Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth
draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth
HTTPBIS D. Schinazi
Internet-Draft Google LLC
Intended status: Standards Track D. Oliver
Expires: 27 July 2024 Guardian Project
J. Hoyland
Cloudflare Inc.
24 January 2024
The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme
draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth-06
Abstract
Existing HTTP authentication schemes are probeable in the sense that
it is possible for an unauthenticated client to probe whether an
origin serves resources that require authentication. It is possible
for an origin to hide the fact that it requires authentication by not
generating Unauthorized status codes, however that only works with
non-cryptographic authentication schemes: cryptographic signatures
require a fresh nonce to be signed, and there is no existing way for
the origin to share such a nonce without exposing the fact that it
serves resources that require authentication. This document proposes
a new non-probeable cryptographic authentication scheme.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://httpwg.org/
http-extensions/draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth.html. Status
information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the HTTP Working Group
mailing list (mailto:ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at
https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/. Working Group
information can be found at https://httpwg.org/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/labels/unprompted-auth.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 July 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The Signature Authentication Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. TLS Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Computing the Authentication Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Key Exporter Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Key Exporter Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Signature Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Authentication Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. The k Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. The a Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. The p Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. The s Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.5. The v Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Non-Probeable Server Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Intermediary Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10.1. HTTP Authentication Schemes Registry . . . . . . . . . . 11
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
10.2. TLS Keying Material Exporter Labels . . . . . . . . . . 11
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
HTTP authentication schemes (see Section 11 of [HTTP]) allow origins
to restrict access for some resources to only authenticated requests.
While these schemes commonly involve a challenge where the origin
asks the client to provide authentication information, it is possible
for clients to send such information unprompted. This is
particularly useful in cases where an origin wants to offer a service
or capability only to "those who know" while all others are given no
indication the service or capability exists. Such designs rely on an
externally-defined mechanism by which keys are distributed. For
example, a company might offer remote employee access to company
services directly via its website using their employee credentials,
or offer access to limited special capabilities for specific
employees, while making discovering (probing for) such capabilities
difficult. Members of less well-defined communities might use more
ephemeral keys to acquire access to geography- or capability-specific
resources, as issued by an entity whose user base is larger than the
available resources can support (by having that entity metering the
availability of keys temporally or geographically).
While digital-signature-based HTTP authentication schemes already
exist ([HOBA]), they rely on the origin explicitly sending a fresh
challenge to the client, to ensure that the signature input is fresh.
That makes the origin probeable as it send the challenge to
unauthenticated clients. This document defines a new signature-based
authentication scheme that is not probeable.
1.1. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses the notation from Section 1.3 of [QUIC].
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
2. The Signature Authentication Scheme
This document defines the "Signature" HTTP authentication scheme. It
uses asymmetric cryptography. User agents possess a key ID and a
public/private key pair, and origin servers maintain a mapping of
authorized key IDs to their associated public keys.
The client uses a TLS keying material exporter to generate data to be
signed (see Section 4) then sends the signature using the
Authorization or Proxy-Authorization header field. The signature and
additional information are exchanged using authentication parameters
(see Section 5).
3. TLS Usage
This authentication scheme is only defined for uses of HTTP with TLS
[TLS]. This includes any use of HTTP over TLS as typically used for
HTTP/2 [HTTP/2], or HTTP/3 [HTTP/3] where the transport protocol uses
TLS as its authentication and key exchange mechanism [QUIC-TLS].
Because the TLS keying material exporter is only secure for
authentication when it is uniquely bound to the TLS session
[RFC7627], the Signature authentication scheme requires either one of
the following properties:
* The TLS version in use is greater or equal to 1.3 [TLS].
* The TLS version in use is 1.2 and the Extended Master Secret
extension [RFC7627] has been negotiated.
Clients MUST NOT use the Signature authentication scheme on
connections that do not meet one of the two properties above. If a
server receives a request that uses this authentication scheme on a
connection that meets neither of the above properties, the server
MUST treat the request as malformed.
4. Computing the Authentication Proof
The user agent computes the authentication proof using a TLS keying
material exporter [KEY-EXPORT] with the following parameters:
* the label is set to "EXPORTER-HTTP-Signature-Authentication"
* the context is set to the structure described in Section 4.1
* the exporter output length is set to 48 bytes (see Section 4.2)
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
4.1. Key Exporter Context
The TLS key exporter context is described in Figure 1:
Signature Algorithm (16),
Key ID Length (i),
Key ID (..),
Public Key Length (i),
Public Key (..),
Scheme Length (i),
Scheme (..),
Host Length (i),
Host (..),
Port (16),
Realm Length (i),
Realm (..),
Figure 1: Key Exporter Context Format
The key exporter context contains the following fields:
Signature Algorithm: The signature scheme sent in the s Parameter
(see Section 5.4).
Key ID: The key ID sent in the k Parameter (see Section 5.1).
Public Key: The public key used by the server to validate the
signature provided by the client (the encoding is described
below).
Scheme: The scheme for this request, encoded using the format of the
scheme portion of a URI as defined in Section 3.1 of [URI].
Host: The host for this request, encoded using the format of the
host portion of a URI as defined in Section 3.2.2 of [URI].
Port: The port for this request, encoded in network byte order.
Note that the port is either included in the URI, or is the
default port for the scheme in use; see Section 3.2.3 of [URI].
Realm: The real of authentication that is sent in the realm
authentication parameter (Section 11.5 of [HTTP]). If the realm
authentication parameter is not present, this SHALL be empty.
This document does not define a means for the origin to
communicate a realm to the client. If a client is not configured
to use a specific realm, it SHALL use an empty realm and SHALL NOT
send the realm authentication parameter.
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
The Signature Algorithm and Port fields are encoded as unsigned
16-bit integers in network byte order. The Key ID, Public Key,
Scheme, Host, and Real fields are length prefixed strings; they are
preceded by a Length field that represents their length in bytes.
These length fields are encoded using the variable-length integer
encoding from Section 16 of [QUIC] and MUST be encoded in the minimum
number of bytes necessary.
The encoding of the public key is determined by the Signature
Algorithm in use as follows:
RSASSA-PSS algorithms: The public key is an RSAPublicKey structure
[PKCS1] encoded in DER [X.690]. BER encodings which are not DER
MUST be rejected.
ECDSA algorithms: The public key is a
UncompressedPointRepresentation structure defined in
Section 4.2.8.2 of [TLS], using the curve specified by the
SignatureScheme.
EdDSA algorithms: The public key is the byte string encoding defined
in [EdDSA].
This document does not define the public key encodings for other
algorithms. In order for a SignatureScheme to be usable with the
Signature HTTP authentication scheme, its public key encoding needs
to be defined in a corresponding document.
4.2. Key Exporter Output
The key exporter output is 48 bytes long. Of those, the first 32
bytes are part of the input to the signature and the next 16 bytes
are sent alongside the signature. This allows the recipient to
confirm that the exporter produces the right values. This is
described in Figure 2:
Signature Input (256),
Verification (128),
Figure 2: Key Exporter Output Format
The key exporter context contains the following fields:
Signature Input: This is part of the data signed using the client's
chosen asymmetric private key (see Section 4.3).
Verification: The verification is transmitted to the server using
the v Parameter (see Section 5.5).
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
4.3. Signature Computation
Once the Signature Input has been extracted from the key exporter
output (see Section 4.2), it is prefixed with static data before
being signed to mitigate issues caused by key reuse. The signature
is computed over the concatenation of:
* A string that consists of octet 32 (0x20) repeated 64 times
* The context string "HTTP Signature Authentication"
* A single 0 byte which serves as a separator
* The Signature Input extracted from the key exporter output (see
Section 4.2)
For example, if the Signature Input has all its 32 bytes set to 01,
the content covered by the signature (in hexadecimal format) would
be:
2020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020
2020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020
48545450205369676E61747572652041757468656E7469636174696F6E
00
0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101
Figure 3: Example Content Covered by Signature
This constructions mirrors that of the TLS 1.3 CertificateVerify
message defined in Section 4.4.3 of [TLS].
The resulting signature is then transmitted to the server using the p
Parameter (see Section 5.3).
5. Authentication Parameters
This specification defines the following authentication parameters.
All of the byte sequences below are encoded using base64url (see
Section 5 of [BASE64]) without quotes and without padding. In other
words, these byte sequence authentication parameters values MUST NOT
include any characters other then ASCII letters, digits, dash and
underscore.
The integer below is encoded without a minus and without leading
zeroes. In other words, the integer authentication parameters value
MUST NOT include any characters other than digits, and MUST NOT start
with a zero unless the full value is "0".
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
Using the syntax from [ABNF]:
signature-byte-sequence-param-value = *( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_" )
signature-integer-param-value = %x31-39 1*4( DIGIT ) / "0"
Figure 4: Authentication Parameter Value ABNF
5.1. The k Parameter
The REQUIRED "k" (key ID) parameter is a byte sequence that
identifies which key the user agent wishes to use to authenticate.
This can for example be used to point to an entry into a server-side
database of known keys.
5.2. The a Parameter
The REQUIRED "a" (public key) parameter is a byte sequence that
contains the public key used by the server to validate the signature
provided by the client. This avoids key confusion issues (see
[SEEMS-LEGIT]). The encoding of the public key is described in
Section 4.1.
5.3. The p Parameter
The REQUIRED "p" (proof) parameter is a byte sequence that specifies
the proof that the user agent provides to attest to possessing the
credential that matches its key ID.
5.4. The s Parameter
The REQUIRED "s" (signature) parameter is an integer that specifies
the signature scheme used to compute the proof transmitted in the "p"
directive. Its value is an integer between 0 and 65535 inclusive
from the IANA "TLS SignatureScheme" registry maintained at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-
parameters.xhtml#tls-signaturescheme>.
5.5. The v Parameter
The REQUIRED "v" (verification) parameter is a byte sequence that
specifies the verification that the user agent provides to attest to
possessing the key exporter output (see Section 4.2 for details).
This avoids issues with signature schemes where certain keys can
generate signatures that are valid for multiple inputs (see
[SEEMS-LEGIT]).
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
6. Example
For example, the key ID "basement" authenticating using Ed25519
[ED25519] could produce the following header field:
NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792
Authorization: Signature \
k=YmFzZW1lbnQ, \
a=VGhpcyBpcyBh-HB1YmxpYyBrZXkgaW4gdXNl_GhlcmU, \
s=2055, \
v=dmVyaWZpY2F0aW9u_zE2Qg, \
p=SW5zZXJ0_HNpZ25hdHVyZSBvZiBub25jZSBoZXJlIHdo\
aWNoIHRha2VzIDUxMiBiaXRz-GZvciBFZDI1NTE5IQ
Figure 5: Example Header Field
7. Non-Probeable Server Handling
Servers that wish to introduce resources whose existence cannot be
probed need to ensure that they do not reveal any information about
those resources to unauthenticated clients. In particular, such
servers MUST respond to authentication failures with the exact same
response that they would have used for non-existent resources. For
example, this can mean using HTTP status code 404 (Not Found) instead
of 401 (Unauthorized). Such authentication failures can be caused
for example by:
* absence of the Authorization (or Proxy-Authorization) field
* failure to parse that field
* use of the Signature authentication scheme with an unknown key ID
* mismatch between key ID and provided public key
* failure to validate the verification parameter
* failure to validate the signature.
In order to validate the signature, the server needs to first parse
the field containing the signature, then look up the key ID in its
database of public keys, and finally perform the cryptographic
validation. These steps can take time, and an attacker could detect
use of this mechanism if that time is observable by comparing the
timing of a request for a known non-existent resource to the timing
of a request for a potentially authenticated resource. Servers can
mitigate this observability by slightly delaying responses to some
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
non-existent resources such that the timing of the authentication
verification is not observable. This delay needs to be carefully
considered to avoid having the delay itself leak the fact that this
origin uses this mechanism at all.
Non-probeable resources also need to be non-discoverable for
unauthenticated users. For example, if a server operator wishes to
hide an authenticated resource by pretending it does not exist to
unauthenticated users, then the server operator needs to ensure there
are no unauthenticated pages with links to that resource, and no
other out-of-band ways for unauthenticated users to discover this
resource.
8. Intermediary Considerations
Since the Signature HTTP authentication scheme leverages TLS keying
material exporters, its output cannot be transparently forwarded by
HTTP intermediaries. HTTP intermediaries that support this
specification have two options:
* The intermediary can validate the authentication received from the
client, then inform the upstream HTTP server of the presence of
valid authentication.
* The intermediary can export the Signature Input and Verification
(see Section 4.2}), and forward it to the upstream HTTP server,
then the upstream server performs the validation.
The mechanism for the intermediary to communicate this information to
the upstream HTTP server is out of scope for this document.
Note that both of these mechanisms require the upstream HTTP server
to trust the intermediary. This is usually the case because the
intermediary already needs access to the TLS certificate private key
in order to respond to requests.
9. Security Considerations
The Signature HTTP authentication scheme allows a user agent to
authenticate to an origin server while guaranteeing freshness and
without the need for the server to transmit a nonce to the user
agent. This allows the server to accept authenticated clients
without revealing that it supports or expects authentication for some
resources. It also allows authentication without the user agent
leaking the presence of authentication to observers due to clear-text
TLS Client Hello extensions.
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
The authentication proofs described in this document are not bound to
individual HTTP requests; if the key is used for authentication
proofs on multiple requests on the same connection, they will all be
identical. This allows for better compression when sending over the
wire, but implies that client implementations that multiplex
different security contexts over a single HTTP connection need to
ensure that those contexts cannot read each other's header fields.
Otherwise, one context would be able to replay the Authorization
header field of another. This constraint is met by modern Web
browsers. If an attacker were to compromise the browser such that it
could access another context's memory, the attacker might also be
able to access the corresponding key, so binding authentication to
requests would not provide much benefit in practice.
Key material used for the Signature HTTP authentication scheme MUST
NOT be reused in other protocols. Doing so can undermine the
security guarantees of the authentication.
Origins offering this scheme can link requests that use the same key.
However, requests are not linkable across origins if the keys used
are specific to the individual origins using this scheme.
10. IANA Considerations
10.1. HTTP Authentication Schemes Registry
This document, if approved, requests IANA to register the following
entry in the "HTTP Authentication Schemes" Registry maintained at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-authschemes>:
Authentication Scheme Name: Signature
Reference: This document
Notes: None
10.2. TLS Keying Material Exporter Labels
This document, if approved, requests IANA to register the following
entry in the "TLS Exporter Labels" registry maintained at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters#exporter-labels>:
Value: EXPORTER-HTTP-Signature-Authentication
DTLS-OK: N
Recommended: Y
Reference: This document
11. References
11.1. Normative References
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
[ABNF] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5234>.
[BASE64] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.
[EdDSA] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032>.
[FOLDING] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
"Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8792>.
[HTTP] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[KEY-EXPORT]
Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5705>.
[PKCS1] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017>.
[QUIC] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
[RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A.,
Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension",
RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7627>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[TLS] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[URI] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986>.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding Rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021 , February 2021.
11.2. Informative References
[ED25519] Josefsson, S. and J. Schaad, "Algorithm Identifiers for
Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", RFC 8410,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8410, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8410>.
[HOBA] Farrell, S., Hoffman, P., and M. Thomas, "HTTP Origin-
Bound Authentication (HOBA)", RFC 7486,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7486, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7486>.
[HTTP/2] Thomson, M., Ed. and C. Benfield, Ed., "HTTP/2", RFC 9113,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9113, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9113>.
[HTTP/3] Bishop, M., Ed., "HTTP/3", RFC 9114, DOI 10.17487/RFC9114,
June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9114>.
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
[MASQUE-ORIGINAL]
Schinazi, D., "The MASQUE Protocol", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-schinazi-masque-00, 28 February
2019, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
schinazi-masque-00>.
[QUIC-TLS] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure
QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9001>.
[SEEMS-LEGIT]
Jackson, D., Cremers, C., Cohn-Gordon, K., and R. Sasse,
"Seems Legit: Automated Analysis of Subtle Attacks on
Protocols That Use Signatures", CCS '19: Proceedings of
the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pp. 2165–2180,
DOI 10.1145/3319535.3339813, 2019,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3339813>.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank many members of the IETF community,
as this document is the fruit of many hallway conversations. In
particular, the authors would like to thank David Benjamin, Nick
Harper, Dennis Jackson, Ilari Liusvaara, François Michel, Lucas
Pardue, Justin Richer, Ben Schwartz, Martin Thomson, and Chris
A. Wood for their reviews and contributions. The mechanism described
in this document was originally part of the first iteration of MASQUE
[MASQUE-ORIGINAL].
Authors' Addresses
David Schinazi
Google LLC
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
United States of America
Email: dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com
David M. Oliver
Guardian Project
Email: david@guardianproject.info
URI: https://guardianproject.info
Jonathan Hoyland
Cloudflare Inc.
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft The Signature HTTP Authentication Scheme January 2024
Email: jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com
Schinazi, et al. Expires 27 July 2024 [Page 15]
