Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication
draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication
Network Working Group M. Jethanandani
Internet-Draft Kloud Services
Updates: 5880 (if approved) A. Mishra
Intended status: Standards Track Aalyria Technologies
Expires: 8 August 2024 A. Saxena
Ciena Corporation
M. Bhatia
Google
5 February 2024
Optimizing BFD Authentication
draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-14
Abstract
This document describes an optimization to BFD Authentication as
described in Section 6.7 of BFD RFC 5880. This document updates RFC
5880.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 August 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Note to RFC Editor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Authentication Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. NULL Auth Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Optimizing Authentication YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. The YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Auth Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.4. Updated IANA Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Updated BFD IANA Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix B. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B.1. Single Hop BFD Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. Introduction
Authenticating every BFD [RFC5880] control packet with MD5
Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC1321], or Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1)
is a computationally intensive process. This makes it difficult, if
not impossible to authenticate every packet - particularly at faster
rates. Also, the recent escalating series of attacks on MD5 and
SHA-1 described in Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1
[SHA-1-attack1] and New Collision Search for SHA-1 [SHA-1-attack2]
raise concerns about their remaining useful lifetime as outlined in
Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the
HMAC-MD5 Algorithm [RFC6151] and Security Considerations for the
SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC6194]. If replaced by
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stronger algorithms, the computational overhead, will make the task
of authenticating every packet even more difficult to achieve.
This document proposes that BFD control packets that signal a state
change, a demand mode change (to D bit), a poll sequence change (P or
F bit change) be categorized as a significant change. Control
packets that do not require a poll sequence, such as
bfd.RequiredMinRxInterval or bfd.RequiredMinTxInterval, are also
considered as a significant change. In other words, the contents of
an Up packet MUST NOT change aside from the authentication section
without stronger authentication to take advantage of the method
described in this document.
In the Up state, most packets that are transmitted and received have
no state change associated with them. Limiting authentication to
packets that affect a BFD session's state allows more sessions to be
supported with this optimized method of authentication.
Once the session has reached the Up state, the session can choose the
Auth Type to be one of:
* No authentication, i.e., Authentication Present (A-bit) is zero.
Having no authentication provides computational relief to the
system. However, a malicious user can blindly inject traffic that
will be accepted by the BFD session.
* NULL Auth Type (Section 3) as defined in this document. This type
prevents blind injection, but is vulnerable to active attacks,
where the attacker is aware of the sequence number, and
potentially becomes the PITM. However, periodic check with
stronger authentication can thwart that attack as described below.
* Meticulous Keyed ISAAC authentication as described in Secure BFD
Sequence Numbers [I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers]. This
authentication type prevents the attack when the Up packets do not
change, because only the paired devices know the shared secret,
key, and sequence number to select the ISAAC result.
To detect a Person In the Middle (PITM) attack when the session is in
Up state, implementations have two options. They can choose to use:
* Test periodic strong authentication using a Poll sequence. To
perform a strong authentication, a Poll sequence SHOULD be
initiated by the sender. If a Fin is not received within the
Detect Interval, the session has been compromised, and should be
brought down. The interval for initiating a Poll sequence can be
configured depending on the capability of the system.
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* Meticulous Keyed ISAAC as defined in Securing BFD Sequence Numbers
[I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers].
Most packets transmitted on a BFD session are BFD Up packets.
Authenticating a small subset of these packets with a Poll sequence
as described above, for example every one minute, significantly
reduces the computational demand for the system while maintaining
security of the session across the configured interval.
The rest of this document is structured as follows: Section 2 talks
about the changes to authentication mode as described in BFD
[RFC5880]. Section 3 goes into the details of the new Authentication
Type.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]
[RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
here.
1.2. Note to RFC Editor
This document uses several placeholder values throughout the
document. Please replace them as follows and remove this note before
publication.
RFC XXXX, where XXXX is the number assigned to this document at the
time of publication.
2024-02-05 with the actual date of the publication of this document.
1.3. Terminology
The following terms used in this document have been defined in BFD
[RFC5880].
* Detect Multiplier
* Detection Time
The following terms are introduced in this document.
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+=============+==============================================+
| Term | Meaning |
+=============+==============================================+
| significant | State change, a demand mode change (to D |
| change | bit) or a poll sequence change (P or F bit). |
| | Control packets that do not require a poll |
| | sequence, such as bfd.RequiredMinRxInterval |
| | bfd.RequiredMinTxInterval, or bfd.DetectMult |
| | are also considered as a significant change. |
+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| configured | Interval at which BFD control packets are |
| interval | retried with a stronger authentication. |
+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
Table 1
2. Authentication Mode
The cryptographic authentication mechanisms specified in BFD
[RFC5880] describes enabling and disabling of authentication as a one
time operation. As a security precaution, it mentions that
authentication state be allowed to change at most once. Once
enabled, every packet must have Authentication Bit set and the
associated Authentication Type appended. In addition, it states that
an implementation SHOULD NOT allow the authentication state to be
changed based on the receipt of a BFD control packet.
This document proposes that the authentication mode be modified to be
enabled on demand. Instead of authenticating every packet, BFD peers
are configured for which packets need to be authenticated, and
authenticate only those packets. The remaining packets MAY be
transmitted and received without authentication, or use a less
expensive authentication. For example, the two ends can be
configured such that BFD control packets that indicate a significant
change should be authenticated and enable authentication on those
packets only. If the two ends have previously been configured as
such, but at least one side decides not to authenticate a significant
change packet, then the BFD session will fail to come up.
The proposal outlines which BFD control packets are required to be
authenticated. A BFD control packet that fails authentication is
discarded, or a BFD control packet that was supposed to be
authenticated, but was not; e.g. a significant change packet, is
discarded. However, there is no change to the state machine for BFD,
as the decision of a significant change is still decided by how many
valid consecutive packets were received, authenticated or otherwise.
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The following table summarizes when the Auth Type should be set with
a Auth or a OPT authentication type. The table should be read with
the column indicating the BFD state the receiver is currently in, and
the row indicating the BFD state the receiver might transition to
based on the BFD control packet received. The intersection of the
two indicates whether the received BFD control packet should have the
Auth Type set to either Auth, or OPT. The BFD state refers to the
states in BFD state machine described in Section 6.2 of BFD
[RFC5880].
Read : On state change from <column> to <row>
Auth : Strongly authenticated BFD control packet
OPT : Any or no authentication, as configured.
n/a : Invalid state transition.
Select : Most packets OPT AUTH. Selective (periodic)
packets authenticated.
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| | DOWN | INIT | UP |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| DOWN | OPT | Auth | Auth |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| INIT | Auth | OPT | n/a |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| UP | Auth | Auth | Select |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+
Figure 1: Optimized Authentication Map
In other words, the contents of an Up packet MUST NOT change aside
from the authentication section without stronger authentication.
Implementations supporting this feature can send BFD packets with or
without authentication that carries a meticulously increasing
sequence number. This meticulously increasing sequence number
prevents replay attacks, and it supports BFD Stability
[I-D.ietf-bfd-stability].
The NULL Authentication type is defined in NULL Authentication Type
(Section 3). This authentication type does not provide any
authentication of the BFD Control Up packets, but does carry a
meticulously increasing sequence number compatible with this
specification.
Secure BFD Sequence Numbers [I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers]
defines an authentication mechanism that does not provide any
authentication of the BFD Control packets, carries a meticulously
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increasing sequence number, but provides for a stronger mechanism to
prevent active attacks against these procedures for Up packets
without requiring strong authentication.
3. NULL Auth Type
This section describes a new Authentication Type as:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Auth Type | Auth Len | Auth Key ID | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: NULL Auth Type
where:
Auth Type: The Authentication Type, which in this case is TBD (NULL,
to be assigned by IANA, with a suggested value of 6).
Auth Len: The length of the NULL Auth Type, in bytes; i.e. 8 bytes
Auth Key ID: The authentication key ID in use for this packet. Must
be set to zero.
Reserved: This byte MUST be set to zero on transmit and ignored on
receive.
Sequence Number: The sequence number for this packet.
Implementations will use sequence numbers (bfd.XmitAuthSeq) as
defined in BFD [RFC5880].
4. Optimizing Authentication YANG Model
4.1. Data Model Overview
The YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] model defined in this document augments the
"ietf-bfd" module to add configuration relevant to the management of
the feature defined in this document. In particular, it adds crypto
algorithms that are described in this model, and in Secure BFD
Sequence Numbers [I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers]. It adds a
feature statement to enable optimized authentication. Finally, it
adds a flag to enable optimized authentication, an interval value
that specifies how often the BFD session should be re-authenticated
once it is in the Up state, and the key chain that should be used in
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the Up state.
4.2. Tree Diagram
The tree diagram for the YANG modules defined in this document use
annotations defined in YANG Tree Diagrams. [RFC8340].
module: ietf-bfd-opt-auth
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh
/bfd-ip-sh:sessions/bfd-ip-sh:session
/bfd-ip-sh:authentication:
+--rw optimized-auth? boolean {optimized-auth}?
+--rw reauth-interval? uint32
+--rw up-auth-type? key-chain:key-chain-ref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-mh:ip-mh
/bfd-ip-mh:session-groups/bfd-ip-mh:session-group
/bfd-ip-mh:authentication:
+--rw optimized-auth? boolean {optimized-auth}?
+--rw reauth-interval? uint32
+--rw up-auth-type? key-chain:key-chain-ref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-lag:lag
/bfd-lag:sessions/bfd-lag:session/bfd-lag:authentication:
+--rw optimized-auth? boolean {optimized-auth}?
+--rw reauth-interval? uint32
+--rw up-auth-type? key-chain:key-chain-ref
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-mpls:mpls
/bfd-mpls:session-groups/bfd-mpls:session-group
/bfd-mpls:authentication:
+--rw optimized-auth? boolean {optimized-auth}?
+--rw reauth-interval? uint32
+--rw up-auth-type? key-chain:key-chain-ref
4.3. The YANG Model
This YANG module imports YANG Key Chain [RFC8177], A YANG Data Model
for Routing Management (NMDA version) [RFC8349], and YANG Data Model
for Bidirectional Forwading Detection (BFD) [RFC9314].
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<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-bfd-opt-auth@2024-02-05.yang"
module ietf-bfd-opt-auth {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-opt-auth";
prefix "bfdoa";
import ietf-routing {
prefix "rt";
reference
"RFC 8349: A YANG Data Model for Routing Management
(NMDA version)";
}
import ietf-bfd {
prefix bfd;
reference
"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional
Forwarding Detection.";
}
import ietf-bfd-ip-sh {
prefix bfd-ip-sh;
reference
"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional
Forwarding Detection.";
}
import ietf-bfd-ip-mh {
prefix bfd-ip-mh;
reference
"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional
Forwarding Detection.";
}
import ietf-bfd-lag {
prefix bfd-lag;
reference
"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional
Forwarding Detection.";
}
import ietf-bfd-mpls {
prefix bfd-mpls;
reference
"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional
Forwarding Detection.";
}
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import ietf-key-chain {
prefix key-chain;
reference
"RFC 8177: YANG Key Chain.";
}
organization
"IETF BFD Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/bfd>
WG List: <rtg-bfd@ietf.org>
Authors: Mahesh Jethanandani (mjethanandani@gmail.com)
Ashesh Mishra (mishra.ashesh@gmail.com)
Ankur Saxena (ankurpsaxena@gmail.com)
Manav Bhatia (mnvbhatia@google.com).";
description
"This YANG module augments the base BFD YANG model to add
attributes related to BFD Optimized Authentication.
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself
for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
revision "2024-02-05" {
description
"Initial Version.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Optimizing BFD Authentication.";
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}
feature optimized-auth {
description
"When enabled, this implementation supports optimized
authentication as described in this document.";
}
identity no-auth {
base key-chain:crypto-algorithm;
description
"No authentication will be used.";
}
identity null {
base key-chain:crypto-algorithm;
description
"BFD Null type defined in this draft.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Optimizing BFD Authentication.";
}
identity meticulous-keyed-isaac {
base key-chain:crypto-algorithm;
description
"BFD ISAAC Keyed Meticulous.";
reference
"I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers: Securing BFD Sequence
Numbers.";
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols" +
"/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh" +
"/bfd-ip-sh:sessions/bfd-ip-sh:session" +
"/bfd-ip-sh:authentication" {
leaf optimized-auth {
if-feature optimized-auth;
type boolean;
default false;
description
"If set to true, BFD Single Hop Sessions will be
enabled for optimized authentication.";
}
leaf reauth-interval {
when "../optimized-auth = 'true'";
type uint32;
units "microseconds";
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default "60000000";
description
"Interval of time after which a strong authentication
should be enabled to prevent a Person-In-The-Middle
attack. Default is 1 minute.
This value SHOULD have jitter applied to it to avoid
self-synchronization during expensive authentication
operations.";
}
leaf up-auth-type {
type key-chain:key-chain-ref;
must "(../optimized-auth = 'true') and " +
"(../bfd-ip-sh:meticulous = 'true')";
description
"The authentication type that should be used once the
connection transitions to Up state. In case
of optimized auth, the choices are Reserved (or no
authentication), NULL Auth, or Meticulous Keyed ISAAC.";
}
description
"Augment the 'bfd' container to add attributes related to BFD
optimized authentication.";
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/" +
"rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-mh:ip-mh/" +
"bfd-ip-mh:session-groups/bfd-ip-mh:session-group/" +
"bfd-ip-mh:authentication" {
leaf optimized-auth {
if-feature optimized-auth;
type boolean;
default false;
description
"If set to true, BFD Multi Hop Sessions will be
enabled for optimized authentication.";
}
leaf reauth-interval {
when "../optimized-auth = 'true'";
type uint32;
units "microseconds";
default "60000000";
description
"Interval of time after which a strong authentication
should be enabled to prevent a Person-In-The-Middle
attack. Default is 1 minute.
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This value SHOULD have jitter applied to it to avoid
self-synchronization during expensive authentication
operations.";
}
leaf up-auth-type {
type key-chain:key-chain-ref;
must "(../optimized-auth = 'true') and " +
"(../bfd-ip-mh:meticulous = 'true')";
description
"The authentication type that should be used once the
connection transitions to Up state. In case
of optimized auth, the choices are Reserved (or no
authentication), NULL Auth, or Meticulous Keyed ISAAC.";
}
description
"Augment the 'bfd' container to add attributes related to BFD
optimized authentication.";
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/" +
"rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-lag:lag/" +
"bfd-lag:sessions/bfd-lag:session/" +
"bfd-lag:authentication" {
leaf optimized-auth {
if-feature optimized-auth;
type boolean;
default false;
description
"If set to true, BFD LAG Sessions will be
enabled for optimized authentication.";
}
leaf reauth-interval {
when "../optimized-auth = 'true'";
type uint32;
units "microseconds";
default "60000000";
description
"Interval of time after which a strong authentication
should be enabled to prevent a Person-In-The-Middle
attack. Default is 1 minute.
This value SHOULD have jitter applied to it to avoid
self-synchronization during expensive authentication
operations.";
}
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leaf up-auth-type {
type key-chain:key-chain-ref;
must "(../optimized-auth = 'true') and " +
"(../bfd-lag:meticulous = 'true')";
description
"The authentication type that should be used once the
connection transitions to Up state. In case
of optimized auth, the choices are Reserved (or no
authentication), NULL Auth, or Meticulous Keyed ISAAC.";
}
description
"Augment the 'bfd' container to add attributes related to BFD
optimized authentication.";
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/" +
"rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-mpls:mpls/" +
"bfd-mpls:session-groups/bfd-mpls:session-group/" +
"bfd-mpls:authentication" {
leaf optimized-auth {
if-feature optimized-auth;
type boolean;
default false;
description
"If set to true, BFD MPLS Sessions will be
enabled for optimized authentication.";
}
leaf reauth-interval {
when "../optimized-auth = 'true'";
type uint32;
units "microseconds";
default "60000000";
description
"Interval of time after which a strong authentication
should be enabled to prevent a Person-In-The-Middle
attack. Default is 1 minute.
This value SHOULD have jitter applied to it to avoid
self-synchronization during expensive authentication
operations.";
}
leaf up-auth-type {
type key-chain:key-chain-ref;
must "(../optimized-auth = 'true') and " +
"(../bfd-mpls:meticulous = 'true')";
description
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"The authentication type that should be used once the
connection transitions to Up state. In case
of optimized auth, the choices are Reserved (or no
authentication), NULL Auth, or Meticulous Keyed ISAAC.";
}
description
"Augment the 'bfd' container to add attributes related to BFD
optimized authentication.";
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
5. IANA Considerations
This documents requests two new authentication types, one URI, one
YANG model, and an update to an existing IANA YANG model.
5.1. Auth Type
This document requests an update to the registry titled "BFD
Authentication Types". IANA is requested to assign two new BFD
AuthType:
* NULL Auth Type (Section 3), with a suggested value of 6.
* Meticulous Keyed ISAAC Authentication
[I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers] (Part
meticulous-keyed-isaac-authentication), with a suggested value of
7.
5.2. IETF XML Registry
This document registers one URIs in the "ns" subregistry of the "IETF
XML" registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the
following registration is requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-opt-auth
Registrant Contact: The IESG
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
5.3. The YANG Module Names Registry
This document registers one YANG modules in the "YANG Module Names"
registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the following
registrations are requested:
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name: ietf-bfd-opt-auth
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-opt-auth
prefix: bfdoa
reference: RFC XXXX
5.4. Updated IANA Module
This document also requests an update to an existing IANA YANG module
described in Updated BFD IANA Module (Appendix A)
6. Security Considerations
The YANG module specified in this document defines a schema for data
that is designed to be accessed via network management protocols such
as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer
is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure
transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer
is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS
[RFC8446]. The NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or
RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
RESTCONF protocol operations and content.
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config)
to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
effect on network operations. Some of the subtrees and data nodes
and their sensitivity/vulnerability are described here.
* 'optimized-auth' flag is used to enable optimized authentication
for the session. If this was not intended, or the other end is
not configured with the same flag, the BFD session will fail to
come up.
* 'reauth-interval' specifies the interval in Up state, after which
a strong authentication SHOULD be performed to prevent a Person-
In-The-Middle (PITM) attack. If this interval is set very low, or
very high, then it will make optimization worthless.
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes.
There are no read-only data nodes defined in this model.
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Some of the RPC operations in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control access to these operations.
There are no RPC operations defined in this model.
The approach described in this document enhances the ability to
authenticate a BFD session by taking away the onerous requirement
that every BFD control packet be authenticated. By authenticating
packets that affect the state of the session, the security of the BFD
session is maintained. In this mode, packets that are a significant
change but are not authenticated, are dropped by the system.
Therefore, a malicious user that tries to inject a non-authenticated
packet; e.g. with a Down state to take a session down will fail.
That combined with the proposal of using sequence number defined in
Secure BFD Sequence Numbers [I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers]
further enhances the security of BFD sessions.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers]
DeKok, A., Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Mishra, A., and
A. Saxena, "Meticulous Keyed ISAAC for BFD
Authentication", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers-13, 4 February 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bfd-
secure-sequence-numbers-13>.
[I-D.ietf-bfd-stability]
Mishra, A., Jethanandani, M., Saxena, A., Pallagatti, S.,
Chen, M., and P. Fan, "BFD Stability", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-bfd-stability-12, 31 January
2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
bfd-stability-12>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
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[RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8177] Lindem, A., Ed., Qu, Y., Yeung, D., Chen, I., and J.
Zhang, "YANG Data Model for Key Chains", RFC 8177,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8177, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8177>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
[RFC8349] Lhotka, L., Lindem, A., and Y. Qu, "A YANG Data Model for
Routing Management (NMDA Version)", RFC 8349,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8349, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8349>.
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[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9127] Rahman, R., Ed., Zheng, L., Ed., Jethanandani, M., Ed.,
Pallagatti, S., and G. Mirsky, "YANG Data Model for
Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)", RFC 9127,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9127, October 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9127>.
[RFC9314] Jethanandani, M., Ed., Rahman, R., Ed., Zheng, L., Ed.,
Pallagatti, S., and G. Mirsky, "YANG Data Model for
Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)", RFC 9314,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9314, September 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9314>.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>.
[RFC6151] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>.
[RFC6194] Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security
Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest
Algorithms", RFC 6194, DOI 10.17487/RFC6194, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6194>.
[SHA-1-attack1]
Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu, "Finding Collisions in the
Full SHA-1", 2005.
[SHA-1-attack2]
Wang, X., Yao, A., and F. Yao, "New Collision Search for
SHA-1", 2005.
Appendix A. Updated BFD IANA Module
This section carries the updated IANA BFD Module, iana-bfd-types.yang
module, first defined in YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forward
Detection (BFD) [RFC9127]. The updated module carries two new
authentication type enum definitions, 'null' with a suggested value
of 6, and 'meticulous-keyed-isaac' with a suggested value of 7. This
module should replace the version that currently exists in the IANA
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registry.
<CODE BEGINS> file "iana-bfd-types@2024-02-05.yang"
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===============
module iana-bfd-types {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-bfd-types";
prefix iana-bfd-types;
organization
"IANA";
contact
"Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
Postal: ICANN
12025 Waterfront Drive, Suite 300
Los Angeles, CA 90094-2536
United States of America
Tel: +1 310 301 5800
<mailto:iana@iana.org>";
description
"This module defines YANG data types for IANA-registered
BFD parameters.
This YANG module is maintained by IANA and reflects the
'BFD Diagnostic Codes' and 'BFD Authentication Types'
registries.
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9127; see the
RFC itself for full legal notices.";
reference
"RFC 9127: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD)";
revision 2024-02-05 {
description
"Add NULL and Meticulous ISAAC authentication type.";
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reference
"I-D.ietf-bfd-optimized-auth: Optimizing BFD Authentication.";
}
revision 2021-10-21 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC 9127: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD)";
}
/*
* Type definitions
*/
typedef diagnostic {
type enumeration {
enum none {
value 0;
description
"No Diagnostic.";
}
enum control-expiry {
value 1;
description
"Control Detection Time Expired.";
}
enum echo-failed {
value 2;
description
"Echo Function Failed.";
}
enum neighbor-down {
value 3;
description
"Neighbor Signaled Session Down.";
}
enum forwarding-reset {
value 4;
description
"Forwarding Plane Reset.";
}
enum path-down {
value 5;
description
"Path Down.";
}
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enum concatenated-path-down {
value 6;
description
"Concatenated Path Down.";
}
enum admin-down {
value 7;
description
"Administratively Down.";
}
enum reverse-concatenated-path-down {
value 8;
description
"Reverse Concatenated Path Down.";
}
enum mis-connectivity-defect {
value 9;
description
"Mis-connectivity defect.";
reference
"RFC 5880: Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
RFC 6428: Proactive Connectivity Verification, Continuity
Check, and Remote Defect Indication for the MPLS Transpo\
rt
Profile";
}
}
description
"BFD diagnostic codes as defined in RFC 5880. Values are
maintained in the 'BFD Diagnostic Codes' IANA registry.
Range is 0 to 31.";
reference
"RFC 5880: Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)";
}
typedef auth-type {
type enumeration {
enum reserved {
value 0;
description
"Reserved.";
}
enum simple-password {
value 1;
description
"Simple Password.";
}
enum keyed-md5 {
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value 2;
description
"Keyed MD5.";
}
enum meticulous-keyed-md5 {
value 3;
description
"Meticulous Keyed MD5.";
}
enum keyed-sha1 {
value 4;
description
"Keyed SHA1.";
}
enum meticulous-keyed-sha1 {
value 5;
description
"Meticulous Keyed SHA1.";
}
enum null {
value 6;
description
"NULL Auth.";
}
enum meticulous-keyed-isaac {
value 7;
description
"Meticulous Keyed ISAAC.";
}
}
description
"BFD authentication type as defined in RFC 5880. Values are
maintained in the 'BFD Authentication Types' IANA registry.
Range is 0 to 255.";
reference
"RFC 5880: Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)";
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
Appendix B. Examples
This section tries to show some examples in how the model can be
configured.
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B.1. Single Hop BFD Configuration
This example demonstrates how a Single Hop BFD session can be
configured for optimized authentication.
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===============
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<key-chains
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain">
<key-chain>
<name>bfd-auth-config</name>
<description>"An example for BFD Optimized Auth configuration."\
</description>
<key>
<key-id>55</key-id>
<lifetime>
<send-lifetime>
<start-date-time>2017-01-01T00:00:00Z</start-date-time>
<end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time>
</send-lifetime>
<accept-lifetime>
<start-date-time>2016-12-31T23:59:55Z</start-date-time>
<end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:05Z</end-date-time>
</accept-lifetime>
</lifetime>
<crypto-algorithm xmlns:opt-auth=
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-opt-auth">opt-auth:meti\
culous-keyed-isaac</crypto-algorithm>
<key-string>
<keystring>testvector</keystring>
</key-string>
</key>
</key-chain>
</key-chains>
<interfaces
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-interfaces"
xmlns:if-type="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-if-type">
<interface>
<name>eth0</name>
<type>if-type:ethernetCsmacd</type>
</interface>
</interfaces>
<routing
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-routing"
xmlns:bfd-types="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-types"
xmlns:iana-bfd-types="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-bfd-type\
s"
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xmlns:opt-auth="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-opt-auth">
<control-plane-protocols>
<control-plane-protocol>
<type>bfd-types:bfdv1</type>
<name>name:BFD</name>
<bfd xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd">
<ip-sh xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-ip-sh">
<sessions>
<session>
<interface>eth0</interface>
<dest-addr>2001:db8:0:113::101</dest-addr>
<desired-min-tx-interval>10000</desired-min-tx-interv\
al>
<required-min-rx-interval>
10000
</required-min-rx-interval>
<authentication>
<meticulous>true</meticulous>
<opt-auth:optimized-auth>true</opt-auth:optimized-a\
uth>
<opt-auth:reauth-interval>30000</opt-auth:reauth-in\
terval>
<opt-auth:up-auth-type>bfd-auth-config</opt-auth:up\
-auth-type>
</authentication>
</session>
</sessions>
</ip-sh>
</bfd>
</control-plane-protocol>
</control-plane-protocols>
</routing>
Authors' Addresses
Mahesh Jethanandani
Kloud Services
United States of America
Email: mjethanandani@gmail.com
Ashesh Mishra
Aalyria Technologies
Email: ashesh@aalyria.com
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Ankur Saxena
Ciena Corporation
3939 N 1st Street
San Jose, CA 95134
United States of America
Email: ankurpsaxena@gmail.com
Manav Bhatia
Google
Doddanekkundi
Bangalore 560048
India
Email: mnvbhatia@google.com
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