Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-dots-use-cases
draft-ietf-dots-use-cases
DOTS R. Dobbins
Internet-Draft Arbor Networks
Intended status: Informational D. Migault
Expires: January 6, 2021 Ericsson
R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
N. Teague
Iron Mountain Data Centers
L. Xia
Huawei
K. Nishizuka
NTT Communications
July 05, 2020
Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling
draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-25
Abstract
The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide
protocols to facilitate interoperability across disparate DDoS
mitigation solutions. This document presents sample use cases which
describe the interactions expected between the DOTS components as
well as DOTS messaging exchanges. These use cases are meant to
identify the interacting DOTS components, how they collaborate, and
what are the typical information to be exchanged.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2021.
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Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Upstream DDoS Mitigation by an Upstream Internet Transit
Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. DDoS Mitigation by a Third Party DDoS Mitigation Service
Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. DDoS Orchestration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
At the time of writing, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack
mitigation solutions are largely based upon siloed, proprietary
communications schemes with vendor lock-in as a side-effect. This
can result in the configuration, provisioning, operation, and
activation of these solutions being a highly manual and often time-
consuming process. Additionally, coordinating multiple DDoS
mitigation solutions simultaneously is fraught with both technical
and process-related hurdles. This greatly increases operational
complexity which, in turn, can degrade the efficacy of mitigations
that are generally highly dependent on a timely reaction by the
system.
The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to specify
protocols that facilitate interoperability between diverse DDoS
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mitigation solutions and ensure greater integration in term of attack
detection, mitigation requests, and attack characterization patterns.
As DDoS solutions are broadly heterogeneous among vendors, the
primary goal of DOTS is to provide high-level interaction amongst
differing DDoS solutions, such as detecting DDoS attacks, initiating/
terminating DDoS mitigation assistance, or requesting the status of a
DDoS mitigation.
This document provides sample use cases that provided input for the
requirements [RFC8612] and design of the DOTS protocols
[RFC8782][RFC8783]. The use cases are not exhaustive and future use
cases are expected to emerge as DOTS is adopted and evolves.
2. Terminology and Acronyms
This document makes use of the same terminology and definitions as
[RFC8612]. In addition it uses the terms defined below:
o DDoS Mitigation System (DMS): A system that performs DDoS
mitigation. The DDoS Mitigation System may be composed of a
cluster of hardware and/or software resources, but could also
involve an orchestrator that may take decisions such as
outsourcing some or all of the mitigation to another DDoS
Mitigation System.
o DDoS Mitigation: The action performed by the DDoS Mitigation
System.
o DDoS Mitigation Service: designates a service provided to a
customer to mitigate DDoS attacks. Each service subscription
usually involve Service Level Agreement (SLA) that has to be met.
It is the responsibility of the DDoS Service provider to
instantiate the DDoS Mitigation System to meet these SLAs.
o DDoS Mitigation Service Provider: designates the administrative
entity providing the DDoS Mitigation Service.
o Internet Transit Provider (ITP): designates the entity that
delivers the traffic to a customer network. It can be an Internet
Service Provider (ISP), or an upstream entity delivering the
traffic to the ISP.
3. Use Cases
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3.1. Upstream DDoS Mitigation by an Upstream Internet Transit Provider
This use case describes how an enterprise or a residential customer
network may take advantage of a pre-existing relation with its ITP in
order to mitigate a DDoS attack targeting its network.
For clarity of discussion, the targeted network is indicated as an
enterprise network, but the same scenario applies to any downstream
network, including residential and cloud hosting networks.
As the ITP provides connectivity to the enterprise network, it is
already on the path of the inbound and outbound traffic of the
enterprise network and well aware of the networking parameters
associated to the enterprise network WAN connectivity. This eases
both the configuration and the instantiation of a DDoS Mitigation
Service.
This section considers two kinds of DDoS Mitigation Service between
an enterprise network and an ITP:
o The upstream ITP may instantiate a DDoS Mitigation System (DMS)
upon receiving a request from the enterprise network. This
typically corresponds to the case when the enterprise network is
under attack.
o On the other hand, the ITP may identify an enterprise network as
the source of an attack and send a mitigation request to the
enterprise DMS to mitigate this at the source.
The two scenarios, though different, have similar interactions
between the DOTS client and server. For the sake of simplicity, only
the first scenario will be detailed in this section. Nevertheless,
the second scenario is also in scope for DOTS.
In the first scenario, as depicted in Figure 1, an enterprise network
with self-hosted Internet-facing properties such as Web servers,
authoritative DNS servers, and VoIP servers has a DMS deployed to
protect those servers and applications from DDoS attacks. In
addition to on-premise DDoS defense capability, the enterprise has
contracted with its ITP for DDoS Mitigation Services when attacks
threaten to overwhelm the bandwidth of their WAN link(s).
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+------------------+ +------------------+
| Enterprise | | Upstream |
| Network | | Internet Transit |
| | | Provider |
| +--------+ | | DDoS Attack
| | DDoS | | <=================================
| | Target | | <=================================
| +--------+ | | +------------+ |
| | +-------->| DDoS | |
| | | |S | Mitigation | |
| | | | | System | |
| | | | +------------+ |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| +------------+ | | | |
| | DDoS |<---+ | |
| | Mitigation |C | | |
| | System | | | |
| +------------+ | | |
+------------------+ +------------------+
* C is for DOTS client functionality
* S is for DOTS server functionality
Figure 1: Upstream Internet Transit Provider DDoS Mitigation
The enterprise DMS is configured such that if the incoming Internet
traffic volume exceeds 50% of the provisioned upstream Internet WAN
link capacity, the DMS will request DDoS mitigation assistance from
the upstream transit provider. More sophisticated detection means
may be considered as well.
The requests to trigger, manage, and finalize a DDoS Mitigation
between the enterprise DMS and the ITP is performed using DOTS. The
enterprise DMS implements a DOTS client while the ITP implements a
DOTS server which is integrated with their DMS in this example.
When the enterprise DMS locally detects an inbound DDoS attack
targeting its resources (e.g., servers, hosts, or applications), it
immediately begins a DDoS Mitigation.
During the course of the attack, the inbound traffic volume to the
enterprise network exceeds the 50% threshold and the enterprise DMS
escalates the DDoS mitigation. The enterprise DMS DOTS client
signals to the DOTS server on the upstream ITP to initiate DDoS
Mitigation. The DOTS server replies to the DOTS client that it can
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serve this request, and mitigation is initiated on the ITP network by
the ITP DMS.
Over the course of the attack, the DOTS server of the ITP
periodically informs the DOTS client on the mitigation status,
statistics related to DDoS attack traffic mitigation, and related
information. Once the DDoS attack has ended, or decreased to a
certain level that the enterprise DMS might handle by itself, the
DOTS server signals the enterprise DMS DOTS client that the attack
has subsided.
The DOTS client on the enterprise DMS then requests the ITP to
terminate the DDoS Mitigation. The DOTS server on the ITP receives
this request and once the mitigation has ended, confirms the end of
upstream DDoS Mitigation to the enterprise DMS DOTS client.
The following is an overview of the DOTS communication model for this
use-case:
1. A DDoS attack is initiated against resources of a network
organization (here, the enterprise) which has deployed a DOTS-
capable DMS - typically a DOTS client.
2. The enterprise DMS detects, classifies, and begins the DDoS
Mitigation.
3. The enterprise DMS determines that its capacity and/or capability
to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and sends via its
DOTS client a DOTS DDoS Mitigation request to one or more DOTS
servers residing on the upstream ITP.
4. The DOTS server which receives the DOTS Mitigation request
determines that it has been configured to honor requests from the
requesting DOTS client, and honors the request by orchestrating
its own DMS.
5. While the DDoS Mitigation is active, the DOTS server regularly
transmits DOTS DDoS Mitigation status updates to the DOTS client.
6. Informed by the DOTS server status update that the attack has
ended or subsided, the DOTS client transmits a DOTS DDoS
Mitigation termination request to the DOTS server.
7. The DOTS server terminates DDoS Mitigation, and sends the
notification to the DOTS client.
Note that communications between the enterprise DOTS client and the
upstream ITP DOTS server may take place in-band within the main
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Internet WAN link between the enterprise and the ITP; out-of-band via
a separate, dedicated wireline network link utilized solely for DOTS
signaling; or out-of-band via some other form of network connectivity
such as a third-party wireless 4G network connectivity.
Note also that a DOTS client that sends a DOTS Mitigation request may
be also triggered by a network admin that manually confirms the
request to the upstream ITP, in which case the request may be sent
from an application such as a web browser or a dedicated mobile
application.
Note also that when the enterprise is multihomed and connected to
multiple upstream ITPs, each ITP is only able to provide a DDoS
Mitigation Service for the traffic it transits. As a result, the
enterprise network may be required to coordinate the various DDoS
Mitigation Services associated to each link. More multi-homing
considerations are discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-multihoming].
3.2. DDoS Mitigation by a Third Party DDoS Mitigation Service Provider
This use case differs from the previous use case described in
Section 3.1 in that the DDoS Mitigation Service is not provided by an
upstream ITP. In other words, as represented in Figure 2, the
traffic is not forwarded through the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider
by default. In order to steer the traffic to the DDoS Mitigation
Service Provider, some network configuration changes are required.
As such, this use case is likely to apply to large enterprises or
large data centers, but as for the other use cases is not exclusively
limited to them.
Another typical scenario for this use case is for there to be a
relationship between DDoS Mitigation Service Providers, forming an
overlay of DMS. When a DDoS Mitigation Service Provider mitigating a
DDoS attack reaches its resources capacity, it may chose to delegate
the DDoS Mitigation to another DDoS Mitigation Service Provider.
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+------------------+ +------------------+
| Enterprise | | Upstream |
| Network | | Internet Transit |
| | | Provider |
| +--------+ | | DDoS Attack
| | DDoS | | <=================================
| | Target | | <=================================
| +--------+ | | |
| | | |
| | +------------------+
| |
| | +------------------+
| | | DDoS Mitigation |
| | | Service Provider |
| | | |
| +------------+ | | +------------+ |
| | DDoS |<------------>| DDoS | |
| | Mitigation |C | | S| Mitigation | |
| | System | | | | System | |
| +------------+ | | +------------+ |
+------------------+ +------------------+
* C is for DOTS client functionality
* S is for DOTS server functionality
Figure 2: DDoS Mitigation between an Enterprise Network and Third
Party DDoS Mitigation Service Provider
In this scenario, an enterprise network has entered into a pre-
arranged DDoS mitigation assistance agreement with one or more third-
party DDoS Mitigation Service Providers in order to ensure that
sufficient DDoS mitigation capacity and/or capabilities may be
activated in the event that a given DDoS attack threatens to
overwhelm the ability of the enterprise's or any other given DMS to
mitigate the attack on its own.
The pre-arrangement typically includes agreement on the mechanisms
used to redirect the traffic to the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider,
as well as the mechanism to re-inject the traffic back to the
Enterprise Network. Redirection to the DDoS Mitigation Service
Provider typically involves BGP prefix announcement or DNS
redirection, while re-injection of the scrubbed traffic to the
enterprise network may be performed via tunneling mechanisms (e.g.,
GRE). The exact mechanisms used for traffic steering are out of
scope of DOTS, but will need to be pre-arranged, while in some
contexts such changes could be detected and considered as an attack.
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In some cases the communication between the enterprise DOTS client
and the DOTS server of the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider may go
through the ITP carrying the DDoS attack, which would affect the
communication. On the other hand, the communication between the DOTS
client and DOTS server may take a path that is not undergoing a DDoS
attack.
+------------------+ +------------------+
| Enterprise | | Upstream |
| Network | | Internet Transit |
| | | Provider |
| +--------+ | | DDoS Attack
| | DDoS | |<----------------+ | ++====
| | Target | | Mitigated | | || ++=
| +--------+ | | | | || ||
| | | | | || ||
| | +--------|---------+ || ||
| | | || ||
| | +--------|---------+ || ||
| | | DDoS Mitigation | || ||
| | | Service Provider | || ||
| | | | | || ||
| +------------+ | | +------------+ | || ||
| | DDoS |<------------>| DDoS | | || ||
| | mitigation |C | |S | mitigation |<===++ ||
| | system | | | | system |<======++
| +------------+ | | +------------+ |
+------------------+ +------------------+
* C is for DOTS client functionality
* S is for DOTS server functionality
Figure 3: Redirection to a DDoS Mitigation Service Provider
When the enterprise network is under attack or at least is reaching
its capacity or ability to mitigate a given DDoS attack, the DOTS
client sends a DOTS request to the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider
to initiate network traffic diversion - as represented in Figure 3 -
and DDoS mitigation activities. Ongoing attack and mitigation status
messages may be passed between the enterprise network and the DDoS
Mitigation Service Provider using DOTS. If the DDoS attack has
stopped or the severity of the attack has subsided, the DOTS client
can request the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider to terminate the
DDoS Mitigation.
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3.3. DDoS Orchestration
In this use case, one or more DDoS telemetry systems or monitoring
devices monitor a network - typically an ISP network, an enterprise
network, or a data center. Upon detection of a DDoS attack, these
DDoS telemetry systems alert an orchestrator in charge of
coordinating the various DMS's within the domain. The DDoS telemetry
systems may be configured to provide required information, such as a
preliminary analysis of the observation, to the orchestrator.
The orchestrator analyses the various sets of information it receives
from DDoS telemetry systems, and initiates one or more DDoS
mitigation strategies. For example, the orchestrator could select
the DDoS mitigation system in the enterprise network or one provided
by the ITP.
DDoS Mitigation System selection and DDoS Mitigation techniques may
depend on the type of the DDoS attack. In some case, a manual
confirmation or selection may also be required to choose a proposed
strategy to initiate a DDoS Mitigation. The DDoS Mitigation may
consist of multiple steps such as configuring the network, or of
updating already instantiated DDoS mitigation functions. Eventually,
the coordination of the mitigation may involve external DDoS
mitigation resources such as a transit provider or a Third Party DDoS
Mitigation Service Provider.
The communication used to trigger a DDoS Mitigation between the DDoS
telemetry and monitoring systems and the orchestrator is performed
using DOTS. The DDoS telemetry system implements a DOTS client while
the orchestrator implements a DOTS server.
The communication between a network administrator and the
orchestrator is also performed using DOTS. The network administrator
uses, for example, a web interface which interacts with a DOTS
client, while the orchestrator implements a DOTS server.
The communication between the orchestrator and the DDoS Mitigation
Systems is performed using DOTS. The orchestrator implements a DOTS
client while the DDoS Mitigation Systems implement a DOTS server.
The configuration aspects of each DDoS Mitigation System, as well as
the instantiations of DDoS mitigation functions or network
configuration is not part of DOTS. Similarly, the discovery of
available DDoS mitigation functions is not part of DOTS; and as such
is out of scope.
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+----------+
| network |C (Enterprise Network)
| adminis |<-+
| trator | |
+----------+ |
|
+----------+ | S+--------------+ +-----------+
|telemetry/| +->| |C S| DDoS |+
|monitoring|<--->| Orchestrator |<--->| mitigation||
|systems |C S| |<-+ | systems ||
+----------+ +--------------+C | +-----------+|
| +----------+
-----------------------------------|-----------------
|
|
(Internet Transit Provider) |
| +-----------+
| S| DDoS |+
+->| mitigation||
| systems ||
+-----------+|
* C is for DOTS client functionality +----------+
* S is for DOTS server functionality
Figure 4: DDoS Orchestration
The DDoS telemetry systems monitor various aspects of the network
traffic and perform some measurement tasks.
These systems are configured so that when an event or some
measurement indicators reach a predefined level their associated DOTS
client sends a DOTS mitigation request to the orchestrator DOTS
server. The DOTS mitigation request may be associated with some
optional mitigation hints to let the orchestrator know what has
triggered the request. In particular, it is possible for something
that locally to one telemetry system looks like an attack is not
actually an attack when seen from the broader scope (e.g., of the
orchestrator)
Upon receipt of the DOTS mitigation request from the DDoS telemetry
system, the orchestrator DOTS server responds with an acknowledgment,
to avoid retransmission of the request for mitigation. The
orchestrator may begin collecting additional fine-grained and
specific information from various DDoS telemetry systems in order to
correlate the measurements and provide an analysis of the event.
Eventually, the orchestrator may ask for additional information from
the DDoS telemetry system; however, the collection of this
information is out of scope of DOTS.
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The orchestrator may be configured to start a DDoS Mitigation upon
approval from a network administrator. The analysis from the
orchestrator is reported to the network administrator via, for
example, a web interface. If the network administrator decides to
start the mitigation, the network administrator triggers the DDoS
mitigation request using, for example, a web interface of a DOTS
client communicating to the orchestrator DOTS server. This request
is expected to be associated with a context that provides sufficient
information to the orchestrator DOTS server to infer, elaborate and
coordinate the appropriate DDoS Mitigation.
Upon receiving a request to mitigate a DDoS attack aimed at a target,
the orchestrator may evaluate the volume of the attack as well as the
value that the target represents. The orchestrator may select the
DDoS Mitigation Service Provider based on the attack severity. It
may also coordinate the DDoS Mitigation performed by the DDoS
Mitigation Service Provider with some other tasks such as, for
example, moving the target to another network so new sessions will
not be impacted. The orchestrator requests a DDoS Mitigation by the
selected DDoS mitigation systems via its DOTS client, as described in
Section 3.1.
The orchestrator DOTS client is notified that the DDoS Mitigation is
effective by the selected DDoS mitigation systems. The orchestrator
DOTS server returns this information back to the network
administrator.
Similarly, when the DDoS attack has stopped, the orchestrator DOTS
client is notified and the orchestrator's DOTS server indicates to
the DDoS telemetry systems as well as to the network administrator
the end of the DDoS Mitigation.
In addition to the above DDoS Orchestration, the selected DDoS
mitigation system can return back a mitigation request to the
orchestrator as an offloading. For example, when the DDoS attack
becomes severe and the DDoS mitigation system's utilization rate
reaches its maximum capacity, the DDoS mitigation system can send
mitigation requests with additional hints such as its blocked traffic
information to the orchestrator. Then the orchestrator can take
further actions such as requesting forwarding nodes such as routers
to filter the traffic. In this case, the DDoS mitigation system
implements a DOTS client while the orchestrator implements a DOTS
server. Similar to other DOTS use cases, the offloading scenario
assumes that some validation checks are followed by the DMS, the
orchestrator, or both (e.g., avoid exhausting the resources of the
forwarding nodes or inadvertent disruption of legitimate services).
These validation checks are part of the mitigation, and are therefore
out of the scope of the document.
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4. Security Considerations
The document does not describe any protocol, though there are still a
few high-level security considerations to discuss.
DOTS is at risk from three primary attacks: DOTS agent impersonation,
traffic injection, and signaling blocking.
Impersonation and traffic injection mitigation can be mitigated
through current secure communications best practices including mutual
authentication. Preconfigured mitigation steps to take on the loss
of keepalive traffic can partially mitigate signal blocking, but in
general it is impossible to comprehensively defend against an
attacker that can selectively block any or all traffic. Alternate
communication paths that are (hopefully) not subject to blocking by
the attacker in question is another potential mitigation.
Additional details of DOTS security requirements can be found in
[RFC8612].
Service disruption may be experienced if inadequate mitigation
actions are applied. These considerations are out of the scope of
DOTS.
5. IANA Considerations
No IANA considerations exist for this document.
6. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank among others Tirumaleswar Reddy;
Andrew Mortensen; Mohamed Boucadair; Artyom Gavrichenkov; Jon
Shallow, Yuuhei Hayashi, Elwyn Davies, the DOTS WG chairs, Roman
Danyliw and Tobias Gondrom as well as the Security AD Benjamin Kaduk
for their valuable feedback.
We also would like to thank Stephan Fouant that was part of the
initial co-authors of the documents.
7. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dots-multihoming]
Boucadair, M., Reddy.K, T., and W. Pan, "Multi-homing
Deployment Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-
Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)", draft-ietf-dots-
multihoming-04 (work in progress), May 2020.
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[RFC8612] Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open
Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8612, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8612>.
[RFC8782] Reddy.K, T., Ed., Boucadair, M., Ed., Patil, P.,
Mortensen, A., and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-
Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel
Specification", RFC 8782, DOI 10.17487/RFC8782, May 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8782>.
[RFC8783] Boucadair, M., Ed. and T. Reddy.K, Ed., "Distributed
Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data
Channel Specification", RFC 8783, DOI 10.17487/RFC8783,
May 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8783>.
Authors' Addresses
Roland Dobbins
Arbor Networks
Singapore
EMail: rdobbins@arbor.net
Daniel Migault
Ericsson
8275 Trans Canada Route
Saint Laurent, QC 4S 0B6
Canada
EMail: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI 48237
USA
EMail: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com
Nik Teague
Iron Mountain Data Centers
UK
EMail: nteague@ironmountain.co.uk
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Liang Xia
Huawei
No. 101, Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
Nanjing
China
EMail: Frank.xialiang@huawei.com
Kaname Nishizuka
NTT Communications
GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku
Tokyo 108-8118
Japan
EMail: kaname@nttv6.jp
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