Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-avt-srtp-ekt
draft-ietf-avt-srtp-ekt
AVT Working Group D. McGrew
Internet-Draft F. Andreasen
Intended status: Standards Track D. Wing
Expires: May 3, 2012 Cisco
K. Fischer
Siemens Enterprise Communications
October 31, 2011
Encrypted Key Transport for Secure RTP
draft-ietf-avt-srtp-ekt-03
Abstract
SRTP Encrypted Key Transport (EKT) is an extension to SRTP that
provides for the secure transport of SRTP master keys, Rollover
Counters, and other information, within SRTP or SRTCP. This facility
enables SRTP to work for decentralized conferences with minimal
control, and to handle situations caused by early media.
This note defines EKT, and also describes how to use it with SDP
Security Descriptions, DTLS-SRTP, and MIKEY. These other key
management protocols provide an EKT key to everyone in a session, and
EKT coordinates the keys within the session.
Status of this Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2012.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Encrypted Key Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Authentication Tag Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Packet Processing and State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.1. Outbound (Tag Generation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.2. Inbound (Tag Verification) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3. Ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.1. The Default Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.2. AES ECB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.3. Other EKT Ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4. Synchronizing Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.6. Timing and Reliability Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3. Use of EKT with SDP Security Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1. SDP Security Descriptions Recap . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2. Relationship between EKT and SDP Security Descriptions . . 20
3.3. Overview of Combined EKT and SDP Security Description
Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.4. EKT Extensions to SDP Security Descriptions . . . . . . . 22
3.4.1. EKT_Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.4.2. EKT_Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.4.3. EKT_SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5. Offer/Answer Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5.1. Generating the Initial Offer - Unicast Streams . . . . 24
3.5.2. Generating the Initial Answer - Unicast Streams . . . 25
3.5.3. Processing of the Initial Answer - Unicast Streams . . 26
3.6. SRTP-Specific Use Outside Offer/Answer . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.7. Modifying the Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.8. Backwards Compatibility Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.9. Grammar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4. Use of EKT with DTLS-SRTP Key Transport . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1. EKT Extensions to DTLS-SRTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.1. Scaling to Large Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2. Offer/Answer Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2.1. Generating the Initial Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
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4.2.2. Generating the Initial Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2.3. Processing the Initial Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2.4. Modifying the Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5. Use of EKT with MIKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.1. EKT extensions to MIKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.2. Offer/Answer considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2.1. Generating the Initial Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2.2. Generating the Initial Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.2.3. Processing the Initial Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.2.4. Modifying the Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6. Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.1. Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Appendix A. Using EKT to Optimize Interworking DTLS-SRTP with
Security Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
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1. Introduction
RTP is designed to allow decentralized groups with minimal control to
establish sessions, such as for multimedia conferences.
Unfortunately, Secure RTP (SRTP [RFC3711]) cannot be used in many
minimal-control scenarios, because it requires that SSRC values and
other data be coordinated among all of the participants in a session.
For example, if a participant joins a session that is already in
progress, the SRTP rollover counter (ROC) of each SRTP source in the
session needs to be provided to that participant.
The inability of SRTP to work in the absence of central control was
well understood during the design of that protocol; that omission was
considered less important than optimizations such as bandwidth
conservation. Additionally, in many situations SRTP is used in
conjunction with a signaling system that can provide most of the
central control needed by SRTP. However, there are several cases in
which conventional signaling systems cannot easily provide all of the
coordination required. It is also desirable to eliminate the layer
violations that occur when signaling systems coordinate certain SRTP
parameters, such as SSRC values and ROCs.
This document defines Encrypted Key Transport (EKT) for SRTP, an
extension to SRTP that fits within the SRTP framework and reduces the
amount of signaling control that is needed in an SRTP session. EKT
securely distributes the SRTP master key and other information for
each SRTP source, using SRTCP or SRTP to transport that information.
With this method, SRTP entities are free to choose SSRC values as
they see fit, and to start up new SRTP sources with new SRTP master
keys (see Section 2.2) within a session without coordinating with
other entities via signaling or other external means. This fact
allows to reinstate the RTP collision detection and repair mechanism,
which is nullified by the current SRTP specification because of the
need to control SSRC values closely. An SRTP endpoint using EKT can
generate new keys whenever an existing SRTP master key has been
overused, or start up a new SRTP source to replace an old SRTP source
that has reached the packet-count limit. EKT also solves the problem
in which the burst loss of the N initial SRTP packets can confuse an
SRTP receiver, when the initial RTP sequence number is greater than
or equal to 2^16 - N. These features simplify many architectures that
implement SRTP.
EKT provides a way for an SRTP session participant, either sender or
receiver, to securely transport its SRTP master key and current SRTP
rollover counter to the other participants in the session. This
data, possibly in conjunction with additional data provided by an
external signaling protocol, furnishes the information needed by the
receiver to instantiate an SRTP/SRTCP receiver context.
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EKT does not control the manner in which the SSRC and master key are
generated; it is concerned only with their secure transport. Those
values may be generated on demand by the SRTP endpoint, or may be
dictated by an external mechanism such as a signaling agent or a
secure group controller.
EKT is not intended to replace external key establishment mechanisms
such as SDP Security Descriptions [RFC4568], DTLS-SRTP [RFC5764], or
MIKEY [RFC3830][RFC4563]. Instead, it is used in conjunction with
those methods, and it relieves them of the burden of tightly
coordinating every SRTP source among every SRTP participant.
This document is organized as follows. A complete normative
definition of EKT is provided in Section 2. It consists of packet
processing algorithms (Section 2.2) and cryptographic definitions
(Section 2.3) . In Section 3, the use of EKT with SDP Security
Descriptions is defined, and in Section 4 its use with DTLS-SRTP is
defined. In Section 5 we outline the use of EKT with MIKEY.
Section 6 provides a design rationale. Security Considerations are
provided in Section 7, and IANA considerations are provided in
Section 8.
1.1. Conventions Used In This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. Encrypted Key Transport
In EKT, an SRTP master key is encrypted with a Key Encrypting Key
(KEK), and the resulting ciphertext is transported (using the EKT
Base Authentication Tag) in selected SRTCP or in selected SRTP
packets. A single KEK suffices for a single SRTP session, regardless
of the number of participants in the session. However, there can be
multiple KEKs used within a particular session. We use terms "KEK"
or "EKT key" to mean the same thing; the latter term is used when
describing the relation of EKT to external key management.
In order to convey the ciphertext of the SRTP master key, and other
additional information, the Authentication Tag field is subdivided as
defined in Section 2.1. EKT defines new SRTP and SRTCP
authentication functions, which use this format. It incorporates a
conventional authentication function, which is called the base
authentication function in this specification. Any authentication
function, such as the default one of HMAC-SHA1 with a 160-bit key and
an 80-bit authentication tag, can be used as a base authentication
function. EKT also defines a new method of providing SRTP master
keys to an endpoint.
2.1. Authentication Tag Formats
The EKT Authentication Tag uses one of the two formats defined below.
These two formats can always be unambiguously distinguished on
receipt by examining the final bit of the EKT Authentication Tag,
which is also the final bit of the SRTP packet. The first format is
the Full EKT Authentication Tag (Figure 1), and the second is the
Abbreviated EKT Authentication Tag (Figure 2).
The following figure shows the packet layout for the Full EKT
Authentication Tag:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
: Base Authentication Tag :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
: Encrypted Master Key :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Rollover Counter |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Initial Sequence Number | Security Parameter Index |1|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Full EKT Authentication Tag format
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The Full EKT Authentication Tag field contains the following sub-
fields:
Base Authentication Tag: This field contains the authentication tag
computed by the base authentication function. The value of this
field is used to check the authenticity of the packet.
Encrypted Master Key: The length of this field is variable, and is
equal to the ciphertext size N defined in Section 2.3. Note that
the length of the field is inferable from the SPI field, since the
particular EKT cipher used by the sender of a packet is inferable
from that field. The Encrypted Master Key field is included
outside of the authenticated portion of the SRTCP packet,
immediately following the Authentication Tag. It contains the
ciphertext value resulting from the encryption of the SRTP master
key corresponding to the SSRC contained in the packet. The
encryption and decryption of this value is done using a cipher as
defined in Section 2.3.
Rollover Counter: The length of this field is fixed at 32 bits.
This field is set to the current value of the SRTP rollover
counter in the SRTP context associated with the SSRC in the SRTCP
packet. This field immediately follows the Encrypted Master Key
field.
Initial Sequence Number (ISN): The length of this field is fixed at
16 bits. If this field is nonzero, then it indicates the RTP
sequence number of the initial RTP packet that is protected using
the SRTP master key conveyed (in encrypted form) by the Encrypted
Master Key field of this packet. If this field is zero, it
indicates that the initial RTP packet protected using the SRTP
master key conveyed in this packet preceded, or was concurrent
with, the last roll-over of the RTP sequence number.
Security Parameter Index (SPI): The length of this field is fixed at
15 bits. This field indicates the appropriate Key Encrypting Key
and other parameters for the receiver to use when processing the
packet. It is an "index" into a table of possibilities (which are
established via signaling or some other out-of-band means), much
like the IPsec Security Parameter Index [RFC4301]. The parameters
that are identified by this field are:
* The Key Encrypting Key used to process the packet.
* The EKT cipher used to process the packet.
* The Secure RTP parameters associated with the SRTP Master Key
carried by the packet and the SSRC value in the packet.
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Section 8.2. of [RFC3711] summarizes the parameters defined by
that specification.
* The Master Salt associated with the Master Key. (This value is
part of the parameters mentioned above, but we call it out for
emphasis.) The Master Salt is communicated separately, via
signaling, typically along with the EKT Key Encrypting Key.
Together, these elements are called an EKT parameter set. Within
each SRTP session, each distinct EKT parameter set that may be
used MUST be associated with a distinct SPI value, to avoid
ambiguity. The SPI field follows the Initial Sequence Number.
Since it appears at the end of the packet, and has a fixed length,
it is always possible to unambiguously parse this field.
Final bit: This MUST be 1. This flag distinguishes the packet
layout between Figure 2 or Figure 1.
The following figure shows the packet layout of the Abbreviated EKT
Authentication Tag:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
: Base Authentication Tag :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |0|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Abbreviated EKT Authentication Tag format
The Abbreviated EKT Authentication Tag field contains the following
sub-fields:
Base Authentication Tag: same as described above.
Reserved: 7 bits. MUST be 0 on transmission and MUST be ignored on
reception.
Final Bit: This MUST be 0. This flag distinguishes the packet
layout betweenFigure 1 or Figure 2.s
2.2. Packet Processing and State Machine
At any given time, each SRTP/SRTCP source has associated with it a
single EKT parameter set. This parameter set is used to process all
outbound packets, and is called the outbound parameter set. There
may be other EKT parameter sets that are used by other SRTP/SRTCP
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sources in the same session. All of these EKT parameter sets SHOULD
be stored by all of the participants in an SRTP session, for use in
processing inbound SRTCP traffic.
We next review SRTP authentication and show how the EKT
authentication method is built on top of a base authentication
method. An SRTP or SRTCP authentication method consists of a tag-
generation function and a verification function. The tag-generation
function takes as input a secret key, the data to be authenticated,
and the packet index. It provides an authentication tag as its sole
output, and is used in the processing of outbound packets. The
verification function takes as input a secret key, the data to be
authenticated, the packet index, and the authentication tag. It
returns an indication of whether or not the data, index, and tag are
valid or not. It is used in the processing of inbound packets. EKT
defines a tag-generation function in terms of the base tag-generation
function, and defines a verification function in terms of the base
verification function. The tag-generation function is used to
process outbound packets, and the verification function is used to
process inbound packets.
2.2.1. Outbound (Tag Generation)
When an SRTP or SRTCP packet needs to be sent, the EKT tag generation
function works as follows. The Rollover Counter field in the packet
is set to the current value of the SRTP rollover counter (represented
as an unsigned integer in network byte order).
The Initial Sequence Number field is set to zero, if the initial RTP
packet protected using the current SRTP master key for this source
preceded, or was concurrent with, the last roll-over of the RTP
sequence number. Otherwise, that field is set to the value of the
RTP sequence number of the initial RTP packet that was or will be
protected by that key. When the SRTP master key corresponding to a
source is changed, the new key SHOULD be communicated in advance via
EKT. (Note that the ISN field allows the receiver to know when it
should start using the new key to process SRTP packets.) This
enables the rekeying event to be communicated before any RTP packets
are protected with the new key. The rekeying event MUST NOT change
the value of ROC (otherwise, the current value of the ROC would not
be known to late joiners of existing sessions).
The Security Parameter Index field is set to the value of the
Security Parameter Index that is associated with the outbound
parameter set.
The Encrypted Master Key field is set to the ciphertext created by
encrypting the SRTP master key with the EKT cipher, using the KEK as
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the encryption key. The encryption process is detailed in
Section 2.3. Implementations MAY cache the value of this field to
avoid recomputing it for each packet that is sent.
2.2.1.1. Computing the Base Authentication Tag
If using the Base Authentication Tag format, the field is computed
using the base tag-generation function as follows. It can only be
computed after all of the other fields have been set. The
authenticated input consists of the following elements, in order:
1. the SRTP or SRTCP authenticated portion,
2. a string of zero bits whose length exactly matches that of the
Base Authentication Tag field,
3. the Encrypted Master Key field,
4. the Rollover Counter field,
5. the Initial Sequence Number field, and
6. the Security Parameter Index field.
Implementation note: the string of zero bits is included in the
authenticated input in order to allow implementations to compute
the base authentication tag using a single pass of the base
authentication function. Implementations MAY write zeros into the
Base Authentication Tag field prior to computing that function, on
the sending side.
2.2.1.2. Computing the Abbreviated Authentication Tag
If using the Abbreviated Authentication Tag format, the field is
computed using the base tag-generation function as follows. It can
only be computed after all of the other fields have been set. The
authenticated input consists of the following elements, in order:
1. the SRTP or SRTCP authenticated portion,
2. a string of zero bits whose length exactly matches that of the
Base Authentication Tag field. Then for SRTP only, place the ROC
(in network order) into the first 4 bytes of the "base
authentication tag" field.
3. set reserved bits and final bit to zeros.
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2.2.2. Inbound (Tag Verification)
The EKT verification function proceeds as follows (see Figure 3), or
uses an equivalent set of steps. Recall that the verification
function is a component of SRTP and SRTCP processing. When a packet
does not pass the verification step, the function indicates this fact
to the SRTCP packet processing function when it returns control to
that function.
1. The Security Parameter Index field is checked to determine which
EKT parameter set should be used when processing the packet. If
multiple parameter sets been defined for the SRTP session, then
the one that is associated with the Security Parameter Index
value that matches the Security Parameter Index field in the
packet is used. This parameter set is called the matching
parameter set below. If there is no matching SPI, then the
verification function MUST return an indication of authentication
failure, and the steps described below are not performed.
2. If there is already an SRTP crypto context associated with the
SSRC in the packet, and replay protection is in use, then the
receiver performs the replay check described in Section 3.3.2 of
[RFC3711]. If the EKT fields are conveyed in an RTCP packet,
then the packet index used in that check is formed from the
Rollover Counter and the Initial Sequence Number fields in that
packet. If the EKT fields are conveyed in an SRTP packet, then
the packet index used in that check is formed from the EKT
Rollover Counter field and the RTP Sequence Number in that
packet.
3. The Encrypted Master Key field is decrypted using the EKT
cipher's decryption function. That field is used as the
ciphertext input, and the Key Encrypting Key in the matching
parameter set is used as the decryption key. The decryption
process is detailed in Section 2.3. The plaintext resulting from
this decryption is provisionally accepted as the SRTP master key
corresponding to the SSRC in the packet. If an SRTP master key
identifier (MKI) is present in the packet, then the provisional
key corresponds to the particular SSRC and MKI combination. A
provisional key MUST be used only to process one single packet.
A provisional SRTP or SRTCP authentication key is generated from
the provisional master key, and the SRTP master salt from the
matching parameter set, using the SRTP key derivation algorithm
(see Section 4.3 of [RFC3711]).
4. An authentication check is performed on the packet, using the
provisional SRTP or SRTCP authentication key. This key is
provided to the base authentication function (see Figure 3),
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which is evaluated as described in Section 2.2.1.1. If the Base
Authentication Tag field matches the tag computed by the base
authentication function, then the packet passes the check.
Implementation note: a receiver MAY copy the Base
Authentication Tag field into temporary storage, then write
zeros into that field, prior to computing the base
authentication tag value. This step allows the base
authentication function to be computed in a single pass over
the data in the packet.
5. If the base authentication check using the provisional key fails,
then the provisional key MUST be discarded and it MUST NOT affect
any subsequent processing. The verification function MUST return
an indication of authentication failure, and the steps described
below are not performed.
6. Otherwise, if the base authentication check is passed, the
provisional key is also accepted as the SRTP master key
corresponding to the SRTP source that sent the packet. If an MKI
is present in the packet, then the master key corresponds to the
particular SSRC and MKI combination. If there is no SRTP crypto
context corresponding to the SSRC in the packet, then a new
crypto context is created. The rollover counter in the context
is set to the value of the Rollover Counter field. If the crypto
context is not new, then the rollover counter in the context MUST
NOT be set to a value lower than its current value. (If the
replay protection step described above is performed, it ensures
that this requirement is satisfied.)
7. If the Initial Sequence Number field is nonzero, then the initial
sequence number for the SRTP master key is set to the packet
index created by appending that field to the current rollover
counter and treating the result as a 48-bit unsigned integer.
The initial sequence number for the master key is equivalent to
the "From" value of the <From, To> pair of indices (Section 8.1.1
of [RFC3711]) that can be associated with a master key.
8. The newly accepted SRTP master key, the SRTP parameters from the
matching parameter set, the SSRC from the packet, and the MKI
from the packet, if one is present, are stored in the crypto
context associated with the SRTP source. The SRTP Key Derivation
algorithm is run in order to compute the SRTP encryption and
authentication keys, and those keys are stored for use in SRTP
processing of inbound packets. The Key Derivation algorithm
takes as input the newly accepted SRTP master key, along with the
Master Salt from the matching parameter set.
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Implementation note: the receiver may want to retain old
master keys for some brief period of time, so that out of
order packets can be processed.
9. The verification function then returns an indication that the
packet passed the verification.
Implementation note: the value of the Encrypted Master Key
field is identical in successive packets protected by the same
KEK and SRTP master key. This value MAY be cached by an SRTP
receiver to minimize computational effort, by allowing it to
recognize when the SRTP master key is unchanged, and thus
avoid repeating Steps 2, 6, and 7.
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+------- Encrypted Master Key
|
v
+------------+
| Decryption |
| Function |<-------------------------- Key Encrypting Key
+------------+
| +----------------+ EKT
+--------+-- provisional ---->| SRTCP |<-- master
| master key | Key Derivation | salt
| +----------------+
| |
| provisional SRTCP authentication key
| |
| v
| +----------------+
| authenticated portion --> | Base SRTCP |
| authentication tag -----> | Verification |
| +----------------+
| |
| +----------------+ +---+
| | return FAIL |<- FAIL -| ? |
| +----------------+ +---+
| |
| +----------------+ |
+------->| set master key,|<- PASS ---+
| ROC, and MKI |
+----------------+
|
v
+----------------+
| return PASS |
+----------------+
Figure 3: EKT inbound processing.
2.3. Ciphers
EKT uses a cipher to encrypt the SRTP master keys. We first specify
the interface to the cipher, in order to abstract the interface away
from the details of that function. We then define the cipher that is
used in EKT by default. This cipher MUST be implemented, but another
cipher that conforms to this interface MAY be used, in which case its
use MUST be coordinated by external means (e.g., call signaling).
An EKT cipher consists of an encryption function and a decryption
function. The encryption function E(K, P) takes the following
inputs:
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o a secret key K with a length of L bytes, and
o a plaintext value P with a length of M bytes.
The encryption function returns a ciphertext value C whose length is
N bytes, where N is at least M. The decryption function D(K, C) takes
the following inputs:
o a secret key K with a length of L bytes, and
o a ciphertext value C with a length of N bytes.
The decryption function returns a plaintext value P that is M bytes
long. These functions have the property that D(K, E(K, P)) = P for
all values of K and P. Each cipher also has a limit T on the number
of times that it can be used with any fixed key value. For each key,
the encryption function MUST NOT be invoked on more than T distinct
values of P, and the decryption function MUST NOT be invoked on more
than T distinct values of C.
An EKT cipher MUST resist attacks in which both ciphertexts and
plaintexts can be adaptively chosen. For each randomly chosen key,
the encryption and decryption functions cannot be distinguished from
a random permutation and its inverse with non-negligible advantage.
This must be true even for adversaries that can query both the
encryption and decryption functions adaptively. The advantage is
defined as the difference between the probability that the adversary
will identify the cipher as such and the probability that the
adversary will identify the random permutation as the cipher, when
each case is equally likely.
2.3.1. The Default Cipher
The default EKT Cipher is the AES Key Wrap [RFC3394] algorithm, which
can be used with plaintexts larger than 16 bytes in length, and is
thus suitable for keys of any size. It requires a plaintext length M
that is a multiple of eight bytes, and it returns a ciphertext with a
length of N = M + 8 bytes. It can be used with key sizes of L = 16,
24, and 32, and its use with those key sizes is indicated as
AESKW_128, AESKW_192, and AESKW_256, respectively. The key size
determines the length of the AES key used by the Key Wrap algorithm.
With this cipher, T=2^48.
2.3.2. AES ECB
The simplest EKT cipher is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[FIPS197] with 128-bit keys, in Electronic Codebook (ECB) Mode. Its
use is indicated as AES_ECB, and its parameters are fixed at L=16,
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M=16, and T=2^48. Note that M matches the size of the SRTP master
keys used by the default SRTP key derivation function; if an SRTP
cipher with a different SRTP master key length is to be used with
EKT, then another EKT cipher must be used. ECB is the simplest mode
of operation of a block cipher, in which the block cipher is used in
its raw form.
2.3.3. Other EKT Ciphers
Other specification MAY extend this one by defining other EKT ciphers
per Section 8. This section defines how those ciphers interact with
this specification.
An EKT cipher determines how the Encrypted Master Key field is
written, and how it is processed when it is read. This field is
opaque to the other aspects of EKT processing. EKT ciphers are free
to use this field in any way, but they SHOULD NOT use other EKT or
SRTP fields as an input. The values of the parameters L, M, N, and T
MUST be defined by each EKT cipher, and those values MUST be
inferable from the EKT parameter set.
2.4. Synchronizing Operation
A participant in a session MAY opt to use a particular EKT key to
protect outbound packets after it accepts that EKT key for protecting
inbound traffic. In this case, the fact that one participant has
changed to using a new EKT key for outbound traffic can trigger other
participants to switch to using the same key.
An SRTP/SRTCP source SHOULD change its SRTP master key after its EKT
key has been changed. This will ensure that the set of participants
able to decrypt the traffic will be limited to those who know the
current EKT key.
EKT can be transported over SRTCP, but some of the information that
it conveys is used for SRTP processing; some elements of the EKT
parameter set apply to both SRTP and SRTCP. Furthermore, SRTCP
packets can be lost and both SRTP and SRTCP packets may be delivered
out of order. This can lead to various race conditions, which we
review below.
When joining an SRTP session, SRTP packets may be received before any
EKT over SRTCP packets, which implies the crypto context has not been
established, unless other external signaling mechanism has done so.
Rather than automatically discarding such SRTP packets, the receiver
MAY want to provisionally place them in a jitter buffer and delay
discarding them until playout time.
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When an SRTP source using EKT over SRTCP performs a rekeying
operation, there is a race between the actual rekeying signaled via
SRTCP and the SRTP packets secured by the new keying material. If
the SRTP packets are received first, they will fail authentication;
alternatively, if authentication is not being used, they will decrypt
to unintelligible random-looking plaintext. (Note, however, that
[RFC3711] says that SRTP "SHOULD NOT be used without message
authentication".) In order to address this problem, the rekeying
event can be sent before packets using the new SRTP master key are
sent (by use of the ISN field). Another solution involves using an
MKI at the expense of added overhead in each SRTP packet.
Alternatively, receivers MAY want to delay discarding packets from
known SSRCs that fail authentication in anticipation of receiving a
rekeying event via EKT (SRTCP) shortly.
The ROC signaled via EKT over SRTCP may be off by one when it is
received by the other party(ies) in the session. In order to deal
with this, receivers should simply follow the SRTP packet index
estimation procedures defined in Section 3.3.1 [RFC3711].
2.5. Transport
EKT MUST be used over SRTCP, whenever RTCP is in use. EKT MAY be
used over SRTP. When EKT over SRTP is used in an SRTP session in
which SRTCP is available, then EKT MUST be used for both SRTP and
SRTCP.
The packet processing, state machine, and Authentication Tag format
for EKT over SRTP are nearly identical to that for EKT over SRTCP.
Differences are highlighted in Section 2.2.1 and Section 2.2.2.
2.6. Timing and Reliability Consideration
SRTCP communicates the master key and ROC for the SRTP session.
Thus, as explained above, if SRTP packets are received prior to the
corresponding SRTCP (EKT) packet, a race condition occurs. From an
EKT point of view, it is therefore desirable for an SRTP sender to
send an EKT packet containing the Base Authentication Tag as soon as
possible, and in no case any later than when the initial SRTP packet
is sent. It is RECOMMENDED that the Base Authentication Tag be
transmitted 3 times (to accomodate packet loss) and to provide a
reliable indication to the receiver that the sender is now using the
EKT key. If the Base Authentication Tag sent in SRTCP, the SRTCP
timing rules associated with the profile under which it runs (e.g.,
RTP/SAVP or RTP/SAVPF) MUST be obeyed. Subject to that constraint,
SRTP senders using EKT over SRTCP SHOULD send an SRTCP packet as soon
as possible after joining a session. Note that there is no need for
SRTP receivers to do so. Also note, that per RFC 3550, Section 6.2,
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it is permissible to send a compound RTCP packet immediately after
joining a unicast session (but not a multicast session).
SRTCP is not reliable and hence SRTCP packets may be lost. This is
obviously a problem for endpoints joining an SRTP session and
receiving SRTP traffic (as opposed to SRTCP), or for endpoints
receiving SRTP traffic following a rekeying event. To reduce the
impact of lost packets, SRTP senders using EKT over SRTCP SHOULD send
SRTCP packets as often as allowed by the profile under which they
operate.
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3. Use of EKT with SDP Security Descriptions
The SDP Security Descriptions (SDESC) [RFC4568] specification defines
a generic framework for negotiating security parameters for media
streams negotiated via the Session Description Protocol by use of a
new SDP "crypto" attribute and the Offer/Answer procedures defined in
[RFC3264]. In addition to the general framework, SDES also defines
how to use that framework specifically to negotiate security
parameters for Secure RTP. Below, we first provide a brief recap of
the crypto attribute when used for SRTP and we then explain how it is
complementary to EKT. In the rest of this Section, we provide
extensions to the crypto attribute and associated offer/answer
procedures to define its use with EKT.
3.1. SDP Security Descriptions Recap
The SRTP crypto attribute defined for SDESC contains a tag followed
by three types of parameters (refer to [RFC4568] for details):
o Crypto-suite. Identifies the encryption and authentication
transform
o Key parameters. SRTP keying material and parameters.
o Session parameters. Additional (optional) SRTP parameters such as
Key Derivation Rate, Forward Error Correction Order, use of
unencrypted SRTP, and other parameters defined by SDESC.
The crypto attributes in the example SDP in Figure 4 illustrate these
parameters.
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v=0
o=sam 2890844526 2890842807 IN IP4 192.0.2.5
s=SRTP Discussion
i=A discussion of Secure RTP
u=http://www.example.com/seminars/srtp.pdf
e=marge@example.com (Marge Simpson)
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.12
t=2873397496 2873404696
m=audio 49170 RTP/SAVP 0
a=crypto:1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80
inline:WVNfX19zZW1jdGwgKCkgewkyMjA7fQp9CnVubGVz|2^20|1:4
FEC_ORDER=FEC_SRTP
a=crypto:2 F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80
inline:MTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJDREUwMTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJjZGVm|2^20|1:4;
inline:QUJjZGVmMTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJDREUwMTIzNDU2Nzg5|2^20|2:4
FEC_ORDER=FEC_SRTP
Figure 4: SDP Security Descriptions example
For legibility the SDP shows line breaks that are not present on the
wire.
The first crypto attribute has the tag "1" and uses the crypto-suite
AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80. The "inline" parameter provides the SRTP
master key and salt, the master key lifetime (number of packets), and
the (optional) Master Key Identifier (MKI) whose value is "1" and has
a byte length of "4" in the SRTP packets. Finally, the FEC_ORDER
session parameter indicates the order of Forward Error Correction
used (FEC is applied before SRTP processing by the sender of the SRTP
media).
The second crypto attribute has the tag "2" and uses the crypto-suite
F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80. It includes two SRTP master keys and associated
salts. The first one is used with the MKI value 1, whereas the
second one is used with the MKI value 2. Finally, the FEC_ORDER
session parameter indicates the order of Forward Error Correction
used.
3.2. Relationship between EKT and SDP Security Descriptions
SDP Security Descriptions [RFC4568] define a generic framework for
negotiating security parameters for media streams negotiated via the
Session Description Protocol by use of the Offer/Answer procedures
defined in [RFC3264]. In addition to the general framework, SDESC
also defines how to use it specifically to negotiate security
parameters for Secure RTP.
EKT and SDESC are complementary. SDESC can negotiate several of the
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SRTP security parameters (e.g., cipher and use of Master Key
Identifier/MKI) as well as SRTP master keys. SDESC, however, does
not negotiate SSRCs and their associated Rollover Counter (ROC).
Instead, SDESC relies on a so-called "late binding", where a newly
observed SSRC will have its crypto context initialized to a ROC value
of zero. Clearly, this does not work for participants joining an
SRTP session that has been established for a while and hence has a
non-zero ROC. It is impossible to use SDESC to join an SRTP session
that is already in progress. In this case, EKT on the endpoint
running SDP Security can provide the additional signaling necessary
to communicate the ROC (Section 6.4.1 of [RFC4568]). The use of EKT
solves this problem by communicating the ROC associated with the SSRC
in the media plane.
SDP Security Descriptions negotiates different SRTP master keys in
the send and receive direction. The offer contains the master key
used by the offerer to send media, and the answer contains the master
key used by the answerer to send media. Consequently, if media is
received by the offerer prior to the answer being received, the
offerer does not know the master key being used. Use of SDP security
preconditions can solve this problem, however it requires an
additional round-trip as well as a more complicated state machine.
EKT solves this problem by simply sending the master key used in the
media plane thereby avoiding the need for security preconditions.
If multiple crypto-suites were offered, the offerer also will not
know which of the crypto-suites offered was selected until the answer
is received. EKT solves this problem by using a correlator, the
Security Parameter Index (SPI), which uniquely identifies each crypto
attribute in the offer.
One of the primary call signaling protocols using offer/answer is the
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261]. SIP uses the INVITE
message to initiate a media session and typically includes an offer
SDP in the INVITE. An INVITE may be "forked" to multiple recipients
which potentially can lead to multiple answers being received.
SDESC, however, does not properly support this scenario, mainly
because SDP and RTP/RTCP does not contain sufficient information to
allow for correlation of an incoming RTP/RTCP packet with a
particular answer SDP. Note that extensions providing this
correlation do exist (e.g., Interactive Connectivity Establishment
(ICE)). SDESC addresses this point-to-multipoint problem by moving
each answer to a separate RTP transport address thereby turning a
point-to-multipoint scenario into multiple point-to-point scenarios.
There are however significant disadvantages to doing so. As long as
the crypto attribute in the answer does not contain any declarative
parameters that differ from those in the offer, EKT solves this
problem by use of the SPI correlator and communication of the
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answerer's SRTP master key in EKT.
As can be seen from the above, the combination of EKT and SDESC
provides a better solution to SRTP negotiation for offer/answer than
either of them alone. SDESC negotiates the various SRTP crypto
parameters (which EKT does not), whereas EKT addresses the
shortcomings of SDESC.
3.3. Overview of Combined EKT and SDP Security Description Operation
We define three session extension parameters to SDESC to communicate
the EKT cipher, EKT key, and Security Parameter Index to the peer.
The original SDESC parameters are used as defined in [RFC4568],
however the procedures associated with the SRTP master key differ
slightly, since both SDESC and EKT communicate an SRTP master key.
In particular, the SRTP master key communicated via SDESC is used
only if there is currently no crypto context established for the SSRC
in question. This will be the case when an entity has received only
the offer or answer, but has yet to receive a valid EKT message from
the peer. Once a valid EKT message is received for the SSRC, the
crypto context is initialized accordingly, and the SRTP master key
will then be derived from the EKT message. Subsequent offer/answer
exchanges do not change this: The most recent SRTP master key
negotiated via EKT will be used, or, if none is available for the
SSRC in question, the most recent SRTP master key negotiated via
offer/answer will be used. Note that with these rules, once a valid
EKT message has been received for a given SSRC, rekeying for that
SSRC can only be done via EKT. The associated SRTP crypto parameters
however can be changed via SDESC.
3.4. EKT Extensions to SDP Security Descriptions
In order to use EKT and SDESC in conjunction with each other, the
following new SDES session parameters are defined. These MUST NOT
appear more than once in a given crypto attribute:
EKT_Cipher: The EKT cipher used to encrypt the SRTP Master Key
EKT_Key: The EKT key used to encrypt the SRTP Master Key
EKT_SPI: The EKT Security Parameter Index
Below are details on each of these attributes.
3.4.1. EKT_Cipher
The (optional) EKT_Cipher parameter defines the EKT cipher used to
encrypt the EKT key with in SRTCP packets. The default value is
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"AESKW_128" in accordance with Section 2.3.1. For the AES Key Wrap
cipher, the values "AESKW_128", "AESKW_192", and "AESKW_256" are
defined for values of L=16, 24, and 32 respectively. For the AES ECB
cipher, "AES_ECB" is defined. In the Offer/Answer model, the
EKT_Cipher parameter is a negotiated parameter.
3.4.2. EKT_Key
The (mandatory) EKT_Key parameter is the key K used to encrypt the
SRTP Master Key in SRTCP packets. The value is base64 encoded as
described in Section 4 [RFC4648]. When base64 decoding the key,
padding characters (i.e., one or two "=" at the end of the base64
encoded data) are discarded (see [RFC4648] for details). Base64
encoding assumes that the base64 encoding input is an integral number
of octets. If a given EKT cipher requires the use of a key with a
length that is not an integral number of octets, said cipher MUST
define a padding scheme that results in the base64 input being an
integral number of octets. For example, if the length defined was
250 bits, then 6 padding bits would be needed, which could be defined
to be the last 6 bits in a 256 bit input. In the Offer/Answer model,
the EKT_Key parameter is a negotiated parameter.
3.4.3. EKT_SPI
The (mandatory) EKT_SPI parameter is the Security Parameter Index.
It is encoded as an ASCII string representing the hexadecimal value
of the Security Parameter Index. The SPI identifies the *offer*
crypto attribute (including the EKT Key and Cipher) being used for
the associated SRTP session. A crypto attribute corresponds to an
EKT Parameter Set and hence the SPI effectively identifies a
particular EKT parameter set. Note that the scope of the SPI is the
SRTP session, which may or may not be limited to the scope of the
associated SIP dialog. In particular, if one of the participants in
an SRTP session is an SRTP translator, the scope of the SRTP session
is not limited to the scope of a single SIP dialog. However, if all
of the participants in the session are endpoints or mixers, the scope
of the SRTP session will correspond to a single SIP dialog. In the
Offer/Answer model, the EKT_SPI parameter is a negotiated parameter.
3.5. Offer/Answer Procedures
In this section, we provide the offer/answer procedures associated
with use of the three new SDESC parameters defined in Section
Section 3.4. Since SDESC is defined only for unicast streams, we
provide only offer/answer procedures for unicast streams here as
well.
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3.5.1. Generating the Initial Offer - Unicast Streams
When the initial offer is generated, the offerer MUST follow the
steps defined in [RFC4568] Section 7.1.1 as well as the following
steps.
For each unicast media line using SDESC and where use of EKT is
desired, the offerer MUST include one EKT_Key parameter and one
EKT_SPI parameter in at least one "crypto" attribute (see [RFC4568]).
The EKT_SPI parameter serves to identify the EKT parameter set used
for a particular SRTCP packet. Consequently, within a single media
line, a given EKT_SPI value MUST NOT be used with multiple crypto
attributes. Note that the EKT parameter set to use for the session
is not yet established at this point; each offered crypto attribute
contains a candidate EKT parameter set. Furthermore, if the media
line refers to an existing SRTP session, then any SPI values used for
EKT parameter sets in that session MUST NOT be remapped to any
different EKT parameter sets. When an offer describes an SRTP
session that is already in progress, the offer SHOULD use an EKT
parameter set (incl. EKT_SPI and EKT_KEY) that is already in use.
If an EKT_Cipher other than the default cipher is to be used, then
the EKT_Cipher parameter MUST be included as well.
If a given crypto attribute includes more than one set of SRTP key
parameters (SRTP master key, salt, lifetime, MKI), they MUST all use
the same salt. (EKT requires a single shared salt between all the
participants in the direct SRTP session).
Important Note: The scope of the offer/answer exchange is the SIP
dialog(s) established as a result of the INVITE, however the scope
of EKT is the direct SRTP session, i.e., all the participants that
are able to receive SRTP and SRTCP packets directly. If an SRTP
session spans multiple SIP dialogs, the EKT parameter sets MUST be
synchronized between all the SIP dialogs where SRTP and SRTCP
packets can be exchanged. In the case where the SIP entity
operates as an RTP mixer (and hence re-originates SRTP and SRTCP
packets with its own SSRC), this is not an issue, unless the mixer
receives traffic from the various participants on the same
destination IP address and port, in which case further
coordination of SPI values and crypto parameters may be needed
between the SIP dialogs (note that SIP forking with multiple early
media senders is an example of this). However if it operates as
an RTP translator, synchronized negotiation of the EKT parameter
sets on *all* the involved SIP dialogs will be needed. This is
non-trivial in a variety of use cases, and hence use of the
combined SDES/EKT mechanism with RTP translators should be
considered very carefully. It should be noted, that use of SRTP
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with RTP translators in general should be considered very
carefully as well.
The EKT session parameters can either be included as optional or
mandatory parameters, however within a given crypto attribute, they
MUST all be either optional or mandatory.
3.5.2. Generating the Initial Answer - Unicast Streams
When the initial answer is generated, the answerer MUST follow the
steps defined in [RFC4568] Section 7.1.2 as well as the following
steps.
For each unicast media line using SDESC, the answerer examines the
associated crypto attribute(s) for the presence of EKT parameters.
If mandatory EKT parameters are included with a "crypto" attribute,
the answerer MUST support those parameters in order to accept that
offered crypto attribute. If optional EKT parameters are included
instead, the answerer MAY accept the offered crypto attribute without
using EKT. However, doing so will prevent the offerer from
processing any packets received before the answer. If neither
optional nor mandatory EKT parameters are included with a crypto
attribute, and that crypto attribute is accepted in the answer, EKT
MUST NOT be used. If a given a crypto attribute includes a mixture
of optional and mandatory EKT parameters, or an incomplete set of
mandatory EKT parameters, that crypto attribute MUST be considered
invalid.
When EKT is used with SDESC, the offerer and answerer MUST use the
same SRTP master salt. Thus, the SRTP key parameter(s) in the answer
crypto attribute MUST use the same master salt as the one accepted
from the offer.
When the answerer accepts the offered media line and EKT is being
used, the crypto attribute included in the answer MUST include the
same EKT parameter values as found in the accepted crypto attribute
from the offer (however, if the default EKT cipher is being used, it
may be omitted). Furthermore, the EKT parameters included MUST be
mandatory (i.e., no "-" prefix).
Acceptance of a crypto attribute with EKT parameters leads to
establishment of the EKT parameter set for the corresponding SRTP
session. Consequently, the answerer MUST send packets in accordance
with that particular EKT parameter set only. If the answerer wants
to enable the offerer to process SRTP packets received by the offerer
before it receives the answer, the answerer MUST NOT include any
declarative session parameters that either were not present in the
offered crypto attribute, or were present but with a different value.
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Otherwise, the offerer's view of the EKT parameter set would differ
from the answerer's until the answer is received. Similarly, unless
the offerer and answerer has other means for correlating an answer
with a particular SRTP session, the answer SHOULD NOT include any
declarative session parameters that either were not present in the
offered crypto attribute, or were present but with a different value.
If this recommendation is not followed and the offerer receives
multiple answers (e.g., due to SIP forking), the offerer may not be
able to process incoming media stream packets correctly.
3.5.3. Processing of the Initial Answer - Unicast Streams
When the offerer receives the answer, it MUST perform the steps in
[RFC4568] Section 7.1.3 as well as the following steps for each SRTP
media stream it offered with one or more crypto lines containing EKT
parameters in it.
If the answer crypto line contains EKT parameters, and the
corresponding crypto line from the offer contained the same EKT
values, use of EKT has been negotiated successfully and MUST be used
for the media stream. When determining whether the values match,
optional and mandatory parameters MUST be considered equal.
Furthermore, if the default EKT cipher is being used, it MAY be
either present or absent in the offer and/or answer.
If the answer crypto line does not contain EKT parameters, then EKT
MUST NOT be used for the corresponding SRTP session. Note that if
the accepted crypto attribute contained mandatory EKT parameters in
the offer, and the crypto attribute in the answer does not contain
EKT parameters, then negotiation has failed (Section 5.1.3 of
[RFC4568]).
If the answer crypto line contains EKT parameters but the
corresponding offered crypto line did not, or if the parameters don't
match or are invalid, then the offerer MUST consider the crypto line
invalid (see Section 7.1.3 of [RFC4568] for further operation).
The EKT parameter set is established when the answer is received,
however there are a couple of special cases to consider here. First
of all, if an SRTCP packet is received prior to the answer, then the
EKT parameter set is established provisionally based on the SPI
included. Once the answer (which may include declarative session
parameters) is received, the EKT parameter set is fully established.
The second case involves receipt of multiple answers due to SIP
forking. In this case, there will be multiple EKT parameter sets;
one for each SRTP session. As mentioned earlier, reliable
correlation of SIP dialogs to SRTP sessions requires extensions, and
hence if one or more of the answers include declarative session
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parameters, it may be difficult to fully establish the EKT parameter
set for each SRTP session. In the absence of a specific correlation
mechanism, it is RECOMMENDED, that such correlation be done based on
the signaled receive IP-address in the SDP and the observed source
IP-address in incoming SRTP/SRTCP packets, and, if necessary, the
signaled receive UDP port and the observed source UDP port.
3.6. SRTP-Specific Use Outside Offer/Answer
Security Descriptions use for SRTP is not defined outside offer/
answer and hence neither does Security Descriptions with EKT.
3.7. Modifying the Session
When a media stream using the SRTP security descriptions has been
established, and a new offer/answer exchange is performed, the
offerer and answerer MUST follow the steps in Section 7.1.4 of
[RFC4568] as well as the following steps. SDESC allows for all
parameters of the session to be modified, and the EKT session
parameters are no exception to that, however, there are a few
additional rules to be adhered to when using EKT.
It is permissible to start a session without the use of EKT, and then
subsequently start using EKT, however the converse is not. Thus,
once use of EKT has been negotiated on a particular media stream, EKT
MUST continue to be used on that media stream in all subsequent
offer/answer exchanges.
The reason for this is that both SDESC and EKT communicate the SRTP
Master Key with EKT Master Keys taking precedence. Reverting back to
an SDESC-controlled master key in a synchronized manner is difficult.
Once EKT is being used, the salt for the direct SRTP session MUST NOT
be changed. Thus, a new offer/answer which does not create a new
SRTP session (e.g., because it reuses the same IP address and port)
MUST use the same salt for all crypto attributes as is currently used
for the direct SRTP session.
Finally, subsequent offer/answer exchanges MUST NOT remap a given SPI
value to a different EKT parameter set until 2^32 other mappings have
been used within the SRTP session. In practice, this requirements is
most easily met by using a monotonically increasing SPI value (modulo
2^32 and starting with zero) per direct SRTP session. Note that a
direct SRTP session may span multiple SIP dialogs, and in such cases
coordination of SPI values across those SIP dialogs will be required.
In the simple point-to-point unicast case without translators, the
requirement simply applies within each media line in the SDP. In the
point-to-multipoint case, the requirement applies across all the
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associated SIP dialogs.
3.8. Backwards Compatibility Considerations
Backwards compatibility can be achieved in a couple of ways. First
of all, SDESC allows for session parameters to be prefixed with "-"
to indicate that they are optional. If the answerer does not support
the EKT session parameters, such optional parameters will simply be
ignored. When the answer is received, absence of the parameters will
indicate that EKT is not being used. Receipt of SRTCP packets prior
to receipt of such an answer will obviously be problematic (as is
normally the case for SDESC without EKT).
Alternatively, SDESC allows for multiple crypto lines to be included
for a particular media stream. Thus, two crypto lines that differ in
their use of EKT parameters (presence in one, absence in the other)
can be used as a way to negotiate use of EKT. When the answer is
received, the accepted crypto attribute will indicate whether EKT is
being used or not.
3.9. Grammar
The ABNF [RFC5234] syntax for the three new SDP Security Descriptions
session parameters is shown in Figure 5.
EKT = EKT_Cipher "|" EKT_Key "|" EKT_SPI
EKT_Cipher = "EKT=" EKT_Cipher_Name
EKT_Cipher_Name = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "_") ; "AES_128", "AESKW_128"
; "AESKW_192" and
; "AESKW_256" defined in
; this document.
EKT_Key = 1*(base64) ; See Section 4 of [RFC4648]
base64 = ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/" / "="
EKT_SPI = 4HEXDIG ; See [RFC5234]
Figure 5: ABNF for the EKT session parameters
Using the example from Figure 5 with the EKT extensions to SDP
Security Descriptions results in the following example SDP:
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v=0
o=sam 2890844526 2890842807 IN IP4 192.0.2.5
s=SRTP Discussion
i=A discussion of Secure RTP
u=http://www.example.com/seminars/srtp.pdf
e=marge@example.com (Marge Simpson)
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.12
t=2873397496 2873404696
m=audio 49170 RTP/SAVP 0
a=crypto:1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80
inline:WVNfX19zZW1jdGwgKCkgewkyMjA7fQp9CnVubGVz|2^20|1:4
FEC_ORDER=FEC_SRTP EKT=AES_128|FE9C|AAE0
a=crypto:2 F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80
inline:MTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJDREUwMTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJjZGVm|2^20|1:4;
inline:QUJjZGVmMTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJDREUwMTIzNDU2Nzg5|2^20|2:4
FEC_ORDER=FEC_SRTP EKT=AES_128|FE9C|AAE0
For legibility the SDP shows line breaks that are not present on the
wire.
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4. Use of EKT with DTLS-SRTP Key Transport
This document defines an extension to DTLS-SRTP called Key Transport.
Using EKT with the DTLS-SRTP Key Transport extensions allows securely
transporting SRTP keying material from one DTLS-SRTP peer to another,
so the same SRTP keying material can be used by those peers and so
those peers can process EKT keys. This combination of protocols is
valuable because it combines the advantages of DTLS (strong
authentication of the endpoint and flexibility) with the advantages
of EKT (allowing secure multiparty RTP with loose coordination and
efficient communication of per-source keys).
4.1. EKT Extensions to DTLS-SRTP
This document adds a new TLS negotiated extension called "ekt". This
adds a new TLS content type, EKT, and a new negotiated extension EKT.
The negotiated extension MUST only be requested in conjunction with
the "use_srtp" extension (Section 3.2 of [RFC5764]). The DTLS server
indicates its support for EKT by including "dtls-srtp-ekt" in its SDP
and "ekt" in its TLS ServerHello message. If a DTLS client includes
"ekt" in its ClientHello, but does not receive "ekt" in the
ServerHello, the DTLS client MUST NOT send DTLS packets with the
"ekt" content-type.
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Using the syntax described in DTLS [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4347-bis], the
following structures are used:
enum {
ekt_key(0),
ekt_key_ack(1),
ekt_key_error(254),
(255)
} SRTPKeyTransportType;
struct {
SRTPKeyTransportType keytrans_type;
uint24 length;
uint16 message_seq;
uint24 fragment_offset;
uint24 fragment_length;
select (SRTPKeyTransportType) {
case ekt_key:
EKTkey;
};
} KeyTransport;
enum {
AES_128(0),
AESKW_128(1),
AESKW_192(2),
AESKW_256(3),
} ektcipher;
struct {
ektcipher EKT_Cipher;
uint EKT_Key_Value<1..256>;
uint EKT_Master_Salt<1..256>;
uint16 EKT_SPI;
} EKTkey;
Figure 6: Additional TLS Data Structures
The diagram below shows a message flow of DTLS client and DTLS server
using the DTLS-SRTP Key Transport extension. SRTP packets exchanged
prior to the ekt_message are encrypted using the SRTP master key
derived from the normal DTLS-SRTP key derivation function. After the
ekt_key message, they can be encrypted using the EKT key.
Editor's note: do we need reliability for the ekt_key messages?
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Client Server
ClientHello + use_srtp + EKT
-------->
ServerHello + use_srtp + EKT
Certificate*
ServerKeyExchange*
CertificateRequest*
<-------- ServerHelloDone
Certificate*
ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify*
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished -------->
[ChangeCipherSpec]
<-------- Finished
SRTP packets <-------> SRTP packets
SRTP packets <-------> SRTP packets
ekt_key -------->
SRTP packets <-------> SRTP packets
SRTP packets <-------> SRTP packets
Figure 7: Handshake Message Flow
4.1.1. Scaling to Large Groups
In certain scenarios it is useful to perform DTLS-SRTP with a device
that is not the RTP peer. A common scenario is multicast, where it
is necessary to distribute the DTLS-SRTP (and EKT distribution) to
several devices. To allow for this, a new SDP attribute, dtls-srtp-
host, is defined which follows the general syntax specified in
Section 5.13 of [RFC4566]. When signaled, it indicates this host
controls the EKT keying for all group members. For the dtls-srtp-
host attribute:
o the name is the ASCII string "dtls-srtp-host" (lowercase)
o the value is the IP address and port number used for DTLS-SRTP
o This is a media-level attribute and MUST NOT appear at the session
level
The formal description of the attribute is defined by the following
ABNF [RFC5234] syntax:
attribute = "a=dtls-srtp-host:"
dtls-srtp-host-info *(SP dtls-srtp-host-info)
host-info = nettype space addrtype space
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connection-address space port CRLF
Multiple IP/port pairs are provided for IPv6/IPv4 interworking, and
to allow failover. The receiving host SHOULD attempt to use them in
the order provided.
An example of SDP containing the dtls-srtp-host attribute:
v=0
o=sam 2890844526 2890842807 IN IP4 192.0.2.5
s=SRTP Discussion
i=A discussion of Secure RTP
u=http://www.example.com/seminars/srtp.pdf
e=marge@example.com (Marge Simpson)
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.12
t=2873397496 2873404696
m=audio 49170 UDP/TLS/RTP/SAVP 0
a=fingerprint:SHA-1
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
a=dtls-srtp-ekt
a=dtls-srtp-host:IN IP4 192.0.2.13 56789
For legibility the SDP shows line breaks that are not present on the
wire.
4.2. Offer/Answer Considerations
This section describes Offer/Answer considerations for the use of EKT
together with DTLS-SRTP for unicast and multicast streams. The
offerer and answerer MUST follow the procedures specified in
[RFC5764] as well as the following ones.
As most DTLS-SRTP processing is performed on the media channel,
rather than in SDP, there is little processing performed in SDP other
than informational and to redirect DTLS-SRTP to an alternate host.
Advertising support for the extension is necessary in SDP because in
some cases it is required to establish an SRTP call. For example, a
mixer may be able to only support SRTP listeners if those listeners
implement DTLS Key Transport (because it lacks the CPU cycles
necessary to encrypt SRTP uniquely for each listener).
4.2.1. Generating the Initial Offer
The initial offer contains a new SDP attribute, "dtls-srtp-ekt",
which contains no value. This indicates the offerer is capable of
supporting DTLS-SRTP with EKT extensions, and indicates the desire to
use the "ekt" extension during the DTLS-SRTP handshake. If the
offerer wants another host to perform DTLS-SRTP-EKT processing, it
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also includes the dtls-srtp-host attribute in its offer
(Section 4.1).
An example of SDP containing the dtls-srtp-ekt attribute::
v=0
o=sam 2890844526 2890842807 IN IP4 192.0.2.5
s=SRTP Discussion
i=A discussion of Secure RTP
u=http://www.example.com/seminars/srtp.pdf
e=marge@example.com (Marge Simpson)
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.12
t=2873397496 2873404696
m=audio 49170 UDP/TLS/RTP/SAVP 0
a=fingerprint:SHA-1
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
a=dtls-srtp-ekt
For legibility the SDP shows line breaks that are not present on the
wire.
4.2.2. Generating the Initial Answer
Upon receiving the initial offer, the presence of the dtls-srtp-ekt
attribute indicates a desire to receive the EKT extension in the
DTLS-SRTP handshake. The presence of the dtls-srtp-host attribute
indicates an alternate host to send the DTLS-SRTP handshake (instead
of the host on the c/m lines). DTLS messages should be constructed
according to those two attributes.
The SDP answer SHOULD contain the dtls-srtp-ekt attribute to indicate
the answerer understands dtls-srtp. It should only contain the dtls-
srtp-host attribute if the answerer also wishes to offload its DTLS-
SRTP processing to another host.
4.2.3. Processing the Initial Answer
The presence of the dtls-srtp-ekt attribute indicates a desire by the
answerer to perform DTLS-SRTP with EKT extensions, and the dtls-srtp-
host attribute indicates an alternate host for DTLS-SRTP processing.
After successful negotiation of the key_transport extension, the DTLS
client and server MAY exchange SRTP packets, encrypted using the KDF
described in [RFC5764]. This is normal and expected, even if Key
Transport was negotiated by both sides, as neither side may (yet)
have a need to alter the SRTP key. However, it is also possible that
one (or both) peers will immediately send new_srtp_key message before
sending any SRTP, and also possible that SRTP, encrypted with an
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unknown key, may be received before the new_srtp_key message is
received.
4.2.4. Modifying the Session
As DTLS-SRTP-EKT processing is done on the DTLS-SRTP channel (media
channel) rather than signaling, no special processing for modifying
the session is necessary.
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5. Use of EKT with MIKEY
The advantages outlined in Section 1 are useful in some scenarios in
which MIKEY is used to establish SRTP sessions. In this section, we
briefly review MIKEY and related work, and discuss these scenarios.
An SRTP sender or a group controller can use MIKEY to establish a
SRTP cryptographic context. This capability includes the
distribution of a TEK generation key (TGK) or the TEK itself,
security policy payload, crypto session bundle ID (CSB_ID) and a
crypto session ID (CS_ID). The TEK directly maps to an SRTP master
key, whereas the TGK is used along with the CSB_ID and a CS_ID to
generate a TEK. The CS_ID is used to generate multiple TEKs (SRTP
master keys) from a single TGK. For a media stream in SDP, MIKEY
allocates two consecutive numbers for the crypto session IDs, so that
each direction uses a different SRTP master key (see [RFC4567]).
The MIKEY specification [RFC3830] defines three modes to exchange
keys, associated parameters and to protect the MIKEY message: pre-
shared key, public-key encryption and Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
In the first two modes the MIKEY initiator only chooses and
distributes the TGK or TEK, whereas in the third mode both MIKEY
entities (the initiator and responder) contribute to the keys. All
three MIKEY modes have in common that for establishing a SRTP session
the exchanged key is valid for the send and receive direction.
Especially for group communications it is desirable to update the
SRTP master key individually per direction. EKT provides this
property by distributing the SRTP master key within the SRTP/SRTCP
packet.
MIKEY already supports synchronization of ROC values between the
MIKEY initiator and responder. The SSRC / ROC value pair is part of
the MIKEY Common Header payload. This allows providing the current
ROC value to late joiners of a session. However, in some scenarios a
key management based ROC synchronization is not sufficient. For
example, in mobile and wireless environments, members may go in and
out of coverage and may miss a sequence number overrun. In point-to-
multipoint translator scenarios it is desirable to not require the
group controller to track the ROC values of each member, but to
provide the ROC value by the originator of the SRTP packet. A better
alternative to synchronize the ROC values is to send them directly
via SRTP/SRTCP, as EKT does. A separate SRTP extension is being
proposed [RFC4771] to include the ROC as part of a modified
authentication tag. Unlike EKT, this extension uses only SRTP and
not SRTCP as its transport and does not allow updating the SRTP
master key.
Besides the ROC, MIKEY synchronizes also the SSRC values of the SRTP
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streams. Each sender of a stream sends the associated SSRC within
the MIKEY message to the other party. If a SRTP session participant
starts a new SRTP source or a new participant is added to a group,
subsequent SDP offer/answer and MIKEY exchanges are necessary to
update the SSRC values. EKT improves these scenarios by updating the
keys and SSRC values without coordination on the signaling channel.
With EKT, SRTP can handle early media, since the EKT SPI allows the
receiver to identify the cryptographic keys and parameters used by
the source.
The MIKEY specification [RFC3830] suggests the use of unicast for
rekeying. This method does not scale well to large groups or
interactive groups. The EKT extension of SRTP/SRTCP provides a
solution for rekeying the SRTP master key and for ROC/SSRC
synchronization. EKT is not a substitution for MIKEY, but rather a
complementary addition to address the above described limitations of
MIKEY.
In the next section we provide an extension to MIKEY for support of
EKT. EKT can be used only with the pre-shared key or public-key
encryption MIKEY mode of [RFC3830]. The Diffie-Hellman exchange mode
is not suitable in conjunction with EKT, because it is not possible
to establish one common EKT key over multiple EKT entities.
Additional MIKEY modes specified in separate documents are not
considered for EKT.
5.1. EKT extensions to MIKEY
In order to use EKT with MIKEY, the EKT cipher, EKT key and EKT SPI
must be negotiated in the MIKEY message exchange.
For EKT we specify a new SRTP Policy Type in the Security Policy (SP)
payload of MIKEY (see Section 6.10 of [RFC3830]). The SP payload
contains a set of policies. Each policy consists of a number Policy
Param TLVs.
Prot type | Value
-------------------
EKT | TBD (will be requested from IANA)
For legibility the SDP shows line breaks that are not present on the
wire.
Figure 8: EKT Security Policy
The EKT Security Policy has one parameter representing the EKT
cipher.
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Type | Meaning | Possible values
----------------------------------------------------
0 | EKT cipher | see below
Figure 9: EKT Security Policy Parameters
EKT cipher | Value
-------------------
AES_128 | 0
AESKW_128 | 1
AESKW_192 | 2
AESKW_256 | 3
Figure 10: EKT Cipher Parameters
AES_128 is the default value for the EKT cipher.
The two mandatory EKT parameters (EKT_Key and EKT_SPI) are
transported in the MIKEY KEMAC payload within one separate Key Data
sub-payload. As specified in Section 6.2 of [RFC3830], the KEMAC
payload carries the TEK Generation Key (TGK) or the Traffic
Encryption Key (TEK). One or more TGKs or TEKs are carried in
individual Key Data sub-payloads within the KEMAC payload. The KEMAC
payload is encrypted as part of MIKEY. The Key Data sub- payload,
specified in Section 6.13 of [RFC3830], has the following format:
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Payload | Type | KV | Key data length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
: Key data :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
: Salt length (optional) ! Salt data (optional) :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
: KV data (optional) :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 11: Key Data Sub-Payload of MIKEY
These fields are described below:
Type: 4 bits in length, indicates the type of key included in the
payload. We define Type = TBD (will be requested from IANA) to
indicate transport of the EKT key.
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KV: (4 bits): indicates the type of key validity period specified.
KV=1 is currently specified as an SPI. We use that value to
indicate the KV_data contains the ETK_SPI for the key type
EKT_Key. KV_data would be 16 bits in length, but it is also
possible to interpret the length from the 'Key data len' field.
KV data MUST NOT be optional for the key type EKT_Key when KV = 1.
Salt length, Salt Data: These optional fields SHOULD be omitted for
the key type EKT_Key, if the SRTP master salt is already present
in the TGK or TEK Key Data sub-payload. The EKT_Key sub-payload
MUST contain a SRTP master salt, if the SRTP master salt is not
already present in the TGK or TEK Key Data sub-payload.
KV Data: length determined by Key Data Length field.
5.2. Offer/Answer considerations
This section describes Offer/Answer considerations for the use of EKT
together with MIKEY for unicast streams. The offerer and answerer
MUST follow the procedures specified in [RFC3830] and [RFC4567] as
well as the following ones.
5.2.1. Generating the Initial Offer
If it is intended to use MIKEY together with EKT, the offerer MUST
include at least one MIKEY key-mgmt attribute with one EKT_Key Key
Data sub-payload and the EKT_Cipher Security Policy payload. MIKEY
can be used on session or media level. On session level, MIKEY
provides the keys for multiple SRTP sessions in the SDP offer. The
EKT SPI references a EKT parameter set including the Secure RTP
parameters as specified in Section 8.2 in [RFC3711]. If MIKEY is
used on session level, it is only possible to use one EKT SPI value.
Therefore, the session-level MIKEY message MUST contain one SRTP
Security Policy payload only, which is valid for all related SRTP
media lines. If MIKEY is used on media level, different SRTP
Security Policy parameters (and consequently different EKT SPI
values) can be used for each media line. If MIKEY is used on session
and media level, the medial level content overrides the session level
content.
EKT requires a single shared SRTP master salt between all
participants in the direct SRTP session. If a MIKEY key-mgmt
attribute contains more than one TGK or TEK Key Data sub-payload, all
the sub-payloads MUST contain the same master salt value.
Consequently, the EKT_Key Key Data sub-payload MAY also contain the
same salt or MAY omit the salt value. If the SRTP master salt is not
present in the TGK and TEK Key Data sub-payloads, the EKT_Key sub-
payload MUST contain a master salt.
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5.2.2. Generating the Initial Answer
For each media line in the offer using MIKEY, provided on session or/
and on media level, the answerer examines the related MIKEY key-mgmt
attributes for the presence of EKT parameters. In order to accept
the offered key-mgmt attribute, the MIKEY message MUST contain one
EKT_Key Key Data sub-payload and the EKT_Cipher Security Policy
payload. The answerer examines also the existence of a SRTP master
salt in the TGK/TEK and/or the EKT_Key sub-payloads. If multiple
salts are available, all values MUST be equal. If the salt values
differ or no salt is present, the key-mgmt attribute MUST be
considered as invalid.
The MIKEY responder message in the SDP answer does not contain a
MIKEY KEMAC or Security Policy payload and consequently does not
contain any EKT parameters. If the key-mgmt attribute for a media
line was accepted by the answerer, the EKT parameter set of the
offerer is valid for both directions of the SRTP session.
5.2.3. Processing the Initial Answer
On reception of the answer, the offerer examines if EKT has been
accepted for the offered media lines. If a MIKEY key-mgmt attribute
is received containing a valid MIKEY responder message, EKT has been
successfully negotiated. On receipt of a MIKEY error message, EKT
negotiation has failed. For example, this may happen if an EKT
extended MIKEY initiator message is sent to a MIKEY entity not
supporting EKT. A MIKEY error code 'Invalid SP' or 'Invalid DT' is
returned to indicate that the EKT_Cipher Security Policy payload or
the EKT_Key sub-payload is not supported. In this case, the offerer
may send a second SDP offer with a MIKEY key-mgmt attribute without
the additional EKT extensions.
This behavior can be improved by defining an additional key-mgmt
prtcl-id value 'mikeyekt' and offering two key-mgmt SDP attributes.
One attribute offers MIKEY together with EKT and the other one offers
MIKEY without EKT. This is for further discussion.
5.2.4. Modifying the Session
Once a SRTP stream has been established, a new offer/answer exchange
can modify the session including the EKT parameters. If the EKT key
or EKT cipher is modified (i.e., a new EKT parameter set is created)
the offerer MUST also provide a new EKT SPI value. The offerer MUST
NOT remap an existing EKT SPI value to a new EKT parameter set.
Similar, a modification of the SRTP Security Policy leads to a new
EKT parameter set and requires a fresh EKT SPI, even the EKT key or
cipher did not change.
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Once EKT is being used, the SRTP master salt for the SRTP session
MUST NOT be changed. The salt in the Key Data sub-payloads within
the subsequent offers MUST be the same as the one already used.
After EKT has been successfully negotiated for a session and a SRTP
master key has been transported by EKT, it is difficult to switch
back to a pure MIKEY based key exchange in a synchronized way.
Therefore, once EKT is being used for a session, EKT MUST be used
also in all subsequent offer/answer exchanges for that session.
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6. Design Rationale
From [RFC3550], a primary function of RTCP is to carry the CNAME, a
"persistent transport-level identifier for an RTP source" since
"receivers require the CNAME to keep track of each participant." EKT
works in much the same way, using SRTCP to carry information needed
for the proper processing of the SRTP traffic.
With EKT, SRTP gains the ability to synchronize the creation of
cryptographic contexts across all of the participants in a single
session. This feature provides some, but not all, of the
functionality that is present in IKE phase two (but not phase one).
Importantly, EKT does not provide a way to indicate SRTP options.
With EKT, external signaling mechanisms provide the SRTP options and
the EKT Key, but need not provide the key(s) for each individual SRTP
source. EKT provides a separation between the signaling mechanisms
and the details of SRTP. The signaling system need not coordinate
all SRTP streams, nor predict in advance how many streams will be
present, nor communicate SRTP-level information (e.g., rollover
counters) of current sessions.
EKT is especially useful for multi-party sessions, and for the case
where multiple RTP sessions are sent to the same destination
transport address (see the example in the definition of "RTP session"
in [RFC3550]). A SIP offer that is forked in parallel (sent to
multiple endpoints at the same time) can cause multiple RTP sessions
to be sent to the same transport address, making EKT useful for use
with SIP.
EKT can also be used in conjunction with a scalable group-key
management system like GDOI [RFC3547]. Such a system provides a
secure entity authentication method and a way to revoke group
membership, both of which are out of scope of EKT.
It is natural to use SRTCP to transport encrypted keying material for
SRTP, as it provides a secure control channel for (S)RTP. However,
there are several different places in SRTCP in which the encrypted
SRTP master key and ROC could be conveyed. We briefly review some of
the alternatives in order to motivate the particular choice used in
this specification. One alternative is to have those values carried
as a new SDESC item or RTCP packet. This would require that the
normal SRTCP encryption be turned off for the packets containing that
SDESC item, since on the receiver's side, SRTCP processing completes
before the RTCP processing starts. This tension between encryption
and the desire for RTCP privacy is highly undesirable. Additionally,
this alternative makes SRTCP dependent upon the parsing of the RTCP
compound packet, which adds complexity. It is simpler to carry the
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encrypted key in a new SRTCP field. One way to do this and to be
backwards compatible with the existing specification is to define a
new crypto function that incorporates the encrypted key. We define a
new authentication transform because EKT relies on the normal SRTCP
authentication to provide implicit authentication of the encrypted
key.
An SRTP packet containing an SSRC that has not been seen will be
discarded. This practice may induce a burst of packet loss at the
outset of an SRTP stream, due to the loss or reorder of the first
SRTCP packet with the EKT containing the key and rollover counter for
that stream. However, this practice matches the conservative RTP
memory-allocation strategy; many existing applications accept this
risk of initial packet loss. Alternatively, implementations may wish
to delay discarding such packets for a short period of time as
described in Section 2.4.
When EKT is carried in SRTCP, it adds eight additional bytes to each
SRTCP packet, plus the length of the Encrypted Master Key field.
Using the SRTP and EKT defaults, the total overhead is 24 bytes.
This overhead does not detract from the total bandwidth used by SRTP,
since it is included in the RTCP bandwidth computation. However, it
will cause the control protocol to issue packets less frequently.
The main motivation for the use of the variable-length format is
bandwidth conservation. If EKT is used of SRTP, there will be a loss
of bandwidth due to the additional 24 bytes in each RTP packet. For
some applications, this bandwidth loss is significant.
6.1. Alternatives
In its current design, EKT requires that the Master Salt be
established out of band. That requirement is undesirable. In an
offer/answer environment, it forces the answerer to re-use the same
Master Salt value used by the offerer. The Master Salt value could
be carried in EKT packets though that would consume yet more
bandwidth.
In some scenarios, two SRTP sessions may be combined into a single
session. When using EKT in such sessions, it is desirable to have an
SPI value that is larger than 15 bits, so that collisions between SPI
values in use in the two different sessions are unlikely (since each
collision would confuse the members of one of the sessions.)
An alternative that addresses both of these needs is as follows: the
SPI value can be lengthed from 15 bits to 63 bits, and the Master
Salt can be identical to, or constructed from, the SPI value. SRTP
conventionally uses a 14-byte Master Salt, but shorter values are
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acceptable. This alternative would add six bytes to each EKT packet;
that overhead may be a reasonable tradeoff for addressing the
problems outlined above.
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7. Security Considerations
With EKT, each SRTP sender and receiver can generate distinct SRTP
master keys. This property avoids any security concern over the re-
use of keys, by empowering the SRTP layer to create keys on demand.
Note that the inputs of EKT are the same as for SRTP with key-
sharing: a single key is provided to protect an entire SRTP session.
However, EKT provides complete security, even in the absence of
further out-of-band coordination of SSRCs, and even when SSRC values
collide.
EKT uses encrypted key transport with implicit authentication. A
strong cipher is used to ensure the confidentiality of the master
keys as they are transported. The authenticity of the master keys is
ensured by the base authentication check, which uses the plaintext
form of that key. If the base authentication function and the cipher
cannot be defeated by a particular attacker, then that attacker will
be unable to defeat the implicit authentication.
In order to avoid potential security issues, the SRTP authentication
tag length used by the base authentication method MUST be at least
ten octets.
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8. IANA Considerations
This section registers with IANA the following SRTP session
parameters for SDP Security Descriptions [RFC4568]:
o EKT_KEY
o EKT_CIPHER
o EKT_SPI
The definition of these parameters is provided in Section 3.4.
We request the following IANA assignments from existing MIKEY IANA
tables:
o From the Key Data payload name spaces, a value to indicate the
type as the 'EKT_Key'.
o From the Security Policy table name space, a new value to be
assigned for 'EKT' (see Figure 8).
Furthermore, we need the following two new IANA registries created,
populated with the initial values in this document. New values for
both of these registries can be defined via Specification Required
[RFC5226].
o EKT parameter type (initially populated with the list from
Figure 9)
o EKT cipher (initially populated with the list from Figure 10)
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9. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Lakshminath Dondeti for assistance with earlier versions of
this document. Thanks to Nermeen Ismail, Eddy Lem, and Rob Raymond
for fruitful discussions and comments. Thanks to Romain Biehlmann
for his encouragement to add support DTLS-SRTP-EKT key servers for
multicast. Thanks to Felix Wyss for his review and comments
regarding ciphers.
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10. References
10.1. Normative References
[FIPS197] "The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS-197 Federal
Information Processing Standard.
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4347-bis]
Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security version 1.2", draft-ietf-tls-rfc4347-bis-06 (work
in progress), July 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
June 2002.
[RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264,
June 2002.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
[RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, July 2003.
[RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
RFC 3711, March 2004.
[RFC4563] Carrara, E., Lehtovirta, V., and K. Norrman, "The Key ID
Information Type for the General Extension Payload in
Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)", RFC 4563, June 2006.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006.
[RFC4567] Arkko, J., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., Norrman, K., and E.
Carrara, "Key Management Extensions for Session
Description Protocol (SDP) and Real Time Streaming
Protocol (RTSP)", RFC 4567, July 2006.
[RFC4568] Andreasen, F., Baugher, M., and D. Wing, "Session
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Internet-Draft EKT SRTP October 2011
Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media
Streams", RFC 4568, July 2006.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[RFC4771] Lehtovirta, V., Naslund, M., and K. Norrman, "Integrity
Transform Carrying Roll-Over Counter for the Secure Real-
time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 4771, January 2007.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
[RFC5764] McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 5764, May 2010.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC3547] Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "The
Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.
[RFC3830] Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K.
Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
August 2004.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
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Appendix A. Using EKT to Optimize Interworking DTLS-SRTP with Security
Descriptions
Today, SDP Security Descriptions [RFC4568] is used for distributing
SRTP keys in several different IP PBX systems and is expected to be
used by 3GPP's Long Term Evolution (LTE). The IP PBX systems are
typically used within a single enterprise, and LTE is used within the
confines of a mobile operator's network. A Session Border Controller
is a reasonable solution to interwork between Security Descriptions
in one network and DTLS-SRTP in another network. For example, a
mobile operator (or an Enterprise) could operate Security
Descriptions within their network and DTLS-SRTP towards the Internet.
However, due to the way Security Descriptions and DTLS-SRTP manage
their SRTP keys, such an SBC has to authenticate, decrypt, re-
encrypt, and re-authenticate the SRTP (and SRTCP) packets in one
direction, as shown in Figure 12, below. This is computationally
expensive.
RFC4568 endpoint SBC DTLS-SRTP endpoint
| | |
1. |---key=A------------->| |
2. | |<-DTLS-SRTP handshake->|
3. |<--key=B--------------| |
4. | |<--SRTP, encrypted w/B-|
5. |<-SRTP, encrypted w/B-| |
6. |-SRTP, encrypted w/A->| |
7. | (decrypt, re-encrypt) |
8. | |-SRTP, encrypted w/C-->|
| | |
Figure 12: Interworking Security Descriptions and DTLS-SRTP
The message flow is as follows (similar steps occur with SRTCP):
1. The Security Descriptions [RFC4568] endpoint discloses its SRTP
key to the SBC, using a=crypto in its SDP.
2. SBC completes DTLS-SRTP handshake. From this handshake, the SBC
derives the SRTP key for traffic from the DTLS-SRTP endpoint (key
B) and to the DTLS-SRTP endpoint (key C).
3. The SBC communicates the SRTP encryption key (key B) to the
Security Descriptions endpoint (using a=crypto). (There is no
way, with DTLS-SRTP, to communicate the Security Descriptions key
to the DTLS-SRTP key endpoint.)
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4. The DTLS-SRTP endpoint sends an SRTP key, encrypted with its key
B. This is received by the SBC.
5. The received SRTP packet is simply forwarded; the SBC does not
need to do anything with this packet as its key (key B) was
already communicated in step 3.
6. The Security Descriptions endpoint sends an SRTP packet,
encrypted with its key A.
7. The SBC has to authenticate and decrypt the SRTP packet (using
key A), and re-encrypt it and generate an HMAC (using key C).
8. The SBC sends the new SRTP packet.
If EKT is deployed on the DTLS-SRTP endpoints, EKT helps to avoid the
computationally expensive operation so the SBC does not need not
perform any per-packet operations on the SRTP (or SRTCP) packets in
either direction. With EKT the SBC can simply forward the SRTP (and
SRTCP) packets in both directions without per-packet HMAC or
cryptographic operations.
To accomplish this interworking, DTLS-SRTP EKT must be supported on
the DTLS-SRTP endpoint, which allows the SBC to transport the
Security Description key to the EKT endpoint and send the DTLS-SRTP
key to the Security Descriptions endpoint. This works equally well
for both incoming and outgoing calls. An abbreviated message flow is
shown in Figure 13, below.
RFC4568 endpoint SBC DTLS-SRTP endpoint
| | |
1. |---key=A------------->| |
2. | |<-DTLS-SRTP handshake->|
3. |<--key=B--------------| |
4. | |--new_srtp_key:A------>|
5. | |<--SRTP, encrypted w/B-|
5. |<-SRTP, encrypted w/B-| |
6. |-SRTP, encrypted w/A->| |
7. | |-SRTP, encrypted w/A-->|
| | |
Figure 13: Interworking Security Descriptions and EKT
The message flow is as follows (similar steps occur with SRTCP):
1. Security Descriptions endpoint discloses its SRTP key to the SBC
(a=crypto).
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2. SBC completes DTLS-SRTP handshake. From this handshake, the SBC
derives the SRTP key for traffic from the DTLS-SRTP endpoint (key
B) and to the DTLS-SRTP endpoint (key C).
3. The SBC communicates the SRTP encryption key (key B) to the
Security Descriptions endpoint.
4. The SBC uses the EKT to indicate that SRTP packets will be
encrypted with 'key A' towards the DTLS-SRTP endpoint.
5. The DTLS-SRTP endpoint sends an SRTP key, encrypted with its key
B. This is received by the SBC.
6. The received SRTP packet is simply forwarded; the SBC does not
need to do anything with this packet as its key (key B) was
communicated in step 3.
7. The Security Descriptions endpoint sends an SRTP packet,
encrypted with its key A.
8. The received SRTP packet is simply forwarded; the SBC does not
need to do anything with this packet as its key (key A) was
communicated in step 4.
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Authors' Addresses
David A. McGrew
Cisco Systems, Inc.
510 McCarthy Blvd.
Milpitas, CA 95035
US
Phone: (408) 525 8651
Email: mcgrew@cisco.com
URI: http://www.mindspring.com/~dmcgrew/dam.htm
Flemming Andreason
Cisco Systems, Inc.
499 Thornall Street
Edison, NJ 08837
US
Email: fandreas@cisco.com
Dan Wing
Cisco Systems, Inc.
510 McCarthy Blvd.
Milpitas, CA 95035
US
Phone: (408) 853 4197
Email: dwing@cisco.com
Kai Fischer
Siemens Enterprise Communications GmbH & Co. KG
Hofmannstr. 51
Munich, Bavaria 81739
Germany
Email: kai.fischer@siemens-enterprise.com
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