Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy
Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft Qrator Labs & Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov
Expires: 3 October 2022 Qrator Labs
R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
K. Patel
Arrcus
K. Sriram
USA NIST
1 April 2022
Route Leak Prevention and Detection using Roles in UPDATE and OPEN
Messages
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-24
Abstract
Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes that violate
assumptions of BGP topology relationships, e.g., announcing a route
learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or a
lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer or announcing a route learned from
one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit provider.
These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent BGP route
filtering or lack of coordination between autonomous systems (ASes).
Existing approaches to leak prevention rely on marking routes by
operator configuration, with no check that the configuration
corresponds to that of the eBGP neighbor, or enforcement that the two
eBGP speakers agree on the peering relationship. This document
enhances the BGP OPEN message to establish an agreement of the
peering relationship on each eBGP session between autonomous systems
in order to enforce appropriate configuration on both sides.
Propagated routes are then marked according to the agreed
relationship, allowing both prevention and detection of route leaks.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 October 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. BGP Role Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Role Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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1. Introduction
Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes that violate
assumptions of BGP topology relationships, e.g., announcing a route
learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or a
lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer or announcing a route learned from
one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit provider
[RFC7908]. These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent
BGP route filtering or lack of coordination between autonomous
systems (ASes).
Existing approaches to leak prevention rely on marking routes by
operator configuration, with no check that the configuration
corresponds to that of the eBGP neighbor, or enforcement that the two
eBGP speakers agree on the relationship. This document enhances the
BGP OPEN message to establish an agreement of the relationship on
each eBGP session between autonomous systems in order to enforce
appropriate configuration on both sides. Propagated routes are then
marked according to the agreed relationship, allowing both prevention
and detection of route leaks.
This document specifies a means of replacing the operator-driven
configuration-based method of route leak prevention, described above,
with an in-band method for route leak prevention and detection.
This method uses a new configuration parameter, BGP Role, which is
negotiated using a BGP Role Capability in the OPEN message [RFC5492].
An eBGP speaker may require the use of this capability and
confirmation of BGP Role with a neighbor for the BGP OPEN to succeed.
An optional, transitive BGP Path Attribute, called Only to Customer
(OTC), is specified in Section 4. It prevents ASes from creating
leaks and detects leaks created by the ASes in the middle of an AS
path. The main focus/applicability is the Internet (IPv4 and IPv6
unicast route advertisements).
2. Terminology
The terms "local AS" and "remote AS" are used to refer to the two
ends of an eBGP session. The "local AS" is the AS where the protocol
action being described is to be performed, and "remote AS" is the AS
at the other end of the eBGP session in consideration.
The use of the term "route is ineligible" in this document has the
same meaning as in [RFC4271], i.e., "route is ineligible to be
installed in Loc-RIB and will be excluded from the next phase of
route selection."
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2.1. Peering Relationships
The terms for peering relationships defined and used in this document
(see below) do not necessarily represent business relationships based
on payment agreements. These terms are used to represent
restrictions on BGP route propagation, sometimes known as the Gao-
Rexford model [Gao]. The terms Provider, Customer, and Peer used
here are synonymous to the terms "transit provider", "customer", and
"lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer", respectively, used in [RFC7908].
The following is a list of BGP Roles for eBGP peering and the
corresponding rules for route propagation:
Provider: MAY propagate any available route to a Customer.
Customer: MAY propagate any route learned from a Customer, or
locally originated, to a Provider. All other routes MUST NOT be
propagated.
Route Server (RS): MAY propagate any available route to a Route
Server Client (RS-Client).
Route Server Client (RS-Client): MAY propagate any route learned
from a Customer, or locally originated, to an RS. All other
routes MUST NOT be propagated.
Peer: MAY propagate any route learned from a Customer, or locally
originated, to a Peer. All other routes MUST NOT be propagated.
If the local AS has one of the above Roles (in the order shown), then
the corresponding peering relationship with the remote AS is
Provider-to-Customer, Customer-to-Provider, RS-to-RS-Client, RS-
Client-to-RS, or Peer-to-Peer (i.e., lateral peers), respectively.
These are called normal peering relationships.
If the local AS has more than one peering role with the remote AS
such peering relation is called Complex. An example is when the
peering relationship is Provider-to-Customer for some prefixes while
it is Peer-to-Peer for other prefixes [Gao].
A BGP speaker may apply policy to reduce what is announced, and a
recipient may apply policy to reduce the set of routes they accept.
Violation of the route propagation rules listed above may result in
route leaks [RFC7908]. Automatic enforcement of these rules should
significantly reduce route leaks that may otherwise occur due to
manual configuration mistakes.
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As specified in Section 4, the Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute is
used to identify all the routes in the AS that have been received
from a Peer, Provider, or RS.
3. BGP Role
The BGP Role characterizes the relationship between the eBGP speakers
forming a session. One of the Roles described below SHOULD be
configured at the local AS for each eBGP session (see definitions in
Section 2) based on the local AS's knowledge of its Role. The only
exception is when the eBGP connection is Complex (see Section 5).
BGP Roles are mutually confirmed using the BGP Role Capability
(described in Section 3.1) on each eBGP session.
Allowed Roles for eBGP sessions are:
* Provider - the local AS is a transit Provider of the remote AS;
* Customer - the local AS is a transit Customer of the remote AS;
* RS - the local AS is a Route Server (usually at an Internet
exchange point) and the remote AS is its RS-Client;
* RS-Client - the local AS is a client of an RS and the RS is the
remote AS;
* Peer - the local and remote ASes are Peers (i.e., have a lateral
peering relationship).
3.1. BGP Role Capability
The BGP Role Capability is defined as follows:
* Code - 9
* Length - 1 (octet)
* Value - integer corresponding to speaker's BGP Role (see Table 1).
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+=======+==============================+
| Value | Role name (for the local AS) |
+=======+==============================+
| 0 | Provider |
+-------+------------------------------+
| 1 | RS |
+-------+------------------------------+
| 2 | RS-Client |
+-------+------------------------------+
| 3 | Customer |
+-------+------------------------------+
| 4 | Peer (i.e., Lateral Peer) |
+-------+------------------------------+
| 5-255 | Unassigned |
+-------+------------------------------+
Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values
If BGP Role is locally configured, the eBGP speaker MUST advertise
BGP Role Capability in the BGP OPEN message. An eBGP speaker MUST
NOT advertise multiple versions of the BGP Role Capability. The
error handling when multiple BGP Role Capabilities are received is
described in Section 3.2.
3.2. Role Correctness
Section 3.1 described how BGP Role encodes the relationship on each
eBGP session between autonomous systems (ASes).
The mere receipt of BGP Role Capability does not automatically
guarantee the Role agreement between two eBGP neighbors. If the BGP
Role Capability is advertised, and one is also received from the
peer, the Roles MUST correspond to the relationships in Table 2. If
the Roles do not correspond, the BGP speaker MUST reject the
connection using the Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode
TBD).
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+===============+================+
| Local AS Role | Remote AS Role |
+===============+================+
| Provider | Customer |
+---------------+----------------+
| Customer | Provider |
+---------------+----------------+
| RS | RS-Client |
+---------------+----------------+
| RS-Client | RS |
+---------------+----------------+
| Peer | Peer |
+---------------+----------------+
Table 2: Allowed Pairs of Role
Capabilities
For backward compatibility, if the BGP Role Capability is sent but
one is not received, the BGP Speaker SHOULD ignore the absence of the
BGP Role Capability and proceed with session establishment. The
locally configured BGP Role is used for the procedures described in
Section 4.
An operator may choose to apply a "strict mode" in which the receipt
of a BGP Role Capability from the remote AS is required. When
operating in the "strict mode", if the BGP Role Capability is sent,
but one is not received, then the connection is rejected using the
Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode TBD). See comments in
Section 7.
If an eBGP speaker receives multiple but identical BGP Role
Capabilities with the same value in each, then the speaker considers
them to be a single BGP Role Capability and proceeds [RFC5492]. If
multiple BGP Role Capabilities are received and not all of them have
the same value, then the BGP speaker MUST reject the connection using
the Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode TBD).
The BGP Role value for the local AS (in conjunction with the OTC
Attribute in the received UPDATE message) is used in the route leak
prevention and detection procedures described in Section 4.
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4. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute
The Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute is an optional transitive path
attribute of the UPDATE message with Attribute Type Code 35 and a
length of 4 octets. The purpose of this attribute is to enforce that
once a route is sent to a Customer, Peer, or RS-Client (see
definitions in Section 2.1), it will subsequently go only to
Customers. The attribute value is an AS number (ASN) determined by
the procedures described below.
The following ingress procedure applies to the processing of the OTC
Attribute on route receipt:
1. If a route with the OTC Attribute is received from a Customer or
RS-Client, then it is a route leak and MUST be considered
ineligible (see Section 2).
2. If a route with the OTC Attribute is received from a Peer (i.e.,
remote AS with a Peer Role) and the Attribute has a value that is
not equal to the remote (i.e., Peer's) AS number, then it is a
route leak and MUST be considered ineligible.
3. If a route is received from a Provider, Peer, or RS, and the OTC
Attribute is not present, then it MUST be added with a value
equal to the AS number of the remote AS.
The following egress procedure applies to the processing of the OTC
Attribute on route advertisement:
1. If a route is to be advertised to a Customer, Peer, or RS-Client
(when the sender is an RS), and the OTC Attribute is not present,
then when advertising the route, an OTC Attribute MUST be added
with a value equal to the AS number of the local AS.
2. If a route already contains the OTC Attribute, it MUST NOT be
propagated to Providers, Peers, or RS(s).
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The above-described procedures provide both leak prevention for the
local AS and leak detection and mitigation multiple hops away. In
the case of prevention at the local AS, the presence of an OTC
Attribute indicates to the egress router that the route was learned
from a Peer, Provider, or RS, and it can be advertised only to the
customers. The same OTC Attribute which is set locally also provides
a way to detect route leaks by an AS multiple hops away if a route is
received from a Customer, Peer, or RS-Client. For example, if an AS
sets the OTC Attribute on a route sent to a Peer and the route is
subsequently received by a compliant AS from a Customer, then the
receiving AS detects (based on the presence of the OTC Attribute)
that the route is a leak.
The OTC Attribute might be set at the egress of the remote AS or at
the ingress of the local AS, i.e., if the remote AS is non-compliant
with this specification, then the local AS will have to set the OTC
Attribute if it is absent. In both scenarios, the OTC value will be
the same. This makes the scheme more robust and benefits early
adopters.
The OTC Attribute is considered malformed if the length value is not
4. An UPDATE message with a malformed OTC Attribute SHALL be handled
using the approach of "treat-as-withdraw" [RFC7606].
The BGP Role negotiation and OTC Attribute based procedures specified
in this document are NOT RECOMMENDED to be used between autonomous
systems in an AS Confederation [RFC5065]. If an OTC Attribute is
added on egress from the AS Confederation, its value MUST equal the
AS Confederation Identifier. Also, on egress from the AS
Confederation, an UPDATE MUST NOT contain an OTC Attribute with a
value corresponding to any Member-AS Number other than the AS
Confederation Identifier.
The procedures specified in this document in scenarios that use
private AS numbers behind an Internet-facing ASN (e.g., a data center
network [RFC7938] or stub customer) may be used, but any details are
outside the scope of this document. On egress from the Internet-
facing AS, the OTC Attribute MUST NOT contain a value other than the
Internet-facing ASN.
Once the OTC Attribute has been set, it MUST be preserved unchanged
(this also applies to an AS Confederation).
The described ingress and egress procedures are applicable only for
the address families AFI 1 (IPv4) and AFI 2 (IPv6) with SAFI 1
(unicast) in both cases and MUST NOT be applied to other address
families by default. The operator MUST NOT have the ability to
modify the procedures defined in this section.
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5. Additional Considerations
Roles MUST NOT be configured on an eBGP session with a Complex
peering relationship. If multiple eBGP sessions can segregate the
Complex peering relationship into eBGP sessions with normal peering
relationships, BGP Roles SHOULD be used on each of the resulting eBGP
sessions.
An operator may want to achieve an equivalent outcome by configuring
policies on a per-prefix basis to follow the definitions of peering
relations as described in Section 2.1. However, in this case, there
are no in-band measures to check the correctness of the per-prefix
peering configuration.
The incorrect setting of BGP Roles and/or OTC Attributes may affect
prefix propagation. Further, this document does not specify any
special handling of an incorrect AS number in the OTC Attribute.
In AS migration scenarios [RFC7705], a given router may represent
itself as any one of several different ASes. This should not be a
problem since the egress procedures in Section 4 specify that the OTC
Attribute is to be attached as part of route transmission.
Therefore, a router is expected to set the OTC value equal to the ASN
it is currently representing itself as.
Section 6 of [RFC7606] documents possible negative impacts of "treat-
as-withdraw" behavior. Such negative impacts may include forwarding
loops or blackholes. It also discusses debugging considerations
related to this behavior.
6. IANA Considerations
IANA has registered a new BGP Capability (Section 3.1) in the
"Capability Codes" registry's "IETF Review" range [RFC5492]. The
description for the new capability is "BGP Role". IANA has assigned
the value 9 [to be removed upon publication:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/capability-
codes.xhtml]. This document is the reference for the new capability.
The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is
requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role
Value" in the Capability Codes registry. Assignments consist of a
Value and a corresponding Role name. Initially, this registry is to
be populated with the data contained in Table 1 found in Section 3.1.
Future assignments may be made by the "IETF Review" policy as defined
in [RFC8126]. The registry is as shown in Table 3.
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+=======+===============================+===============+
| Value | Role name (for the local AS) | Reference |
+=======+===============================+===============+
| 0 | Provider | This document |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
| 1 | RS | This document |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
| 2 | RS-Client | This document |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
| 3 | Customer | This document |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
| 4 | Peer (i.e., Lateral Peer) | This document |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
| 5-255 | To be assigned by IETF Review | |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
Table 3: IANA Registry for BGP Role
IANA has registered a new OPEN Message Error subcode named the "Role
Mismatch" (see Section 3.2) in the OPEN Message Error subcodes
registry. IANA has assigned the value 11 [to be removed upon
publication: https://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters/bgp-
parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6]. This document is the reference
for the new subcode.
Due to improper use of the values 8, 9, and 10 in the OPEN Message
Error subcodes registry, this document requested IANA to mark these
values as "Deprecated". IANA has marked values 8-10 as "Deprecated"
in the OPEN Message Error subcodes registry. This document is listed
as the reference.
IANA has also registered a new path attribute named "Only to Customer
(OTC)" (see Section 4) in the "BGP Path Attributes" registry. IANA
has assigned code value 35 [To be removed upon publication:
http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters/bgp-
parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-2]. This document is the reference
for the new attribute.
7. Security Considerations
The security considerations of BGP (as specified in [RFC4271] and
[RFC4272]) apply.
This document proposes a mechanism using BGP Role for the prevention
and detection of route leaks that are the result of BGP policy
misconfiguration. A misconfiguration of the BGP Role may affect
prefix propagation. For example, if a downstream (i.e., towards a
Customer) peering link were misconfigured with a Provider or Peer
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Role, this will limit the number of prefixes that can be advertised
in this direction. On the other hand, if an upstream provider were
misconfigured (by a local AS) with the Customer Role, this may result
in propagating routes that are received from other Providers or
Peers. But the BGP Role negotiation and the resulting confirmation
of Roles make such misconfigurations unlikely.
Setting the strict mode of operation for BGP Role negotiation as the
default may result in a situation where the eBGP session will not
come up after a software update. Implementations with such default
behavior are strongly discouraged.
Removing the OTC Attribute or changing its value can limit the
opportunity for route leak detection. Such activity can be done on
purpose as part of an on-path attack. For example, an AS can remove
the OTC Attribute on a received route and then leak the route to its
transit provider. This kind of threat is not new in BGP and it may
affect any Attribute (Note: BGPsec [RFC8205] offers protection only
for the AS_PATH Attribute).
Adding an OTC Attribute when the route is advertised from Customer to
Provider will limit the propagation of the route. Such a route may
be considered as ineligible by the immediate Provider or its Peers or
upper layer Providers. This kind of OTC Attribute addition is
unlikely to happen on the Provider side because it will limit the
traffic volume towards its Customer. On the Customer side, adding an
OTC Attribute for traffic engineering purposes is also discouraged
because it will limit route propagation in an unpredictable way.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5065, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5065>.
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[RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February
2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>.
[RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.
[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
8.2. Informative References
[Gao] Gao, L. and J. Rexford, "Stable Internet routing without
global coordination", IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking, Volume 9, Issue 6, pp 689-692, DOI
10.1109/90.974523, December 2001,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/974523>.
[RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>.
[RFC7705] George, W. and S. Amante, "Autonomous System Migration
Mechanisms and Their Effects on the BGP AS_PATH
Attribute", RFC 7705, DOI 10.17487/RFC7705, November 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7705>.
[RFC7938] Lapukhov, P., Premji, A., and J. Mitchell, Ed., "Use of
BGP for Routing in Large-Scale Data Centers", RFC 7938,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7938, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7938>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
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Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Alvaro Retana, Bruno Decraene, Jeff Haas,
John Scudder, Sue Hares, Ben Maddison, Andrei Robachevsky, Daniel
Ginsburg, Ruediger Volk, Pavel Lunin, Gyan Mishra, and Ignas Bagdonas
for review, comments, and suggestions during the course of this work.
Thanks are also due to many IESG reviewers whose comments greatly
helped improve the clarity, accuracy, and presentation in the
document.
Contributors
Brian Dickson
Independent
Email: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com
Doug Montgomery
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
Email: dougm@nist.gov
Authors' Addresses
Alexander Azimov
Qrator Labs & Yandex
Ulitsa Lva Tolstogo 16
Moscow
119021
Russian Federation
Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com
Eugene Bogomazov
Qrator Labs
1-y Magistralnyy tupik 5A
Moscow
123290
Russian Federation
Email: eb@qrator.net
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com
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Keyur Patel
Arrcus
2077 Gateway Place, Suite #400
San Jose, CA 95119
United States of America
Email: keyur@arrcus.com
Kotikalapudi Sriram
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
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Azimov, et al. Expires 3 October 2022 [Page 15]
