Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-roadblock-avoidance
draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-roadblock-avoidance
DNSOP W. Hardaker
Internet-Draft Parsons
Intended status: Best Current Practice O. Gudmundsson
Expires: October 6, 2016 CloudFlare
S. Krishnaswamy
Parsons
April 4, 2016
DNSSEC Roadblock Avoidance
draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-roadblock-avoidance-04.txt
Abstract
This document describes problems that a DNSSEC aware resolver/
application might run into within a non-compliant infrastructure. It
outline potential detection and mitigation techniques. The scope of
the document is to create a shared approach to detect and overcome
network issues that a DNSSEC software/system may face.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 6, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Implementation experiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Detecting DNSSEC Non-Compilance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Determining DNSSEC support in neighboring recursive
resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Supports UDP answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. Supports TCP answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3. Supports EDNS0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.4. Supports the DO bit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.5. Supports the AD bit DNSKEY algorithm 5 . . . . . . . 7
3.1.6. Returns RRsig for signed answer . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.7. Supports querying for DNSKEY records . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.8. Supports querying for DS records . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.9. Supports negative answers with NSEC records . . . . . 8
3.1.10. Supports negative answers with NSEC3 records . . . . 8
3.1.11. Supports queries where DNAME records lead to an
answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.12. Permissive DNSSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.13. UDP size limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.14. Supports Unknown RRtypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Direct Network Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1. Support for Remote UDP Over Port 53 . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.2. Support for Remote UDP With Fragmentation . . . . . . 10
3.2.3. Support for Outbound TCP Over Port 53 . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. Support for DNSKEY and DS combinations . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Aggregating The Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Resolver capability description . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Roadblock Avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. Partial Resolver Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1.1. Known Insecure Lookups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1.2. Partial NSEC/NSEC3 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Start-Up and Network Connectivity Issues . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. What To Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Quick Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1. Test negative answers Algorithm 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2. Test Algorithm 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.3. Test Algorithm 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.4. Really fails when DNSSEC does not validate . . . . . . . 17
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
This document describes problems with DNSSEC ([RFC4034], [RFC4035])
deployment due to non-compliant infrastructure. It poses potential
detection and mitigation techniques.
1.1. Background
Deployment of DNSSEC validation is hampered by network components
that make it difficult or sometimes impossible for validating
resolvers to effectively obtain the DNSSEC data they need. This can
occur for many different reasons including
o Because neighboring recursive resolvers and DNS proxies [RFC5625]
are not fully DNSSEC compliant
o Because resolvers are not even DNSSEC aware
o Because "middle-boxes" active block/restrict outbound traffic to
the DNS port (53) either UDP and/or TCP .
o Network component in path does not allow UDP fragments
o etc...
This document talks about ways a Host Validator can detect the state
of the network it is attached to, and ways to hopefully circumvent
the problems associated with the network defects it discovers. The
tests described in this document may be performed on any validating
resolver to detect and prevent problems. While these recommendations
are mainly aimed at Host Validators it it prudent to perform these
test from regular Validating Resolvers before enabling just to make
sure things work.
There are situations where a host can not talk directly to a Resolver
the tests below do not address how to overcome that. In these
situations it is not uncommon to get results that are not consistent.
This mainly happens when there are DNS proxies/forwarders between the
user and the actual resolvers.
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1.2. Implementation experiences
Multiple lessons learned from multiple implementations led to the
development of this document, including (in alphabetical order)
DNSSEC-Tools' DNSSEC-Check, DNSSEC_Resolver_Check, dnssec-trigger,
FCC_Grade.
Detecting full non-support for specified DNSKEY algorithms and DS
digest algorithms is outside the scope of this document but the
document provides information on how to do that, see sample test
tool: https://github.com/ogud/DNSSEC_ALG_Check This document will
test compliance with Algorithm 5, 7 and Algorithm 13 with DS digest
algorithm 1 and 2.
1.3. Notation
When we talk about a "Host Validator", this can either be a library
that an application has linked in or an actual validating resolver
running on the same machine.
A variant of this is a "Validating Forwarding Resolver", which is a
resolver that is configured to use upstream Resolvers if possible.
Validating Forward Resolver needs to perform the same set of tests
before using an upstream recursive resolver.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Goals
This document is intended to show how a Host Validator can detect the
capabilities of a nearby recursive resolver, and work around any
problems that could potentially affect DNSSEC resolution. This
enables the Host Validator to make use of the caching functionality
of the recursive resolver, which is desirable in that it decreases
network traffic and improves response times.
A Host Validator has two choices: it can wait to determine that it
has problems with a recursive resolver based on the results that it
is getting from real-world queries issued to it, or it can
proactively test for problems (Section Section 3) to build a work
around list ahead of time (Section Section 5). There are pros and
cons to both of these paths that are application specific, and this
document does not attempt to provide guidance about whether proactive
tests should or should not be used. Either way, DNSSEC roadblock
avoidance techniques ought to be used when needed and if possible.
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Note: The same tests can be used for a recursive resolver to check if
its upstream connections hinder DNSSEC validation.
This document specifies two sets of tests to perform a comprehensive
one and a fast one. The fast one will detect most common problems,
thus if the fast one passes then the comprehensive MAY be executed as
well.
3. Detecting DNSSEC Non-Compilance
A Host Validator may choose to determine early-on what bottlenecks
exist that may hamper its ability to perform DNSSEC look-ups. This
section outlines tests that can be done to test certain features of
the surrounding network.
NOTE: when performing these tests against an address, we make the
following assumption about that address: It is a uni-cast address or
an any-cast cluster where all servers have identical configuration
and connectivity.
NOTE: when performing these tests we also assume that the path is
clear of "DNS interfering" crap-ware/middle-boxes, like stupid
firewalls, proxies, forwarders. Presence of such crap can easily
make the recursive resolver look bad. It is beyond the scope of the
document as how to test around the interference.
3.1. Determining DNSSEC support in neighboring recursive resolvers
Ideally, a Host Validator can make use of the caching present in
neighboring recursive resolvers. This section discusses the tests
that a neighboring recursive resolver MUST pass in order to be fully
usable as a near-by DNS cache.
Unless stated otherwise, all of the following tests SHOULD have the
recursive flag set when sending out a query and SHOULD be sent over
UDP. Unless otherwise stated, the tests MUST NOT have the DO bit set
or utilize any of the other DNSSEC related requirements, like EDNS0.
The tests are designed to check for one feature at a time.
3.1.1. Supports UDP answers
Purpose: This tests basic DNS over UDP functionality to a resolver.
Test: A DNS request is sent to the resolver under test for an A
record for a known existing domain, such as www.dnssec-tools.org.
SUCCESS: A DNS response was received that contains an a A record in
the answer section. (The data itself does not need to be checked.)
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Note: an implementation MAY chose to not perform the rest of the
tests if this test fails, as clearly the resolver under test is
severely broken.
3.1.2. Supports TCP answers
Purpose: This tests basic TCP functionality to a resolver.
Test: A DNS request is sent over TCP to the resolver under test for
an A record for a known existing domain, such as www.dnssec-
tools.org.
SUCCESS: A DNS response was received that contains an A record in the
answer section. (The data itself does not need to be checked.)
3.1.3. Supports EDNS0
Purpose: Test whether a resolver properly supports the EDNS0
extension option.
Pre-requisite: "Supports UDP or TCP".
Test: Send a request to the resolver under test for an A record for a
known existing domain, such as www.dnssec-tools.org, with an EDNS0
OPT record in the additional section.
SUCCESS: A DNS response was received that contains an EDNS0 option
with version number 0.
3.1.4. Supports the DO bit
Purpose: This tests whether a resolver has minimal support of the DO
bit.
Pre-requisite: "Supports EDNS0".
Test: Send a request to the resolver under test for an A record for a
known existing domain such as www.dnssec-tools.org. Set the DO bit
in the outgoing query.
SUCCESS: A DNS response was received that contains the DO bit set.
Note: this only tests that the resolver sets the DO bit in the
response. Later checks will determine if the DO bit was actually
made use of. Some resolvers successfully pass this test because they
simply copy the unknown flags into the response. Don't worry,
they'll fail the later tests.
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3.1.5. Supports the AD bit DNSKEY algorithm 5
Purpose: This tests whether the resolver is a validating resolver.
Pre-requisite: "Supports the DO bit".
Test: Send a request to the resolver under test for an A record for a
known existing domain in a DNSSEC signed zone which is verifiable to
a configured trust anchor, such as www.dnssec-tools.org using the
root's published DNSKEY or DS record as a trust anchor. Set the DO
bit in the outgoing query.
SUCCESS: A DNS response was received that contains the AD bit set.
BONUS: As AD is set this resolver supports Algorithm 5 RSASHA1
3.1.6. Returns RRsig for signed answer
Purpose: This tests whether a resolver will properly return RRSIG
records when the DO bit is set.
Pre-requisite: "Supports the DO bit".
Test: Send a request to the resolver under test for an A record for a
known existing domain in a DNSSEC signed zone, such as www.dnssec-
tools.org. Set the DO bit in the outgoing query.
SUCCESS: A DNS response was received that contains at least one RRSIG
record.
3.1.7. Supports querying for DNSKEY records
Purpose: This tests whether a resolver can query for and receive a
DNSKEY record from a signed zone.
Pre-requisite: "Supports the DO bit."
Test: Send a request to the resolver under test for an DNSKEY record
which is known to exist in a signed zone, such as dnssec-tools.org/
DNSKEY. Set the DO bit in the outgoing query.
SUCCESS: A DNS response was received that contains a DNSKEY record in
the answer section.
Note: Some DNSKEY RRset's are large and if the network path has
problems with large answers this query may result in either false
positive or false negative. In general the DNSKEY queried for is a
small enough to fit into 1220 byte answer, to avoid false negative
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result when TCP is disabled. However, querying many zones will
result in answers greater than 1220 bytes so ideally TCP MUST be
available.
3.1.8. Supports querying for DS records
Purpose: This tests whether a resolver can query for and receive a DS
record from a signed zone.
Pre-requisite: "Supports the DO bit."
Test: Send a request to the resolver under test for an DS record
which is known to exist in a signed zone, such as dnssec-tools.org/
DS. Set the DO bit in the outgoing query.
SUCCESS: A DNS response was received that contains a DS record in the
answer section.
3.1.9. Supports negative answers with NSEC records
Purpose: This tests whether a resolver properly returns NSEC records
for a non-existing domain in a DNSSEC signed zone.
Pre-requisite: "Supports the DO bit."
Test: Send a request to the resolver under test for an A record which
is known to not existing, such as non-existent.test.dnssec-tools.org.
Set the DO bit in the outgoing query.
SUCCESS: A DNS response was received that contains an NSEC record.
Note: The query issued in this test MUST be sent to a NSEC signed
zone. Getting back appropriate NSEC3 records does not indicate a
failure, but a bad test.
3.1.10. Supports negative answers with NSEC3 records
Purpose: This tests whether a resolver properly returns NSEC3 records
([RFC5155]) for a non-existing domain in a DNSSEC signed zone.
Pre-requisite: "Supports the DO bit."
Test: Send a request to the resolver under test for an A record which
is known to be non-existent, such as non-existent.nsec3-
ns.test.dnssec-tools.org. Set the DO bit in the outgoing query.
SUCCESS: A DNS response was received that contains an NSEC3 record.
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Bonus: If the AD bit is set, this validator supports algorithm 7
RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1
Note: The query issued in this test MUST be sent to a NSEC3 signed
zone. Getting back appropriate NSEC records does not indicate a
failure, but a bad test.
3.1.11. Supports queries where DNAME records lead to an answer
Purpose: This tests whether a resolver can query for an A record in a
zone with a known DNAME referral for the record's parent.
Test: Send a request to the resolver under test for an A record which
is known to exist in a signed zone within a DNAME referral child
zone, such as good-a.dname-good-ns.test.dnssec-tools.net.
SUCCESS: A DNS response was received that contains a DNAME in the
answer section. An RRSIG MUST also be received in the answer section
that covers the DNAME record.
3.1.12. Permissive DNSSEC
Purpose: To see if a validating resolver is ignoring DNSSEC
validation failures.
Pre-requisite: Supports the AD bit.
Test: ask for data from a broken DNSSEC delegation such as badsign-
a.test.dnssec-tools.org.
SUCCESS: A reply with the Rcode set to SERVFAIL
3.1.13. UDP size limits
Strictly speaking nothing other than using TCP can be used to
overcome this. Thus the host should use TCP fallback when UDP query
times out.
3.1.14. Supports Unknown RRtypes
Purpose: Some DNS Resolvers/gateways only support some RRtypes. This
causes problems for applications that need recently defined types.
Pre-requisite: "Supports UDP or TCP".
Test: Send a request for recently defined type or unknown type in the
20000-22000 range, that resolves to a server that will return answer
for all types, such as alltypes.res.dnssecready.org
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SUCCESS: A DNS response was retrieved that contains the type
requested in the answer section.
3.2. Direct Network Queries
If need be, a Host Validator may need to make direct queries to
authoritative servers or known Open Recursive Resolvers in order to
collect data. To do that, a number of key network features MUST be
functional.
3.2.1. Support for Remote UDP Over Port 53
Purpose: This tests basic UDP functionality to outside the local
network.
Test: A DNS request is sent to a known distant authoritative server
for a record known to be within that server's authoritative data.
Example: send a query to the address of ns1.dnssec-tools.org for the
www.dnssec-tools.org/A record.
SUCCESS: A DNS response was received that contains an a A record in
the answer section.
Note: an implementation can use the local resolvers for determining
the address of the name server that is authoritative for the given
zone. The recursive bit MAY be set for this request, but does not
need to be.
3.2.2. Support for Remote UDP With Fragmentation
Purpose: This tests if the local network can receive fragmented UDP
answers
Pre-requisite: Local UDP > 1500 is possible
Test: A DNS request is sent over UDP to a known distant DNS address
asking for a record that has answer larger than 2000 bytes. Example
send a query for the dnssec-tools.org/DNSKEY record with the DO bit
set in the outgoing query.
Success: A DNS response was received that contains the large answer.
Note: A failure in getting large answers over UDP is not a serious
problem if TCP is working.
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3.2.3. Support for Outbound TCP Over Port 53
Purpose: This tests basic TCP functionality to outside the local
network.
Test: A DNS request is sent over TCP to a known distant authoritative
server for a record known to be within that server's authoritative
data. Example: send a query to the address of ns1.dnssec-tools.org
for the www.dnssec-tools.org/A record.
SUCCESS: A DNS response was received that contains an a A record in
the answer section.
Note: an implementation can use the local resolvers for determining
the address of the name server that is authoritative for the given
zone. The recursive bit MAY be set for this request, but does not
need to be.
3.3. Support for DNSKEY and DS combinations
Purpose: These tests can check if an algorithm combinations are
supported.
Pre-requisite: At least one of above tests has returned AD bit
proving upstream is validating
Test: A DNS request is sent over UDP to the resolver under tests for
a known combination of the DS number (N) and DNSKEY number (M) of the
form ds-N.alg-M-nsec.dnssec-test.org, for example ds-2.alg-13-
nsec.dnssec-test.org TXT or ds-4.alg-13-nsec3.dnssec-test.org TXT.
SUCCESS: a DNS response is received with AD bit set with TXT record
in the answer section.
BONUS: AD in response to the examples above demonstrates support for
Algorithm 13 and the two DS algorithm(s) with both NSEC and NSEC3
Note: for algorithms 6 and 7 NSEC is not defined thus query for alg-
M-nsec3 is required, similarly NSEC3 is not defined for algorithms 1,
3 and 5. Furthermore algorithms 2, 4, 9, 11 do not have definitions
to sign zones.
4. Aggregating The Results
Some conclusions can be drawn from the results of the above tests in
an "aggregated" form. This section defines some labels to assign to
a resolver under test given the results of the tests run against
them.
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4.1. Resolver capability description
This section will group and label certain common results
Resolvers are classified into following broad behaviors:
Validator: The resolver passes all DNSSEC tests and had the AD bit
appropriately set.
DNSSEC Aware: The resolver passes all DNSSEC tests, but does not
appropriately set the AD bit on answers, indicating it is not
validating. A Host Validator will function fine using this
resolver as a forwarder.
Non-DNSSEC capable: The resolver is not DNSSEC aware and will make
it hard for a Host Validator to operate behind it. It MAY be
usable for querying for data that is in known insecure sections of
the DNS tree.
Not a DNS Resolver: This is a bad address and not used anymore.
While it would be great if all resolvers fell cleanly into one of the
broad categories above, that is not the case. For that reason it is
necessary to augment the classification with more descriptive result,
this is done by adding the word "Partial" in front of Validator/
DNSSEC Aware classifications, followed by sub-descriptors of what is
not working.
Unknown: Failed Unknown test
DNAME: Failed DNAME test
NSEC3: Failed NSEC3 test
TCP: TCP not available
SlowBig: UDP is size limited but TCP fallback works
NoBig: TCP not available and UDP is size limited
Permissive: Passes data known to fail validation
5. Roadblock Avoidance
The goal of this document is to tie the above tests and aggregations
to avoidance practices; however the document does not specify exactly
how to do that.
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Once we have determined what level of support is available in the
neighboring network, we can determine what MUST be done in order to
effectively act as a validating resolver. This section discusses
some of the options available given the results from the previous
sections.
The general fallback approach can be described by the following
sequence:
If the resolver is labeled as "Validator" or "DNSSEC aware"
Send query through this resolver and perform local
validation on the results.
If validation fails, try the next resolver
Else if the resolver is labeled "Not a DNS Resolver" or
"Non-DNSSEC capable"
Mark it as unusable and try next resolver
Else if no more resolvers are configured and if direct queries
are supported
1. try iterating from Root
2. If the answer is SECURE/BOGUS:
Return the result of the iteration
3. If the query is INSECURE:
Re-query "Non-DNSSEC capable" servers and return
answers from them w/o the AD bit set to the client.
This will increase the likelihood that spit-view unsigned
answers are found.
Else return an useful error code
While attempting resolution through a particular recursive name
server with a particular transport method that worked, any transport-
specific parameters MUST be remembered in order to short-circuit any
unnecessary fallback attempts.
Transport-specific parameters MUST also be remembered for each
authoritative name server that is queried while performing an
iterative mode lookup.
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Any transport settings that are remembered for a particular name
server MUST be periodically refreshed; they should also be refreshed
when an error is encountered as described below.
For a stub resolver, problems with the name server MAY manifest
themselves as the following types of error conditions:
o No response/error response or missing DNSSEC meta-data.
o Illegal Response, which prevents the validator from fetching all
necessary records required for constructing an authentication
chain. This could result when referral loops are encountered,
when any of the antecedent zone delegations are lame, when aliases
are erroneously followed for certain RRtypes (such as SOA, DNSKEYs
or DS records), or when resource records for certain types (e.g.
DS) are returned from a zone that is not authoritative for such
records.
o Bogus Response, when the cryptographic assertions in the
authentication chain do not validate properly.
For each of the above error conditions a validator MAY adopt the
following dynamic fallback technique, preferring a particular
approach if it is known to work for a given name server or zone from
previous attempts.
o No response, error response, or missing DNSSEC meta-data
* Re-try with different EDNS0 sizes (4096, 1492, None)
* Re-try with TCP only
* Perform an iterative query starting from Root if the previous
error was returned from a lookup that had recursion enabled.
* Re-try using an alternative transport method, if this
alternative method is known (configured) to be supported by the
nameserver in question.
o Illegal Response
* Perform an iterative query starting from Root if the previous
error was returned from a lookup that had recursion enabled.
* Check if any of the antecedent zones up to the closest
configured trust anchor are provably insecure.
o Bogus Response
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* Perform an iterative query starting from Root if the previous
error was returned from a lookup that had recursion enabled.
For each fallback technique, attempts to multiple potential name
servers should be skewed such that the next name server is tried when
the previous one encounters an error or a timeout is reached,
whichever is earlier.
The validator SHOULD remember, in its zone-specific fallback cache,
any broken behavior identified for a particular zone for a duration
of that zone's SOA negative TTL.
The validator MAY place name servers that exhibit broken behavior
into a blacklist, and bypass these name servers for all zones that
they are authoritative for. The validator MUST time out entries in
this name server blacklist periodically, where this interval could be
set to be the same as the DNSSEC BAD cache default TTL.
5.1. Partial Resolver Usage
It MAY be possible to use Non-DNSSEC Capable caching resolvers in
careful ways if maximum optimization is desired. This section
describes some of the advanced techniques that could be used to use a
resolver in at least a minimal way. Most of the time this would be
unnecessary, except in the case where none of the resolvers are fully
compliant and thus the choices would be to use them at least
minimally or not at all (and no caching benefits would be available).
5.1.1. Known Insecure Lookups
If a resolver is Non-DNSSEC Capable but a section of the DNS tree has
been determined to be Provably Insecure [RFC4035], then queries to
this section of the tree MAY be sent through Non-DNSSEC Capable
caching resolver.
5.1.2. Partial NSEC/NSEC3 Support
This is real uncommon and only affects old resolvers, that also lack
support for Unknown types, rendering them mostly useless and to be
avoided.
6. Start-Up and Network Connectivity Issues
A number of scenarios will produce either short-term or long-term
connectivity issues with respect to DNSSEC validation. Consider the
following cases:
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Time Synchronization: Time synchronization problems can occur when
a device which has been off for a period of time and the clock is
no longer in close synchronization with "real time" or when a
device always has clock set to the same time during start-up.
This will cause problems when the device needs to resolve their
source of time synchronization, such as "ntp.example.com".
Changing Network Properties: A newly established network
connection MAY change state shortly after a HTTP-based pay-wall
authentication system has been used. This especially common in
hotel networks, where DNSSEC, validation and even DNS are not
functional until the user proceeds through a series of forced web
pages used to enable their network. The tests in
Section Section 3 will produce very different results before and
after the network authorization has succeeded. APIs exist on many
operating systems to detect initial network device status changes,
such as right after DHCP has finished, but few (none?) exist to
detect that authentication through a pay-wall has succeeded.
There are only two choices when situations like this happen:
Continue to perform DNSSEC processing, which will likely result in
all DNS requests failing. This is the most secure route, but
causes the most operational grief for users.
Turn off DNSSEC support until the network proves to be usable.
This allows the user to continue using the network, at the
sacrifice of security. It also allows for a denial of security-
service attack if a man-in-the-middle can convince a device that
DNSSEC is impossible.
6.1. What To Do
If Host Validator detects that DNSSEC resolution is not possible it
SHOULD warn user. In the case there is no user no reporting can be
performed thus the device MAY have a policy of action, like continue
or fail.
7. Quick Test
The quick tests defined below make the following assumption that the
questions are asked of a real resolver and the only real question is:
"how complete is the DNSSEC support?". This quick test as been
implemented in few programs developed at IETF hackthons at IETF-91
and IETF-92. The programs use a common grading method, for each
question that returns expected answer the resolver gets a point. If
the AD bit is set as expected the resolver gets a second point.
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7.1. Test negative answers Algorithm 5
Query: realy-doesnotexist.dnssec-test.org. A
Answer: RCODE= NXDOMAIN, Empty Answer, Authority: NSEC proof
7.2. Test Algorithm 8
Query: alg-8-nsec3.dnssec-test.org. SOA
Answer: RCODE= 0, Answer: SOA record
7.3. Test Algorithm 13
Query: alg-13-nsec.dnssec-test.org. SOA
Answer: RCODE= 0, Answer: SOA record
7.4. Really fails when DNSSEC does not validate
Query: dnssec-failed.org. SOA
Answer: RCODE=SERVFAIL, empty answer, and authority, AD=0
8. Security Considerations
This document discusses problems that may occur while deploying the
secure DNSSEC protocol and what mitigation's can be used to help
detect and mitigate these problems. Following these suggestions will
result in a more secure DNSSEC operational environment than if DNSSEC
was simply disabled when it fails to perform as expected.
9. IANA Considerations
No IANA actions are required.
10. Acknowledgments
We thank Petr Spacek for extensive comments and suggestions.
11. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
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[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.
[RFC5625] Bellis, R., "DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines", BCP
152, RFC 5625, DOI 10.17487/RFC5625, August 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5625>.
Authors' Addresses
Wes Hardaker
Parsons
P.O. Box 382
Davis, CA 95617
US
Email: ietf@hardakers.net
Olafur Gudmundsson
CloudFlare
San Francisco, CA 94107
USA
Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com
Suresh Krishnaswamy
Parsons
7110 Samuel Morse Dr
Columbia, MD 21046
US
Email: suresh@tislabs.com
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