Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting
draft-ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting
DMARC S. Jones (ed)
Internet-Draft DMARC.org
Obsoletes: 7489 (if approved) A. Vesely (ed)
Updates: 6591 (if approved) Tana
Intended status: Standards Track 14 September 2023
Expires: 17 March 2024
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)
Failure Reporting
draft-ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting-09
Abstract
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
(DMARC) is a scalable mechanism by which a domain owner can request
feedback about email messages using their domain in the From: address
field. This document describes "failure reports," or "failed message
reports", which provide details about individual messages that failed
to authenticate according to the DMARC mechanism.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 March 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Failure Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Reporting Format Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Verifying External Destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Feedback Report Header Fields Registry Update . . . . . . 5
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1. Data Exposure Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. Report Recipients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A.1. Entire Domain, Monitoring Only, Per-Message Reports . . . 8
A.2. Per-Message Failure Reports Directed to Third Party . . . 9
Appendix B. Example Failure Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix C. Change Log {change-log} . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
C.1. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
C.2. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
C.3. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
C.4. 03 to 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
C.5. 04 to 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
C.6. 05 to 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
C.7. 06 to 07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
C.8. 07 to 08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
C.9. 08 to 09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH BEFORE PUBLISHING:
The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub at:
https://github.com/ietf-wg-dmarc/draft-ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting
(https://github.com/ietf-wg-dmarc/draft-ietf-dmarc-failure-reporting)
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Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
(DMARC) [I-D.ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis] is a scalable mechanism by which a
mail-originating organization can express domain-level policies and
preferences for message validation, disposition, and reporting, that
a mail-receiving organization can use to improve mail handling. This
document focuses on one type of reporting that can be requested under
DMARC.
Failure reports provide detailed information about the failure of a
single message or a group of similar messages failing for the same
reason. They are meant to aid in cases where a domain owner is
unable to detect why failures reported in aggregate form did occur.
It is important to note these reports can contain either the header
or the entire content of a failed message, which in turn may contain
personally identifiable information, which should be considered when
deciding whether to generate such reports.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Failure Reports
Besides the header or the entire content of a failed message, failure
reports supply details about transmission and DMARC authentication,
which may aid the Domain Owner in determining failure causes.
Failure reports are normally generated and sent almost immediately
after the Mail Receiver detects a DMARC failure. Rather than waiting
for an aggregate report, these reports are useful for quickly
notifying the Domain Owners when there is an authentication failure.
Whether the failure is due to an infrastructure problem or the
message is inauthentic, failure reports also provide more information
about the failed message than is available in an aggregate report.
These reports should include as much of the message header and body
as possible, consistent with the reporting party's privacy policies,
to enable the Domain Owner to diagnose the authentication failure.
When a Domain Owner requests failure reports for the purpose of
forensic analysis, and the Mail Receiver is willing to provide such
reports, the Mail Receiver generates and sends a message using the
format described in [RFC6591]; this document updates that reporting
format, as described in Section 3.
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The destination(s) and nature of the reports are defined by the "ruf"
and "fo" tags as defined in Section 5.3 of [I-D.ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis].
Where multiple URIs are selected to receive failure reports, the
report generator MUST make an attempt to deliver to each of them.
External destinations MUST be verified, see Section 4. Report
generators MUST NOT consider ruf= tags in records having a "psd=y"
tag, unless there are specific agreements between the interested
parties.
An obvious consideration is the denial-of-service attack that can be
perpetrated by an attacker who sends numerous messages purporting to
be from the intended victim Domain Owner but that fail both SPF and
DKIM; this would cause participating Mail Receivers to send failure
reports to the Domain Owner or its delegate in potentially huge
volumes. Accordingly, participating Mail Receivers are encouraged to
aggregate these reports as much as is practical, using the Incidents
field of the Abuse Reporting Format [RFC5965]. Indeed, the aim is
not to count each and every failure, but rather to report different
failure paths. Various pruning techniques are possible, including
the following:
* store reports for a period of time before sending them, allowing
detection, collection, and reporting of like incidents;
* apply rate limiting, such as a maximum number of reports per
minute that will be generated (and the remainder discarded);
3. Reporting Format Update
Operators implementing this specification also implement an augmented
version of [RFC6591] as follows:
1. A DMARC failure report includes the following ARF header fields,
with the indicated normative requirement levels:
* Identity-Alignment (REQUIRED; defined below)
* Delivery-Result (OPTIONAL)
* DKIM-Domain, DKIM-Identity, DKIM-Selector (REQUIRED for DKIM
failures of an aligned identifier)
* DKIM-Canonicalized-Header, DKIM-Canonicalized-Body (OPTIONAL
if reporting a DKIM failure)
* SPF-DNS (REQUIRED for SPF failure of an aligned identifier)
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2. The "Identity-Alignment" field is defined to contain a comma-
separated list of authentication mechanism names that failed to
authenticate an aligned identity, or the keyword "none" if none
did. ABNF:
id-align = "Identity-Alignment:" [CFWS]
( "none" /
dmarc-method *( [CFWS] "," [CFWS] dmarc-method ) )
[CFWS]
dmarc-method = ( "dkim" / "spf" )
; each may appear at most once in an id-align
3. Authentication Failure Type "dmarc" is defined, which is to be
used when a failure report is generated because some or all of
the authentication mechanisms failed to produce aligned
identifiers. Note that a failure report generator MAY also
independently produce an ARF message for any or all of the
underlying authentication methods.
4. Verifying External Destinations
If the target domain of a mailto address of a ruf= tag is not the
same as the DMARC record domain where the tag was found, the report
generator MUST verify that the target domain acknowledges sending
those reports; the procedure is described in Section 3 of
[I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting].
4.1. Transport
Email streams carrying DMARC failure reports SHOULD be DMARC aligned.
Reporters MAY rate limit the number of failure reports sent to any
recipient to avoid overloading recipient systems. Unaligned reports
may in turn produce subsequent failure reports that could cause mail
loops.
5. IANA Considerations
5.1. Feedback Report Header Fields Registry Update
IANA is requested to change the "Identity-Alignment" entry in the
"Feedback Report Header Fields" registry to refer to this document.
6. Privacy Considerations
This section discusses issues specific to private data that may be
included in the DMARC reporting functions.
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6.1. Data Exposure Considerations
Failed-message reporting provides message-specific details pertaining
to authentication failures. Individual reports can contain message
content as well as trace header fields. Domain Owners are able to
analyze individual reports and attempt to determine root causes of
authentication mechanism failures, gain insight into
misconfigurations or other problems with email and network
infrastructure, or inspect messages for insight into abusive
practices.
These reports may expose sender and recipient identifiers (e.g.,
RFC5322.From addresses), and although the [RFC6591] format used for
failed-message reporting supports redaction, failed-message reporting
is capable of exposing the entire message to the report recipient.
Domain Owners requesting reports will receive information about mail
claiming to be from them, which includes mail that was not, in fact,
from them. Information about the final destination of mail where it
might otherwise be obscured by intermediate systems will therefore be
exposed.
When message-forwarding arrangements exist, Domain Owners requesting
reports will also receive information about mail forwarded to domains
that were not originally part of their messages' recipient lists.
This means that destination domains previously unknown to the Domain
Owner may now become visible.
6.2. Report Recipients
A DMARC record can specify that reports should be sent to an
intermediary operating on behalf of the Domain Owner. This is done
when the Domain Owner contracts with an entity to monitor mail
streams for abuse and performance issues. Receipt by third parties
of such data may or may not be permitted by the Mail Receiver's
privacy policy, terms of use, or other similar governing document.
Domain Owners and Mail Receivers should both review and understand if
their own internal policies constrain the use and transmission of
DMARC reporting.
Some potential exists for report recipients to perform traffic
analysis, making it possible to obtain metadata about the Receiver's
traffic. In addition to verifying compliance with policies,
Receivers need to consider that before sending reports to a third
party.
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7. Security Considerations
Considerations discussed in Section 11 of [I-D.ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis]
apply.
In addition, note that Organizational Domains are only an
approximation to actual domain ownership. Therefore, reports may be
sent to someone unrelated to the actual sender or domain owner. That
makes considerations in Section 6.1 all the more relevant.
8. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting]
Brotman, A., "DMARC Aggregate Reporting", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dmarc-aggregate-
reporting-12, 27 August 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dmarc-
aggregate-reporting-12>.
[I-D.ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis]
Herr, T. and J. R. Levine, "Domain-based Message
Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-28,
6 July 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis-28>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5965] Shafranovich, Y., Levine, J., and M. Kucherawy, "An
Extensible Format for Email Feedback Reports", RFC 5965,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5965, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5965>.
[RFC6591] Fontana, H., "Authentication Failure Reporting Using the
Abuse Reporting Format", RFC 6591, DOI 10.17487/RFC6591,
April 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6591>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
Appendix A. Examples
This section presents some examples related to the use of DMARC
reporting functions.
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A.1. Entire Domain, Monitoring Only, Per-Message Reports
The owners of the domain "example.com" have deployed SPF and DKIM on
their messaging infrastructure. Reports like the one shown in
Appendix B of [I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting] allow them to
discover some messaging systems that had not yet implemented DKIM
correctly. However, they are still seeing periodic authentication
failures. In order to diagnose these intermittent problems, they
wish to request per-message failure reports when authentication
failures occur.
Many Receivers will not honor such a request, but the Domain Owner
feels that any reports it does receive will be helpful enough to
justify publishing this request.
The Domain Owner accomplishes this by adding the following tag to its
policy record:
ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com
It means that failure reports should be sent via email to the address
"auth-reports@example.com".
The updated DMARC policy record might look like this when retrieved
using a common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a
single line but is wrapped here for publication):
% dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com.
"v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com;
ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com"
To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
(following the conventional zone file format):
; DMARC record for the domain example.com
_dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; "
"rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com; "
"ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com" )
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A.2. Per-Message Failure Reports Directed to Third Party
The Domain Owner from the previous example is maintaining the same
policy but now wishes to have a third party receive and process the
per-message failure reports. Again, not all Receivers will honor
this request, but those that do may implement additional checks to
validate that the third party wishes to receive the failure reports
for this domain.
The Domain Owner needs to alter its ruf= tag from Appendix A.1 as
follows:
"ruf=mailto:auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net
It means that per-message failure reports should be sent via email to
the address "auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net".
The DMARC policy record might look like this when retrieved using a
common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a single
line but is wrapped here for publication):
% dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com.
"v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com;
ruf=mailto:auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net"
To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
(following the conventional zone file format):
; DMARC record for the domain example.com
_dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; "
"rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com; "
"ruf=mailto:auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net" )
Because the address used in the "ruf" tag is outside the
Organizational Domain in which this record is published, conforming
Receivers will implement additional checks as described in Section 4
of this document. In order to pass these additional checks, the
third party will need to publish an additional DNS record to mean as
follows:
Given the DMARC record published by the Domain Owner at
"_dmarc.example.com", the DNS administrator for the third party
agrees to receive the corresponding records by publishing a DMARC TXT
resource record at
"example.com._report._dmarc.thirdparty.example.net".
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The resulting DNS record can be minimal, and might look like this
when retrieved using a common command-line tool (the output shown
would appear on a single line but is wrapped here for publication):
% dig +short TXT example.com._report._dmarc.thirdparty.example.net
"v=DMARC1;"
To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for example.net might
create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
(following the conventional zone file format):
zone file for thirdparty.example.net
; Accept DMARC failure reports on behalf of example.com
example.com._report._dmarc IN TXT "v=DMARC1;"
The third party can also publih a ruf= tag in order to override the
specific address published by example.com with a different address in
the same third party domain. Intermediaries and other third parties
should refer to Section 4 for the full details of this mechanism.
Appendix B. Example Failure Report
This is the full content of a failure message, including the message
header.
Received: from gen.example (gen.example [192.0.2.1])
(TLS: TLS1.3,256bits,ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
by mail.consumer.example with ESMTPS
id 00000000005DC0DD.0000442E; Tue, 19 Jul 2022 07:57:50 +0200
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple;
d=gen.example; s=mail; t=1658210268;
bh=rCrh1aFDE8d/Fltt8wbcu48bLOu4OM23QXqphUZPAIM=;
h=From:To:Date:Subject:From;
b=IND9JkuwF9/5841kzxMbPeej0VYimVzNKozR2R89M8eYO2zOlCBblx507Gz0YK7mE
/h6pslWm0ODBVFzLlwY9CXv4Vu62QsN0RBIXHPjEXOkoM2VCD5zCd+5i5dtCFX7Mxh
LThb2ZJ3efklbSB9RQRwxcmRvCPV7z6lt/Ds9sucVE1RDODYHjx+iWnAUQrlos6ZQb
u/YOUGjf60LPpyljfPu3EpFwo80mSHyQlP/4S5KEykgPQMgCqLPPKvJwu1aAIDj+jG
q2ylO3fmc/ERDeDWACtR67YNabEKBWtjqCRLNxKttazViJTZ5drcLfpX0853KoougX
Rltp7zdoLdy4A==
From: DMARC Filter <DMARC@gen.example>;
To: dmarcfail@consumer.example
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 00:57:48 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: FW: This is the original subject
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/report; report-type=feedback-report;
boundary="=_mime_boundary_"
Message-Id: <20220719055748.4AE9D403CC@gen.example>;
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This is a MIME-formatted message. If you see this text it means that
your E-mail software does not support MIME-formatted messages.
--=_mime_boundary_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
This is an authentication failure report for an email message
received from IP 192.0.2.2 on Tue, 19 Jul 2022 00:57:48 -0500.
--=_mime_boundary_
Content-Type: message/feedback-report
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Feedback-Type: auth-failure
Version: 1
User-Agent: DMARC-Filter/1.2.3
Auth-Failure: dmarc
Authentication-Results: gen.example;
dmarc=fail header.from=consumer.example
Identity-Alignment: dkim
DKIM-Domain: consumer.example
DKIM-Identity: @consumer.example
DKIM-Selector: epsilon
Original-Envelope-Id: 65E1A3F0A0
Original-Mail-From: author=gen.example@forwarder.example
Source-IP: 192.0.2.2
Source-Port: 12345
Reported-Domain: consumer.example
--=_mime_boundary_
Content-Type: message/rfc822; charset=utf-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Authentication-Results: gen.example;
dkim=permerror header.d=forwarder.example header.b="EjCbN/c3";
dkim=temperror header.d=forwarder.example header.b="mQ8GEWPc";
dkim=permerror header.d=consumer.example header.b="hETrymCb";
dkim=neutral header.d=consumer.example header.b="C2nsAp3A";
Received: from mail.forwarder.example
(mail.forwarder.example [IPv6:2001:db8::23ac])
by mail.gen.example (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E8B0C159826
for <x@gen.example>; Sun, 14 Aug 2022 07:58:29 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail.forwarder.example (localhost [127.0.0.1])
by mail.forwarder.example (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4Ln7Qw4fnvz6Bq
for <x@gen.example>; Tue, 19 Jul 2022 07:57:44 +0200
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
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d=forwarder.example; s=ed25519-59hs; t=1658210264;
x=1663210264; bh=KYH/g7ForvDbnyyDLYSjauMYMW6sEIqu75/9w3OIONg=;
h=Message-ID:Date:List-Id:List-Archive:List-Post:List-Help:
List-Subscribe:List-Unsubscribe:List-Owner:MIME-Version:Subject:To:
References:From:In-Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:
autocrypt:cc:content-transfer-encoding:content-type:date:from:
in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:openpgp:references:subject:to;
b=EjCbN/c3bTU4QkZH/zwTbYxBDp0k8kpmWSXh5h1M7T8J4vtRo+hvafJazT3ZRgq+7
+4dzEQwUhl+NOJYXXNUAA==
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
d=forwarder.example; s=rsa-wgJg; t=1658210264; x=1663210264;
bh=KYH/g7ForvDbnyyDLYSjauMYMW6sEIqu75/9w3OIONg=;
h=Message-ID:Date:List-Id:List-Archive:List-Post:List-Help:
List-Subscribe:List-Unsubscribe:List-Owner:MIME-Version:Subject:To:
References:From:In-Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding:
autocrypt:cc:content-transfer-encoding:content-type:date:from:
in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:openpgp:references:subject:to;
b=mQ8GEWPcVpBpeqQ88pcbXpGHBT0J/Rwi8Zd2WZTXWWneQGRCOJLRcbBJpjqnrwtqd
76IqawH86tihz4Z/12J1GBCdNx1gfazsoI3yaqfooRDYg0mSyZHrYhQBmodnPcqZj4
/25L5278sc/UNrYO9az2n7R/skbVZ0bvSo2eEiGU8fcpO8+a5SKNYskhaviAI4eGIB
iRMdEP7gP8dESdnZguNbY5HI32UMDpPPNqajzd/BgcqbveYpRrWCDOhcY47POV7GHM
i/KLHiZXtJsL3/Pr/4TL+HTjdX8EDSsy1K5/JCvJCFsJHnSvkEaJQGLn/2m03eW9r8
9w1bQ90aY+VCQ==
X-Original-To: users@forwarder.example
Received: from mail.consumer.example (mail.consumer.example [192.0.2.4])
(using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits)
key-exchange ECDHE (P-256) server-signature ECDSA (P-384)
server-digest SHA384)
(Client did not present a certificate)
by mail.forwarder.example (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4Ln7Qs55xmz4nP
for <users@forwarder.example>; Tue, 19 Jul 2022 07:57:41 +0200 (CEST)
Authentication-Results: mail.forwarder.example;
arc=none smtp.remote-ip=192.0.2.4
Authentication-Results: mail.forwarder.example;
dkim=pass (512-bit key; secure) header.d=consumer.example
header.i=@consumer.example header.a=ed25519-sha256
header.s=epsilon header.b=hETrymCb;
dkim=pass (1152-bit key; secure) header.d=consumer.example
header.i=@consumer.example header.a=rsa-sha256
header.s=delta header.b=C2nsAp3A
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
d=consumer.example; s=epsilon; t=1658210255;
bh=KYH/g7ForvDbnyyDLYSjauMYMW6sEIqu75/9w3OIONg=;
h=Date:Subject:To:References:From:In-Reply-To;
b=hETrymCbz6T1Dyo5dCG9dk8rPykKLdhJCPFeJ9TiiP/kaoN2afpUYtj+SrI+I83lp
p1F/FfYSGy7zz3Q3OdxBA==
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
d=consumer.example; s=delta; t=1658210255;
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bh=KYH/g7ForvDbnyyDLYSjauMYMW6sEIqu75/9w3OIONg=;
h=Date:To:References:From:In-Reply-To;
b=C2nsAp3AMNX33Nq7nN/StPo921xE3XGF8Ju3iAKdYB3EKhsril0N5IjWGlglJECst
jLNKSo7KWZZ2lkH/dVZ9Rs1GHT2uaKy1sc/xmNIC5rHdhrxammiwpTSo4PsT8disfc
3DVF6Q62n0EsdLFqcw1KY8A9inFqYKY2tqoo+y4zMtItqCYx3xjsj3I0IFLuX
Author: Message Author <author@consumer.example>
Received: from [192.0.2.8] (host-8-2-0-192.isp.example [192.0.2.8])
(AUTH: CRAM-MD5 uXDGrn@SYT0/k, TLS: TLS1.3,128bits,
ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
by mail.consumer.example with ESMTPSA
id 00000000005DC076.00004417; Tue, 19 Jul 2022 07:57:35 +0200
Message-ID: <2431dc66-b010-c9cc-4f2b-a1f889f8bdb4@consumer.example>
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 07:57:33 +0200
List-Id: <users.forwarder.example>
List-Post: <mailto:users@forwarder.example>
List-Help: <mailto:users+help@forwarder.example>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:users+subscribe@forwarder.example>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:users+unsubscribe@forwarder.example>
List-Owner: <mailto:users+owner@forwarder.example>
Precedence: list
MIME-Version: 1.0
Subject: This is the original subject
Content-Language: en-US
To: users@forwarder.example
Authentication-Results: consumer.example; auth=pass (details omitted)
From: Message Author <author@consumer.example>
In-Reply-To: <20220718102753.0f6d9dde.cel@example.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
[ Message body was here ]
--=_mime_boundary_--
If the body of the message is not included, the last MIME entity
would have "Content-Type: text/rfc822-headers" instead of message/
rfc822.
Appendix C. Change Log {change-log}
[RFC Editor: Please remove this section prior to publication.]
C.1. 00 to 01
* Replace references to RFC7489 with references to I-D.ietf-dmarc-
dmarcbis.
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* Replace the 2nd paragraph in the Introduction with the text
proposed by Ned for Ticket #55, which enjoys some consensus:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmarc/
HptVyJ9SgrfxWRbeGwORagPrhCw
(https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmarc/
HptVyJ9SgrfxWRbeGwORagPrhCw)
* Strike a spurious sentence about criticality of feedback, which
was meant for feedback in general, not failure reports. In fact,
failure reports are not critical to establishing and maintaining
accurate authentication deployments. Still attributable to Ticket
#55.
* Remove the content of section "Verifying External Destinations"
and refer to I-D.ietf-dmarc-aggregate-reporting.
* Remove the content of section "Security Considerations" and refer
to I-D.ietf-dmarc-dmarcbis.
* Slightly tweak the wording of the example in Appendix A.1 so that
it makes sense standing alone.
* Remove the sentence containing "must include any URI(s)", as the
issue arose <eref
target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dmarc/
mFk0qiTCy8tzghRvcxus01W_Blw"/>.
* Add paragraph in Security Considerations, noting that note that
Organizational Domains are only an approximation...
* Add a Transport section, mentioning DMARC conformance and failure
report mail loops (Ticket #28).
C.2. 01 to 02
* Add a sentence to make clear that counting failures is not the
aim.
C.3. 02 to 03
* Updated references.
C.4. 03 to 04
* Add an example report.
* Remove the old Acknowledgements section.
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* Add a IANA Consideration section
C.5. 04 to 05
* Convert to markdown
* Remove irrelevant material.
C.6. 05 to 06
* A Vesely was incorrectly removed from list of document editors.
Corrected.
* Added Terminology section with recoomended boilerplate re:
RFC2119.
C.7. 06 to 07
* Reduce Terminology section
* minor nits
C.8. 07 to 08
* Specify what detailed information a report contains, in the 1st
paragraph of Section 2
* A couple of typos
C.9. 08 to 09
* Replace < with < and > with > in Appendix B
Authors' Addresses
Steven M Jones
DMARC.org
Email: smj@dmarc.org
Alessandro Vesely
Tana
Email: vesely@tana.it
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