify that the "proximity-registrar-cert" field
in the PVR matches its own registrar LDevID certificate. In
addition, the domain registrar needs to verify the association of the
pledge to its domain based on the product-serial-number contained in
the PVR and in the IDevID certificate of the pledge. (This is just
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part of the supply chain integration). Moreover, the domain
registrar verifies if the Registrar-Agent is authorized to interact
with the pledge for voucher-requests and enroll-requests, based on
the EE (RegAgt) certificate data contained in the PVR.
Misbinding of a pledge by a faked domain registrar is countered as
described in BRSKI security considerations Section 11.4 of [RFC8995].
10.3. Misuse of Registrar-Agent Credentials
Concerns of misusage of a Registrar-Agent with a valid EE (RegAgt)
certificate may be addressed by utilizing short-lived certificates
(e.g., valid for a day) to authenticate the Registrar-Agent against
the domain registrar. The EE (RegAgt) certificate may have been
acquired by a prior BRSKI run for the Registrar-Agent, if an IDevID
is available on Registrar-Agent. Alternatively, the EE (RegAgt)
certificate may be acquired by a service technician from the domain
PKI system in an authenticated way.
In addition it is required that the EE (RegAgt) certificate is valid
for the complete bootstrapping phase. This avoids that a Registrar-
Agent could be misused to create arbitrary "agent-signed-data"
objects to perform an authorized bootstrapping of a rogue pledge at a
later point in time. In this misuse "agent-signed-data" could be
dated after the validity time of the EE (RegAgt) certificate, due to
missing trusted timestamp in the Registrar-Agents signature. To
address this, the registrar SHOULD verify the certificate used to
create the signature on "agent-signed-data". Furthermore the
registrar also verifies the EE (RegAgt) certificate used in the TLS
handshake with the Registrar-Agent. If both certificates are
verified successfully, the Registrar-Agent's signature can be
considered as valid.
10.4. Misuse of DNS-SD with mDNS to obtain list of pledges
To discover a specific pledge a Registrar-Agent may request the
service name in combination with the product-serial-number of a
specific pledge. The pledge reacts on this if its product-serial-
number is part of the request message.
If the Registrar-Agent performs DNS-based Service Discovery without a
specific product-serial-number, all pledges in the domain react if
the functionality is supported. This functionality enumerates and
reveals the information of devices available in the domain. The
information about this is provided here as a feature to support the
commissioning of devices. A manufacturer may decide to support this
feature only for devices not possessing a LDevID or to not support
this feature at all, to avoid an enumeration in an operative domain.
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10.5. YANG Module Security Considerations
The enhanced voucher-request described in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis]
is based on [RFC8995], but uses a different encoding based on
[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher]. The security considerations as
described in Section 11.7 of [RFC8995] (Security Considerations)
apply.
The YANG module specified in [I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis] defines the
schema for data that is subsequently encapsulated by a JOSE signed-
data Content-type as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher]. As
such, all of the YANG-modeled data is protected against modification.
The use of YANG to define data structures via the [RFC8971]
"structure" statement, is relatively new and distinct from the
traditional use of YANG to define an API accessed by network
management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF
[RFC8040]. For this reason, these guidelines do not follow the
template described by Section 3.7 of [RFC8407] (Security
Considerations).
11. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the various reviewers, in particular Brian E.
Carpenter, Charlie Kaufman (Early SECDIR review), Martin Björklund
(Early YANGDOCTORS review), Marco Tiloca (Early IOTDIR review), Oskar
Camenzind, Hendrik Brockhaus, and Ingo Wenda for their input and
discussion on use cases and call flows. Further review input was
provided by Jesser Bouzid, Dominik Tacke, and Christian Spindler.
Special thanks to Esko Dijk for the in deep review and the improving
proposals. Support in PoC implementations and comments resulting
from the implementation was provided by Hong Rui Li and He Peng Jia.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher]
Werner, T. and M. Richardson, "JWS signed Voucher
Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-jws-voucher-09, 29 August
2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
anima-jws-voucher-09>.
[I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis]
Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., Eckert, T. T.,
and Q. Ma, "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping
Protocols", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
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anima-rfc8366bis-11, 4 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-
rfc8366bis-11>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-sztp-csr]
Watsen, K., Housley, R., and S. Turner, "Conveying a
Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in a Secure Zero Touch
Provisioning (SZTP) Bootstrapping Request", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-sztp-csr-14,
2 March 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-netconf-sztp-csr-14>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3339>.
[RFC6762] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6762>.
[RFC6763] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6763>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.
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[RFC8366] Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
"A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8366>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>.
[RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8615>.
[RFC8995] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>.
[RFC9360] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Header Parameters for Carrying and Referencing X.509
Certificates", RFC 9360, DOI 10.17487/RFC9360, February
2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9360>.
12.2. Informative References
[androidnsd]
"Android Developer: Connect devices wirelessly", archived
at https://web.archive.org/web/20230000000000*/https://dev
eloper.android.com/training/connect-devices-wirelessly,
n.d., <https://developer.android.com/training/connect-
devices-wirelessly>.
[androidtrustfail]
"Security with Network Protocols", archived at https://web
.archive.org/web/20230326153937/https://developer.android.
com/training/articles/security-ssl, n.d.,
<https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-
ssl>.
[BRSKI-PRM-abstract]
"Abstract BRSKI-PRM Protocol Overview", March 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/113/materials/
slides-113-anima-update-on-brski-with-pledge-in-responder-
mode-brski-prm-00>.
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[I-D.eckert-anima-brski-discovery]
Eckert, T. T., von Oheimb, D., and E. Dijk, "Discovery for
BRSKI variations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-eckert-anima-brski-discovery-01, 23 October 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-eckert-anima-
brski-discovery-01>.
[I-D.ietf-anima-brski-ae]
von Oheimb, D., Fries, S., and H. Brockhaus, "BRSKI-AE:
Alternative Enrollment Protocols in BRSKI", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-brski-ae-10, 1
March 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-anima-brski-ae-10>.
[I-D.irtf-t2trg-taxonomy-manufacturer-anchors]
Richardson, M., "A Taxonomy of operational security
considerations for manufacturer installed keys and Trust
Anchors", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-
t2trg-taxonomy-manufacturer-anchors-03, 30 January 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-t2trg-
taxonomy-manufacturer-anchors-03>.
[I-D.richardson-anima-registrar-considerations]
Richardson, M. and W. Pan, "Operational Considerations for
BRSKI Registrar", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
richardson-anima-registrar-considerations-08, 14 February
2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
richardson-anima-registrar-considerations-08>.
[I-D.richardson-emu-eap-onboarding]
DeKok, A. and M. Richardson, "EAP defaults for devices
that need to onboard", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-richardson-emu-eap-onboarding-03, 2 April 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-richardson-
emu-eap-onboarding-03>.
[IEEE-802.1AR]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
802.1AR Secure Device Identifier", IEEE 802.1AR, June
2018.
[onpath] "can an on-path attacker drop traffic?", n.d.,
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/saag/
m1r9uo4xYznOcf85Eyk0Rhut598/>.
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[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2986>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3629>.
[RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5272>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6241>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7252>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8040>.
[RFC8407] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of
Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8407>.
[RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
"Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8792>.
[RFC8971] Pallagatti, S., Ed., Mirsky, G., Ed., Paragiri, S.,
Govindan, V., and M. Mudigonda, "Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD) for Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network
(VXLAN)", RFC 8971, DOI 10.17487/RFC8971, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8971>.
[RFC8990] Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., Ed., and B. Liu, Ed., "GeneRic
Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", RFC 8990,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8990, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8990>.
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[RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[RFC9238] Richardson, M., Latour, J., and H. Habibi Gharakheili,
"Loading Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) URLs from QR
Codes", RFC 9238, DOI 10.17487/RFC9238, May 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9238>.
[RFC9483] Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and S. Fries, "Lightweight
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", RFC 9483,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9483, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9483>.
[RFC9525] Saint-Andre, P. and R. Salz, "Service Identity in TLS",
RFC 9525, DOI 10.17487/RFC9525, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9525>.
Appendix A. Examples
These examples are folded according to [RFC8792] Single Backslash
rule.
A.1. Example Pledge Voucher-Request (PVR) - from Pledge to Registrar-
Agent
The following is an example request sent from a Pledge to the
Registrar-Agent, in "General JWS JSON Serialization". The message
size of this PVR is: 4649 bytes
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{
"payload":
"eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXItcmVxdWVzdC1wcm06dm91Y2hlciI6eyJhc3NlcnRpb24\
iOiJhZ2VudC1wcm94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoiMDEyMzQ1Njc4OSIsIm5\
vbmNlIjoiTDNJSjZocHRIQ0lRb054YWFiOUhXQT09IiwiY3JlYXRlZC1vbiI6IjIwMjI\
tMDQtMjZUMDU6MTY6MTcuNzA5WiIsImFnZW50LXByb3ZpZGVkLXByb3hpbWl0eS1yZWd\
pc3RyYXItY2VydCI6Ik1JSUI0akNDQVlpZ0F3SUJBZ0lHQVhZNzJiYlpNQW9HQ0NxR1N\
NNDlCQU1DTURVeEV6QVJCZ05WQkFvTUNrMTVRblZ6YVc1bGMzTXhEVEFMQmdOVkJBY01\
CRk5wZEdVeER6QU5CZ05WQkFNTUJsUmxjM1JEUVRBZUZ3MHlNREV5TURjd05qRTRNVEp\
hRncwek1ERXlNRGN3TmpFNE1USmFNRDR4RXpBUkJnTlZCQW9NQ2sxNVFuVnphVzVsYzN\
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NeERUQUxCZ05WQkFjTUJGTnBkR1V4R0RBV0JnTlZCQU1NRDBSdmJXRnBibEpsWjJsemR\
ISmhjakJaTUJNR0J5cUdTTTQ5QWdFR0NDcUdTTTQ5QXdFSEEwSUFCQmsxNksvaTc5b1J\
rSzVZYmVQZzhVU1I4L3VzMWRQVWlaSE10b2tTZHFLVzVmbldzQmQrcVJMN1dSZmZlV2t\
5Z2Vib0pmSWxsdXJjaTI1d25oaU9WQ0dqZXpCNU1CMEdBMVVkSlFRV01CUUdDQ3NHQVF\
VRkJ3TUJCZ2dyQmdFRkJRY0RIREFPQmdOVkhROEJBZjhFQkFNQ0I0QXdTQVlEVlIwUkJ\
FRXdQNElkY21WbmFYTjBjbUZ5TFhSbGMzUXVjMmxsYldWdWN5MWlkQzV1WlhTQ0huSmx\
aMmx6ZEhKaGNpMTBaWE4wTmk1emFXVnRaVzV6TFdKMExtNWxkREFLQmdncWhrak9QUVF\
EQWdOSUFEQkZBaUJ4bGRCaFpxMEV2NUpMMlByV0N0eVM2aERZVzF5Q08vUmF1YnBDN01\
hSURnSWhBTFNKYmdMbmdoYmJBZzBkY1dGVVZvL2dHTjAvand6SlowU2wyaDR4SVhrMSI\
sImFnZW50LXNpZ25lZC1kYXRhIjoiZXlKd1lYbHNiMkZrSWpvaVpYbEtjRnBZVW0xTVd\
GcDJaRmRPYjFwWVNYUmpiVlo0WkZkV2VtUkRNWGRqYlRBMldWZGtiR0p1VVhSak1teHV\
ZbTFXYTB4WFVtaGtSMFZwVDI1emFWa3pTbXhaV0ZKc1drTXhkbUpwU1RaSmFrbDNUV3B\
KZEUxRVVYUk5hbHBWVFVSVk5rMUVZelpPUkVWMVRrUlJORmRwU1hOSmJrNXNZMjFzYUd\
KRE1YVmtWekZwV2xoSmFVOXBTWGROVkVsNlRrUlZNazU2WnpWSmJqRTVJaXdpYzJsbmJ\
tRjBkWEpsY3lJNlczc2ljSEp2ZEdWamRHVmtJam9pWlhsS2NtRlhVV2xQYVVwWlkwaHd\
jMVJWZERSaVNFSkNUbXBvYWxaVVZrZFZWVEZaVmxoYWRWTldVVEpWV0dNNVNXbDNhVmx\
YZUc1SmFtOXBVbFpOZVU1VVdXbG1VU0lzSW5OcFoyNWhkSFZ5WlNJNklrY3pWM2hHU0d\
WMFdGQTRiR3hTVmkwNWRXSnlURmxxU25aUllUWmZlUzFRYWxGWk5FNWhkMW81Y0ZKaGI\
yeE9TbTlFTm1SbFpXdHVTVjlGV0daemVWWlRZbmM0VTBONlRWcE1iakJoUVhWb2FVZFp\
UakJSSW4xZGZRPT0iLCJhZ2VudC1zaWduLWNlcnQiOlsiTUlJQjFEQ0NBWHFnQXdJQkF\
nSUVZbWQ0T1RBS0JnZ3Foa2pPUFFRREFqQStNUk13RVFZRFZRUUtEQXBOZVVKMWMybHV\
aWE56TVEwd0N3WURWUVFIREFSVGFYUmxNUmd3RmdZRFZRUUREQTlVWlhOMFVIVnphRTF\
2WkdWc1EwRXdIaGNOTWpJd05ESTJNRFEwTWpNeldoY05Nekl3TkRJMk1EUTBNak16V2p\
BOU1STXdFUVlEVlFRS0RBcE5lVUoxYzJsdVpYTnpNUTB3Q3dZRFZRUUhEQVJUYVhSbE1\
SY3dGUVlEVlFRRERBNVNaV2RwYzNSeVlYSkJaMlZ1ZERCWk1CTUdCeXFHU000OUFnRUd\
DQ3FHU000OUF3RUhBMElBQkd4bHJOZmozaVJiNy9CUW9kVys1WWlvT3poK2pJdHlxdVJ\
JTy9XejdZb1czaXdEYzNGeGV3TFZmekNyNU52RDEzWmFGYjdmcmFuK3Q5b3RZNVdMaEo\
2alp6QmxNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQWZCZ05WSFNNRUdEQVdnQlJ2b1QxdWR\
lMmY2TEVRaFU3SEhqK3ZKL2Q3SXpBZEJnTlZIUTRFRmdRVVhwemxNS3hscEE2OGNVNUZ\
RTVhVdm5JVDZRd3dFd1lEVlIwbEJBd3dDZ1lJS3dZQkJRVUhBd0l3Q2dZSUtvWkl6ajB\
FQXdJRFNBQXdSUUlnYzJ5NnhvT3RvUUJsSnNnbE9MMVZ4SEdvc1R5cEVxUmZ6MFF2NFp\
FUHY0d0NJUUNWeWIyRjl6VjNuOTUrb2xnZkZKZ1pUV0V6NGRTYUYzaHpSUWIzWnVCMjl\
RPT0iLCJNSUlCekRDQ0FYR2dBd0lCQWdJRVhYakhwREFLQmdncWhrak9QUVFEQWpBMU1\
STXdFUVlEVlFRS0RBcE5lVUoxYzJsdVpYTnpNUTB3Q3dZRFZRUUhEQVJUYVhSbE1ROHd\
EUVlEVlFRRERBWlVaWE4wUTBFd0hoY05NVGt3T1RFeE1UQXdPRE0yV2hjTk1qa3dPVEV\
4TVRBd09ETTJXakErTVJNd0VRWURWUVFLREFwTmVVSjFjMmx1WlhOek1RMHdDd1lEVlF\
RSERBUlRhWFJsTVJnd0ZnWURWUVFEREE5VVpYTjBVSFZ6YUUxdlpHVnNRMEV3V1RBVEJ\
nY3Foa2pPUFFJQkJnZ3Foa2pPUFFNQkJ3TkNBQVRsRzBmd1QzM29leloxdmtIUWJldGV\
ibWorQm9WK1pGc2pjZlF3MlRPa0pQaE9rT2ZBYnU5YlMxcVppOHlhRVY4b2VyS2wvNlp\
YYmZ4T21CanJScmNYbzJZd1pEQVNCZ05WSFJNQkFmOEVDREFHQVFIL0FnRUFNQTRHQTF\
VZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJQ0JEQWZCZ05WSFNNRUdEQVdnQlRvWklNelFkc0Qvai8rZ1gvN2N\
CSnVjSC9YbWpBZEJnTlZIUTRFRmdRVWI2RTliblh0bitpeEVJVk94eDQvcnlmM2V5TXd\
DZ1lJS29aSXpqMEVBd0lEU1FBd1JnSWhBUG5CMHcxTkN1cmhNeEp3d2ZqejdnRGlpeGt\
VWUxQU1o5ZU45a29oTlFVakFpRUF3NFk3bHR4V2lQd0t0MUo5bmp5ZkRObDVNdUVEQml\
teFIzQ1hvWktHUXJVPSJdfX0",
"signatures":[{
"protected":"eyJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQitUQ0NBYUNnQXdJQkFnSUdBWG5WanNVN\
U1Bb0dDQ3FHU000OUJBTUNNRDB4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQWtGUk1SVXdFd1lEVlFRS0RBe\
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EthVzVuU21sdVowTnZjbkF4RnpBVkJnTlZCQU1NRGtwcGJtZEthVzVuVkdWemRFTkJNQ\
0FYRFRJeE1EWXdOREExTkRZeE5Gb1lEems1T1RreE1qTXhNak0xT1RVNVdqQlNNUXN3Q\
1FZRFZRUUdFd0pCVVRFVk1CTUdBMVVFQ2d3TVNtbHVaMHBwYm1kRGIzSndNUk13RVFZR\
FZRUUZFd293TVRJek5EVTJOemc1TVJjd0ZRWURWUVFEREE1S2FXNW5TbWx1WjBSbGRtb\
GpaVEJaTUJNR0J5cUdTTTQ5QWdFR0NDcUdTTTQ5QXdFSEEwSUFCQzc5bGlhUmNCalpjR\
UVYdzdyVWVhdnRHSkF1SDRwazRJNDJ2YUJNc1UxMWlMRENDTGtWaHRVVjIxbXZhS0N2T\
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yI6IkVTMjU2In0",
"signature":"Y_ohapnmvbwjLuUicOB7NAmbGM7igBfpUlkKUuSNdG-eDI4BQ\
yuXZ2aw93zZId45R7XxAK-12YKIx6qLjiPjMw"
}]
}
Figure 37: Example Pledge-Voucher-Request - PVR
A.2. Example Parboiled Registrar Voucher-Request (RVR) - from Registrar
to MASA
The term parboiled refers to food which is partially cooked. In
[RFC8995], the term refers to a pledge-voucher-request (PVR) which
has been received by the Registrar, and then has been processed by
the Registrar ("cooked"), and is now being forwarded to the MASA.
The following is an example registrar-voucher-request (RVR) sent from
the Registrar to the MASA, in "General JWS JSON Serialization". Note
that the previous PVR can be seen in the payload as "prior-signed-
voucher-request". The message size of this RVR is: 13257 bytes
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{
"payload":
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Fries, et al. Expires 5 September 2024 [Page 84]
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Nakk0TURjeU56VTVXaGNOTXpBd01qSTRNRGN5TnpVNVdqQmxNUXN3Q1FZRFZRUUdFd0p\
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"signatures":[{
"protected":"eyJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQjhEQ0NBWmFnQXdJQkFnSUdBWEJoTUtZSU1\
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sImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2In0",
"signature":"67t3n8zyEek4IM2Ko3Y_UvE1hzp794QFNTqG-HzTrBQtE4_4-yS\
yyFd3kP6YCn35YYJ7yK35d3styo_yoiPfKA"
}]
}
Figure 38: Example Registrar-Voucher-Request - RVR
Fries, et al. Expires 5 September 2024 [Page 88]
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A.3. Example Voucher - from MASA to Pledge, via Registrar and
Registrar-Agent
The following is an example voucher-response from MASA to Pledge via
Registrar and Registrar-Agent, in "General JWS JSON Serialization".
The message size of this Voucher is: 1916 bytes
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{
"payload":"eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXI6dm91Y2hlciI6eyJhc3NlcnRpb24iOiJhZ2V\
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"signatures":[{
"protected":"eyJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQmt6Q0NBVGlnQXdJQkFnSUdBV0ZCakNrWU1\
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FS2JzVkRpVT0iXSwiYWxnIjoiRVMyNTYifQ",
"signature":"0TB5lr-cs1jqka2vNbQm3bBYWfLJd8zdVKIoV53eo2YgSITnKKY\
TvHMUw0wx9wdyuNVjNoAgLysNIgEvlcltBw"
}]
}
Figure 39: Example Voucher-Response from MASA
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A.4. Example Voucher, MASA issued Voucher with additional Registrar
signature (from MASA to Pledge, via Registrar and Registrar-Agent)
The following is an example voucher-response from MASA to Pledge via
Registrar and Registrar-Agent, in "General JWS JSON Serialization".
The message size of this Voucher is: 3006 bytes
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
{
"payload":"eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXI6dm91Y2hlciI6eyJhc3NlcnRpb24iOiJhZ2V\
udC1wcm94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoiMDEyMzQ1Njc4OSIsIm5vbmNlIjo\
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"signatures":[{
"protected":"eyJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQmt6Q0NBVGlnQXdJQkFnSUdBV0ZCakNrWU1\
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FS2JzVkRpVT0iXSwidHlwIjoidm91Y2hlci1qd3MranNvbiIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2In0\
",
"signature":"ShqW8uFRkuAXIzjAhB4bolMMndcY7GYq3Kbo94yvGtjCaxEX3Hp\
6QXZUTEJ_kulQ1G7DnaU4igDPdUGtcV9Lkw"},{
"protected":"eyJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQjRqQ0NBWWlnQXdJQkFnSUdBWFk3MmJiWk1\
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2S1wvaTc5b1JrSzVZYmVQZzhVU1I4XC91czFkUFVpWkhNdG9rU2RxS1c1Zm5Xc0JkK3F\
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STDdXUmZmZVdreWdlYm9KZklsbHVyY2kyNXduaGlPVkNHamV6QjVNQjBHQTFVZEpRUVd\
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aMFNsMmg0eElYazEiXSwidHlwIjoidm91Y2hlci1qd3MranNvbiIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU\
2In0",
"signature":"N4oXV48V6umsHMKkhdSSmJYFtVb6agjD32uXpIlGx6qVE7Dh0-b\
qhRRyjnxp80IV_Fy1RAOXIIzs3Q8CnMgBgg"
}]
}
Figure 40: Example Voucher-Response from MASA, with additional
Registrar signature
Appendix B. HTTP-over-TLS operations between Registrar-Agent and Pledge
The use of HTTP-over-TLS between Registrar-Agent and pledge has been
identified as an optional mechanism.
Provided that the key-agreement in the underlying TLS protocol
connection can be properly authenticated, the use of TLS provides
privacy for the voucher and enrollment operations between the pledge
and the Registrar-Agent. The authenticity of the onboarding and
enrollment is not dependant upon the security of the TLS connection.
The use of HTTP-over-TLS is not mandated by this document for a
number of reasons:
1. A certificate is generally required in order to do TLS. While
there are other modes of authentication including PSK, various
EAP methods and raw public key, they do no help as there is no
previous relationship between the Registrar-Agent.
2. The pledge can use it's IDevID certificate to authenticate
itself, but [RFC9525] DNS-ID methods do not apply as the pledge
does not have a FQDN. Instead a new mechanism is required, which
authenticates the X520SerialNumber DN attribute which must be
present in every IDevID.
If the Registrar-Agent has a preconfigured list of which product-
serial-number(s), from which manufacturers it expects to see, then it
can attempt to match this pledge against a list of potential devices.
Fries, et al. Expires 5 September 2024 [Page 91]
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In many cases only the list of manufacturers is known ahead of time,
so at most the Registrar-Agent can show the X520SerialNumber to the
(human) operator who may then attempt to confirm that they are
standing in front of a device with that product-serial-number. The
use of scannable QRcodes may help automate this in some cases.
1. The CA used to sign the IDevID will be a manufacturer private PKI
as described in [I-D.irtf-t2trg-taxonomy-manufacturer-anchors],
Section 4.1. The anchors for this PKI will never be part of the
public WebPKI anchors which are distributed with most smartphone
operating systems. A Registrar-Agent application will need to
use different APIs in order to initiate an HTTPS connection
without performing WebPKI verification. The application will
then have to do it's own certificate chain verification against a
store of manufacturer trust anchors. In the Android ecosystem
this involved use of a customer TrustManager: many application
developers do not create these correctly, and there is
significant push to remove this option as it has repeatedly
resulted in security failures. See [androidtrustfail]
2. The use of the Host: (or :authority in HTTP/2) is explained in
[RFC9110], Section 7.2. This header is mandatory, and so a
compliant HTTPS client is going to insert it. But, the contents
of this header will at best be an IP address that came from the
discovery process. The pledge MUST therefore ignore the Host:
header when it processes requests, and the pledge MUST NOT do any
kind of name-base virtual hosting using the IP address/port
combination. Note that there is no requirement for the pledge to
operate it's BRSKI-PRM service on port 80 or port 443, so if
there is no reason for name-based virtual hosting.
3. Note that an Extended Key Usage (EKU) for TLS WWW Server
authentication cannot be expected in the pledge's IDevID
certificate. IDevID certificates are intended to be widely
useable and EKU does not support that use.
Appendix C. History of Changes [RFC Editor: please delete]
Proof of Concept Code available
From IETF draft 11 -> IETF draft 12:
* Updated acknowledgements to reflect early reviews
* Addressed Shepherd review part 2 (Pull Request #132)
From IETF draft 10 -> IETF draft 11:
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* issue #79, clarified that BRSKI discovery in the context of BRSKI-
PRM is not needed in Section 6.2.1.
* issue #103, removed step 6 in verification handling for the
wrapped CA certificate provisioning as only applicable after
enrollment Section 7.7
* issue #128: included notation of nomadic operation of the
Registrar-Agent in Section 5, including proposed text from PR #131
* issue #130, introduced DNS service discovery name for brski_pledge
to enable discovery by the Registrar-Agent in Section 8
* removed unused reference RFC 5280
* removed site terminology
* deleted duplicated text in Section 6.3
* clarified registrar discovery and relation to BRSKI-Discovery in
Section 6.2.1
* clarified discovery of pledges by the Registrar-Agent in
Section 6.2.2, deleted reference to GRASP as handled in BRSKI-
Discovery
* addressed comments from SECDIR early review
From IETF draft 09 -> IETF draft 10:
* issue #79, clarified discovery in the context of BRSKI-PRM and
included information about future discovery enhancements in a
separate draft in Section 6.2.1.
* issue #93, included information about conflict resolution in mDNS
and GRASP in Section 6.2.2
* issue #103, included verification handling for the wrapped CA
certificate provisioning in Section 7.7
* issue #106, included additional text to elaborate more the
registrar status handling in Section 7.9 and Section 7.10
* issue #116, enhanced DoS description in Section 10.1
* issue #120, included statement regarding pledge host header
processing in Section 6.3
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* issue #122, availability of product-serial-number information on
registrar agent clarified in Section 7.1
* issue #123, Clarified usage of alternative voucher formats in
Section 7.3.2
* issue #124, determination of pinned domain certificate done as in
RFC 8995 included in Section 7.3.3
* issue #125, remove strength comparison of voucher assertions in
Section 5.4 and Section 7
* issue #130, aligned the usage of site and domain throughout the
document
* changed naming of registrar certificate from LDevID(RegAgt) to EE
(RegAgt) certificate throughout the document
* change x5b to x5bag according to [RFC9360]
* updated JSON examples -> "signature": BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
From IETF draft 08 -> IETF draft 09:
* issue #80, enhanced Section 6.2.2 with clarification on the
product-serial-number and the inclusion of GRASP
* issue #81, enhanced introduction with motivation for
agent_signed_data
* issue #82, included optional TLS protection of the communication
link between Registrar-Agent and pledge in the introduction
Section 4, and Section 7.1
* issue #83, enhanced Section 7.2 and Section 7.3 with note to re-
enrollment
* issue #87, clarified available information at the Registrar-Agent
in Section 7.1
* issue #88, clarified, that the PVR in Section 7.1 and PER in
Section 7.2 may contain the certificate chain. If not contained
it MUST be available at the registrar.
* issue #91, clarified that a separate HTTP connection may also be
used to provide the PER in Section 7.4
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* resolved remaining editorial issues discovered after WGLC
(responded to on the mailing list in Reply 1 and Reply 2)
resulting in more consistent descriptions
* issue #92: kept separate endpoint for wrapped CSR on registrar
Section 7.5
* issue #94: clarified terminology (possess vs. obtained)
* issue #95: clarified optional IDevID CA certificates on Registrar-
Agent
* issue #96: updated exchangesfig_uc2_3 to correct to just one CA
certificate provisioning
* issue #97: deleted format explanation in exchanges_uc2_3 as it may
be misleading
* issue #99: motivated verification of second signature on voucher
in Section 7.6
* issue #100: included negative example in Figure 25
* issue #101: included handling if Section 7.6 voucher telemetry
information has not been received by the Registrar-Agent
* issue #102: relaxed requirements for CA certs provisioning in
Section 7.7
* issue #105: included negative example in Figure 29
* issue #107: included example for certificate revocation in
Section 7.10
* issue #108: renamed heading to Pledge-Status Request of
Section 7.11
* issue #111: included pledge-status response processing for
authenticated requests in Section 7.11
* issue #112: added "Example key word in pledge-status response in
Figure 36
* issue #113: enhanced description of status reply for "factory-
default" in Section 7.11
* issue #114: Consideration of optional TLS usage in Privacy
Considerations
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* issue #115: Consideration of optional TLS usage in Privacy
Considerations to protect potentially privacy related information
in the bootstrapping like status information, etc.
* issue #116: Enhanced DoS description and mitigation options in
security consideration section
* updated references
From IETF draft 07 -> IETF draft 08:
* resolved editorial issues discovered after WGLC (still open issues
remaining)
* resolved first comments from the Shepherd review as discussed in
PR #85 on the ANIMA github
From IETF draft 06 -> IETF draft 07:
* WGLC resulted in a removal of the voucher enhancements completely
from this document to RFC 8366bis, containing all enhancements and
augmentations of the voucher, including the voucher-request as
well as the tree diagrams
* smaller editorial corrections
From IETF draft 05 -> IETF draft 06:
* Update of list of reviewers
* Issue #67, shortened the pledge endpoints to prepare for
constraint deployments
* Included table for new endpoints on the registrar in the overview
of the Registrar-Agent
* addressed review comments from SECDIR early review (terminology
clarifications, editorial improvements)
* addressed review comments from IOTDIR early review (terminology
clarifications, editorial improvements)
From IETF draft 04 -> IETF draft 05:
* Restructured document to have a distinct section for the object
flow and handling and shortened introduction, issue #72
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* Added security considerations for using mDNS without a specific
product-serial-number, issue #75
* Clarified pledge-status responses are cumulative, issue #73
* Removed agent-sign-cert from trigger data to save bandwidth and
remove complexity through options, issue #70
* Changed terminology for LDevID(Reg) certificate to registrar
LDevID certificate, as it does not need to be an LDevID, issue #66
* Added new protected header parameter (created-on) in PER to
support freshness validation, issue #63
* Removed reference to CAB Forum as not needed for BRSKI-PRM
specifically, issue #65
* Enhanced error codes in section 5.5.1, issue #39, #64
* Enhanced security considerations and privacy considerations, issue
#59
* Issue #50 addressed by referring to the utilized enrollment
protocol
* Issue #47 MASA verification of LDevID(RegAgt) to the same
registrar LDevID certificate domain CA
* Reworked terminology of "enrollment object", "certification
object", "enrollment request object", etc., issue #27
* Reworked all message representations to align with encoding
* Added explanation of MASA requiring domain CA cert in section
5.5.1 and section 5.5.2, issue #36
* Defined new endpoint for pledge bootstrapping status inquiry,
issue #35 in section Section 7.11, IANA considerations and section
Section 6.3
* Included examples for several objects in section Appendix A
including message example sizes, issue #33
* PoP for private key to registrar certificate included as
mandatory, issues #32 and #49
* Issue #31, clarified that combined pledge may act as client/server
for further (re)enrollment
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* Issue #42, clarified that Registrar needs to verify the status
responses with and ensure that they match the audit log response
from the MASA, otherwise it needs drop the pledge and revoke the
certificate
* Issue #43, clarified that the pledge shall use the create time
from the trigger message if the time has not been synchronized,
yet.
* Several editorial changes and enhancements to increasing
readability.
From IETF draft 03 -> IETF draft 04:
* In deep Review by Esko Dijk lead to issues #22-#61, which are bein
stepwise integrated
* Simplified YANG definition by augmenting the voucher-request from
RFC 8995 instead of redefining it.
* Added explanation for terminology "endpoint" used in this
document, issue #16
* Added clarification that Registrar-Agent may collect PVR or PER or
both in one run, issue #17
* Added a statement that nonceless voucher may be accepted, issue
#18
* Simplified structure in section Section 3.1, issue #19
* Removed join proxy in Figure 1 and added explanatory text, issue
#20
* Added description of pledge-CAcerts endpoint plus further handling
of providing a wrapped CA certs response to the pledge in section
Section 7.7; also added new required registrar endpoint (section
Section 7.3 and IANA considerations) for the registrar to provide
a wrapped CA certs response, issue #21
* utilized defined abbreviations in the document consistently, issue
#22
* Reworked text on discovery according to issue #23 to clarify scope
and handling
* Added several clarifications based on review comments
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From IETF draft 02 -> IETF draft 03:
* Updated examples to state "base64encodedvalue==" for x5c
occurrences
* Include link to SVG graphic as general overview
* Restructuring of section 5 to flatten hierarchy
* Enhanced requirements and motivation in Section 4
* Several editorial improvements based on review comments
From IETF draft 01 -> IETF draft 02:
* Issue #15 included additional signature on voucher from registrar
in section Section 7.3 and section Section 5.4 The verification of
multiple signatures is described in section Section 7.6
* Included representation for General JWS JSON Serialization for
examples
* Included error responses from pledge if it is not able to create a
Pledge-Voucher-Request or an enrollment request in section
Section 7.1
* Removed open issue regarding handling of multiple CSRs and Enroll-
Responses during the bootstrapping as the initial target it the
provisioning of a generic LDevID certificate. The defined
endpoint on the pledge may also be used for management of further
certificates.
From IETF draft 00 -> IETF draft 01:
* Issue #15 lead to the inclusion of an option for an additional
signature of the registrar on the voucher received from the MASA
before forwarding to the Registrar-Agent to support verification
of POP of the registrars private key in section Section 7.3 and
exchanges_uc2_3.
* Based on issue #11, a new endpoint was defined for the registrar
to enable delivery of the wrapped enrollment request from the
pledge (in contrast to plain PKCS#10 in simple enroll).
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* Decision on issue #8 to not provide an additional signature on the
enrollment-response object by the registrar. As the Enroll-
Response will only contain the generic LDevID certificate. This
credential builds the base for further configuration outside the
initial enrollment.
* Decision on issue #7 to not support multiple CSRs during the
bootstrapping, as based on the generic LDevID certificate the
pledge may enroll for further certificates.
* Closed open issue #5 regarding verification of ietf-ztp-types
usage as verified via a proof-of-concept in section Section 7.1.
* Housekeeping: Removed already addressed open issues stated in the
draft directly.
* Reworked text in from introduction to section pledge-responder-
mode
* Fixed "serial-number" encoding in PVR/RVR
* Added prior-signed-voucher-request in the parameter description of
the registrar-voucher-request in Section 7.3.
* Note added in Section 7.3 if sub-CAs are used, that the
corresponding information is to be provided to the MASA.
* Inclusion of limitation section (pledge sleeps and needs to be
waked up. Pledge is awake but Registrar-Agent is not available)
(Issue #10).
* Assertion-type aligned with voucher in RFC8366bis, deleted related
open issues. (Issue #4)
* Included table for endpoints in Section 6.3 for better
readability.
* Included registrar authorization check for Registrar-Agent during
TLS handshake in section Section 7.3. Also enhanced figure
Figure 4 with the authorization step on TLS level.
* Enhanced description of registrar authorization check for
Registrar-Agent based on the agent-signed-data in section
Section 7.3. Also enhanced figure Figure 4 with the authorization
step on Pledge-Voucher-Request level.
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* Changed agent-signed-cert to an array to allow for providing
further certificate information like the issuing CA cert for the
LDevID(RegAgt) certificate in case the registrar and the
Registrar-Agent have different issuing CAs in Figure 4 (issue
#12). This also required changes in the YANG module in
[I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis]
* Addressed YANG warning (issue #1)
* Inclusion of examples for a trigger to create a Pledge-Voucher-
Request and an Pledge Enroll-Request.
From IETF draft-ietf-anima-brski-async-enroll-03 -> IETF anima-brski-
prm-00:
* Moved UC2 related parts defining the Pledge in Responder Mode from
draft-ietf-anima-brski-async-enroll-03 to this document This
required changes and adaptations in several sections to remove the
description and references to UC1.
* Addressed feedback for voucher-request enhancements from YANG
doctor early review, meanwhile moved to
[I-D.ietf-anima-rfc8366bis] as well as in the security
considerations (formerly named ietf-async-voucher-request).
* Renamed ietf-async-voucher-request to IETF-voucher-request-prm to
to allow better listing of voucher related extensions; aligned
with constraint voucher (#20)
* Utilized ietf-voucher-request-async instead of ietf-voucher-
request in voucher exchanges to utilize the enhanced voucher-
request.
* Included changes from draft-ietf-netconf-sztp-csr-06 regarding the
YANG definition of csr-types into the enrollment request exchange.
From IETF draft 02 -> IETF draft 03:
* Housekeeping, deleted open issue regarding YANG voucher-request in
Section 7.1 as voucher-request was enhanced with additional leaf.
* Included open issues in YANG model in Section 5 regarding
assertion value agent-proximity and csr encapsulation using SZTP
sub module).
From IETF draft 01 -> IETF draft 02:
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* Defined call flow and objects for interactions in UC2. Object
format based on draft for JOSE signed voucher artifacts and
aligned the remaining objects with this approach in Section 7.
* Terminology change: issue #2 pledge-agent -> Registrar-Agent to
better underline Registrar-Agent relation.
* Terminology change: issue #3 PULL/PUSH -> pledge-initiator-mode
and pledge-responder-mode to better address the pledge operation.
* Communication approach between pledge and Registrar-Agent changed
by removing TLS-PSK (former section TLS establishment) and
associated references to other drafts in favor of relying on
higher layer exchange of signed data objects. These data objects
are included also in the Pledge-Voucher-Request and lead to an
extension of the YANG module for the voucher-request (issue #12).
* Details on trust relationship between Registrar-Agent and
registrar (issue #4, #5, #9) included in Section 5.
* Recommendation regarding short-lived certificates for Registrar-
Agent authentication towards registrar (issue #7) in the security
considerations.
* Introduction of reference to Registrar-Agent signing certificate
using SKID in Registrar-Agent signed data (issue #37).
* Enhanced objects in exchanges between pledge and Registrar-Agent
to allow the registrar to verify agent-proximity to the pledge
(issue #1) in Section 7.
* Details on trust relationship between Registrar-Agent and pledge
(issue #5) included in Section 5.
* Split of use case 2 call flow into sub sections in Section 7.
From IETF draft 00 -> IETF draft 01:
* Update of scope in Section 3.1 to include in which the pledge acts
as a server. This is one main motivation for use case 2.
* Rework of use case 2 in Section 5 to consider the transport
between the pledge and the pledge-agent. Addressed is the TLS
channel establishment between the pledge-agent and the pledge as
well as the endpoint definition on the pledge.
* First description of exchanged object types (needs more work)
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* Clarification in discovery options for enrollment endpoints at the
domain registrar based on well-known endpoints do not result in
additional /.well-known URIs. Update of the illustrative example.
Note that the change to /brski for the voucher related endpoints
has been taken over in the BRSKI main document.
* Updated references.
* Included Thomas Werner as additional author for the document.
From individual version 03 -> IETF draft 00:
* Inclusion of discovery options of enrollment endpoints at the
domain registrar based on well-known endpoints in new section as
replacement of section 5.1.3 in the individual draft. This is
intended to support both use cases in the document. An
illustrative example is provided.
* Missing details provided for the description and call flow in
pledge-agent use case Section 5, e.g. to accommodate distribution
of CA certificates.
* Updated CMP example in to use lightweight CMP instead of CMP, as
the draft already provides the necessary /.well-known endpoints.
* Requirements discussion moved to separate section in Section 4.
Shortened description of proof of identity binding and mapping to
existing protocols.
* Removal of copied call flows for voucher exchange and registrar
discovery flow from [RFC8995] in UC1 to avoid doubling or text or
inconsistencies.
* Reworked abstract and introduction to be more crisp regarding the
targeted solution. Several structural changes in the document to
have a better distinction between requirements, use case
description, and solution description as separate sections.
History moved to appendix.
From individual version 02 -> 03:
* Update of terminology from self-contained to authenticated self-
contained object to be consistent in the wording and to underline
the protection of the object with an existing credential. Note
that the naming of this object may be discussed. An alternative
name may be attestation object.
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* Simplification of the architecture approach for the initial use
case having an offsite PKI.
* Introduction of a new use case utilizing authenticated self-
contain objects to onboard a pledge using a commissioning tool
containing a pledge-agent. This requires additional changes in
the BRSKI call flow sequence and led to changes in the
introduction, the application example,and also in the related
BRSKI-PRM call flow.
From individual version 01 -> 02:
* Update of introduction text to clearly relate to the usage of
IDevID and LDevID.
* Update of description of architecture elements and changes to
BRSKI in Section 5.
* Enhanced consideration of existing enrollment protocols in the
context of mapping the requirements to existing solutions in
Section 4.
From individual version 00 -> 01:
* Update of examples, specifically for building automation as well
as two new application use cases in Section 3.1.
* Deletion of asynchronous interaction with MASA to not complicate
the use case. Note that the voucher exchange can already be
handled in an asynchronous manner and is therefore not considered
further. This resulted in removal of the alternative path the
MASA in Figure 1 and the associated description in Section 5.
* Enhancement of description of architecture elements and changes to
BRSKI in Section 5.
* Consideration of existing enrollment protocols in the context of
mapping the requirements to existing solutions in Section 4.
* New section starting with the mapping to existing enrollment
protocols by collecting boundary conditions.
Contributors
Esko Dijk
IoTconsultancy.nl
Email: esko.dijk@iotconsultancy.nl
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Toerless Eckert
Futurewei
Email: tte@cs.fau.de
Matthias Kovatsch
Siemens Schweiz AG
Email: ietf@kovatsch.net
Authors' Addresses
Steffen Fries
Siemens AG
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 Munich
Germany
Email: steffen.fries@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com/
Thomas Werner
Siemens AG
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 Munich
Germany
Email: thomas-werner@siemens.com
URI: https://www.siemens.com/
Eliot Lear
Cisco Systems
Richtistrasse 7
CH-8304 Wallisellen
Switzerland
Phone: +41 44 878 9200
Email: lear@cisco.com
Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
URI: http://www.sandelman.ca/
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