Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-bess-evpn-proxy-arp-nd
draft-ietf-bess-evpn-proxy-arp-nd
BESS Workgroup J. Rabadan, Ed.
Internet-Draft S. Sathappan
Updates: 7432 (if approved) K. Nagaraj
Intended status: Standards Track G. Hankins
Expires: April 9, 2022 Nokia
T. King
DE-CIX
October 6, 2021
Operational Aspects of Proxy-ARP/ND in Ethernet Virtual Private Networks
draft-ietf-bess-evpn-proxy-arp-nd-16
Abstract
This document describes the Ethernet Virtual Private Networks (EVPN)
Proxy-ARP/ND function, augmented by the capability of the ARP/ND
Extended Community. From that perspective this document updates the
EVPN specification to provide more comprehensive documentation of the
operation of the Proxy-ARP/ND function. The EVPN Proxy-ARP/ND
function and the ARP/ND Extended Community help operators of Internet
Exchange Points, Data Centers, and other networks deal with IPv4 and
IPv6 address resolution issues associated with large Broadcast
Domains by reducing and even suppressing the flooding produced by
address resolution in the EVPN network.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 9, 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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Table of Contents
1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. The Data Center Use-Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. The Internet Exchange Point Use-Case . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Solution Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Proxy-ARP/ND Sub-Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Learning Sub-Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Proxy-ND and the NA Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. Reply Sub-Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4. Unicast-forward Sub-Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.5. Maintenance Sub-Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.6. Flood (to Remote PEs) Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.7. Duplicate IP Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Solution Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1. All Dynamic Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2. Dynamic Learning with Proxy-ARP/ND . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3. Hybrid Dynamic Learning and Static Provisioning with
Proxy-ARP/ND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.4. All Static Provisioning with Proxy-ARP/ND . . . . . . . . 21
5.5. Example of Deployment in Internet Exchange Points . . . . 21
5.6. Example of Deployment in Data Centers . . . . . . . . . . 22
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
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BCP14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
ARP: Address Resolution Protocol.
AS-MAC: Anti-spoofing MAC. It is a especial MAC configured on all
the PEs attached to the same BD and used for the Duplicate IP
Detection procedures.
BD: Broadcast Domain.
BUM: Broadcast, Unknown unicast and Multicast layer-2 traffic.
CE: Customer Edge router.
DAD: Duplicate Address Detection, as per [RFC4861].
DC: Data Center.
EVI: EVPN Instance.
EVPN: Ethernet Virtual Private Networks, as per [RFC7432].
GARP: Gratuitous ARP message.
IP->MAC: an IP address associated to a MAC address. IP->MAC entries
are programmed in Proxy-ARP/ND tables and may be of three different
types: dynamic, static or EVPN-learned.
IXP: Internet eXchange Point.
IXP-LAN: the IXP's large Broadcast Domain to where Internet routers
are connected.
LAG: Link Aggregation Group.
MAC or IP DA: MAC or IP Destination Address.
MAC or IP SA: MAC or IP Source Address.
ND: Neighbor Discovery Protocol.
NS: Neighbor Solicitation message.
NA: Neighbor Advertisement.
NUD: Neighbor Unreachability Detection, as per [RFC4861].
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O Flag: Override Flag in NA messages, as per [RFC4861].
PE: Provider Edge router.
R Flag: Router Flag in NA messages, as per [RFC4861].
RT2: EVPN Route type 2 or EVPN MAC/IP Advertisement route, as per
[RFC7432].
S Flag: Solicited Flag in NA messages, as per [RFC4861].
SN-multicast address: Solicited-Node IPv6 multicast address used by
NS messages.
TLLA: Target Link Layer Address, as per [RFC4861].
VPLS: Virtual Private LAN Service.
This document assumes familiarity with the terminology used in
[RFC7432].
2. Introduction
As specified in [RFC7432] the IP Address field in the Ethernet
Virtual Private Networks (EVPN) MAC/IP Advertisement route may
optionally carry one of the IP addresses associated with the MAC
address. A PE may learn local IP->MAC pairs and advertise them in
EVPN MAC/IP Advertisement routes. Remote PEs importing those routes
in the same Broadcast Domain (BD) may add those IP->MAC pairs to
their Proxy-ARP/ND tables and reply to local ARP requests or Neighbor
Solicitations (or 'unicast-forward' those packets to the owner MAC),
reducing and even suppressing in some cases the flooding in the EVPN
network.
EVPN and its associated Proxy-ARP/ND function are extremely useful in
DCs or Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) with large broadcast domains,
where the amount of ARP/ND flooded traffic causes issues on connected
routers and CEs. [RFC6820] describes the address resolution problems
in large DC networks.
This document describes the Proxy-ARP/ND function in [RFC7432]
networks, augmented by the capability of the ARP/ND Extended
Community [RFC9047]. From that perspective this document updates
[RFC7432].
Proxy-ARP/ND may be implemented to help IXPs, DCs and other operators
deal with the issues derived from address resolution in large
broadcast domains.
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2.1. The Data Center Use-Case
As described in [RFC6820] the IPv4 and IPv6 address resolution can
create a lot of issues in large DCs. In particular, the issues
created by the IPv4 Address Resolution Protocol procedures may be
significant.
On one hand, ARP Requests use broadcast MAC addresses, therefore any
Tenant System in a large Broadcast Domain will see a large amount of
ARP traffic, which is not addressed to most of the receivers.
On the other hand, the flooding issue becomes even worse if some
Tenant Systems disappear from the broadcast domain, since some
implementations will persistently retry sending ARP Requests. As
[RFC6820] states, there are no clear requirements for retransmitting
ARP Requests in the absence of replies, hence an implementation may
choose to keep retrying endlessly even if there are no replies.
The amount of flooding that address resolution creates can be
mitigated by the use of EVPN and its Proxy-ARP/ND function.
2.2. The Internet Exchange Point Use-Case
The implementation described in this document is especially useful in
IXP networks.
A typical IXP provides access to a large layer-2 Broadcast Domain for
peering purposes (referred to as 'the peering network'), where
(hundreds of) Internet routers are connected. We refer to these
Internet routers as Customer Edge (CE) devices in this section.
Because of the requirement to connect all routers to a single layer-2
network the peering networks use IPv4 addresses in length ranges from
/21 to /24 (and even bigger for IPv6), which can create very large
broadcast domains. This peering network is transparent to the CEs,
and therefore, floods any ARP request or NS messages to all the CEs
in the network. Gratuitous ARP and NA messages are flooded to all
the CEs too.
In these IXP networks, most of the CEs are typically peering routers
and roughly all the BUM traffic is originated by the ARP and ND
address resolution procedures. This ARP/ND BUM traffic causes
significant data volumes that reach every single router in the
peering network. Since the ARP/ND messages are processed in "slow
path" software processors and they take high priority in the routers,
heavy loads of ARP/ND traffic can cause some routers to run out of
resources. CEs disappearing from the network may cause address
resolution explosions that can make a router with limited processing
power fail to keep BGP sessions running.
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The issue might be better in IPv6 routers if MLD-snooping was
enabled, since ND uses SN-multicast address in NS messages; however,
ARP uses broadcast and has to be processed by all the routers in the
network. Some routers may also be configured to broadcast periodic
GARPs [RFC5227]. For IPv6, the fact that IPv6 CEs have more than one
IPv6 address contributes to the growth of ND flooding in the network.
The amount of ARP/ND flooded traffic grows linearly with the number
of IXP participants, therefore the issue can only grow worse as new
CEs are added.
In order to deal with this issue, IXPs have developed certain
solutions over the past years. While these solutions may mitigate
the issues of address resolution in large broadcasts domains, EVPN
provides new more efficient possibilities to IXPs. EVPN and its
Proxy-ARP/ND function may help solve the issue in a distributed and
scalable way, fully integrated with the PE network.
3. Solution Description
Figure 1 illustrates an example EVPN network where the Proxy-ARP/ND
function is enabled.
BD1
Proxy-ARP/ND
+------------+
IP1/M1 +----------------------------+ |IP1->M1 EVPN|
GARP --->Proxy-ARP/ND | |IP2->M2 EVPN|
+---+ +--------+ RT2(IP1/M1) | |IP3->M3 sta |
|CE1+------| BD1 | ------> +------+---|IP4->M4 dyn |
+---+ +--------+ | +------------+
PE1 | +--------+ Who has IP1?
| EVPN | | BD1 | <----- +---+
| EVI1 | | | -----> |CE3|
IP2/M2 | | | | IP1->M1 +---+
GARP --->Proxy-ARP/ND | +--------+ | IP3/M3
+---+ +--------+ RT2(IP2/M2) | |
|CE2+----| BD1 | ------> +--------------+
+---+ +--------+ PE3| +---+
PE2 | +----+CE4|
+----------------------------+ +---+
<---IP4/M4 GARP
Figure 1: Proxy-ARP/ND network example
When the Proxy-ARP/ND function is enabled in a BD (Broadcast Domain)
of the EVPN PEs, each PE creates a Proxy table specific to that BD
that can contain three types of Proxy-ARP/ND entries:
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a. Dynamic entries: learned by snooping CE's ARP and ND messages.
For instance, IP4->M4 in Figure 1.
b. Static entries: provisioned on the PE by the management system.
For instance, IP3->M3 in Figure 1.
c. EVPN-learned entries: learned from the IP/MAC information encoded
in the received RT2's coming from remote PEs. For instance,
IP1->M1 and IP2->M2 in Figure 1.
As a high level example, the operation of the EVPN Proxy-ARP/ND
function in the network of Figure 1 is described below. In this
example we assume IP1, IP2 and IP3 are IPv4 addresses:
1. Proxy-ARP/ND is enabled in BD1 of PE1, PE2 and PE3.
2. The PEs start adding dynamic, static and EVPN-learned entries to
their Proxy tables:
A. PE3 adds IP1->M1 and IP2->M2 based on the EVPN routes
received from PE1 and PE2. Those entries were previously
learned as dynamic entries in PE1 and PE2 respectively, and
advertised in BGP EVPN.
B. PE3 adds IP4->M4 as dynamic. This entry is learned by
snooping the corresponding ARP messages sent by CE4.
C. An operator also provisions the static entry IP3->M3.
3. When CE3 sends an ARP Request asking for the MAC address of IP1,
PE3 will:
A. Intercept the ARP Request and perform a Proxy-ARP lookup for
IP1.
B. If the lookup is successful (as in Figure 1), PE3 will send
an ARP Reply with IP1->M1. The ARP Request will not be
flooded to the EVPN network or any other local CEs.
C. If the lookup is not successful, PE3 will flood the ARP
Request in the EVPN network and the other local CEs.
In the same example, if we assume IP1, IP2, IP3 and IP4 are now IPv6
addresses and Proxy-ARP/ND is enabled in BD1:
1. PEs will start adding entries in a similar way as for IPv4,
however there are some differences:
A. IP1->M1 and IP2->M2 are learned as dynamic entries in PE1 and
PE2 respectively, by snooping NA messages and not by snooping
NS messages. In the IPv4 case, any ARP frame can be snooped
to learn the dynamic Proxy-ARP entry. When learning the
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dynamic entries, the R and O Flags contained in the snooped
NA messages will be added to the Proxy-ND entries too.
B. PE1 and PE2 will advertise those entries in EVPN MAC/IP
Advertisement routes, including the corresponding learned R
and O Flags in the ARP/ND Extended Community.
C. PE3 also adds IP4->M4 as dynamic, after snooping an NA
message sent by CE4.
2. When CE3 sends an NS message asking for the MAC address of IP1,
PE3 behaves as in the IPv4 example, by intercepting the NS, doing
a lookup on the IP and replying with an NA if the lookup is
successful. If it is successful the NS is not flooded to the
EVPN PEs or any other local CEs.
3. If the lookup is not successful, PE3 will flood the NS to remote
EVPN PEs attached to the same BD and the other local CEs as in
the IPv4 case.
As PE3 learns more and more host entries in the Proxy-ARP/ND table,
the flooding of ARP Request messages among PEs is reduced and in some
cases it can even be suppressed. In a network where most of the
participant CEs are not moving between PEs and they advertise their
presence with GARPs or unsolicited-NA messages, the ARP/ND flooding
among PEs, as well as the unknown unicast flooding, can practically
be suppressed. In an EVPN-based IXP network, where all the entries
are Static, the ARP/ND flooding among PEs is in fact totally
suppressed.
In a network where CEs move between PEs, the Proxy-ARP/ND function
relies on the CE signaling its new location via GARP or unsolicited-
NA messages so that tables are immediately updated. If a CE moves
"silently", that is, without issuing any GARP or NA message upon
getting attached to the destination PE, the mechanisms described in
Section 3.5 make sure that the Proxy-ARP/ND tables are eventually
updated.
3.1. Proxy-ARP/ND Sub-Functions
The Proxy-ARP/ND function can be structured in six sub-functions or
procedures:
1. Learning sub-function
2. Reply sub-function
3. Unicast-forward sub-function
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4. Maintenance sub-function
5. Flood handling sub-function
6. Duplicate IP detection sub-function
A Proxy-ARP/ND implementation MUST at least support the Learning,
Reply, Maintenance, and Duplicate IP detection sub-functions. The
following sections describe each individual sub-function.
3.2. Learning Sub-Function
A Proxy-ARP/ND implementation in an EVPN BD MUST support dynamic and
EVPN-learned entries, and SHOULD support static entries.
Static entries are provisioned from the management plane. A static
entry is configured on the PE attached to the host using the IP
address in that entry. The provisioned static IP->MAC entry MUST be
advertised in EVPN with an ARP/ND Extended Community where the
Immutable ARP/ND Binding Flag (I) is set to 1, as per [RFC9047].
When the I flag in the ARP/ND Extended Community is 1, the
advertising PE indicates that the IP address must not be associated
to a MAC, other than the one included in the EVPN MAC/IP
Advertisement route. The advertisement of I=1 in the ARP/ND Extended
Community is compatible with any value of the Sticky bit (S) or
Sequence Number in the [RFC7432] MAC Mobility Extended Community.
Note that the I bit in the ARP/ND Extended Community refers to the
immutable configured association between the IP and the MAC address
in the IP->MAC binding, whereas the S bit in the MAC Mobility
Extended Community refers to the fact that the advertised MAC address
is not subject to the [RFC7432] mobility procedures.
An entry may associate a configured static IP to a list of potential
MACs, i.e. IP1->(MAC1,MAC2..MACN). Until a frame (including local
ARP/NA message) is received from the CE, the PE will not advertise
any IP1->MAC in EVPN. Upon receiving traffic from the CE, the PE
will check that the source MAC, E.g., MAC1, is included in the list
of allowed MACs. Only in that case, the PE will activate the
IP1->MAC1 and advertise only that IP1 and MAC1 in an EVPN MAC/IP
Advertisement route.
The PE MUST create EVPN-learned entries from the received valid EVPN
MAC/IP Advertisement routes containing a MAC and IP address.
Dynamic entries are learned in different ways depending on whether
the entry contains an IPv4 or IPv6 address:
a. Proxy-ARP dynamic entries:
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The PE MUST snoop all ARP packets (that is, all frames with
Ethertype 0x0806) received from the CEs attached to the BD in
order to learn dynamic entries. ARP packets received from
remote EVPN PEs attached to the same BD are not snooped. The
Learning function will add the Sender MAC and Sender IP of the
snooped ARP packet to the Proxy-ARP table. Note that a MAC or
an IP address with value 0 SHOULD NOT be learned.
b. Proxy-ND dynamic entries:
The PE MUST snoop the NA messages (Ethertype 0x86dd, ICMPv6
type 136) received from the CEs attached to the BD and learn
dynamic entries from the Target Address and TLLA information.
NA messages received from remote EVPN PEs are not snooped. A
PE implementing Proxy-ND as in this document MUST NOT create
dynamic IP->MAC entries from NS messages, since they don't
contain the R Flag required by the Proxy-ND reply function.
See Section 3.2.1 for more information about the R Flag.
This document specifies an "anycast" capability that can be
configured for the proxy-ND function of the PE, and affects
how dynamic Proxy-ND entries are learned based on the O Flag
of the snooped NA messages. If the O Flag is zero in the
received NA message, the IP->MAC SHOULD only be learned in
case the IPv6 "anycast" capability is enabled in the BD.
Irrespective, an NA message with O Flag = 0 will be normally
forwarded by the PE based on a MAC DA lookup.
The following procedure associated to the Learning sub-function is
RECOMMENDED:
o When a new Proxy-ARP/ND EVPN or static active entry is learned (or
provisioned), the PE SHOULD send a GARP or unsolicited-NA message
to all the connected access CEs. The PE SHOULD send a GARP or
unsolicited-NA message for dynamic entries only if the ARP/NA
message that previously created the entry on the PE was NOT
flooded to all the local connected CEs before. This GARP/
unsolicited-NA message makes sure the CE ARP/ND caches are updated
even if the ARP/NS/NA messages from CEs connected to remote PEs
are not flooded in the EVPN network.
Note that if a Static entry is provisioned with the same IP as an
existing EVPN-learned or Dynamic entry, the Static entry takes
precedence.
In case of a PE reboot, the static and EVPN entries will be re-added
as soon as the PE is back online and receives all the EVPN routes for
the BD. However, the dynamic entries will be gone. Due to that
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reason, new NS and ARP Requests will be flooded by the PE to remote
PEs and dynamic entries gradually re-learned again.
3.2.1. Proxy-ND and the NA Flags
[RFC4861] describes the use of the R Flag in IPv6 address resolution:
o Nodes capable of routing IPv6 packets must reply to NS messages
with NA messages where the R Flag is set (R Flag=1).
o Hosts that are not able to route IPv6 packets must indicate that
inability by replying with NA messages that contain R Flag=0.
The use of the R Flag in NA messages has an impact on how hosts
select their default gateways when sending packets off-link, as per
[RFC4861]:
o Hosts build a Default Router List based on the received RAs and
NAs with R Flag=1. Each cache entry has an IsRouter flag, which
must be set for received RAs and is set based on the R flag in the
received NAs. A host can choose one or more Default Routers when
sending packets off-link.
o In those cases where the IsRouter flag changes from TRUE to FALSE
as a result of a NA update, the node must remove that router from
the Default Router List and update the Destination Cache entries
for all destinations using that neighbor as a router, as specified
in [RFC4861] section 7.3.3. This is needed to detect when a node
that is used as a router stops forwarding packets due to being
configured as a host.
The R Flag and O Flag for a Proxy-ARP/ND entry will be learned in the
following ways:
o The R Flag information SHOULD be added to the Static entries by
the management interface. The O Flag information MAY also be
added by the management interface. If the R and O Flags are not
configured, the default value is 1.
o Dynamic entries SHOULD learn the R Flag and MAY learn the O Flag
from the snooped NA messages used to learn the IP->MAC itself.
o EVPN-learned entries SHOULD learn the R Flag and MAY learn the O
Flag from the ARP/ND Extended Community [RFC9047] received from
EVPN along with the RT2 used to learn the IP->MAC itself. If no
ARP/ND Extended Community is received, the PE will add a
configured R Flag/O Flag to the entry. These configured R and O
Flags MAY be an administrative choice with a default value of 1.
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The configuration of this administrative choice provides a
backwards compatible option with EVPN PEs that follow [RFC7432]
but do not support this specification.
Note that, typically, IP->MAC entries with O=0 will not be learned,
and therefore the Proxy-ND function will reply to NS messages with NA
messages that contain O=1. However, this document allows the
configuration of the "anycast" capability in the BD where the Proxy-
ND function is enabled. If "anycast" is enabled in the BD and an NA
message with O=0 is received, the associated IP->MAC entry will be
learned with O=0. If this "anycast" capability is enabled in the BD,
Duplicate IP Detection must be disabled so that the PE is able to
learn the same IP mapped to different MACs in the same Proxy-ND
table. If the "anycast" capability is disabled, NA messages with O
Flag = 0 will not create a Proxy-ND entry (although they will be
forwarded normally), hence no EVPN advertisement with ARP/ND Extended
Community will be generated.
3.3. Reply Sub-Function
This sub-function will reply to address resolution requests/
solicitations upon successful lookup in the Proxy-ARP/ND table for a
given IP address. The following considerations should be taken into
account, assuming that the ARP Request/NS lookup hits a Proxy-ARP/ND
entry IP1->MAC1:
a. When replying to ARP Request or NS messages:
- the PE SHOULD use the Proxy-ARP/ND entry MAC address MAC1 as
MAC SA. This is RECOMMENDED so that the resolved MAC can be
learned in the MAC forwarding database of potential layer-2
switches sitting between the PE and the CE requesting the
address resolution.
- for an ARP reply, the PE MUST use the Proxy-ARP entry IP1 and
MAC1 addresses in the Sender Protocol Address and Hardware
Address fields, respectively.
- for an NA message in response to an address resolution NS or
DAD NS, the PE MUST use IP1 as the IP SA and Target Address.
M1 MUST be used as the Target Link Local Address (TLLA).
b. A PE SHOULD NOT reply to a request/solicitation received on the
same attachment circuit over which the IP->MAC is learned. In
this case the requester and the requested IP are assumed to be
connected to the same layer-2 CE/access network linked to the
PE's attachment circuit, and therefore the requested IP owner
will receive the request directly.
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c. A PE SHOULD reply to broadcast/multicast address resolution
messages, that is, ARP-Request, ARP probes, NS messages as well
as DAD NS messages. An ARP probe is an ARP request constructed
with an all-zero sender IP address that may be used by hosts for
IPv4 Address Conflict Detection as specified in [RFC5227]. A PE
SHOULD NOT reply to unicast address resolution requests (for
instance, NUD NS messages).
d. When replying to an NS, a PE SHOULD set the Flags in the NA
messages as follows:
- The R-bit is set as it was learned for the IP->MAC entry in
the NA messages that created the entry (see Section 3.2.1).
- The S Flag will be set/unset as per [RFC4861].
- The O Flag will be set in all the NA messages issued by the
PE, except in the case the BD is configured with the "anycast"
capability and the entry was previously learned with O=0. If
"anycast" is enabled and there are more than one MAC for a
given IP in the Proxy-ND table, the PE will reply to NS
messages with as many NA responses as 'anycast' entries there
are in the Proxy-ND table.
e. For Proxy-ARP, a PE MUST only reply to ARP-Request with the
format specified in [RFC0826].
f. For Proxy-ND, a PE MUST reply to NS messages with known options
with the format and options specified in [RFC4861], and MAY
reply, discard, forward or unicast-forward NS messages containing
other options. An administrative choice to control the behavior
for received NS messages with unknown options ('reply',
'discard', 'unicast-forward' or 'forward') MAY be supported.
- The 'reply' option implies that the PE ignores the unknown
options and replies with NA messages, assuming a successful
lookup on the Proxy-ND table. An unsuccessful lookup will
result in a 'forward' behavior (i.e., flood the NS message
based on the MAC DA.
- If 'discard' is available, the operator should assess if
flooding NS unknown options may be a security risk for the
EVPN BD (and if so, enable 'discard'), or if, on the contrary,
not forwarding/flooding NS unknown options may disrupt
connectivity. This option discards NS messages with unknown
options, irrespective of the result of the lookup on the
Proxy-ND table.
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- The 'unicast-forward' option is described in Section 3.4.
- The 'forward' option implies flooding the NS message based on
the MAC DA. This option forwards NS messages with unknown
options, irrespective of the result of the lookup on the
Proxy-ND table. The 'forward' option is RECOMMENDED by this
document.
3.4. Unicast-forward Sub-Function
As discussed in Section 3.3, in some cases the operator may want to
'unicast-forward' certain ARP-Request and NS messages as opposed to
reply to them. The implementation of a 'unicast-forward' function is
RECOMMENDED. This option can be enabled with one of the following
parameters:
a. unicast-forward always
b. unicast-forward unknown-options
If 'unicast-forward always' is enabled, the PE will perform a Proxy-
ARP/ND table lookup and in case of a hit, the PE will forward the
packet to the owner of the MAC found in the Proxy-ARP/ND table. This
is irrespective of the options carried in the ARP/ND packet. This
option provides total transparency in the BD and yet reduces the
amount of flooding significantly.
If 'unicast-forward unknown-options' is enabled, upon a successful
Proxy-ARP/ND lookup, the PE will perform a 'unicast-forward' action
only if the ARP-Request or NS messages carry unknown options, as
explained in Section 3.3. The 'unicast-forward unknown-options'
configuration allows the support of new applications using ARP/ND in
the BD while still reducing the flooding.
Irrespective of the enabled option, if there is no successful Proxy-
ARP/ND lookup, the unknown ARP-Request/NS will be flooded in the
context of the BD, as per Section 3.6.
3.5. Maintenance Sub-Function
The Proxy-ARP/ND tables SHOULD follow a number of maintenance
procedures so that the dynamic IP->MAC entries are kept if the owner
is active and flushed (and the associated RT2 withdrawn) if the owner
is no longer in the network. The following procedures are
RECOMMENDED:
a. Age-time
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A dynamic Proxy-ARP/ND entry MUST be flushed out of the table if
the IP->MAC has not been refreshed within a given age-time. The
entry is refreshed if an ARP or NA message is received for the
same IP->MAC entry. The age-time is an administrative option and
its value should be carefully chosen depending on the specific
use case: in IXP networks (where the CE routers are fairly
static) the age-time may normally be longer than in DC networks
(where mobility is required).
b. Send-refresh option
The PE MAY send periodic refresh messages (ARP/ND "probes") to
the owners of the dynamic Proxy-ARP/ND entries, so that the
entries can be refreshed before they age out. The owner of the
IP->MAC entry would reply to the ARP/ND probe and the
corresponding entry age-time reset. The periodic send-refresh
timer is an administrative option and is RECOMMENDED to be a
third of the age-time or a half of the age-time in scaled
networks.
An ARP refresh issued by the PE will be an ARP-Request message
with the Sender's IP = 0 sent from the PE's MAC SA. If the PE
has an IP address in the subnet, for instance on an Integrated
Routing and Bridging (IRB) interface, then it MAY use it as a
source for the ARP request (instead of Sender's IP = 0). An ND
refresh will be a NS message issued from the PE's MAC SA and a
Link Local Address associated to the PE's MAC.
The refresh request messages SHOULD be sent only for dynamic
entries and not for static or EVPN-learned entries. Even though
the refresh request messages are broadcast or multicast, the PE
SHOULD only send the message to the attachment circuit associated
to the MAC in the IP->MAC entry.
The age-time and send-refresh options are used in EVPN networks to
avoid unnecessary EVPN RT2 withdrawals: if refresh messages are sent
before the corresponding BD Bridge-Table and Proxy-ARP/ND age-time
for a given entry expires, inactive but existing hosts will reply,
refreshing the entry and therefore avoiding unnecessary EVPN MAC/IP
Advertisement withdrawals in EVPN. Both entries (MAC in the BD and
IP->MAC in Proxy-ARP/ND) are reset when the owner replies to the ARP/
ND probe. If there is no response to the ARP/ND probe, the MAC and
IP->MAC entries will be legitimately flushed and the RT2s withdrawn.
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3.6. Flood (to Remote PEs) Handling
The Proxy-ARP/ND function implicitly helps reducing the flooding of
ARP Request and NS messages to remote PEs in an EVPN network.
However, in certain use cases, the flooding of ARP/NS/NA messages
(and even the unknown unicast flooding) to remote PEs can be
suppressed completely in an EVPN network.
For instance, in an IXP network, since all the participant CEs are
well known and will not move to a different PE, the IP->MAC entries
for the local CEs may be all provisioned on the PEs by a management
system. Assuming the entries for the CEs are all provisioned on the
local PE, a given Proxy-ARP/ND table will only contain static and
EVPN-learned entries. In this case, the operator may choose to
suppress the flooding of ARP/NS/NA from the local PE to the remote
PEs completely.
The flooding may also be suppressed completely in IXP networks with
dynamic Proxy-ARP/ND entries assuming that all the CEs are directly
connected to the PEs and they all advertise their presence with a
GARP/unsolicited-NA when they connect to the network. If any of
those two assumptions is not true and any of the PEs may not learn
all the local Proxy-ARP/ND entries, flooding of the ARP/NS/NA
messages from the local PE to the remote PEs SHOULD NOT be
suppressed, or the address resolution process for some CEs will not
be completed.
In networks where fast mobility is expected (DC use case), it is NOT
RECOMMENDED to suppress the flooding of unknown ARP-Requests/NS or
GARPs/unsolicited-NAs. Unknown ARP-Requests/NS refer to those ARP-
Request/NS messages for which the Proxy-ARP/ND lookups for the
requested IPs do not succeed.
In order to give the operator the choice to suppress/allow the
flooding to remote PEs, a PE MAY support administrative options to
individually suppress/allow the flooding of:
o Unknown ARP-Request and NS messages.
o GARP and unsolicited-NA messages.
The operator will use these options based on the expected behavior on
the CEs.
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3.7. Duplicate IP Detection
The Proxy-ARP/ND function MUST support duplicate IP detection as per
this section so that ARP/ND-spoofing attacks or duplicate IPs due to
human errors can be detected. For IPv6 addresses, CEs will continue
to carry out the DAD procedures as per [RFC4862]. The solution
described in this section is an additional security mechanism carried
out by the PEs that guarantees IPv6 address moves between PEs are
legitimate and not the result of an attack. [RFC6957] describes a
solution for IPv6 Duplicate Address Detection Proxy, however, it is
defined for point-to-multipoint topologies with a split-horizon
forwarding, where the 'CEs' have no direct communication within the
same L2 link and therefore it is not suitable for EVPN Broadcast
Domains. In addition, the solution described in this section
includes the use of the AS-MAC for additional security.
ARP/ND spoofing is a technique whereby an attacker sends "fake" ARP/
ND messages onto a broadcast domain. Generally the aim is to
associate the attacker's MAC address with the IP address of another
host causing any traffic meant for that IP address to be sent to the
attacker instead.
The distributed nature of EVPN and Proxy-ARP/ND allows the easy
detection of duplicated IPs in the network, in a similar way to the
MAC duplication detection function supported by [RFC7432] for MAC
addresses.
Duplicate IP detection monitors "IP-moves" in the Proxy-ARP/ND table
in the following way:
a. When an existing active IP1->MAC1 entry is modified, a PE starts
an M-second timer (default value of M=180), and if it detects N
IP moves before the timer expires (default value of N=5), it
concludes that a duplicate IP situation has occurred. An IP move
is considered when, for instance, IP1->MAC1 is replaced by
IP1->MAC2 in the Proxy-ARP/ND table. Static IP->MAC entries,
that is, locally provisioned or EVPN-learned entries with I=1 in
the ARP/ND Extended Community, are not subject to this procedure.
Static entries MUST NOT be overridden by dynamic Proxy-ARP/ND
entries.
b. In order to detect the duplicate IP faster, the PE SHOULD send a
Confirm message to the former owner of the IP. A Confirm message
is a unicast ARP-Request/NS message sent by the PE to the MAC
addresses that previously owned the IP, when the MAC changes in
the Proxy-ARP/ND table. The Confirm message uses a sender's IP
0.0.0.0 in case of ARP (if the PE has an IP address in the subnet
then it MAY use it) and an IPv6 Link Local Address in case of NS.
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If the PE does not receive an answer within a given time, the new
entry will be confirmed and activated. The default RECOMMENDED
time to receive the confirmation is 30 seconds. In case of
spoofing, for instance, if IP1->MAC1 moves to IP1->MAC2, the PE
may send a unicast ARP-Request/NS message for IP1 with MAC DA=
MAC1 and MAC SA= PE's MAC. This will force the legitimate owner
to respond if the move to MAC2 was spoofed, and make the PE issue
another Confirm message, this time to MAC DA= MAC2. If both,
legitimate owner and spoofer keep replying to the Confirm
message, the PE will detect the duplicate IP within the M-second
timer:
- If the IP1->MAC1 pair was previously owned by the spoofer and
the new IP1->MAC2 was from a valid CE, then the issued Confirm
message would trigger a response from the spoofer.
- If it were the other way around, that is, IP1->MAC1 was
previously owned by a valid CE, the Confirm message would
trigger a response from the CE.
Either way, if this process continues, then duplicate
detection will kick in.
c. Upon detecting a duplicate IP situation:
1. The entry in duplicate detected state cannot be updated with
new dynamic or EVPN-learned entries for the same IP. The
operator MAY override the entry, though, with a static
IP->MAC.
2. The PE SHOULD alert the operator and stop responding to ARP/
NS for the duplicate IP until a corrective action is taken.
3. Optionally the PE MAY associate an "anti-spoofing-mac" (AS-
MAC) to the duplicate IP in the Proxy-ARP/ND table. The PE
will send a GARP/unsolicited-NA message with IP1->AS-MAC to
the local CEs as well as an RT2 (with IP1->AS-MAC) to the
remote PEs. This will update the ARP/ND caches on all the
CEs in the BD, and hence all the CEs in the BD will use the
AS-MAC as MAC DA when sending traffic to IP1. This procedure
prevents the spoofer from attracting any traffic for IP1.
Since the AS-MAC is a managed MAC address known by all the
PEs in the BD, all the PEs MAY apply filters to drop and/or
log any frame with MAC DA= AS-MAC. The advertisement of the
AS-MAC as a "black-hole MAC" (by using an indication in the
RT2) that can be used directly in the BD to drop frames is
for further study.
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d. The duplicate IP situation will be cleared when a corrective
action is taken by the operator, or alternatively after a HOLD-
DOWN timer (default value of 540 seconds).
The values of M, N and HOLD-DOWN timer SHOULD be a configurable
administrative option to allow for the required flexibility in
different scenarios.
For Proxy-ND, the Duplicate IP Detection described in this section
SHOULD only monitor IP moves for IP->MACs learned from NA messages
with O Flag=1. NA messages with O Flag=0 would not override the ND
cache entries for an existing IP, and therefore the procedure in this
section would not detect duplicate IPs. This Duplicate IP Detection
for IPv6 SHOULD be disabled when the IPv6 "anycast" capability is
activated in a given BD.
4. Solution Benefits
The solution described in this document provides the following
benefits:
a. The solution may suppress completely the flooding of the ARP/ND
messages in the EVPN network, assuming that all the CE IP->MAC
addresses local to the PEs are known or provisioned on the PEs
from a management system. Note that in this case, the unknown
unicast flooded traffic can also be suppressed, since all the
expected unicast traffic will be destined to known MAC addresses
in the PE BDs.
b. The solution reduces significantly the flooding of the ARP/ND
messages in the EVPN network, assuming that some or all the CE
IP->MAC addresses are learned on the data plane by snooping ARP/
ND messages issued by the CEs.
c. The solution provides a way to refresh periodically the CE
IP->MAC entries learned through the data plane, so that the
IP->MAC entries are not withdrawn by EVPN when they age out
unless the CE is not active anymore. This option helps reducing
the EVPN control plane overhead in a network with active CEs that
do not send packets frequently.
d. Provides a mechanism to detect duplicate IP addresses and avoid
ARP/ND-spoof attacks or the effects of duplicate addresses due to
human errors.
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5. Deployment Scenarios
Four deployment scenarios with different levels of ARP/ND control are
available to operators using this solution, depending on their
requirements to manage ARP/ND: all dynamic learning, all dynamic
learning with Proxy-ARP/ND, hybrid dynamic learning and static
provisioning with Proxy-ARP/ND, and all static provisioning with
Proxy-ARP/ND.
5.1. All Dynamic Learning
In this scenario for minimum security and mitigation, EVPN is
deployed in the BD with the Proxy-ARP/ND function shutdown. PEs do
not intercept ARP/ND requests and flood all requests issued by the
CEs, as a conventional layer-2 network among those CEs would do.
While no ARP/ND mitigation is used in this scenario, the operator can
still take advantage of EVPN features such as control plane learning
and all-active multihoming in the peering network.
Although this option does not require any of the procedures described
in this document, it is added as baseline/default option for
completeness. This option is equivalent to VPLS as far as ARP/ND is
concerned. The options described in Section 5.2, Section 5.3 and
Section 5.4 are only possible in EVPN networks in combination with
their Proxy-ARP/ND capabilities.
5.2. Dynamic Learning with Proxy-ARP/ND
This scenario minimizes flooding while enabling dynamic learning of
IP->MAC entries. The Proxy-ARP/ND function is enabled in the BDs of
the EVPN PEs, so that the PEs snoop ARP/ND messages issued by the CEs
and respond to CE ARP-requests/NS messages.
PEs will flood requests if the entry is not in their Proxy table.
Any unknown source IP->MAC entries will be learned and advertised in
EVPN, and traffic to unknown entries is discarded at the ingress PE.
This scenario makes use of the Learning, Reply and Maintenance sub-
functions, with an optional use of the Unicast-forward and Duplicate
IP detection sub-functions. The Flood handling sub-function uses
default flooding for unknown ARP-Request/NS messages.
5.3. Hybrid Dynamic Learning and Static Provisioning with Proxy-ARP/ND
Some IXPs and other operators want to protect particular hosts on the
BD while allowing dynamic learning of CE addresses. For example, an
operator may want to configure static IP->MAC entries for management
and infrastructure hosts that provide critical services. In this
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scenario, static entries are provisioned from the management plane
for protected IP->MAC addresses, and dynamic learning with Proxy-ARP/
ND is enabled as described in Section 5.2 on the BD.
This scenario makes use of the same sub-functions as in Section 5.2,
but adding static entries added by the Learning sub-function.
5.4. All Static Provisioning with Proxy-ARP/ND
For a solution that maximizes security and eliminates flooding and
unknown unicast in the peering network, all IP->MAC entries are
provisioned from the management plane. The Proxy-ARP/ND function is
enabled in the BDs of the EVPN PEs, so that the PEs intercept and
respond to CE requests. Dynamic learning and ARP/ND snooping is
disabled so that ARP-Requests and NS to unknown IPs are discarded at
the ingress PE. This scenario provides an operator the most control
over IP->MAC entries and allows an operator to manage all entries
from a management system.
In this scenario, the Learning sub-function is limited to static
entries, the Maintenance sub-function will not require any procedures
due to the static entries, and the Flood handling sub-function will
completely suppress Unknown ARP-Requests/NS messages as well as GARP
and unsolicited-NA messages.
5.5. Example of Deployment in Internet Exchange Points
Nowadays, almost all IXPs install some security rules in order to
protect the peering network (BD). These rules are often called port
security. Port security summarizes different operational steps that
limit the access to the IXP-LAN and the customer router, and controls
the kind of traffic that the routers are allowed to exchange (e.g.,
Ethernet, IPv4, IPv6). Due to this, the deployment scenario as
described in Section 5.4 "All Static Provisioning with Proxy-ARP/ND"
is the predominant scenario for IXPs.
In addition to the "All Static Provisioning" behavior, in IXP
networks it is recommended to configure the Reply Sub-Function to
'discard' ARP-Requests/NS messages with unrecognized options.
At IXPs, customers usually follow a certain operational life-cycle.
For each step of the operational life-cycle specific operational
procedures are executed.
The following describes the operational procedures that are needed to
guarantee port security throughout the life-cycle of a customer with
focus on EVPN features:
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1. A new customer is connected the first time to the IXP:
Before the connection between the customer router and the IXP-LAN
is activated, the MAC of the router is allow-listed on the IXP's
switch port. All other MAC addresses are blocked. Pre-defined
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses of the IXP peering network space are
configured at the customer router. The IP->MAC static entries
(IPv4 and IPv6) are configured in the management system of the
IXP for the customer's port in order to support Proxy-ARP/ND.
In case a customer uses multiple ports aggregated to a single
logical port (LAG) some vendors randomly select the MAC address
of the LAG from the different MAC addresses assigned to the
ports. In this case the static entry will be used associated to
a list of allowed MACs.
2. Replacement of customer router:
If a customer router is about to be replaced, the new MAC
address(es) must be installed in the management system besides
the MAC address(es) of the currently connected router. This
allows the customer to replace the router without any active
involvement of the IXP operator. For this, static entries are
also used. After the replacement takes place, the MAC
address(es) of the replaced router can be removed.
3. Decommissioning a customer router
If a customer router is decommissioned, the router is
disconnected from the IXP PE. Right after that, the MAC
address(es) of the router and IP->MAC bindings can be removed
from the management system.
5.6. Example of Deployment in Data Centers
DCs normally have different requirements than IXPs in terms of Proxy-
ARP/ND. Some differences are listed below:
a. The required mobility in virtualized DCs makes the "Dynamic
Learning" or "Hybrid Dynamic and Static Provisioning" models more
appropriate than the "All Static Provisioning" model.
b. IPv6 'anycast' may be required in DCs, while it is typically not
a requirement in IXP networks. Therefore if the DC needs IPv6
anycast addresses, the "anycast" capability will be explicitly
enabled in the Proxy-ND function, hence the Proxy-ND sub-
functions modified accordingly. For instance, if IPv6 'anycast'
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is enabled in the Proxy-ND function, the Duplicate IP Detection
procedure in Section 3.7 must be disabled.
c. DCs may require special options on ARP/ND as opposed to the
address resolution function, which is the only one typically
required in IXPs. Based on that, the Reply Sub-function may be
modified to forward or discard unknown options.
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [RFC7432] and [RFC9047] apply to this
document too. Note that EVPN does not inherently provide
cryptographic protection (including confidentiality protection).
The procedures in this document reduce the amount of ARP/ND message
flooding, which in itself provides a protection to "slow path"
software processors of routers and Tenant Systems in large BDs. The
ARP/ND requests that are replied by the Proxy-ARP/ND function (hence
not flooded) are normally targeted to existing hosts in the BD. ARP/
ND requests targeted to absent hosts are still normally flooded;
however, the suppression of Unknown ARP-Requests and NS messages
described in Section 3.6 can provide an additional level of security
against ARP-Requests/NS messages issued to non-existing hosts.
While the unicast-forward and/or flood suppression sub-functions
provide an added security mechanism for the BD, they can also
increase the risk of blocking the service for a CE if the EVPN PEs
cannot provide the ARP/ND resolution that the CE needs.
The solution also provides protection against Denial Of Service
attacks that use ARP/ND-spoofing as a first step. The Duplicate IP
Detection and the use of an AS-MAC as explained in Section 3.7
protects the BD against ARP/ND spoofing.
The Proxy-ARP/ND function specified in this document does not allow
the learning of an IP address mapped to multiple MAC addresses in the
same table, unless the "anycast" capability is enabled (and only in
case of Proxy-ND). When "anycast" is enabled in the Proxy-ND
function, the number of allowed entries for the same IP address MUST
be limited by the operator to prevent DoS attacks that attempt to
fill the Proxy-ND table with a significant number of entries for the
same IP.
The document provides some examples and guidelines that can be used
by IXPs in their EVPN BDs. When EVPN and its associated Proxy-ARP/ND
function are used in IXP networks, they provide ARP/ND security and
mitigation. IXPs must still employ additional security mechanisms
that protect the peering network as per the established BCPs such as
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the ones described in [Euro-IX-BCP]. For example, IXPs should
disable all unneeded control protocols, and block unwanted protocols
from CEs so that only IPv4, ARP and IPv6 Ethertypes are permitted on
the peering network. In addition, port security features and ACLs
can provide an additional level of security.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Proxy-ARP/ND solution in this
document will not work if there is a mechanism securing ARP/ND
exchanges among CEs, because the PE is not able to secure the
"proxied" ND messages.
7. IANA Considerations
No IANA considerations.
8. Acknowledgments
The authors want to thank Ranganathan Boovaraghavan, Sriram
Venkateswaran, Manish Krishnan, Seshagiri Venugopal, Tony Przygienda,
Robert Raszuk and Iftekhar Hussain for their review and
contributions. Thank you to Oliver Knapp as well, for his detailed
review.
9. Contributors
In addition to the authors listed on the front page, the following
co-authors have also contributed to this document:
Wim Henderickx
Nokia
Daniel Melzer
DE-CIX Management GmbH
Erik Nordmark
Zededa
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC7432] Sajassi, A., Ed., Aggarwal, R., Bitar, N., Isaac, A.,
Uttaro, J., Drake, J., and W. Henderickx, "BGP MPLS-Based
Ethernet VPN", RFC 7432, DOI 10.17487/RFC7432, February
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7432>.
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[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
[RFC0826] Plummer, D., "An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or
Converting Network Protocol Addresses to 48.bit Ethernet
Address for Transmission on Ethernet Hardware", STD 37,
RFC 826, DOI 10.17487/RFC0826, November 1982,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc826>.
[RFC5227] Cheshire, S., "IPv4 Address Conflict Detection", RFC 5227,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5227, July 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5227>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9047] Rabadan, J., Ed., Sathappan, S., Nagaraj, K., and W. Lin,
"Propagation of ARP/ND Flags in an Ethernet Virtual
Private Network (EVPN)", RFC 9047, DOI 10.17487/RFC9047,
June 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9047>.
10.2. Informative References
[Euro-IX-BCP]
Euro-IX, "European Internet Exchange Association Best
Practises -
https://www.euro-ix.net/en/forixps/set-ixp/ixp-bcops/".
[RFC6820] Narten, T., Karir, M., and I. Foo, "Address Resolution
Problems in Large Data Center Networks", RFC 6820,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6820, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6820>.
[RFC6957] Costa, F., Combes, J-M., Ed., Pougnard, X., and H. Li,
"Duplicate Address Detection Proxy", RFC 6957,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6957, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6957>.
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[RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>.
Authors' Addresses
Jorge Rabadan (editor)
Nokia
777 Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
Email: jorge.rabadan@nokia.com
Senthil Sathappan
Nokia
701 E. Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043 USA
Email: senthil.sathappan@nokia.com
Kiran Nagaraj
Nokia
701 E. Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043 USA
Email: kiran.nagaraj@nokia.com
Greg Hankins
Nokia
Email: greg.hankins@nokia.com
Thomas King
DE-CIX Management GmbH
Email: thomas.king@de-cix.net
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