Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-capport-api
draft-ietf-capport-api
Captive Portal Interaction T. Pauly, Ed.
Internet-Draft Apple Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track D. Thakore, Ed.
Expires: 20 December 2020 CableLabs
18 June 2020
Captive Portal API
draft-ietf-capport-api-08
Abstract
This document describes an HTTP API that allows clients to interact
with a Captive Portal system. With this API, clients can discover
how to get out of captivity and fetch state about their Captive
Portal sessions.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 December 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. API Connection Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Server Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. API State Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Example Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1. Captive Portal API JSON Media Type Registration . . . . . 9
8.2. Captive Portal API Keys Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
This document describes a HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
Application Program Interface (API) that allows clients to interact
with a Captive Portal system. The API defined in this document has
been designed to meet the requirements in the Captive Portal
Architecture [I-D.ietf-capport-architecture]. Specifically, the API
provides:
* The state of captivity (whether or not the client has access to
the Internet)
* A URI of a user-facing web portal that can be used to get out of
captivity
* Authenticated and encrypted connections, using TLS for connections
to both the API and user-facing web portal
2. Terminology
This document leverages the terminology and components described in
[I-D.ietf-capport-architecture] and additionally defines the
following terms:
* Captive Portal Client: The client that interacts with the Captive
Portal API is typically some application running on the User
Equipment that is connected to the Captive Network. This is also
referred to as the "client" in this document.
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* Captive Portal API Server: The server exposing the APIs defined in
this document to the client. This is also referred to as the "API
server" in this document.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Workflow
The Captive Portal Architecture defines several categories of
interaction between clients and Captive Portal systems:
1. Provisioning, in which a client discovers that a network has a
captive portal, and learns the URI of the API server.
2. API Server interaction, in which a client queries the state of
captivity and retrieves the necessary information to get out of
captivity.
3. Enforcement, in which the enforcement device in the network
blocks disallowed traffic.
This document defines the mechanisms used in the second category. It
is assumed that the location of the Captive Portal API server has
been discovered by the client as part of Provisioning. A set of
mechanisms for discovering the API Server endpoint is defined in
[I-D.ietf-capport-rfc7710bis].
4. API Connection Details
The API server endpoint MUST be accessed over HTTP using an https URI
[RFC2818], and SHOULD use the default https port. For example, if
the Captive Portal API server is hosted at "example.org", the URI of
the API could be "https://example.org/captive-portal/api"
The client SHOULD NOT assume that the URI of the API server for a
given network will stay the same, and SHOULD rely on the discovery or
provisioning process each time it joins the network.
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As described in Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-capport-architecture], the
identity of the client needs to be visible to the Captive Portal API
server in order for the server to correctly reply with the client's
portal state. If the identifier used by the Captive Portal system is
the client's set of IP addresses, the system needs to ensure that the
same IP addresses are visible to both the API server and the
enforcement device.
If the API server needs information about the client identity that is
not otherwise visible to it, the URI provided to the client during
provisioning SHOULD be distinct per client. Thus, depending on how
the Captive Portal system is configured, the URI will be unique for
each client host and between sessions for the same client host.
For example, a Captive Portal system that uses per-client session
URIs could use "https://example.org/captive-portal/api/X54PD39JV" as
its API URI.
4.1. Server Authentication
The purpose of accessing the Captive Portal API over an HTTPS
connection is twofold: first, the encrypted connection protects the
integrity and confidentiality of the API exchange from other parties
on the local network; and second, it provides the client of the API
an opportunity to authenticate the server that is hosting the API.
This authentication allows the client to ensure that the entity
providing the Captive Portal API has a valid certificate for the
hostname provisioned by the network using the mechanisms defined in
[I-D.ietf-capport-rfc7710bis], by validating that a DNS-ID [RFC6125]
on the certificate is equal to the provisioned hostname.
Clients performing revocation checking will need some means of
accessing revocation information for certificates presented by the
API server. Online Certificate Status Protocol [RFC6960] (OCSP)
stapling, using the TLS Certificate Status Request extension
[RFC6066] SHOULD be used. OCSP stapling allows a client to perform
revocation checks without initiating new connections. To allow for
other forms of revocation checking, especially for clients that do
not support OCSP stapling, a captive network SHOULD permit
connections to OCSP responders or Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
that are referenced by certificates provided by the API server. For
more discussion on certificate revocation checks, see Section 6.5 of
BCP 195 [RFC7525]. In addition to connections to OCSP responders and
CRLs, a captive network SHOULD also permit connections to Network
Time Protocol (NTP) [RFC5905] servers or other time-sync mechanisms
to allow clients to accurately validate certificates.
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Certificates with missing intermediate certificates that rely on
clients validating the certificate chain using the URI specified in
the Authority Information Access (AIA) extension [RFC5280] SHOULD NOT
be used by the Captive Portal API server. If the certificates do
require the use of AIA, the captive network MUST allow client access
to the host specified in the URI.
If the client is unable to validate the certificate presented by the
API server, it MUST NOT proceed with any of the behavior for API
interaction described in this document. The client will proceed to
interact with the captive network as if the API capabilities were not
present. It may still be possible for the user to access the network
if the network redirects a cleartext webpage to a web portal.
5. API State Structure
The Captive Portal API data structures are specified in JavaScript
Object Notation (JSON) [RFC8259]. Requests and responses for the
Captive Portal API use the "application/captive+json" media type.
Clients SHOULD include this media type as an Accept header in their
GET requests, and servers MUST mark this media type as their Content-
Type header in responses.
The following key MUST be included in the top-level of the JSON
structure returned by the API server:
* "captive" (boolean): indicates whether the client is in a state of
captivity, i.e it has not satisfied the conditions to access the
external network. If the client is captive (i.e. captive=true),
it will still be allowed enough access for it to perform server
authentication (Section 4.1).
The following keys can be optionally included in the top-level of the
JSON structure returned by the API server:
* "user-portal-url" (string): provides the URL of a web portal that
MUST be accessed over TLS with which a user can interact.
* "venue-info-url" (string): provides the URL of a webpage or site
that SHOULD be accessed over TLS on which the operator of the
network has information that it wishes to share with the user
(e.g., store info, maps, flight status, or entertainment).
* "can-extend-session" (boolean): indicates that the URL specified
as "user-portal-url" allows the user to extend a session once the
client is no longer in a state of captivity. This provides a hint
that a client system can suggest accessing the portal URL to the
user when the session is near its limit in terms of time or bytes.
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* "seconds-remaining" (number): an integer that indicates the number
of seconds remaining, after which the client will be placed into a
captive state. The API server SHOULD include this value if the
client is not captive (i.e. captive=false) and the client session
is time-limited, and SHOULD omit this value for captive clients
(i.e. captive=true) or when the session is not time-limited.
* "bytes-remaining" (number): an integer that indicates the number
of bytes remaining, after which the client will be in placed into
a captive state. The byte count represents the sum of the total
number of IP packet (layer 3) bytes sent and received by the
client, including IP headers. Captive portal systems might not
count traffic to whitelisted servers, such as the API server, but
clients cannot rely on such behavior. The API server SHOULD
include this value if the client is not captive (i.e.
captive=false) and the client session is byte-limited, and SHOULD
omit this value for captive clients (i.e. captive=true) or when
the session is not byte-limited.
The valid JSON keys can be extended by adding entries to the Captive
Portal API Keys Registry (Section 8). If a client receives a key
that it does not recognize, it MUST ignore the key and any associated
values. All keys other than the ones defined in this document as
"required" will be considered optional.
Captive Portal JSON content can contain per-client data that is not
appropriate to store in an intermediary cache. Captive Portal API
servers SHOULD set the Cache-Control header field in any responses to
"private", or a more restrictive value such as "no-store" [RFC7234].
Client behavior for issuing requests for updated JSON content is
implementation-specific, and can be based on user interaction or the
indications of seconds and bytes remaining in a given session. If at
any point the client does not receive valid JSON content from the API
server, either due to an error or due to receiving no response, the
client SHOULD continue to apply the most recent valid content it had
received; or, if no content had been received previously, proceed to
interact with the captive network as if the API capabilities were not
present.
6. Example Interaction
A client connected to a captive network upon discovering the URI of
the API server will query the API server to retrieve information
about its captive state and conditions to escape captivity. In this
example, the client discovered the URI "https://example.org/captive-
portal/api/X54PD39JV" using one of the mechanisms defined in
[I-D.ietf-capport-rfc7710bis].
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To request the Captive Portal JSON content, a client sends an HTTP
GET request:
GET /captive-portal/api/X54PD39JV HTTP/1.1
Host: example.org
Accept: application/captive+json
The server then responds with the JSON content for that client:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: private
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2020 05:07:35 GMT
Content-Type: application/captive+json
{
"captive": true,
"user-portal-url": "https://example.org/portal.html"
}
Upon receiving this information the client will use this information
to direct the user to the web portal (as specified by the user-
portal-url value) to enable access to the external network. Once the
user satisfies the requirements for external network access, the
client SHOULD query the API server again to verify that it is no
longer captive.
When the client requests the Captive Portal JSON content after
gaining external network access, the server responds with updated
JSON content:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: private
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2020 05:08:13 GMT
Content-Type: application/captive+json
{
"captive": false,
"user-portal-url": "https://example.org/portal.html",
"venue-info-url": "https://flight.example.com/entertainment",
"seconds-remaining": 326,
"can-extend-session": true
}
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7. Security Considerations
One of the goals of this protocol is to improve the security of the
communication between client hosts and Captive Portal systems.
Client traffic is protected from passive listeners on the local
network by requiring TLS-encrypted connections between the client and
the Captive Portal API server, as described in Section 4. All
communication between the clients and the API server MUST be
encrypted.
In addition to encrypting communications between clients and Captive
Portal systems, this protocol requires a basic level of
authentication from the API server, as described in Section 4.1.
Specifically, the API server MUST present a valid certificate on
which the client can perform revocation checks. This allows the
client to ensure that the API server has authority for the hostname
that was provisioned by the network using
[I-D.ietf-capport-rfc7710bis]. Note that this validation only
confirms that the API server matches what the network's provisioning
mechanism (such as DHCP or IPv6 Router Advertisements) provided, and
not validating the security of those provisioning mechanisms or the
user's trust relationship to the network.
7.1. Privacy Considerations
Information passed between a client and the user-facing web portal
may include a user's personal information, such as a full name and
credit card details. Therefore, it is important that both the user-
facing web portal and the API server that points a client to the web
portal are only accessed over encrypted connections.
It is important to note that although communication to the user-
facing web portal requires using TLS, the authentication only
validates that the web portal server matches the name in the URI
provided by the API server. Since this is not a name that a user
typed in, the hostname of the web site that would be presented to the
user may include "confusable characters" that can mislead the user.
See Section 12.5 of [RFC8264] for a discussion of confusable
characters.
8. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to create a registration for an "application/
captive+json" media type (Section 8.1) and a registry for fields in
that format (Section 8.2).
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8.1. Captive Portal API JSON Media Type Registration
This document registers the media type for Captive Portal API JSON
text, "application/captive+json".
Type name: application
Subtype name: captive+json
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: Encoding considerations are identical to
those specified for the "application/json" media type.
Security considerations: See Section 7
Interoperability considerations: This document specifies format of
conforming messages and the interpretation thereof.
Published specification: This document
Applications that use this media type: This media type is intended to
be used by servers presenting the Captive Portal API, and clients
connecting to such captive networks.
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information: N/A
Person and email address to contact for further information: See
Authors' Addresses section
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: N/A
Author: CAPPORT IETF WG
Change controller: IETF
8.2. Captive Portal API Keys Registry
IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry called "Captive
Portal API Keys", which will reserve JSON keys for use in Captive
Portal API data structures. The initial contents of this registry
are provided in Section 5.
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Each entry in the registry contains the following fields:
Key: The JSON key being registered, in string format.
Type: The type of the JSON value to be stored, as one of the value
types defined in [RFC8259].
Description: A brief description explaining the meaning of the
value, how it might be used, and/or how it should be interpreted
by clients.
Specification: A reference to a specification that defines the key
and explains its usage.
New assignments for Captive Portal API Keys Registry will be
administered by IANA using the Specification Required policy
[RFC8126]. The Designated Expert is expected to validate the
existence of documentation describing new keys in a permanent
publicly available specification, such as an Internet Draft or RFC.
The expert is expected to validate that new keys have a clear meaning
and do not create unnecessary confusion or overlap with existing
keys. Keys that are specific to non-generic use cases, particularly
ones that are not specified as part of an IETF document, are
encouraged to use a domain-specific prefix.
9. Acknowledgments
This work in this document was started by Mark Donnelly and Margaret
Cullen. Thanks to everyone in the CAPPORT Working Group who has
given input.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
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[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
"Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
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10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-capport-architecture]
Larose, K., Dolson, D., and H. Liu, "CAPPORT
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-capport-architecture-08, 11 May 2020,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-capport-
architecture-08.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-capport-rfc7710bis]
Kumari, W. and E. Kline, "Captive-Portal Identification in
DHCP / RA", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
capport-rfc7710bis-07, 23 May 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/
internet-drafts/draft-ietf-capport-rfc7710bis-07.txt>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC8264] Saint-Andre, P. and M. Blanchet, "PRECIS Framework:
Preparation, Enforcement, and Comparison of
Internationalized Strings in Application Protocols",
RFC 8264, DOI 10.17487/RFC8264, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8264>.
Authors' Addresses
Tommy Pauly (editor)
Apple Inc.
One Apple Park Way
Cupertino, California 95014,
United States of America
Email: tpauly@apple.com
Darshak Thakore (editor)
CableLabs
858 Coal Creek Circle
Louisville, CO 80027,
United States of America
Email: d.thakore@cablelabs.com
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