Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-bfd-unsolicited
draft-ietf-bfd-unsolicited
Network Working Group E. Chen
Internet-Draft Palo Alto Networks
Intended status: Standards Track N. Shen
Expires: 29 October 2023 Zededa
R. Raszuk
Arrcus
R. Rahman
Graphiant
27 April 2023
Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications
draft-ietf-bfd-unsolicited-16
Abstract
For operational simplification of "sessionless" applications using
Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD), in this document we present
procedures for "unsolicited BFD" that allow a BFD session to be
initiated by only one side, and established without explicit per-
session configuration or registration by the other side (subject to
certain per-interface or global policies).
We also introduce a new YANG module to configure and manage
"unsolicited BFD". The YANG module in this document is based on YANG
1.1 as defined in RFC 7950 and conforms to the Network Management
Datastore Architecture (NMDA) as described in RFC 8342. This
document augments RFC 9314.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 29 October 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Procedures for Unsolicited BFD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. State Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. YANG Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Unsolicited BFD Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Unsolicited BFD Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Data Model Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. BFD Protocol Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. BFD Protocol Authentication Considerations . . . . . . . 14
7.3. YANG Module Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction
The current implementation and deployment practice for BFD ([RFC5880]
and [RFC5881]) usually requires BFD sessions be explicitly configured
or registered on both sides. This requirement is not an issue when
an application like BGP [RFC4271] has the concept of a "session" that
involves both sides for its establishment. However, this requirement
can be operationally challenging when the prerequisite "session" does
not naturally exist between two endpoints in an application.
Simultaneous configuration and coordination may be required on both
sides for BFD to take effect. For example:
* When BFD is used to keep track of the "liveness" of the nexthop of
static routes. Although only one side may need the BFD
functionality, currently both sides need to be involved in
specific configuration and coordination and in some cases static
routes are created unnecessarily just for BFD.
* When BFD is used to keep track of the "liveness" of the third-pary
nexthop of BGP routes received from the Route Server [RFC7947] at
an Internet Exchange Point (IXP). As the third-party nexthop is
different from the peering address of the Route Server, for BFD to
work, currently two routers peering with the Route Server need to
have routes and nexthops from each other (although indirectly via
the Route Server).
Clearly it is beneficial and desirable to reduce or eliminate
unnecessary configurations and coordination in these "sessionless"
applications using BFD.
In this document we present procedures for "unsolicited BFD" that
allow a BFD session to be initiated by only one side, and established
without explicit per-session configuration or registration by the
other side (subject to certain per-interface or global policies).
Unsolicited BFD impacts only the initiation of BFD sessions. There
is no change to all the other procedures specified in [RFC5880] such
as, but not limited to, the Echo function and Demand mode.
With "unsolicited BFD" there is potential risk for excessive resource
usage by BFD from "unexpected" remote systems. To mitigate such
risks, several mechanisms are recommended in the Security
Considerations section.
The procedure described in this document could be applied to BFD for
Multihop paths [RFC5883]. However, because of security risks, this
document applies only to BFD for single IP hops [RFC5881].
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Compared to the "Seamless BFD" [RFC7880], this proposal involves only
minor procedural enhancements to the widely deployed BFD itself.
Thus, we believe that this proposal is inherently simpler in the
protocol itself and deployment. As an example, it does not require
the exchange of BFD discriminators over an out-of-band channel before
BFD session bring-up.
When BGP Add-Path [RFC7911] is deployed at an IXP using a Route
Server, multiple BGP paths (when they exist) can be made available to
the clients of the Route Server as described in [RFC7947].
Unsolicited BFD can be used by BGP route selection's Route
Resolvability Condition Section 9.1.2.1 of [RFC4271] to exclude
routes where the NEXT_HOP is not reachable using the procedures
specified in this document.
2. Procedures for Unsolicited BFD
With "unsolicited BFD", one side takes the "Active role" and the
other side takes only the "Passive role" as described in [RFC5880],
section 6.1.
Passive unsolicited BFD support MUST be disabled by default, and MUST
require explicit configuration to be enabled. On the passive side,
the following BFD parameters, from [RFC5880] section 6.8.1 SHOULD be
configurable:
* bfd.DesiredMinTxInterval
* bfd.RequiredMinRxInterval
* bfd.DetectMult
The passive side MAY also choose to use the values of the parameters
above that the active side uses in its BFD Control packets. However,
the bfd.LocalDiscr value MUST be selected by the passive side to
allow multiple unsolicited BFD sessions.
The active side starts sending the BFD Control packets as specified
in [RFC5880]. The passive side does not send BFD Control packets
initially, it sends BFD Control packets only after it has received
BFD Control packets from the active side.
When the passive side receives a BFD Control packet from the active
side with 0 as "Your Discriminator" and does not find an existing BFD
session, the passive side SHOULD create a matching BFD session toward
the active side, unless not permitted by local configuration or
policy.
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When the passive side receives an incoming BFD Control packet on a
numbered interface, the source address of that packet MUST belong to
the subnet of the interface on which the BFD packet is received, else
the BFD control packet MUST NOT be processed.
The passive side MUST then start sending BFD Control packets and
perform the necessary procedure for bringing up, maintaining and
tearing down the BFD session. If the BFD session fails to get
established within a certain amount of time (which is implementation
specific but has to be at least equal to the local failure detection
time), or if an established BFD session goes down, the passive side
MUST stop sending BFD Control packets and SHOULD delete the BFD
session created until BFD Control packets are initiated by the active
side again.
When an Unsolicited BFD session goes down, an implementation may
retain the session state for a period of time. Retaining this state
can be useful for operational purposes.
3. State Variables
This document defines a new state variable called Role.
bfd.Role
The role of the local system during BFD session initialization, as
per [RFC5880], section 6.1. Possible values are Active or Passive.
4. YANG Data Model
This section extends the YANG data model for BFD [RFC9314] to cover
unsolicited BFD. The new module imports [RFC8349] since the "bfd"
container in [RFC9314] is under "control-plane-protocol". The YANG
module in this document conforms to the Network Management Datastore
Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342].
4.1. Unsolicited BFD Hierarchy
Configuration for unsolicited BFD parameters for IP single-hop
sessions can be done at 2 levels:
* Globally, i.e. for all interfaces.
* For specific interfaces. This requires support for the
"unsolicited-params-per-interface" feature.
If configuration exists at both levels, per-interface configuration
takes precedence over global configuration.
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For operational data, a new "role" leaf node has been added for BFD
IP single-hop sessions.
The tree diagram below uses the graphical representation of data
models, as defined in [RFC8340].
module: ietf-bfd-unsolicited
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh:
+--rw unsolicited?
+--rw local-multiplier? multiplier
+--rw (interval-config-type)?
+--:(tx-rx-intervals)
| +--rw desired-min-tx-interval? uint32
| +--rw required-min-rx-interval? uint32
+--:(single-interval) {single-minimum-interval}?
+--rw min-interval? uint32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh
/bfd-ip-sh:interfaces:
+--rw unsolicited
+--rw enabled? boolean
+--rw local-multiplier? bfd-types:multiplier {bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-per-interface}?
+--rw (interval-config-type)? {bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-per-interface}?
+--:(tx-rx-intervals)
| +--rw desired-min-tx-interval? uint32
| +--rw required-min-rx-interval? uint32
+--:(single-interval) {bfd-types:single-minimum-interval}?
+--rw min-interval? uint32
augment /rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols
/rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh
/bfd-ip-sh:sessions/bfd-ip-sh:session:
+--ro role? bfd-unsol:role
4.2. Unsolicited BFD Module
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-bfd-unsolicited@2023-04-22.yang"
module ietf-bfd-unsolicited {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-unsolicited";
prefix "bfd-unsol";
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// RFC Ed.: replace occurences of YYYY with actual RFC numbers
// and remove this note
import ietf-bfd-types {
prefix "bfd-types";
reference
"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD)";
}
import ietf-bfd {
prefix "bfd";
reference
"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD)";
}
import ietf-bfd-ip-sh {
prefix "bfd-ip-sh";
reference
"RFC 9314: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD)";
}
import ietf-routing {
prefix "rt";
reference
"RFC 8349: A YANG Data Model for Routing Management
(NMDA version)";
}
organization "IETF BFD Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/bfd/>
WG List: <rtg-bfd@ietf.org>
Editors: Enke Chen (enchen@paloaltonetworks.com),
Naiming Shen (naiming@zededa.com),
Robert Raszuk (robert@raszuk.net),
Reshad Rahman (reshad@yahoo.com)";
description
"This module contains the YANG definition for BFD unsolicited
as per RFC YYYY.
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons
identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
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Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC YYYY; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
reference "RFC YYYY";
revision 2023-04-22 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications.";
}
/*
* Feature definitions
*/
feature unsolicited-params-per-interface {
description
"This feature indicates that the server supports per-interface
parameters for unsolicited sessions.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications.";
}
/*
* Type Definitions
*/
identity role {
description
"Base identity from which all roles are derived.
Role of local system during BFD session initialization.";
}
identity active {
base "bfd-unsol:role";
description "Active role";
reference
"RFC5880: Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD),
Section 6.1";
}
identity passive {
base "bfd-unsol:role";
description "Passive role";
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reference
"RFC5880: Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD),
Section 6.1";
}
/*
* Augments
*/
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/"
+ "rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh" {
description
"Augmentation for BFD unsolicited parameters";
container unsolicited {
description
"BFD IP single-hop unsolicited top level container";
uses bfd-types:base-cfg-parms;
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/"
+ "rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh/"
+ "bfd-ip-sh:interfaces" {
description
"Augmentation for BFD unsolicited on IP single-hop interface";
container unsolicited {
description
"BFD IP single-hop interface unsolicited top level
container";
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default false;
description
"BFD unsolicited enabled on this interface.";
}
/*
* The following is the same as bfd-types:base-cfg-parms, but
* without default values (for inheritance)
*/
leaf local-multiplier {
if-feature bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-per-interface;
type bfd-types:multiplier;
description
"Multiplier transmitted by the local system. Defaults to
../../unsolicited/local-multiplier.
A multiplier configured under an interface takes precedence
over the mulitiplier configured at the global level.";
}
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choice interval-config-type {
if-feature bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-per-interface;
description
"Two interval values or one value used for both transmit and
receive. Defaults to ../../unsolicited/interval-config-type.
An interval configured under an interface takes precedence
over any interval configured at the global level.";
case tx-rx-intervals {
leaf desired-min-tx-interval {
type uint32;
units "microseconds";
description
"Desired minimum transmit interval of control packets.";
}
leaf required-min-rx-interval {
type uint32;
units "microseconds";
description
"Required minimum receive interval of control packets.";
}
}
case single-interval {
if-feature "bfd-types:single-minimum-interval";
leaf min-interval {
type uint32;
units "microseconds";
description
"Desired minimum transmit interval and required
minimum receive interval of control packets.";
}
}
}
}
}
augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/"
+ "rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh/"
+ "bfd-ip-sh:sessions/bfd-ip-sh:session" {
description
"Augmentation for BFD unsolicited on IP single-hop session";
leaf role {
type identityref {
base "bfd-unsol:role";
}
config false;
description "Role.";
}
}
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}
<CODE ENDS>
4.3. Data Model Example
This section shows an example on how to configure the passive end of
unsolicited BFD:
* We have global BFD IP single-hop unsolicited configuration with a
local-multiplier of 2 and min-interval at 50ms
* BFD IP single-hop unsolicited is enabled on interface eth0, with a
local-multiplier of 3 and min-interval at 250 ms
* BFD IP single-hop unsolicited is enabled on interface eth1. Since
there is no parameter configuration for eth1, it inherits from the
global configuration.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<config xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<interfaces xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-interfaces">
<interface>
<name>eth0</name>
<type
xmlns:ianaift="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-if-type">ianaift:ethernetCsmacd</type>
</interface>
<interface>
<name>eth1</name>
<type
xmlns:ianaift="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-if-type">ianaift:ethernetCsmacd</type>
</interface>
</interfaces>
<routing xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-routing">
<control-plane-protocols>
<control-plane-protocol>
<type
xmlns:bfd-types="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-types">bfd-types:bfdv1</type>
<name>name:BFD</name>
<bfd xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd">
<ip-sh xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-ip-sh">
<unsolicited>
<local-multiplier>2</local-multiplier>
<min-interval>50000</min-interval>
</unsolicited>
<interfaces>
<interface>eth0</interface>
<unsolicited>
<enabled>true</enabled>
<local-multiplier>3</local-multiplier>
<min-interval>250000</min-interval>
</unsolicited>
</interfaces>
<interfaces>
<interface>eth1</interface>
<unsolicited>
<enabled>true</enabled>
</unsolicited>
</interfaces>
</ip-sh>
</bfd>
</control-plane-protocol>
</control-plane-protocols>
</routing>
</config>
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5. IANA Considerations
This document registers the following namespace URI in the "IETF XML
Registry" [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-unsolicited
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document registers the following YANG module in the "YANG Module
Names" registry [RFC6020]:
Name: ietf-bfd-unsolicited
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-unsolicited
Prefix: bfd-unsol
Reference: RFC YYYY
6. Acknowledgments
Authors would like to thank Acee Lindem, Alvaro Retana, Dan
Romascanu, Derek Atkins, Greg Mirsky, Gyan Mishra, Henning Rogge,
Jeffrey Haas, John Scudder, Lars Eggert, Magnus Westerlund, Mahesh
Jethanandani, Murray Kucherawy, Raj Chetan, Robert Wilton, Roman
Danyliw, Tom Petch, and Zaheduzzaman Sarker for their review and
valuable input.
7. Security Considerations
7.1. BFD Protocol Security Considerations
The same security considerations and protection measures as those
described in [RFC5880] and [RFC5881] apply to this document. In
addition, with "unsolicited BFD" there is potential risk for
excessive resource usage by BFD from "unexpected" remote systems. To
mitigate such risks, implementations of unsolicited BFD MUST:
* Limit the feature to specific interfaces, and to single-hop BFD
sessions using the procedures from [RFC5082]. See Section 5 of
[RFC5881] for the details of these procedures.
* Apply policy to process BFD packets only from certain subnets or
hosts.
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* Deploy the feature only in an environment that does not offer
anonymous participation. Examples include an IXP, where the IXP
operator will have a business relationship with all IXP
participants, or between a provider and its customers.
7.2. BFD Protocol Authentication Considerations
Implementations of unsolicited BFD are RECOMMENDED to use BFD
authentication; see [RFC5880]. If BFD authentication is used, the
strongest BFD authentication mechanism that is supported MUST be
used.
In some environments, such as an Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), BFD
authentication cannot be used because of the lack of coordination for
the operation of the two endpoints of the BFD session.
In other environments, such as when BFD is used to track the next hop
of static routes, it is possible to use BFD authentication. This
comes with the extra cost of configuring matching keychains between
the two endpoints.
7.3. YANG Module Security Considerations
The YANG module specified in this document defines a schema for data
that is designed to be accessed via network management protocols such
as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer
is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure
transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer
is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS
[RFC8446].
The NETCONF access control model [RFC8341] provides the means to
restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a
preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol
operations and content.
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config)
to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes
and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
/routing/control-plane-protocols/control-plane-protocol/bfd/ip-sh
/unsolicited:
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* data node "enabled" enables creation of unsolicited BFD IP single-
hop sessions globally, i.e. on all interfaces. See Section 7.1.
* data nodes local-multiplier, desired-min-tx-interval, required-
min-rx-interval and min-interval all impact the parameters of the
unsolicited BFD IP single-hop sessions. Write operations to these
nodes change the rates of BFD packet generation and detection time
of the failures of a BFD session.
/routing/control-plane-protocols/control-plane-protocol/bfd/ip-sh
/interfaces/interface/unsolicited:
* data node "enabled" enables creation of unsolicited BFD IP single-
hop sessions on a specific interface. See Section 7.1.
* data nodes local-multiplier, desired-min-tx-interval, required-
min-rx-interval and min-interval all impact the parameters of the
unsolicited BFD IP single-hop sessions on the interface.
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data
nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
/routing/control-plane-protocols/control-plane-protocol/bfd/ip-sh
/sessions/session/role: access to this information discloses the role
of the local system in the creation of the unsolicited BFD session.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC5082] Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., Ed., and C.
Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism
(GTSM)", RFC 5082, DOI 10.17487/RFC5082, October 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5082>.
[RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.
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[RFC5881] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)", RFC 5881,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5881, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5881>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
[RFC8349] Lhotka, L., Lindem, A., and Y. Qu, "A YANG Data Model for
Routing Management (NMDA Version)", RFC 8349,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8349, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8349>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
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[RFC9314] Jethanandani, M., Ed., Rahman, R., Ed., Zheng, L., Ed.,
Pallagatti, S., and G. Mirsky, "YANG Data Model for
Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)", RFC 9314,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9314, September 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9314>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC5883] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD) for Multihop Paths", RFC 5883, DOI 10.17487/RFC5883,
June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5883>.
[RFC7880] Pignataro, C., Ward, D., Akiya, N., Bhatia, M., and S.
Pallagatti, "Seamless Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(S-BFD)", RFC 7880, DOI 10.17487/RFC7880, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7880>.
[RFC7911] Walton, D., Retana, A., Chen, E., and J. Scudder,
"Advertisement of Multiple Paths in BGP", RFC 7911,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7911, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7911>.
[RFC7947] Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
"Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", RFC 7947,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7947, September 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7947>.
[RFC8342] Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K.,
and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture
(NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.
Authors' Addresses
Enke Chen
Palo Alto Networks
Email: enchen@paloaltonetworks.com
Naiming Shen
Zededa
Email: naiming@zededa.com
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Robert Raszuk
Arrcus
2077 Gateway Place
San Jose, CA 95110
United States of America
Email: robert@raszuk.net
Reshad Rahman
Graphiant
Canada
Email: reshad@yahoo.com
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