Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-inch-rid
draft-ietf-inch-rid
Extended Incident Handling Working Group Kathleen M. Moriarty
draft-ietf-inch-rid-08.txt MIT Lincoln Laboratory
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Incident Handling:
Real-time Inter-network Defense
Status of this Memo
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
Network security incidents, such as system compromises, worms,
viruses, phishing incidents, and denial of service (DoS), typically
result in the loss of service, data, and resources both human and
system. Network Providers (NPs) need to be equipped and ready to
assist in communicating and tracing security incidents with tools
and procedures in place before the occurrence of an attack. This
paper outlines a proactive inter-network communication method to
facilitate sharing incident handling data and integrate existing
tracing mechanisms across NP boundaries to identify the source(s)
of an attack. The various methods implemented to detect and trace
attacks must be coordinated on the NPs' network as well as provide
a communication mechanism across network borders. It is imperative
that NPs have quick communication methods defined to enable
neighboring NPs to assist in reporting or tracking a security
incident across networks. A complete solution integrating incident
detection, source identification, reporting and communication
capabilities, and methods to stop attack traffic is necessary to
attain higher security levels on networks. Policy guidelines for
handling incidents are recommended and can be agreed upon by a
consortium using the security recommendations and considerations.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Status of this Memo ................................................ 1
Abstract ........................................................... 1
1. Introduction .................................................... 4
1.1 Overview of Attack Types ................................... 5
2. Recommended Network Provider (NP) Technologies .................. 7
3. Characteristics of Attacks ...................................... 8
3.1 Tracing a Distributed Attack ............................... 10
3.1.1 Tracing Security Incidents ........................... 10
3.2 Trace Approaches ........................................... 11
3.2.1 Trace Approach via Traffic Flow Analysis ............. 11
3.2.2 Trace Approach via Hash-Based IP Traceback ........... 12
3.2.3 IP Marking ........................................... 13
3.2.4 Superset of Packet Information for Traces ............ 14
4. Communication Between Network Providers ......................... 15
4.1 Inter-Network Provider RID Messaging ....................... 16
4.2 RID Network Topology ....................................... 18
4.3 Message Formats ............................................ 19
4.3.1 RID Messages and Transport ........................... 19
4.3.2 RID Data Types ....................................... 20
4.3.3 IODEF-Document ...................................... 20
4.3.4 IODEF-RID Schema ..................................... 20
4.3.4.1 NPPath Class ................................... 23
4.3.4.2 TraceStatus Class .............................. 24
4.3.4.3 IncidentSource Class ........................... 25
4.3.4.4 RIDPolicy ..................................... 26
4.4 RID Documents Defined by Message Type Derived from IODEF ... 29
4.4.1 TraceRequest ......................................... 32
4.4.2 TraceAuthorization Message ........................... 32
4.4.3 Result Message ....................................... 33
4.4.4 Investigation Message Request ........................ 35
4.4.5 Report Message ....................................... 36
4.4.6 IncidentQuery ........................................ 37
4.5 RID Communication Exchanges ................................ 38
4.5.1 Upstream Trace Communication Flow .................... 38
4.5.1.1 RID TraceRequest Example ....................... 39
4.5.2 Investigation Request Communication Flow ............. 43
4.5.2.1 Example Investigation Request .................. 44
4.5.3 Report Communication ................................. 45
4.5.3.1 Report Example ................................. 45
4.5.4 IncidentQuery Communication Flow ..................... 46
4.5.4.1 IncidentQuery Example .......................... 46
5. RID Schema Definition ........................................... 48
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6. Message Transport ............................................... 52
6.1 Message Delivery Protocol - Integrity and Authentication ... 52
6.2 Transport Communication .................................... 53
6.3 Authentication of RID Protocol ............................. 53
6.4 Authentication Considerations for a Multi-hop TraceRequest . 54
6.4.1 Public Key Infrastructures and Consortiums ........... 55
6.5 Privacy Concerns and System Use Guidelines ................. 56
7. Security Considerations ......................................... 60
8. IANA Considerations ............................................. 62
9. Summary ......................................................... 62
10. References ..................................................... 64
10.1 Acknowledgements .......................................... 67
10.2 Author Information ........................................ 67
Intellectual Property Statement .................................... 67
Disclaimer of Validity ............................................. 68
Copyright Statement ................................................ 68
Sponsor Information ................................................ 68
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1. Introduction
Incident handling involves the detection and identification of the
source of an attack, whether it be a system compromise, socially
engineered phishing attack, or a denial of service attack. In
order to identify the source of an attack, there must be a way to
trace the attack traffic iteratively upstream through the network
to the source. In cases in which accurate records of an active
session between the victim system and the attacker or source
system are available, the source is easy to identify. The problem
of tracing incidents becomes more difficult when the source is
obscured or spoofed, logs are deleted, and the number of sources
is overwhelming.
Current approaches to mitigating the effects of security incidents
are aimed at identifying and filtering or rate-limiting packets
from attackers who seek to hide the origin of their attack by
source address spoofing from multiple locations. Measures can be
taken at network provider (NP) edge routers providing ingress,
egress, and broadcast filtering as a recommended best practice in
RFC2827.
Network providers have devised solutions, in-house or commercial,
to trace attacks across their backbone infrastructure to either
identify the source on their network or on the next upstream
network in the path to the source. Techniques, such as collecting
packets as traffic traverses the network, have been implemented to
provide the capability to trace attack traffic after an incident
has occurred. Other methods use packet-marking techniques or flow-
based traffic analysis to trace traffic across the network in real
time. The single-network trace mechanisms use similar information
across the individual networks to trace traffic. Problems may
arise when an attempt is made to have a trace continued through the
next upstream network since the trace mechanism and management may
vary.
In the case in which the traffic traverses multiple networks, there
is currently no established communication mechanism for continuing
the trace. If the next upstream network has been identified, a
phone call might be placed to contact the network administrators in
an attempt to have them continue the trace. A communication
mechanism is needed to facilitate the transfer of information to
continue traces accurately and efficiently to upstream networks.
The communication mechanism described in this paper, Real-time
Inter-network Defense (RID), takes into consideration the
information needed by various single network trace implementations
and the requirement for network providers to decide if a trace
request should be permitted to continue. The data in RID messages
will be represented in an Extensible Markup Language (XML) document
and is an extension of the Incident Data Exchange Format (IODEF)
model. By following this model, integration with other aspects of
the network for incident handling is simplified. Finally, methods
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are incorporated into the communication system to indicate what
actions need to be taken closest to the source in order to halt or
mitigate the effects of the attack at hand. RID is intended to
provide a method to communicate the relevant information between
NPs while being compatible with a variety of existing and possible
future detection tracing and response approaches.
Security and privacy considerations are of high concern since
potentially sensitive information may be passed through RID
messages. RID messaging will take advantage of XML security,
security, and privacy policy information set in the RID schema. The
RID schema acts as an XML envelope to support the communication of
IODEF documents for exchanging or tracing information security
incidents. RID messages will be encapsulated in a SOAP wrapper.
The authentication, integrity, and authorization features each
layer has to offer will be used to achieve the level of security
that is necessary. SOAP is used as a message wrapper to direct
messages appropriately, and the SOAP binding will be used with a
specific transport protocol with HTTPS set as the mandatory to
implement protocol and others are optional such as BEEP, S/MIME,
XML SNMP, and others.
1.1 Overview of Attack Types
RID messaging is intended for use in coordinating incident handling
to locate the source of an attack and stop or mitigate the effects
of the attack. The attack types include system or network
compromises, denial of service attacks, or other malicious network
traffic. RID is essentially a messaging system coordinating attack
detection, tracing mechanisms, and the incident handling responses
to locate the source of traffic. If a source address is spoofed, a
more detailed trace of a packet (RID TraceRequest) would be
required to locate the true source. If the source address is
valid, the incident handling may only involve the use of routing
information to determine what network provider is closest to the
source (RID Investigation request) and can assist with the
remediation. The type of RID message used to locate a source is
determined by the validity of the source address. RID message
types are discussed in section 4.3.
The CERT Coordination Center published a paper in October 2001
entitled, "Trends in Denial of Service Attack Technology"[19]. The
paper outlined the behavior of denial-of-service attacks of both
single-source and multiple-source origins. Denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks attempt to consume bandwidth, processing power, or system
resources for the purposes of denying use by normal users.
Bandwidth or processing power-based attacks may use variations on
these packets, such as altering the source address, port numbers,
or TCP options.
DoS attacks are characterized by large amounts of traffic destined
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for particular Internet locations and can originate from a single
or multiple sources. An attack from multiple sources is known as a
distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS). Because DDoS attacks
can originate from multiple sources, tracing such an attack can be
extremely difficult or nearly impossible. Many TraceRequests may
be required to accomplish the task and may require the use of
dedicated network resources to communicate incident handling
information to prevent a DoS against the RID system and network
used for tracing and remediation. Provisions are suggested to
reduce the load and prevent the same trace from occurring twice on
a single-network backbone discussed in section 4 on communication
between NPs. The attacks can be launched from systems across the
Internet unified in their efforts or by compromised systems
enlisted as "zombies" that are controlled by servers, thereby
providing anonymity to the controlling server of the attack. This
scenario may require multiple RID traces, one to locate the zombies
and an additional one to locate the controlling server. DDoS
attacks do not necessarily spoof the source of an attack since
there are a large number of source addresses, which make it
difficult to trace anyway. DDoS attacks can also originate from a
single system or a subset of systems that spoof the source address
in packet headers in order to mask the identity of the attack
source. In this case, an iterative trace through the upstream
networks in the path of the attack traffic may be required.
RID traces may also be used to locate a system used in an attack
to compromise another system. Compromising a system can be
accomplished through one of many attack vectors, using various
techniques from a remote host or through local privilege
escalation attempts. The attack may exploit a system or
application level vulnerability that may be the result of a design
flaw or a configuration issue. A compromised system, as described
above, can be used to later attack other systems. A single RID
Investigation Request may be used in this case since it is probable
that the source address is valid. Identifying the sources of
system compromises may be difficult since an attacker may access
the compromised system from various sources. The attacker may also
take measures to hide their tracks by deleting log files or by
accessing the system through a series of compromised hosts.
Iterative RID traces may be required for each of the compromised
systems used to obscure the source of the attack. If the source
address is valid, an Investigation request may be used in lieu of a
full RID TraceRequest.
System compromises may result from other security incident types
such as worms, Trojans, or viruses. It is often the case that an
incident goes unreported even if valid source address information
is available because it is difficult to take any action to mitigate
or stop the attack. Incident handling is a difficult task for an
NP and even at some client locations due to network size and
resource limitations.
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2. Recommended Network Provider (NP) Technologies
For the purpose of this document, a network provider (NP) shall be
defined as a backbone infrastructure manager of a network. The
network provider's Computer Security Incident Response Team shall
be referred to as the CSIRT. The backbone may be that of an
organization providing network (Internet or private) access to
commercial, personal, government, or educational institutions, or
the backbone provider of the connected network. The connected
network provider is an extension meant to include Intranet and
Extranet providers as well as instances such as a business or
educational institute's private network.
NPs typically manage and monitor their networks through a
centralized network management system (NMS). The acronym NMS will
be used to generically represent management servers on a network
used for the management of network resources and the integration of
RID messaging with other components of the network. This system
may provide functions such as trend analysis for bandwidth
utilization, report communication problems, and trigger a RID trace
across the network or communicate with a RID system that can
initiate a trace. The RID messaging system may be the same or a
system separate from the NMS that communicates with various aspects
of the network to coordinate incident response. The components of
the network that may be integrated through the RID messaging system
include attack or event detection, network tracing, and network
devices to stop the effects of an attack.
The detection of security incidents may rely on manual reporting,
automated intrusion detection tools, and variations in traffic
types or levels on a network. Intrusion detection systems (IDS)
may be integrated into the incident-handling systems to create
IODEF documents or RID messages to facilitate security incident
handling. IDSs monitor network traffic, analyzing packets to
determine if the traffic might be classified as malicious. If an
IDS detects malicious traffic, an analyst would determine the
validity and severity of the attack traffic and if a trace is
necessary. If the analyst determines a trace should be initiated,
an IODEF document with RID extensions could be created or the
necessary information sent to the RID messaging system in order to
create and track the attack traffic. Detection of a security
incident is outside the scope of this paper; however, it should be
possible to integrate detection methods with RID messaging.
Once a security incident has been identified, the information is
put into a RID message to integrate with the NP's single network
trace mechanism. RID messaging is intended to be flexible in order
to accommodate various trace systems currently in use as well as
those that may evolve with technology. RID is intended to
communicate the necessary information needed by a trace mechanism
to the next upstream NP in the path of a trace. Therefore, a RID
message must carry the superset of data required for all tracing
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systems. If possible, the trace may need to inspect packets to
determine a pattern, which could assist reverse path
identification. This may be accomplished by inspecting packet
header information such as the source and destination IP addresses,
ports, and protocol flags to determine if there is a way to
distinguish the packets being traced from other packets. A
description of the incident along with any available automated
trace data should trigger an alert to the NP's security team for
further investigation. The various technologies used to trace
traffic across a network are described in section 3.2.
Another area of integration is the ability to mitigate or stop
attack traffic once a source has been located. Any automated
solution should consider the possible side effects to the network.
A change control process or a central point for configuration
management might be used to ensure that the security of the network
and necessary functionality are maintained and that equipment
configuration changes are documented. Automated solutions may
depend upon the capabilities and current configuration management
solutions on a particular network. The solutions may be based on
authenticated and encrypted Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP) or Network Configuration Protocol (NETConf) access to
devices over an out-of-band connection or other similar
technologies.
3. Characteristics of Attacks
The goal of tracing a security incident may be to identify the
source or to find a point on the network as close to the origin of
the incident as possible. A security incident may be defined as a
system compromise, a worm or Trojan infection, or a single- or
multiple-source denial-of-service attack. Incident tracing can be
used to identify the source(s) of an attack in order to halt or
mitigate the undesired behavior. The communication system,
RID, described in this paper can be used to trace any type of
security incident and allows for actions to be taken when the
source of the attack or a point closer to the source has been
identified. The purpose of tracing an attack would be to halt or
mitigate the affects of the attack through methods such as
filtering or rate-limiting the traffic close to the source or
by using methods such as taking the host or network offline.
Care must also be taken to ensure the system is not abused and to
use proper analysis in determining if attack traffic is, in fact,
attack traffic at each NP along the path of a trace.
Tracing security incidents can be a difficult task since attackers
go to great lengths to obscure their identity. In the case of a
security incident, the true source might be identified through an
existing established connection to the attacker's point of origin.
However, the attacker may not connect to the compromised system for
a long period of time after the initial compromise or may access
the system through a series of compromised hosts spread across the
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network. Other methods of obscuring the source may include
targeting the host with the same attack from multiple sources using
both valid and spoofed source addresses. This tactic can be used
to compromise a machine and leave a difficult task of locating the
true origin for the administrators. DDoS attacks are also
difficult or nearly impossible to trace because of the nature of
the attack. Some of the difficulties in tracing these attacks
include the following:
O the attack originates from multiple sources;
O the attack may include various types of traffic meant to
consume server resources, such as a SYN flood attack without a
significant increase in bandwidth utilization;
O the type of traffic could include valid destination services,
which cannot be blocked since they are essential services to
business, such as DNS servers at an NP or HTTP requests sent to
an organization connected to the Internet;
O the attack may utilize varying types of packets including TCP,
UDP, ICMP, or other IP protocols;
O the attack may use a very small number of packets from any
particular source, thus making a trace after the fact nearly
impossible.
If the source(s) of the attack cannot be determined from IP address
information or tracing the increased bandwidth utilization, it may
be possible to trace the traffic based on the type of packets seen
by the client. In the case of packets with spoofed source
addresses, it is no longer a trivial task to identify the source of
an attack. In the case of an attack using valid source addresses,
methods such as the traceroute utility can be used to fairly
accurately identify the path of the traffic between the source and
destination of an attack. If the true source has been identified,
actions should be taken to halt or mitigate the effects of the
attack by reporting the incident to the NP or the upstream NP
closest to the source. In the case of a spoofed source address,
other methods can be used to trace back to the source of an attack.
The methods include packet filtering, packet hash comparisons, IP
marking techniques, ICMP traceback, and packet flow analysis. As
in the case of attack detection, tracing traffic across a single
network is a function that can be used with RID in order to provide
the networked ability to trace spoofed traffic to the source, while
RID provides all the necessary information to accommodate the
approach used on any single network to accomplish this task. RID
can also be used to report attack traffic close to the source where
the IP address used was determined to be valid.
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3.1 Tracing a Distributed Attack
Tracing a DDoS attack is a very difficult problem. Since DDoS
attacks may involve multiple sources with spoofed addresses, there
may only be a small amount of traffic from each of the originating
hosts. This makes it difficult to trace back to the sources. The
sources may also alternate the type of traffic and the master may
vary the sources from within the pool of sources launching the
attack. Because of the dynamic nature of the DDos attack,
immediate action would need to be taken to have any hope of
locating the origin(s) of the attack with a near real-time trace.
In order to identify a DoS attack or DDoS, a client may notify its
NP that it is currently under attack. Automated methods might
include statistical traffic analysis, which looks for
unexpected fluctuations in bandwidth or in the size and types of
packets sent between networks, hosts, or an IDS. There is
ongoing research in the area of detecting DoS and DDoS, and any
effective techniques could be integrated with the tracing
techniques described in this paper. Some research approaches
include methods that detect backscatter traffic [9], using a data
structure for bandwidth attack detection [10], and monitoring
congestion through packet retransmission information [11].
Once an attack is suspected, traces would have to quickly identify
the various sources of the attack. A generalized approach should
be used to trace back connections using packet header information
such as the destination IP address and any distinguishing header
values of the traffic seen during the attack. The information
collected, along with an example packet, would be used in a RID
message to communicate incident handling information between NPs.
3.1.1 Tracing Security Incidents
If a trace can identify the sources of a distributed attack,
blocking the sources at the NP level close to the attacker could
be an immediate action to stop the attack. In the case of a DDoS
attack, further information may be obtained from the attacking
computers as to the controller of the attack sending the zombies'
control information to carry out the attack. A similar example of
attack traffic with the possibility of multiple traces required
would be one in which an attacker compromised a series of systems
and accomplished hiding their source by logging into a string of
systems to launch the attack. This additional trace is beyond the
scope of this paper, but may use additional tracing mechanisms such
as sniffing the network to locate the controllers of the attack.
Finding a faster and more efficient way to trace multiple sources
of an attack is essential to mitigating DDoS attacks. The ability
to quickly relay and act upon the trace information gathered is
imperative to stopping attack traffic. Tracing multiple attack
paths can also cause additional stress on the network and does not
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scale well.
A CSIRT report might be generated in the form of an IODEF document
and then fed into a RID message or document to facilitate a trace
or multiple traces of attack traffic.
3.2 Trace Approaches
There have been many separate research initiatives to solve the
problem of tracing upstream packets to detect the true source of
attack traffic. Upstream packet tracing is currently confined to
the borders of a network or an NP's network. Traces require access
to network equipment and resources, thus potentially limiting a
trace to a specific network. Once a trace reaches the boundaries
of a network, the network manager or NP adjacent in the upstream
trace must be contacted in order to continue the trace. NPs have
been working on individual solutions to accomplish upstream tracing
within their own network environments. The tracing mechanisms
implemented thus far have included proprietary or custom solutions
requiring specific information such as IP packet header data, hash
values of the attack packets, or marked packets. Hash values are
used to compare a packet against a database of packets that have
passed through the network in the case of "Hash Based IP
Traceback"[7]. Other research solutions involve marking packets as
explained in "ICMP Traceback Messages"[8], "Practical Support for
IP Traceback" [14], and IP Marking [1]. The following sections
outline some available solutions for implementing traceback within
the confines of a network managed by a single entity. The single
network traceback solutions are discussed to determine the
information needed to accomplish an inter-network trace where
different solutions may be in place.
3.2.1 Trace Approach via Traffic Flow Analysis
Traffic flow analysis is used to monitor individual network traffic
streams, such as a single TCP session beginning with the SYN packet
and ending with the final FIN ACK in a session. There have been a
few efforts to standardize flow analysis for network management,
one through the traffic flow management MIB and another through
the IP Flow Information eXport (IPFIX) protocol. The "Traffic Flow
Management" RFC [RFC2720] was designed to provide management
information such as behavior models, capacity planning, network
performance, quality of service, and attribution of network usage
to system administrators. IPFIX is an IETF standard intended to
provide a uniform method of extracting flow information from
network devices. There are several competing standardized methods
for flow analysis; however, since they differ from each other, it
is difficult to generate standardized analysis tools. NetFlow
from Cisco [5] provides similar capabilities to the traffic flow
mib, except that it is specific to IP traffic and has already been
implemented for traffic management in commercial-off-the-shelf
equipment. Although NetFlow was developed by Cisco, it is also an
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open standard. The flow analysis in both implementations can
monitor with a capture filter on source and destination addresses
the number of packets and the count of bytes in each flow, the
originating interface of the traffic, and the upstream peer
information. The upstream peer information is essential to tracing
a spoofed packet back to the true origin.
There are several differences in the implementations and the
monitor and capture capabilities of the two flow analysis
implementations. NetFlow collects all packets and maintains the
following information on packet flows for later analysis:
O Source and destination IP address
O Source and destination TCP/User Datagram Protocol (UDP) ports
O Type of service (ToS)
O Packet and byte counts
O Start and end timestamps
O Input and output interface numbers
O TCP flags and encapsulated protocol (TCP/UDP)
O Routing information (next-hop address, source autonomous system
(AS) number, destination AS number, source prefix mask,
destination prefix mask)
Based on the information listed above, a spoofed packet can be
traced upstream through a network to either identify the true
source or the upstream peer. Various flow-based solutions have
been developed and implemented for use on a single backbone based
on flow analysis, and RID messaging must be able to support
existing and future solutions to trace attacks across multiple
networks. The AS number listed associated with a source IP address
is only valid if the source IP address is valid. The AS number in
this case cannot be trusted until the true source has been
identified.
3.2.2 Trace Approach via Hash-Based IP Traceback
BBN implemented a traceback solution that collects hashes of IP
packets across the network. The Hash-Based IP Traceback was
designed specifically to trace attack traffic and achieve the
following objectives:
O Trace attacks after specific flows of the attack have completed
O Reduce storage requirements needed to save traceable packet data
O Provide a secure method to store packet captures on the Internet
Hash-based IP traceback is another solution to provide the ability
to trace attack traffic. By capturing all packets across the
network and saving hash values for the IP header information that
does not get altered as it traverses the network, attacks can be
traced after the fact. Since hashes of IP header information are
stored instead of the actual header information, privacy
concerns are no longer an issue as might be the case with packet
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captures across the Internet. If a system used to store the
packet captures was compromised, the data could not be used to
identify which entities are "talking" to each other on the
Internet.
BBN also considered how traces could be performed across a single
network, for example an NP's backbone. The solution divides the
network up into regions, each with its own collection station.
The trace might be initiated at a particular collection station
where data for a specific router is stored. When the collection
station traces through its database for the matches of particular
hashes of IP packets, it follows the trace through the network
equipment for its own region. The collection station then
determines which bordering region was the next upstream source of
the attack, and the trace is continued at the next collection
agent. The trace continues until the source is identified or a
neighboring network is identified as the upstream source of the
attack. The upstream network must then be notified in some way in
order to continue the trace. The upstream network will require the
IP packet information in order to continue the trace. The
upstream provider will want to look at its network and resources
and decide if it would like to initiate a trace across its
network. A limited number of packets can be stored based on
resources and network traffic loads. RID is a possible solution
for communicating the upstream TraceRequest between bordering
networks.
3.2.3 IP Marking
The technique of IP Marking can be used more efficiently than
iterative trace mechanisms to trace attacks in which the source
address has been spoofed. This technique has been proposed
specifically in terms of tracing DoS attacks across a network.
All information is correlated at the end node or the target
where the packets received would have been marked probabilistically
along the path of the traffic. This method requires that routers
and other infrastructure equipment have the ability to mark packets
so that the path they took can be derived at the destination
address for the packets. Since all packets are not marked,
depending on the IP Marking scheme used, a number of similar
packets would have to be sent from a single source in order for it
to be identified. IP Marking alone may not be a complete answer
for tracing traffic, since an attacker could switch methods to send
very little data from any one host used in a DDoS attack, thus
making it unlikely that enough packets will be marked to find the
source of each stream. Integrating IP Marking with other
techniques may be the best answer to ensure the efficiency and
robustness of the system as a whole.
There are several ways in which the IP Marking approach may be
useful in integrating with RID. IP Marking may be used to
gather information about the path of the trace up to and including
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identifying the actual source. A peer closer to the source might
be identified if the IP Marking technique were not able to fully
reconstruct the path of the trace. In this instance, the trace
information could be sent to the closest point identified in the
path from the IP Marking technique, thus shortening the length of
time required to trace the traffic through the network. If a
source was identified, a RID Investigation Request might be used in
order to trigger a specific action to take place close to the
source to mitigate or stop the effects of the attack.
3.2.4 Superset of Packet Information for Traces
In order for network traffic to be traced across a network, an
example packet from the attack must be sent along with the
TraceRequest or Investigation request. According to the research
for Hash-based IP Traceback, all of the non-changing fields of an
IP header along with 8 bytes of payload are required to provide
enough information to uniquely trace the path of a packet. The
non-changing fields of the packet header and the 8 bytes of payload
are the superset of data required by most single-network tracing
systems used; limiting the shared data to the superset of the
packet header and 8 bytes of payload prevents the need for sharing
potentially sensitive information that may be contained in the
data portion of a packet.
The RecordItem class in the IODEF will be used to store a
hexadecimal formatted packet including all packet header
information plus 8 bytes of payload or the entire packet contents.
The above trace systems do not require a full packet, but it may be
useful in some cases, so the option is given to allow a full packet
to be included in the data model. Note: Previously, the packet
data was contained in a RID class called IPPacket. The IODEF data
model was extended in August 2005 to accomodate a packet of type
hexidecimal.
If a subset of a packet is used, the following guidelines should be
used to provide compatibility between RID systems. The complete
header MUST be provided so that all systems expect a full packet
header and can be properly parsed. The full content may be
provided, but at least 8 bytes must be included to conduct a
network trace. RID requires the first 28 bytes of an IP v4 packet
in order to perform a trace. The required number of bytes provides
the IP header in an IP v4 packet, which is 10 bytes long; the TCP/
UDP/ICMP header is also 10 bytes long, plus an additional 8 bytes
of payload to distinguish the packet for tracing purposes. RID
requires 48 bytes for an IP v6 packet in order to distinguish the
packet in a trace. The input mechanism should be flexible enough
to allow intrusion detection systems or packet sniffers to provide
the information. The system creating the RID message should also
use the packet information to populate the Incident class
information in order to avoid human error and also allow a system
administrator to override the automatically populated information.
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4. Communication Between Network Providers
Expediting the communication between NPs is essential when
responding to a security-related incident, which may cross network
access points (Internet backbones) between providers. As a result
of the urgency involved in this inter-NP security incident
communication, there must be an effective system in place to
facilitate the interaction. This communication policy or system
should involve multiple means of communication to avoid a single
point of failure. Email is one way to transfer information about
the incident, packet traces, etc. However, e-mail may not be
received in a timely fashion or be acted upon with the same urgency
as a phone call or other communication mechanism.
Each NP should dedicate a phone number to reach a member of the
security incident response team. The phone number could be
dedicated to inter-NP incident communications and must be a
hotline that provides a 24x7 live response. The phone line should
reach someone who would have either the authority and expertise or
the means to expedite the necessary action to investigate the
incident. This may be a difficult policy to establish at smaller
NPs due to resource limitations, so another solution may be
necessary. An outside group may be able to serve this function if
given the necessary access to the NPs network. The outside
resource should be able to mitigate or alleviate the financial
limitations and any lack of experienced resource personnel.
A technical solution to trace traffic across a single NP may
include homegrown or commercial systems in which RID messaging
must accommodate the input requirements. The network management
systems used on the NP's backbone to coordinate the trace across
the single network requires a method to accept and process RID
messages and relay trace requests to the system, as well as to wait
for responses from the system to continue the RID request process
as appropriate. In this scenario, each NP would maintain its own
RID system and integrate with a management station used for network
monitoring and analysis. An alternative for NPs lacking sufficient
resources may be to have a neutral third party with access to the
NP's network resources who could be used to perform the trace
functions. This could be a function of a central organization
operating as a computer response team for the Internet as a whole
or within a consortium that may be able to provide centralized
resources. Consortiums would consist of a group of NPs that agree
to participate in the RID communication protocol with an agreed-
upon policy and communication protocol facilitating the secure
transport of RID XML documents. Transport for RID messages will be
specified in a separate document.
The first method described prevents the need to permit access to
other network's equipment through the use of a standard messaging
mechanism to enable RID or NMSs to communicate trace information
to other networks in a consortium or in neighboring networks. The
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third party mentioned above may be used in this technical solution
to assist in facilitating traces through smaller NPs. The
messaging mechanism may be a logical or physical out-of-band
network to ensure the communication is secure and unaffected by the
state of the network under attack. The two management methods
would accommodate the needs of larger NPs to maintain full
management of their network, and the third party option could be
available to smaller NPs who lack the necessary human resources to
perform a trace. The first method enables the individual NPs to
involve their network operations staff to authorize the continuance
of a trace through their network via a notification and alerting
system. The out-of-band logical solution for messaging may be
permanent virtual circuits configured with a small amount of
bandwidth dedicated to RID communications between NPs.
The network used for the communication, out-of-band or protected
channels, would be direct communication links dedicated to the
transport of RID messages. The communication links would be direct
connections between network peers who have agreed upon use and
abuse policies through the use of a consortium. Consortiums might
be linked through policy comparisons and additional agreements to
form a larger web or iterative network of peers that correlates to
the traffic paths available over the larger web of networks. The
maintenance of the individual links will be the responsibility of
the two network peers hosting the link. Contact information, IP
addresses of RID systems and other information must be coordinated
between bilateral peers by a consortium and may use existing
databases, such as the Routing Arbitor. The security,
configuration, and confidence rating schemes of the RID messaging
peers must be negotiated by peers and must meet certain overall
requirements of the fully connected network (Internet, government,
education, etc.) through the peering and/or a consortium-based
agreement.
RID messaging established with clients of an NP may be negotiated
in a contract as part of a value-added service or through a service
level agreement. Further discussion is beyond the scope of this
document and may be more appropriately handled in network peering
or service level agreements.
Procedures for incident handling need to be established and well
known by anyone that may be involved in incident response. The
procedures should also contain contact information for internal
escalation procedures, as well as for external assistance groups
such as a CSIRT, CCCERT, GIAC, and the FBI.
4.1 Inter-Network Provider RID Messaging
In order to implement a messaging mechanism between RID
communication or NMS systems, a standard protocol and format is
required to ensure inter-operability between vendors. The messages
would have to meet several requirements in order to be meaningful
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as they traverse multiple networks. Real-time Inter-network
Defense (RID) provides the framework necessary for communication
between networks involved in the traceback and mitigation of a
security incident. Several message types described in section 4.3
are necessary to facilitate a trace across multiple networks. The
message types include the Report, IncidentQuery, TraceRequest,
TraceAuthorization, Result, and the Investigation request message.
The Report message is used when an incident is to be filed on a
RID system or associated database, where no further action is
required. An IncidentQuery message is used to request information
on a particular incident. A TraceRequest message is used when the
source of the traffic may have been spoofed. In that case, each
network provider in the upstream path who receives a trace request
will issue a trace across the network to determine the upstream
source of the traffic. The TraceAuthorization and Result messages
are used to communicate the status and result of a trace. The
Investigation request message would only involve the RID
communication systems along the path to the source of the traffic
and not the use of network trace systems. The Investigation
Request leverages the bilateral relationships or a consortium's
inter-connections to mitigate or stop problematic traffic close to
the source. Routes could determine the fastest path to a known
source IP address in the case of a Investigation Request. A
message sent between RID systems for a TraceRequest or an
Investigation Request to stop traffic at the source through a
bordering network would require the information enumerated below:
1. Enough information to enable the network administrators
to make a decision about the importance of continuing the trace.
2. The incident or IP packet information needed to carry out
the trace or investigation.
3. Contact information of the origin of the RID communication. The
contact information could be provided through the autonomous
system number [RFC1930] or NIC handle information listed in the
Registry for Internet Numbers or other Internet databases.
4. Network path information to help prevent any routing loops
through the network from perpetuating a trace. If a RID system
receives a TraceRequest containing its own information in the
path, the trace must cease and the RID system should generate an
alert to inform the network operations staff that a tracing loop
exists.
5. A unique identifier for a single attack should be used to
correlate traces to multiple sources in a DDoS attack.
Use of the communication network and the RID protocol must be
for pre-approved, authorized purposes only. It is the
responsibility of each participating party to adhere to guidelines
set forth in both a global use policy for this system and
one established though the peering agreements for each bilateral
peer or agreed-upon consortium guidelines. The purpose of such
policies is to avoid abuse of the system; the policies shall be
developed by a consortium of participating entities. The global
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policy may be dependent on the domain it operates under; for
example, a government network or a commercial network such as the
Internet would adhere to different guidelines to address the
individual concerns. Privacy issues must be considered in public
networks such as the Internet. Privacy issues are discussed in the
security section along with other requirements that must be agreed
upon by participating entities.
Traces must be legitimate security-related incidents and not used
for purposes such as sabotage or censorship. An example of such
abuse of the system would include a request to rate-limit
legitimate traffic to prevent information from being shared between
users on the Internet (restricting access to online versions of
papers) or restricting access from a competitor's product in order
to sabotage a business.
The RID system should be configurable to either require user input
or automatically continue traces. This feature would enable a
network manager to assess the available resources before continuing
a trace. A trace may cause adverse effects on a network. If the
confidence rating is low, it may not be in the Network Provider's
best interest to continue the trace. The confidence ratings must
adhere to the specifications for selecting the percentage used to
avoid abuse of the system. TraceRequests must be issued by
authorized individuals from the initiating network, set forth in
policy guidelines established through peering or SLA.
4.2 RID Network Topology
The most basic topology for communicating RID systems would be a
direct connection or a bilateral relationship as illustrated below.
__________ __________
| | | |
| RID |__________-------------___________| RID |
|_________| | NP Border | |________|
-------------
Figure 1: Direct Peer Topology
Within the consortium model, several topologies might be agreed
upon and used. One would leverage bilateral network peering
relationships of the members of the consortium. The peers for RID
would match that of routing peers and the logical network borders
would be used. This approach may be necessary for an iterative
trace where the source is unknown. The model would look like the
above diagram; however, there may be an extensive number of inter-
connections of bilateral relationships formed. Also within a
consortium model, it may be useful to establish an integrated mesh
of networks to pass RID messages. This may be beneficial when the
source address is known, and an interconnection may provide a
faster route to reach the closest upstream peer to the source of
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the attack traffic. An example is illustrated below.
_______ _______ ______
| | | | | |
__| RID |____-------------____| RID |____-------------____| RID |__
|_____| | NP Border | |_____| | NP Border | |_____|
| ------------- ------------- |
|_______________________________________________________|
Direct connection to network that is not an immediate network peer
Figure 2: Mesh Peer Topology
By using a fully meshed model in a consortium, broadcasting RID
requests would be possible, but not advisable. By broadcasting a
request, RID peers that may not have carried the attack traffic on
their network would be asked to perform a trace for the potential
of deceasing the time in which the true source was identified. As
a result, many networks would have utilized unnecessary resources
for a TraceRequest that may have also been unnecessary.
4.3 Message Formats
The following section describes the six RID message types which
are based on the IODEF model. The messages are generated and
received on RID communication systems on the NP's network. The
messages may originate from IODEF messages from intrusion detection
servers, CSIRTS, analysts, etc. A RID message uses the IODEF
framework with the RID extension, which is encapsulated in a SOAP
wrapper. Each RID message type, along with an example, is
described in the following sections.
4.3.1 RID Messages and Transport
The six RID message types follow:
1. TraceRequest. This message is sent to the RID system next in
the upstream trace. It is used to initiate a TraceRequest or to
continue a TraceRequest to an upstream network closer to the
source of the origin of the security incident.
2. TraceAuthorization. This message is sent to the initiating RID
system from each of the upstream NPs' RID systems to provide
information on the trace status in the current network.
3. Result. This message is sent to the initiating RID system
through the network of RID systems in the path of the trace as
notification that the source of the attack was located.
4. Investigation. This message type is used when the source of the
traffic is believed to be valid. The purpose of the Investigation
message request is to leverage the existing peer relationships in
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order to notify the network provider closest to the source of the
valid traffic of a security-related incident.
5. Report. This message is used to report a security incident,
for which no action is requested. This may be used for the purpose
of correlating attack information by CSIRTS, statistics and
trending information, etc.
6. IncidentQuery. This message is used to request information
about an incident or incident type from a trusted RID system. The
response is provided through the Report message.
When a system receives a RID message, it must be able to
determine the type of message and parse it accordingly. The
message type is specified in the RIDPolicy class. The RIDPolicy
class is also presented in the SOAP header to facilitate the
communication of security incident data to trace, investigate,
query, or report information security incident information. The
details of the SOAP wrapper are discussed in the SOAP document for
transport communications.
4.3.2 RID Data Types
RID is derived from the IODEF data model and inherits all of the
data types defined in the IODEF model.
4.3.3 IODEF-Document
The IODEF model will be followed as specified in RFCXXXX for each
of the RID message types. (The RFC number will replace the XXXX
when a number has been assigned for the document.) The RID schema
is used to define an XML envelope for IODEF documents to facilitate
RID communications. Each message type varies slightly in format
and purpose; hence, the requirements vary and will be specified for
each. All classes, elements, attributes, etc., that are defined in
the IODEF-Document are valid in the context of a RID message;
however, some listed as optional in IODEF are mandatory for RID as
defined in section 4.4. The IODEF model MUST be fully implemented
to ensure proper parsing of all RID messages.
Please see RFCxxxx for specific information on the IODEF-Document
requirements. (The RFC number will be defined when the document
becomes an RFC.)
4.3.4 IODEF-RID Schema
There are four classes included in the RID extension required to
facilitate RID communications. The NPPath class is used to list
out the path a trace has taken at the RID system or NP level; the
TraceStatus class is used to indicate the approval status of a
TraceRequest or Investigation request; the IncidentSource class is
used to report whether or not a source was found and to identify
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the source host(s) or network(s); and the RIDPolicy class provides
information on the agreed policies and specifies the type of
communication message being used.
The RID schema acts as an envelope for the IODEF schema to
facilitate RID communications. The intent in maintaining a
separate schema and not using the AdditionalData extension of IODEF
is the flexibility of sending messages between RID hosts.
Since RID is a separate schema that includes the IODEF schema, the
RID information acts as an envelope, and then the RIDPolicy
class can be easily extracted for use in the SOAP header for
transport. The security requirements of sending incident
information across the network require the use of encryption. The
RIDPolicy information is not required to be encrypted, so
separating out this data from the IODEF extension removes the need
for decrypting and parsing the entire IODEF and RID document to
determine how it should be handled at each RID host.
The purpose of the RIDPolicy class is to specify the message type
for the receiving host, facilitate the policy needs of RID, and
provide routing information in the form of an IP address of the
destination RID system.
The policy information and guidelines are discussed in section 6.5.
The policy is defined between RID peers and within or between
consortiums. The RIDPolicy is meant to be a tool to facilitate the
defined policies. This MUST be used in accordance with policy set
between clients, peers, consortiums, and/or regions. Security,
privacy, and confidentiality MUST be considered as specified in
this document.
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The RID Schema is defined as follows:
+------------------+
| RID |
+------------------+
| ANY |
| |<>-------------[ RIDPolicy ]
| ENUM restriction |
| ENUM type |<>---{1..*}----[ NPPath ]
| STRING meaning |
| |<>---{0..1}----[ TraceStatus ]
| |
| |<>---{0..1}----[ IncidentSource ]
+------------------+
Figure 3: The RID Schema
The aggregate classes that constitute the RID schema in the
iodef-rid namespace are as follows:
RIDPolicy
One. The RIDPolicy class is used by all message types to
facilitate policy agreements between peers, consortiums or
federations as well as to properly route messages.
NPPath
One or many. The contact information for the NPs involved in a
trace, which includes information on the actual RID or NMS
systems involved in the trace. The schema will not enforce the
requirement of one entry to enable parsing to work propery in
the SOAP header to support transport.
TraceStatus
Zero or One. This is used only in Trace Authorization messages
to report back to the originating RID system if the trace will be
continued by each RID system that received a TraceRequest in the
path to the source of the traffic.
IncidentSource
Zero or One. The IncidentSource class is used in the Result message
only. The IncidentSource provides the information on the
identified source host or network of an attack trace or
investigation.
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4.3.4.1 NPPath Class
The NPPath information is represented in the aggregate RID class.
+------------------+
| NPPath |
+------------------+
| ENUM restriction |<>---{0..1}----[ name ]
| |
| |<>---{0..*}----[ RegistryHandle ]
| |
| |<>-------------[ Node ]
| |
| |<>---{0..*}----[ Email ]
| |
| |<>---{0..*}----[ Telephone ]
| |
| |<>---{0..1}----[ Fax ]
| |
| |<>---{0..1}----[ Timezone ]
| |
| |<>---{1..*}----[ NPPath ]
+------------------+
Figure 4: The NPPath Class
The aggregate classes that constitute the NPPath class are as
follows:
name
Zero or one. NAME. The name of the contact. The contact may
either be an organization or a person. The type attribute
dictates the semantics (organization or person).
RegistryHandle
Zero or many. The handle name in a registry. Care must be taken
to ensure that a handle is meaningful to the recipient.
Intra-organizational handles are of not much use for
extra-organizational communication. The base definition is from
IODEF section 3.7.1.
Node
One. The Node class is used to identify a host or network
device, in this case to identify the system communicating RID
messages or the NP's RID system.
The base definition of the class is reused from the IODEF
specification section 3.16.
Email
Zero or many. EMAIL. The email address of the contact formatted
according to IODEF section 2.2.13.
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Telephone
Zero or many. PHONE. The telephone number of the contact
formatted according to documentation in section 5.21 of RFC2256.
Fax
Zero or one. PHONE. The facsimile telephone number of the
contact formatted according to documentation in section 5.21 of
RFC2256.
Timezone
Zero or one. STRING. The timezone in which the contact resides.
NPPath
One or many. Recursive definition of NPPath, allowing for
grouping of data. This is necessary in order to provide the
complete list of systems communicating in the RID Trace,
Investigation, or Report messages. The first NPPath definition
is used for the originating host and NP information; the second
listing is for the first NP that receives a request or message.
All subsequent entries are used to list the information for each
RID system for the NPs involved.
4.3.4.2 TraceStatus Class
The TraceStatus class is an aggregate class in the RID class.
+-------------------+
| TraceStatus |
+-------------------+
| |
| ENUM restriction |<>-------[ AuthorizationStatus ]
| |
+-------------------+
Figure 5: The TraceStatus Class
The aggregate elements that constitute the TraceStatus class are as
follows:
AuthorizationStatus
One. Required. STRING. The listed values are used to provide a
response to the requesting CSIRT of the status of a TraceRequest
in the current network.
Approved. The trace was approved and will begin in the current
NP.
Denied. The trace was denied in the current NP. The next
closest NP can use this message to filter traffic from the
upstream NP using the example packet to help mitigate the
effects of the attack as close to the source as possible. The
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TraceAuthorization message must be passed back to the
originator and a Result message used from the closest NP to the
source to indicate actions taken in the IODEF History class.
Pending. Awaiting approval and a time-out period has been
reached which resulted in this pending status and
TraceAuthorization message being generated.
4.3.4.3 IncidentSource Class
The IncidentSource class is an aggregate class in the RID class.
+-------------------+
| IncidentSource |
+-------------------+
| |
| ENUM restriction |
| |<>-------------[ SourceFound ]
| |
| |<>---{0..*}----[ Node ]
| |
+-------------------+
Figure 6: The IncidentSource Class
The elements that constitute the IncidentSource class follow:
SourceFound
One. Boolean. The Source class indicates if a source was
identified. If the source was identified, it will be listed in
the Node element of this class.
True. Source of incident was identified.
False. Source of incident was not identified.
Node
One. The Node class is used to identify a host or network
device, in this case to identify the system communicating RID
messages.
The base definition of the class is reused from the IODEF
specification IODEF 3.16.
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4.3.4.4 RIDPolicy
The RIDPolicy class facilitates the delivery of RID messages and is
also referenced in the SOAP header.
+-------------------+
| RIDPolicy |
+-------------------+
| |
| ENUM restriction |<>-------------[ MsgType ]
| |
| |<>---{1..*}----[ PolicyRegion ]
| |
| |<>-------------[ MsgDestination ]
| |
| |<>-------------[ Node ]
| |
| |<>---{1..*}----[ TrafficType ]
| |
| |<>---{0..1)----[ IncidentID ]
+-------------------+
Figure 7: The RIDPolicy Class
The aggregate elements that constitute the RIDPolicy class are as
follows:
MsgType
One. Required. STRING. The type of RID Message sent. The six
types of messages are described in Section 4.3.1 and can be noted
as one of the six selections below.
TraceRequest. This message may be used to initiate a
TraceRequest or to continue a TraceRequest to an upstream
network closer to the source of the origin of the security
incident.
TraceAuthorization. This message is sent to the initiating RID
system from each of the upstream RID systems to provide
information on the trace status in the current network.
Result. This message indicates that the source of the
attack was located and the message is sent to the initiating RID
system through the RID systems in the path of the trace.
Investigation. This message type is used when the source of the
traffic is believed to be valid. The purpose of the
Investigation request is to leverage the existing peer or
consortium relationships in order to notify the network provider
closest to the source of the valid traffic that some event
occurred, which may be a security-related incident.
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Report. This message is used to report a security incident,
for which no action is requested in the IODEF expectation class.
This may be used for the purpose of correlating attack
information by CSIRTS, statistics and trending information, etc.
IncidentQuery. This message is used to request information
from a trusted RID system about an incident or incident type.
MsgDestination
One. Required. STRING. The destination of the RID message will
also appear in the NPPath class, but may be encrypted in some
cases. The destination required at this level may either be the
RID messaging system intended to receive the request or the source
of the incident in the case of an Investigation request where the
RID system that can assist to stop or mitigate the traffic may not
be known and the message has to traverse RID messaging systems by
following the routing path to the closest RID system to the source
of the attack traffic. The Node element lists either the RID
system or the IP of the source, and the meaning of the value in
the Node element is determined by the MsgDestination element.
RIDSystem. The address listed in the Node element of the
RIDPolicy class is the next upstream RID system that will
receive the RID message.
SourceOfIncident. The address listed in the Node element of
the RIDPolicy class is the incident source. The IP address will
be used to determine the path of RID systems that will be used
to find the closest RID system to the source of an attack in
which the IP used by the source is believed to be valid and an
Investigation message is used. This is not to be confused with
the IncidentSource class as the defined value here is from an
initial trace or investigation request, not the source used in a
Result message.
Node
One. The Node class is used to identify a host or network
device, in this case to identify the system communicating RID
messages.
The base definition of the class is reused from the IODEF
specification IODEF 3.16.
PolicyRegion
One or many. Required. STRING. The listed values are used to
determine what policy area may require consideration before a
trace can be approved. The PolicyRegion may include multiple
selections from the list in order to fit all possible policy
considerations when crossing regions, consortiums, or networks.
ClientToNP. An enterprise network initiated the request.
NPToClient. An NP passed a RID request to a client or an
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enterprise attached network to the NP based on the service
level agreements.
Inter-Consortium. A trace that should have no restrictions
within the boundaries of a consortium with the agreed-upon use
and abuse guidelines.
PeerToPeer. A trace that should have no restrictions between
two peers but may require further evaluation before
continuance beyond that point with the agreed-upon use and
abuse guidelines.
Between-Consortiums. A trace that should have no restrictions
between consortiums that have established agreed-upon use and
abuse guidelines.
AcrossNationalBoundaries. This selection must be set if the
trace type is anything but a trace of attack traffic with
malicious intent. This must also be set if the traffic request
is based upon regulations of a specific nation that would not
apply to all nations. This is different from the inter-
consortium since it may be possible to have multiple nations as
members of the same consortium, and this option must be
selected if the traffic is of a type that may have different
restrictions in other nations.
TrafficType
One or many. Required. STRING. The listed values are meant to
assist in determining if a trace is appropriate for the NP
receiving the request to continue the trace. Multiple values may
be selected for this element; however, where possible, it should
be restricted to one value which would most accurately describe
the traffic type.
Attack. This option should only be selected if the traffic is
related to a network-based attack. The type of attack MUST
also be listed in more detail in the IODEF Method and Impact
classes for further clarification to assist in determining if
the trace can be continued. (IODEF sections 3.10 and 3.11)
Network. This option MUST only be selected when the
trace is related to NP network traffic or routing issues.
Content. This category MUST be used only in the case in which the
request is related to the content and regional restrictions on
accessing that type of content exist. This is not malicious
traffic but may include determining what sources or
destinations accessed certain materials available on the
Internet, including, but not limited to, news, technology, or
inappropriate content.
OfficialBusiness. This option MUST be used if the traffic
being traced is requested or affiliated with any government or
other official business request. This would be used during
an investigation by government authorities or other government
traces to track suspected criminal or other activities.
Other. If this option is selected, a description of the trace
type MUST be provided so that policy decisions can be made to
continue or stop the trace. The information should be provided
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in the IODEF message in the Expectation Class or in the History
Class using a HistoryItem log.
IncidentID
Zero or one. Global reference pointing back to the IncidentID
defined in the IODEF data model. The IncidentID includes the
name of the CSIRT, an incident number, and an instance of that
incident. The instance number is appended with a dash
separating the values and is used in cases for which it may be
desirable to group incidents. Examples of incidents that may
be grouped would be botnets, DDoS attacks, multiple hops
of compromised systems found during an investigation, etc.
4.4 RID Documents Defined by Message Type Derived from IODEF
This section includes the mandatory IODEF information used in all
RID messages. Since RID is a wrapper for an IODEF document, the
full IODEF specifications MUST be implemented, and the following
section identifies the IODEF fields that must be filled in when
a RID message or document is generated. Other fields may
optionally be filled in to provide further information to an
incident handler and thus must be implemented for proper parsing of
a RID message wrapping an IODEF document. This section will
reference the IODEF model and the sections of the IODEF RFC where
each IODEF class can be located.
IODEF Schema Classes
Incident Class (IODEF 3.2)
Purpose: The Purpose will be set according to the purpose of the
message type, for instance, incident handling or statistics.
Restriction: Sender can select from the IODEF specifications for
this value and fill in as appropriate.
IncidentID (IODEF 3.3)
GUID: Name of CSIRT or NP that created the document.
AlternativeID (IODEF 3.4)
This incident ID is one set by another CSIRT that is tracking the
same or a similar incident. This value should not be set in the
initial request, but may be set in a request passed forward by an
NP in the path of a trace, investigation, or report.
RelatedActivity Class (IODEF 3.5)
This class is optional if an AlternateID is specified.
AdditionalData Class (IODEF 3.6)
This class is optional and may be used if an extended schema is
necessary to describe the incident.
Contact: Mandatory for RID (IODEF 3.7)
The required aggregate classes for the contact class in RID
messages include Name, RegistryHandle (IODEF 3.7.1), Email,
Telephone. The attributes in the contact class are required in
the IODEF document and thus are required in RID messages and
include Restriction, Role, and Type.
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StartTime: Mandatory for RID (IODEF 3.8.1)
EndTime: Optional for RID, incident may still be in process in
which no end time can be listed (IODEF 3.8.2).
DetectTime: Mandatory for RID (IODEF 3.8.3)
ReportTime: Mandatory for RID (IODEF 3.8.4)
EventData: Required for RID (IODEF 3.12)
Much of the EventData Class is a duplicate for the aggregate
IncidentData class and the proper uses of this class are defined
in the IODEF RFC. The EventData contains the Expectation class
to ensure any action requested is associted back to the proper
EventData.
Expectation: Mandatory for RID (IODEF 3.13)
The StartTime and EndTime, as well as the accuracy required, can
be used to determine the type of trace that would be used on a
network with multiple choices. StartTime and EndTime to stop the
trace would indicate if a fast or slower and more accurate method
should be used for each TraceRequest.
The following attributes are required in RID messages:
Priority and Category. The category attribute is used to
place a request for a specific action to be taken close to
the source.
Note: Although category is required in a request, the NP
closest to the source of the attack decides upon the
ultimate response.
Method: Techniques used in attack - Mandatory for RID to
determine the type of traffic for RIDPolicy informatio)
(IODEF 3.9)
Assessment: Characterization of the impact - Mandatory for RID,
(reference IODEF section 3.10)
Impact aggregate class (IODEF 3.10) MUST be used along with
the Confidence class (IODEF 3.10.4) in the Assessment Class.
The other impact classes are optional and may depend on the
Incident type to determine if the additional classes are
appropriate.
History: Required for upstream trace requests, investigations,
and report messages but not for original request. (IODEF 3.11)
The HistoryItem element specifies the actions taken to stop or
mitigate the effects of a security incident through the atype
attribute. It may also be used to further describe actions
taken along the NP Path of a trace as well as to describe the
incident handling in a report message.
Flow Class: Optional for RID (IODEF 3.14)
System class: (IODEF 3.15)
The System class is required and the information listed in this
class can be automatically entered into this class from the
packet used in the incident trace by the RID implementation.
Information must be reviewed by the submitter and the additional
required classes and attributes filled in for proper processing
of a request. The system class MUST be used to list the
source and the target or intermediate system(s) and MUST note if
the system was spoofed through the use of the Node class (IODEF
3.16). A separate instance of the System class (and Node Class)
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is used for each type of system listed in the document. The
spoof section MUST be used in the System EventData Class of all
RID messages and is set to the value of spoofed for all
TraceRequests that require an actual trace of network traffic.
In an Investigation request, the source is believed to be valid.
All other classes of the System Class are optional as in the
IODEF document.
Node Class and Service class are embedded within other listed
classes or the IODEF definitions are reused in the RID
specification (IODEF 3.16 and 3.17).
Record Class: Optional for RID (IODEF 3.19)
Required for messages types that must include a sample packet.
The RecordItem Class (IODEF 3.19.2) allows for various packet
types to be included in an IODEF document. This replaced the
need for the IPPacket class in RID and must be used to represent
packet data for incident handling.
RID Schema Classes: RID messages require that the NP Path and the
RecordItem (including an example packet) class are used to
provide adequate information for an upstream peer to perform a
trace. The information contained in the NPPath and RecordItem
classes must remain and be maintained in each type of RID
message document. The TraceStatus class is used in the
TraceAuthorization message only since its purpose is to let the
downstream NP know if the trace was approved and will begin in
the next upstream network. The RIDPolicy class is used in
routing RID messages and providing policy information between
participating RID hosts.
NPPath (Original Request should contain originator plus the
next peer in the upstream request, the host that is receiving
the request)
TraceStatus (Approval status for the trace in the current
network)
IncidentSource (Source information for Result message)
RIDPolicy (Policy information to support RID communications)
Restriction
Optional. The IODEF restriction should be used in addition to
the RID privacy and security guidelines since this is optional
on the part of the receiving end of an IODEF message and is
not enforced.
Note: The implementation of the RID system may obtain some of the
information needed to fill in the content required for each message
type automatically from packet input to the system or default
information such as that used in the NPPath class.
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4.4.1 TraceRequest
Description: This message or document is sent to the Network
Management Station next in the upstream trace once the upstream
source of the traffic has been identified.
The following information is required for TraceRequest messages and
will be provided through:
RID Information:
RIDPolicy
RID message type, IncidentID, and destination
policy information
Path information of RID systems used in the trace
NPPath in RID schema
IODEF Information:
Time Stamps (DectectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime)
Incident Identifier (Incident Class, IncidentID)
Trace number - used for multiple traces of a single
incident, must be noted.
Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
Class)
System Class is used to list both the Source and Destination
Information used in the attack and must note if the traffic
is spoofed, thus requiring an upstream TraceRequest in RID.
Expectation class should be used to request any specific actions
to be taken close to the source.
Event, Record, and RecordItem Classes to include example packets
and other information related to the incident.
[Free-form text area for any additional information on
justification for Investigation message request, IODEF
IncidentData Description]
W3C standards for Encryption and Digital Signatures:
Digital signature from initiating RID system, passed to all
systems in upstream trace using XML digital signature.
A DDoS attack can have many sources, resulting in multiple traces
to locate the sources of the attack. It may be valid to continue
multiple traces for a single attack. The path information would
enable the administrators to determine if the exact trace had
already passed through a single network. The incident identifier
must also be used to identify multiple TraceRequests from a
single incident.
4.4.2 TraceAuthorization Message
Description: This message is sent to the initiating RID system from
the next upstream NP's RID system to provide information on the
trace status in the current network.
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The following information is required for TraceAuthorization
messages and will be provided through:
RID Information:
RIDPolicy
RID message type, IncidentID, and destination
policy information
Status of TraceRequest
TraceStatus class in RID schema
Path information of RID systems used in the trace
NPPath class in RID schema
The last NP listed is the NP sending this
TraceAuthorization message. All previous NPs listed in the
NPPath must be retained.
IODEF Information:
Time Stamps (DectectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime)
Incident Identifier (Incident Class, IncidentID)
Trace number - used for multiple traces of a single
incident, must be noted.
Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
Class)
System class information
Event, Record, and RecordItem Classes to include example packets
and other information related to the incident [optional].
[Additional free-form text information on the attack,
Description in History Class]
W3C standards for Encryption and Digital Signatures:
Digital signature of responding NP for authenticity of Trace
Status Message, from the NP creating this message using
XML digital signature.
A message is sent back to the initiating RID system of the trace as
status notification. This message verifies that the next RID
system in the path has received the message from the previous
system in the path. This message also verifies that the trace is
now continuing, has stopped, or is pending in the next upstream.
The pending status would be automatically generated after a
2-minute timeout without system predefined or administrator action
taken to approve or disapprove the trace continuance.
4.4.3 Result Message
Description: This message indicates that the trace or investigation
has been completed and provides the result. The Result message
includes information on whether or not a source was found and the
source information through the IncidentSource class. The Result
information MUST go back to the originating RID system that began
the investigation or trace.
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The following information is required for Result messages and will
be provided through:
RID Information:
RIDPolicy
RID message type, IncidentID, and destination
policy information
Path information of RID systems used in the trace
NPPath class in RID schema
The last NP listed is the NP, which located the source of
the traffic (the NP sending the Result message)
Incident Source
The IncidentSource class of the RID schema is used to
note if a source was identified and the source(s) address.
IODEF Information:
Time Stamps (DectectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime)
Incident Identifier (Incident Class, IncidentID)
Trace number - used for multiple traces of a single
incident, must be noted.
Confidence rating of Security Incident (Impact and Confidence
Class)
System Class is used to list both the Source and Destination
Information used in the attack and must note if the traffic
is spoofed, thus requiring an upstream TraceRequest in RID.
History Class atype attribute is used to note any actions taken.
History class also noes any other background information.
Event, Record, and RecordItem Classes to include example packets
and other information related to the incident [optional]
[Free-form text area for any additional information on
the identified source of the attack traffic, IODEF
Description, Incident Class.]
W3C Encryption and Digital Signature standards:
Digital signature of source NP for authenticity of Result
Message, the NP creating this message using XML digital
signature.
A message sent back to the initiating RID system to notify the
associated CSIRT that the source has been located. The actual
source information may or may not be included, depending on the
policy of the network in which the client or host is attached.
Any action taken by the NP to act upon the discovery of the source
of a trace should be included. The NP may be able to automate the
adjustment of filters at their border router to block outbound
access for the machine(s) discovered as a part of the attack. The
filters may be comprehensive enough to block all Internet access
until the host has taken the appropriate action to resolve any
security issues or to rate-limit the ingress traffic as close to
the source as possible.
Security and privacy considerations discussed in sections 6 and 7
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must be taken into account.
Note: The History Class has been expanded in IODEF to accommodate
all of the possible actions taken as a result of a RID TraceRequest
or Investigation request using the iodef:atype or action type
attribute. The History class should be used to note all
actions taken close to the source of a trace or incident using the
most appropriate option for the type of action along with a
description. The atype attribute in the Expectation class can
also be used to request an appropriate action when a TraceRequest
or Investigation request is made.
4.4.4 Investigation Message Request
Description: This message type is used when the source of the
traffic is believed to be valid. The purpose of the Investigation
message request is to leverage the existing bilateral peer
relationships in order to notify the network provider closest to
the source of the valid traffic that some event occurred,
which may be a security-related incident.
The following information is required for Investigation messages
and will be provided through:
RID Information:
RID Policy
RID message type, IncidentID, and destination
policy information
Path information of RID systems used in the trace
NPPath class in RID schema
IODEF Information:
Time Stamps (DectectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime)
Incident Identifier (Incident Class, IncidentID)
Trace number - used for multiple traces of a single
incident, must be noted.
Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
Class)
System Class is used to list both the Source and Destination
Information used in the attack and must note if the traffic
is spoofed, thus requiring an upstream TraceRequest in RID.
Expectation class should be used to request any specific actions
to be taken close to the source.
Event, Record, and RecordItem Classes to include example packets
and other information related to the incident.
[Free-form text area for any additional information on
justification for Investigation message request, IODEF
Description.]
W3C Encryption and Digital Signature standards:
Digital signature from initiating RID system, passed to all
systems in upstream trace using XML digital signature.
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Security considerations would include the ability to encrypt the
contents of the Investigation message request using the public key
of the destination RID system. The incident number would increase
as if it were a TraceRequest message in order to ensure
uniqueness within the system. The relaying peers would also
append their AS or RID system information as the request message
was relayed along the web of network providers so that the Result
message could utilize the same path as the set of trust
relationships for the return message, thus indicating any actions
taken. The request would also be recorded in both the state table
of the initiating and destination NP RID system. The destination
NP is responsible for any actions taken as a result of the request
in adherence to any service level agreements or internal policies.
The NP should confirm the traffic actually originated from the
suspected system before taking any action and confirm the reason
for the request. The request may be sent directly to a known
RID System or routed by the source address of the attack using
the message destination of RIDPolicy, SourceOfIncident.
Note: All intermediate parties must be able to view RIDPolicy
information in order to properly direct RID messages.
4.4.5 Report Message
Description: This message or document is sent to a RID system to
provide a report of a security incident. This message does not
require any actions to be taken, except to file the report on the
receiving RID system or associated database.
The following information is required for Report messages and will
be provided through:
RID Information:
RID Policy
RID message type, IncidentID, and destination
Policy information
IODEF Information:
Time Stamps (DectectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime)
Incident Identifier (Incident Class, IncidentID)
Trace number - used for multiple traces of a single
incident, must be noted.
Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
Class)
System Class is used to list both the Source and Destination
Information used in the attack.
Event, Record, and RecordItem Classes to include example packets
and other information related to the incident [optional].
[Free-form text area for any additional information on
incident, IODEF IncidentData Description.]
W3C Encryption and Digital Signature standards:
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Digital signature from initiating RID system, passed to all
systems receiving the report using XML digital signature.
Security considerations would include the ability to encrypt the
contents of the Report message request using the public key
of the destination RID system. Senders of a Report message should
note that the information may be used to correlate security
incident information for the purpose of trending, pattern
detection, etc., and may be shared with other parties unless
otherwise agreed upon with the receiving RID system. Therefore,
sending parties of a report message may obfuscate or remove
destination addresses or other sensitive information before
sending a report message. A Report message may be sent either to
file an incident report or in response to an IncidentQuery and
data sensitivity must be considered in both cases. The NPPath
information is not necessary for this message as it will be
communicated directly between two trusted RID systems.
4.4.6 IncidentQuery
Description: The IncidentQuery message is used to request incident
information from a trusted RID system. The request can include the
incident number, if known, or detailed information about the
incident. If the incident number is known, the report message
containing the incident information can easily be returned to the
trusted requestor using automated methods. If an example packet or
other unique information is included in the IncidentQuery, the
return report may be automated; otherwise, analyst intervention may
be required.
The following information is required for an IncidentQuery message
and will be provided through:
RID Information:
RID Policy
RID message type, IncidentID, and destination
Policy information
IODEF Information [optional]:
Time Stamps (DectectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime)
Incident Identifier (Incident Class, IncidentID)
Trace number - used for multiple traces of a single
incident, must be noted.
Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
Class)
System Class is used to list both the Source and Destination
Information used in the attack.
Event, Record, and RecordItem Classes to include example packets
and other information related to the incident [optional].
[Free-form text area for any additional information on
justification for IncidentQuery, IODEF IncidentData
Description.]
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W3C Encryption and Digital Signature standards:
Digital signature from initiating RID system, passed to all
systems receiving the IncidentQuery using XML digital
signature. If a packet is not included, the signature
may be based on the RIDPolicy class.
The proper response to the IncidentQuery message is a Report
message. Multiple reports may be returned for a single query if an
incident type is requested. In this case, the transport would
notify the sending system of the expected number of replies for
proper handling. The Confidence rating may be used in the Incident
Query message to select only incidents with an equal or higher
confidence rating than what is specified. This may be used for
cases when information is gathered on a type of incident but not
on specifics about a single incident. Source and destination
information may not be needed if the IncidentQuery is intended to
gather data about a specific type of incident as well.
4.5 RID Communication Exchanges
The following section outlines the communication flows for RID and
also provides examples of messages.
4.5.1 Upstream Trace Communication Flow
The diagram below outlines the RID TraceRequest communication flow
between RID systems on different networks tracing an attack.
Attack Dest NP-1 NP-2 NP-3 Attack Src
1. Attack | Attack
reported | detected
2. Initiate trace
3. Locate origin
through
upstream NP
4. o---TraceRequest----->
5. Trace
Initiated
6. <-TraceAuthorization-o
7. Locate origin
through
upstream NP.
8. o---TraceRequest--->
9. Trace Initiated
10. <------------TraceAuthorization----o
11. Locate attack
source on network X
12. <------------Result----------------o
Figure 8: TraceRequest Communication Flow
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The NP that detected the attack initiates the trace. The attack
is traced to the source or the next upstream NP. This process
continues until the trace identifies the source of the attack. Any
Trace Authorization and Result messages must pass through all
RID systems in the path back to the trace initiator because of the
secure connections established between RID systems of bordering
networks. The involved systems in the path for Trace Authorization
and Result messages would then have the ability to see and
acknowledge the trace status before sending the messages back along
the RID communication path to the originating RID system.
Before a trace can be initialized, the originating RID system must
check an internal database to determine if a trace to the same IP
address or network address has occurred within a specified period
of time, no less than 1 day. The trace may have been initiated by
the same RID system or this RID system may have been in the path of
the trace. The previous filter must be maintained for a minimum of
one week in order to retrieve the filter for comparison
before initiating a TraceRequest or allowing a trace continuance
to occur. If the network administrator justifies a similar trace,
a note might be added to the Description element of the document to
provide an additional confidence indication to the upstream NPs in
the path of the trace.
A single-network trace may be constrained using factors determined
by the associated NP's network trace system in the path of the
trace. The trace system may either trace a packet in real time or
search through stored packet data for evidence that the packet had
traversed the network. In the case of a real-time trace, the
traffic needs to be active on the network for the trace to be
successful or the trace will cease. A message is sent to indicate
the status, that the trace cannot continue, to the originating RID
system through the consortium's trust relationships formed by the
RID systems in the path of the trace. The packet trace may also be
limited due to the lack of storage space on networks for saving
traffic data. A TraceAuthorization message is sent, in this case
as well, to provide the path information up to the point at which
the trace could no longer be continued to the originator of the
trace through the RID systems in the path of the trace. This
information could also be used to block or mitigate the traffic at
the participating NP closest to the source.
4.5.1.1 RID TraceRequest Example
The example listed is of a TraceRequest based on the incident
report example from the IODEF document. The RID extension classes
were included as appropriate for a TraceRequest message using the
RIDPolicy and NPPath classes. The example given is that of a CSIRT
reporting a DoS attack in progress to the upstream NP. The request
asks the next NP to continue the trace and have the traffic
mitigated closer to the source of the traffic.
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<iodef-rid:RID
xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
<iodef-rid:MsgType>TraceRequest</iodef-rid:MsgType>
<iodef-rid:PolicyRegion>Inter-Consortium
</iodef-rid:PolicyRegion>
<iodef-rid:MsgDestination>RIDSystem
</iodef-rid:MsgDestination>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.20.1.2
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef-rid:TrafficType>Attack</iodef-rid:TrafficType>
<iodef:IncidentID
name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef-rid:NPPath>
<iodef:Name>CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN</iodef:Name>
<iodef:RegistryHandle>CSIRT123</iodef:RegistryHandle>
<iodef:Email>csirt-for-our-domain@ourdomain</iodef:Email>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.17.1.2
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef-rid:NPPath>
<iodef-rid:NPPath>
<iodef:Name>CSIRT-FOR-UPSTREAM-NP</iodef:Name>
<iodef:RegistryHandle>CSIRT345</iodef:RegistryHandle>
<iodef:Email>csirt-for-upstream-np@ourdomain</iodef:Email>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.20.1.2
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef-rid:NPPath>
</iodef-rid:RID>
<IODEF-Document version="1.0">
<iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="traceback">
<iodef:IncidentID
name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef:IncidentData>
<iodef:Description>Host involved in DOS attack
</iodef:Description>
<iodef:StartTime>2004-02-02T22:19:24+00:00
</iodef:StartTime>
<iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-02T22:49:24+00:00
</iodef:DetectTime>
<iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-02T23:20:24+00:00
</iodef:ReportTime>
<iodef:Assessment>
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<iodef:Impact severity="low" completion="failed"
type="dos"></iodef:Impact>
</iodef:Assessment>
<iodef:Contact role="creator" role="irt"
type="organization">
<iodef:ContactName>CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN
</iodef:ContactName>
<iodef:Email>csirt-for-our-domain@ourdomain
</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Contact>
<iodef:Contact role="tech" type="organization">
<iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 10.1.1.2
</iodef:ContactName>
<iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@10.1.1.2</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Contact>
<iodef:History>
<iodef:HistoryItem type="notification">
<iodef:IncidentID
name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
</iodef:IncidentID>CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN
<iodef:Description>Notification sent to next upstream
NP closer to 10.1.1.2</iodef:Description>
<iodef:DateTime>2001-09-14T08:19:01+00:00
</iodef:DateTime>
</iodef:HistoryItem>
</iodef:History>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:System category="source">
<iodef:Service>
<iodef:Port>38765</iodef:Port>
</iodef:Service>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">10.1.1.2
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef:System>
<iodef:System category="target">
<iodef:Service>
<iodef:Port>80</iodef:Port>
</iodef:Service>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.168.1.2
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef:System>
<iodef:Expectation priority="high"
iodef:atype="rate-limit-host">
<iodef:Description>Rate limit traffic close to
source</iodef:Description>
</iodef:Expectation>
<iodef:Record>
<iodef:RecordData>
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<iodef:RecordItem dtype="ipv4-packet">450000522ad
90000ff06c41fc0a801020a010102976d0050103e020810d
94a1350021000ad6700005468616e6b20796f7520666f722
06361726566756c6c792072656164696e672074686973205
246432e0a
</iodef:RecordItem>
<iodef:Description>The IPv4 packet included
was used in the described attack
</iodef:Description>
</iodef:RecordData>
</iodef:Record>
</iodef:EventData>
</iodef:IncidentData>
</iodef:Incident>
</iodef:IODEF-Document>
<-- Digital Signature applied to the RecordItem class using the
XML Digital Signature W3C Recommendations. -->
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><Envelope xmlns="urn:envelope">
<xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0">
<iodef:IODEF-Document>
<iodef:Incident>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Record>
<iodef:RecordData>
<iodef:RecordItem type="ipv4-packet">450000522ad9
0000ff06c41fc0a801020a010102976d0050103e020810d9
4a1350021000ad6700005468616e6b20796f7520666f7220
6361726566756c6c792072656164696e6720746869732052
46432e0a
</iodef:RecordItem>
</iodef:Record>
</iodef:EventData>
</iodef:Incident>
</iodef:IODEF-Document>
<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm=
"http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315#WithComments"/>
<SignatureMethod Algorithm=
"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-sha1"/>
<Reference URI="">
<Transforms>
<Transform Algorithm=
"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
</Transforms>
<DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<DigestValue>KiI5+6SnFAs429VNwsoJjHPplmo=
</DigestValue>
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</Reference>
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue>
VvyXqCzjoW0m2NdxNeToXQcqcSM80W+JMW+Kn01cS3z3KQwCPeswzg==
</SignatureValue>
<KeyInfo>
<KeyValue>
<DSAKeyValue>
<P>/KaCzo4Syrom78z3EQ5SbbB4sF7ey80etKII864WF64B81uRpH5t9j
QTxeEu0ImbzRMqzVDZkVG9xD7nN1kuFw==</P>
<Q>li7dzDacuo67Jg7mtqEm2TRuOMU=</Q>
<G>Z4Rxsnqc9E7pGknFFH2xqaryRPBaQ01khpMdLRQnG541Awtx/XPaF5
Bpsy4pNWMOHCBiNU0NogpsQW5QvnlMpA==</G>
<Y>VFWTD4I/aKni4YhDyYxAJozmj1iAzPLw9Wwd5B+Z9J5E7lHjcAJ+bs
HifTyYdnj+roGzy4o09YntYD8zneQ7lw==</Y>
</DSAKeyValue>
</KeyValue>
</KeyInfo>
</Signature>
</Envelope>
-->
4.5.2 Investigation Request Communication Flow
The diagram below outlines the RID Investigation Request
communication flow between RID systems on different networks for a
security incident with a known source address.
Attack Dest NP-1 NP-2 Attack Src
1. Attack | Attack
reported | detected
2. Determine source
of security incident
3. o---Investigation---->
4. Research
incident and
determine appropriate
actions to take
5. <-------Result-------o
Figure 9: Investigation Communication Flow
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4.5.2.1 Example Investigation Request
The following example will only include the RID-specific details.
The IODEF and security measures are similar to the TraceRequest
information, with the exception that the source is known and the
receiving RID system is known to be close to the source. The
source known is indicated in the IODEF document, which allows for
incident sources to be listed as spoofed, if appropriate.
<iodef-rid:RID
xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
<iodef-rid:MsgType>Investigation</iodef-rid:MsgType>
<iodef-rid:PolicyRegion>PeertoPeer
</iodef-rid:PolicyRegion>
<iodef-rid:MsgDestination>SourceOfIncident
</iodef-rid:MsgDestination>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.25.1.33
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef-rid:TrafficType>Attack</iodef-rid:TrafficType>
<iodef:IncidentID
name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
</iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
<iodef-rid:NPPath>
<iodef:Name>CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN</iodef:Name>
<iodef:RegistryHandle>CSIRT123</iodef:RegistryHandle>
<iodef:Email>csirt-for-our-domain@ourdomain</iodef:Email>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.17.1.2
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef-rid:NPPath>
<iodef-rid:NPPath>
<iodef:Name>CSIRT-FOR-UPSTREAM-NP</iodef:Name>
<iodef:RegistryHandle>CSIRT345</iodef:RegistryHandle>
<iodef:Email>csirt-for-upstream-np@ourdomain</iodef:Email>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.20.1.2
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef-rid:NPPath>
</iodef-rid:RID>
<-- IODEF and XML digital signature follow -->
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4.5.3 Report Communication
The diagram below outlines the RID Report communication flow
between RID systems on different networks.
NP-1 NP-2
1. Generate incident information
and prepare report message
2. o-------Report------->
3. File report in database
Figure 10: Report Communication Flow
The Report communication flow is used to provide information on
specific incidents detected on the network. Incident information
may be shared between CSIRTS or participating RID hosts using this
format. When a report is received, the RID system must verify that
the report has not already been filed. The incident number and
incident data, such as the hexidecimal packet and incident class
information, can be used to compare with existing database entries.
4.5.3.1 Report Example
The following example will only include the RID-specific details.
This report is an unsolicited report message that includes an
IPv4 packet. The IODEF document and digital signature would be
similar to the first example provided for this case.
<iodef-rid:RID
xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
<iodef-rid:MsgType>Report</iodef-rid:MsgType>
<iodef-rid:PolicyRegion>PeertoPeer
</iodef-rid:PolicyRegion>
<iodef-rid:MsgDestination>RIDSystem
</iodef-rid:MsgDestination>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.17.1.2
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef-rid:TrafficType>Attack</iodef-rid:TrafficType>
<iodef:IncidentID
name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#209-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
</iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
<iodef-rid:NPPath>
<iodef:Name>CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN</iodef:Name>
<iodef:RegistryHandle>CSIRT123</iodef:RegistryHandle>
<iodef:Email>csirt-for-our-domain@ourdomain</iodef:Email>
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<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.20.1.2
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef-rid:NPPath>
<iodef-rid:NPPath>
<iodef:Name>CSIRT-FOR-REQUESTING-NP</iodef:Name>
<iodef:RegistryHandle>CSIRT345</iodef:RegistryHandle>
<iodef:Email>csirt-for-requesting-np@ourdomain
</iodef:Email>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.17.1.2
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef-rid:NPPath>
</iodef-rid:RID>
<-- IODEF and XML digital signature follow -->
4.5.4 IncidentQuery Communication Flow
The diagram below outlines the RID IncidentQuery communication flow
between RID systems on different networks.
NP-1 NP-2
1. Generate a request for
information on a specific
incident number or incident type
2. o---IncidentQuery--->
3. Verify policy information
and determine if matches exist
for requested information
4. <-------Report------o
5. Associate report to request
by incident number or type
and file report(s).
Figure 11: IncidentQuery Communication Flow
The IncidentQuery message communication receives a response of a
Report message. If the Report message is empty, the responding
host did not have information available to share with the
requestor. The incident number and responding RID system, as well
as the transport, assist in the association of the request and
response since a report can be filed and is not always solicited.
4.5.4.1 IncidentQuery Example
The IncidentQuery request may be received in several formats as a
result of the type of query being performed. If the incident
number is the only information provided, the IODEF document and IP
packet data may not be needed to complete the request. However, if
a type of incident is requested, the incident number will remain
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null and the IP packet data will not be included in the IODEF
RecordItem class and the other incident information will be the
main source for comparison. In the case in which an incident
number may not be the same between CSIRTS, either or both the
incident number and/or IP packet information can be provided and
used for comparison on the receiving RID system to generate a
Report message(s).
<iodef-rid:RID
xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
<iodef-rid:MsgType>IncidentQuery</iodef-rid:MsgType>
<iodef-rid:PolicyRegion>PeertoPeer
</iodef-rid:PolicyRegion>
<iodef-rid:MsgDestination>RIDSystem
</iodef-rid:MsgDestination>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.20.1.2
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef-rid:TrafficType>Attack</iodef-rid:TrafficType>
<iodef:IncidentID
name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#210-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
</iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
<iodef-rid:NPPath>
<iodef:Name>CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN</iodef:Name>
<iodef:RegistryHandle>CSIRT123</iodef:RegistryHandle>
<iodef:Email>csirt-for-our-domain@ourdomain</iodef:Email>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.17.1.2
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef-rid:NPPath>
<iodef-rid:NPPath>
<iodef:Name>CSIRT-FOR-UPSTREAM-NP</iodef:Name>
<iodef:RegistryHandle>CSIRT345</iodef:RegistryHandle>
<iodef:Email>csirt-for-upstream-np@ourdomain</iodef:Email>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.20.1.2
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef-rid:NPPath>
</iodef-rid:RID>
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5. RID Schema Definition
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!-- edited with XMLSPY v2004 rel. 3 U (http://www.xmlspy.com) by
Kathleen M Moriarty (MIT Lincoln Laboratory) -->
<xs:schema xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
xmlns:xs=http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema
xmlns:ds=http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
<xs:import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"/>
<xs:import namespace=http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#
schemaLocation=
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/xmldsig-core-schema.xsd"/>
<!-- ****************************************************************
*********************************************************************
*** Incident Object Description and Exchange Format XML Schema ***
*** Version 08, August 2006 ***
*********************************************************************
*** Real-time Inter-network Defense - RID XML Schema ***
*** Namespace - iodef-rid, August 2006 ***
*** The namespace is defined to support transport of IODEF ***
*** documents for exchanging incident information. ***
*********************************************************************
-->
<!--RID acts as an envelope for IODEF documents to support the exchange
of messages-->
<!--
====== Real-Time Inter-network Defense - RID ======
==== Suggested definition for RID messaging ======
-->
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>XML Schema wrapper for IODEF</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:element name="RID" type="iodef-rid:RIDType"/>
<xs:complexType name="RIDType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:RIDPolicy"/>
<-- NPPath must be included in every RID message but is set to
monOccurs 0 for the purpose of proper parsing of the SOAP
header. NPPath is needed for the proper flow and response
of RID messages-->
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:NPPath" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:TraceStatus"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:IncidentSource" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="meaning" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:complexType>
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<!--Path of the RID trace includes information on each NP
involved in the upstream trace-->
<xs:element name="NPPath" type="iodef-rid:NPPathType"/>
<xs:complexType name="NPPathType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef:ContactName" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:RegistryHandle" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Email" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Telephone" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Fax" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:TimeZone" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:NPPath" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="restriction" type="xs:NMTOKEN"/>
<xs:attribute name="NPPath" type="xs:NMTOKEN" use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="TimeZone"/>
<!--Used in Trace Authorization Message for RID-->
<xs:element name="TraceStatus" type="iodef-rid:TraceStatusType"/>
<xs:complexType name="TraceStatusType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="AuthorizationStatus" default="Approved">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Approved"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Denied"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Pending"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="restriction" type="xs:NMTOKEN"/>
</xs:complexType>
<!--Incident Source Information for Result Message-->
<xs:element name="IncidentSource" type="iodef-rid:IncidentSourceType"/>
<xs:complexType name="IncidentSourceType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:SourceFound"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Node" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="SourceFound" type="xs:boolean"/>
<!--
====== Real-Time Inter-network Defense Policy - RIDPolicy ======
==== Suggested definition for RIDPolicy for messaging
-->
<xs:annotation>
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<xs:documentation>RID Policy used in SOAP header for transport of
messages</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<!-- RidPolicy information with setting information listed in RID
documentation -->
<xs:element name="RIDPolicy" type="iodef-rid:RIDPolicyType"/>
<xs:complexType name="RIDPolicyType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:MsgType"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:PolicyRegion" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:MsgDestination"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Node"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:TrafficType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:IncidentID"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="MsgType" default="Report">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
<xs:enumeration value="TraceRequest"/>
<xs:enumeration value="TraceAuthorization"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Result"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Investigation"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Report"/>
<xs:enumeration value="IncidentQuery"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="MsgDestination" default="RIDSystem">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
<xs:enumeration value="RIDSystem"/>
<xs:enumeration value="SourceOfIncident"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="PolicyRegion">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ClientToNP"/>
<xs:enumeration value="NPToClient"/>
<xs:enumeration value="InterConsortium"/>
<xs:enumeration value="PeerToPeer"/>
<xs:enumeration value="BetweenConsortiums"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AcrossNationalBoundaries"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>
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<xs:element name="TrafficType" default="Attack">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Attack"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Network"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Content"/>
<xs:enumeration value="OfficialBusiness"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Other"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>
</xs:schema>
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6. Message Transport
The transport specifications will be fully defined in a separate
document. The specified transport protocols must use encryption to
provide an additional level of security, integrity, and
authentication through bi-directional certificate usage. SOAP [15]
will be used as a wrapper for the RID messages, then a protocol
binding will be used for the overlying transport. Any transport
method defined will take advantage of existing standards for ease
of implementation and integration of RID systems. Session
encryption for the transport RID messages will be enforced in the
transport specification. The privacy and security considerations
are addressed fully in RID and do not rely on the security provided
by the transport layer. The encryption requirements and
considerations for RID are discussed in the Security section of
this document.
XML security functions such as digital signature and encryption
provide a standards-based method to encrypt and digitally sign RID
messages. RID messages specify system use and privacy guidelines
through the RIDPolicy class. Public key infrastructure (PKI)
provides the base for authentication and authorization, encryption,
and digital signatures to establish trust relationships between
members of a RID consortium or a peering consortium.
XML security functions such as the digital signature and encryption
can be used within the contents of the message for privacy and
security in cases for which certain elements must remain encrypted
or signed as they traverse the path of a trace. For example, the
digital signature on a TraceRequest can be used to verify the
identity of the trace originator. The use of the XML security
features in RID messaging will be in accordance with the
specifications for the IODEF model; however, the use requirements
may differ since RID also incorporates communication of security
incident information.
6.1 Message Delivery Protocol - Integrity and Authentication
The RID protocol must be able to guarantee delivery and meet
the necessary security requirements of a state-of-the-art protocol.
In order to guarantee delivery, TCP should be considered as the
underlying protocol within the current network standard practices.
Security considerations must include the integrity, authentication,
privacy, and authorization of the messages sent between RID
communication or NMS systems. The communication between RID
systems must be authenticated and encrypted to ensure the integrity
of the messages and the RID systems involved in the trace. Another
concern that needs to be addressed is authentication for a request
that traverses multiple networks. In this scenario, systems in the
path of the multi-hop TraceRequest need to authorize a trace from
not only their neighbor network, but also from the initiating RID
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system as discussed in section 6.3. Several methods can be used to
ensure integrity and privacy of the communication.
The transport mechanism selected (HTTPS, S/MIME, BEEP, etc.) may be
agreed upon by a consortium using RID messaging to ensure
consistency among the peers. Consortiums may vary their selected
transport mechanisms and thus must decide upon a mutual protocol
to use for transport when communicating with peers in a neighboring
consortium using RID. RID systems MUST support HTTPS and
optionally support other protocols such as S/MIME and BEEP. RID,
the XML security functions, and transport protocols must properly
integrate with a public key infrastructure (PKI) managed by the
consortium. Consortiums are discussed in the security and privacy
sections.
6.2 Transport Communication
Out-of-band communications dedicated to NP interaction for RID
messaging would provide additional security as well as guaranteed
bandwidth during a denial-of-service attack. For example, an
out-of-band channel may consist of logical paths defined over the
existing network. Out-of-band communications may not be possible
between all network providers, but should be considered to protect
the network management systems used for RID messaging.
In order to address the integrity and authenticity of messages,
transport encryption MUST be used to secure the traffic sent
between RID systems with pre-defined trust relationships. Systems
with predefined relationships for RID would include those who peer
within a consortium with agreed-upon appropriate use regulations
and for peering consortiums.
Systems used to send authenticated RID messages between networks
MUST use a dedicated and secured interface to connect to a border
Network's RID systems. Each connection to a RID system must meet
the security requirements agreed upon through the consortium
regulations, peering, or SLAs. The RID system interface must only
listen for and send RID messages, which also must be over an
encrypted tunnel meeting the minimum requirement of algorithms and
key lengths established by the consortium, peering, or SLA. The
selected cryptographic algorithms for symmetric encryption, digital
signatures, and hash functions must meet minimum security levels of
the times. The encryption strength must adhere to import and
export regulations of the involved countries for data exchange.
6.3 Authentication of RID Protocol
In order to ensure the authenticity of the RID messages, a
message authentication scheme using a PKI must be inherent to
the protocol. SOAP tied together with TLS used with BEEP or
HTTP(S) using WS-Security requires a trust center such as a PKI
or Kerberos key distribution center for the distribution of
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credentials to provide the necessary levels of security for this
protocol. Public key certificate pairs issued by a trusted
Certificate Authority (CA) will be used to provide the necessary
level of authentication and encryption for the RID protocol. The
CA used for RID messaging must be trusted by all involved parties
and may take advantage of similar efforts, such as the Internet2
federated PKI. The PKI infrastructure used for authentication
would also provide the necessary certificates needed for encryption
via either Transport Layer Security (TLS) used in the HTTPS
protocol, BEEP profile, or Secure MIME (S/MIME).
Hosts receiving a RID message, such as a TraceRequest, for
example, must be able to verify that the sender of the request is
valid and trusted. Using digital signatures on a hash of the
RID message with an X.509 version 3 certificate issued by a
trusted party can be used to authenticate the request. The X.509
version 3 specifications as well as the digital signature
specifications and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Internet
standards set forth in RFC2459 must be followed in order to
interoperate with a PKI designed for similar Internet purposes.
The IODEF specification must be followed for digital signatures to
provide the authentication and integrity aspects required for
secure messaging between network providers. The use of digital
signatures in RID XML messages MUST follow the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C) recommendations for signature syntax and
processing when either the XML encryption or digital signature is
used within a document. Transport specifications will be detailed
in a separate document.
An optional extension to the authentication scheme would be to
incorporate the use of attribute certificates to provide
authorization capabilities as described in RFC3281. This may be
useful as messages are sent from network peers to determine
authorization levels based on the attribute information in the
certificate, which could be used to determine priority of a trace
request. The attribute information might be used to determine if
a TraceRequest should be processed automatically or if human
intervention is required.
6.4 Authentication Considerations for a Multi-hop TraceRequest
Bilateral trust relations between network providers ensure the
authenticity of requests for TraceRequests from immediate peers
in the web of networks formed to provide the traceback
capability. A network provider several hops into the path of the
RID trace must trust the information from its peer as to the
confidence rating of the attack and the previous trust
relationships in the downstream path. In order to provide a
higher assurance level of the authenticity of the TraceRequest,
the originating RID system is included in the TraceRequest along
with contact information and the information of all RID
systems in the path the trace has taken.
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A second measure must be taken to ensure the identity of the
originating RID system. The originating RID system MUST include
a digital signature in the TraceRequest sent to all systems in the
upstream path. The digital signature from the RID system is
performed on the RecordItem class of the IODEF following the XML
digital signature specifications from W3C [22]. The signature
MUST be passed to all parties that receive a TraceRequest, and each
party MUST be able to perform full path validation on the digital
signature. Full path validation verifies the chaining
relationship to a trusted root and also performs certificate
revocation status. In order to accommodate that requirement, the
IP packet in the RecordItem data MUST remain unchanged as a
request is passed along between providers and is the only element
for which the signature is applied. A second benefit to this
requirement is that the integrity of the filter used is ensured as
it is passed to subsequent NPs in the upstream trace of the packet.
The trusted PKI used in section 6.3 will also provide the keys
used to digitally sign the RecordItem class for TraceRequests to
meet the requirement of authenticating the original request.
Since the CA is known and trusted by all parties, any host in the
path of the trace can verify the digital signature.
In the case in which an enterprise network using RID sends a trace
request to its provider, the signature from the enterprise
network must be included in the initial request. The NP may
generate a new request to send upstream to members of the NP
consortium to continue the trace. If the original request is sent,
the originating NP, acting on behalf of the enterprise network
under attack, must also digitally sign the message to assure the
authenticity of the trace. An NP that offers RID as a service may
be using its own PKI to secure RID communications between its
RID system and the attached enterprise networks. NPs participating
in the trace must be able to determine the authenticity of RID
requests at the NP level.
6.4.1 Public Key Infrastructures and Consortiums
Consortiums of NPs are an ideal way to establish a communication
web of trust for RID messaging. The consortium could provide
centralized resources, such as a PKI, and established guidelines
for use of the RID protocol. The consortium would also assist in
establishing trust relationships between the participating NPs to
achieve the necessary level of cooperation and experience-sharing
among the consortium entities. The consortium may also be used for
other purposes to better facilitate communication among NPs in a
common area (Internet, region, government, education, private
networks, etc.).
Using a PKI to distribute certificates used by RID systems provides
an already established method to link trust relationships between
NPs of consortiums that would peer with NPs belonging to a separate
consortium. In other words, consortiums could peer with other
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consortiums to enable communication of RID messages between the
participating NPs. The PKI along with Memorandums of Agreement
could be used to link border directories to share public key
information in a bridge, hierarchy, or a single cross-certification
relationship.
Consortiums also need to establish guidelines for each
participating NP to adhere to. The guidelines MUST include
O Physical and logical practices to protect RID systems;
O Network and application layer protection for RID systems and
communications;
O Proper use guidelines for RID systems, messages, and requests;
and
O A PKI to provide authentication, integrity, and privacy.
The functions described for a consortium's role would parallel
that of a PKI federation. The PKI federations that currently exist
are responsible for establishing security guidelines and PKI trust
models. The trust models are used to support applications
to share information using trusted methods and protocols.
PKI can also provide the same level of security for communication
between an end entity (enterprise, educational, government customer
network) and the NP. The PKI may be a subordinate CA or in the CA
hierarchy from the NP's consortium to establish the trust
relationships necessary as the request is made to other connected
networks.
6.5 Privacy Concerns and System Use Guidelines
Privacy issues raise many concerns when information sharing is
required to achieve the goal of stopping or mitigating the effects
of a security incident. The RIDPolicy class is used to automate
the enforcement of the privacy concerns listed within this
document. The privacy and system use concerns that MUST be
addressed in the RID system and other integrated components
include the following:
Network Provider Concerns:
o Privacy of data monitored and/or stored on IDS for attack
detection.
o Privacy of data monitored and stored on systems used to trace
traffic across a single network.
Customer attached networks participating in RID with NP:
O Customer networks may include enterprise, educational, government
or other attached network to an NP participating in RID and MUST
be made fully aware of the security and privacy considerations
for using RID.
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O Customers MUST know the security and privacy considerations in
place by their NP and the consortium of which the NP is a member.
O Customers MUST understand that their data can and will be sent to
other NPs in order to complete a trace unless an agreement
stating otherwise is made in the service level agreements between
the customer and NP.
Parties Involved in the Attack:
o Privacy of the identity of a host involved in an attack.
o Privacy of information such as the source and destination used
for communication purposes over the monitored or RID connected
network(s).
o Protection of data from being viewed by intermediate parties
in the path of a Investigation request MUST be considered.
Consortium Considerations:
o System use restricted to security incident handling within the
local region's definitions of appropriate traffic for the network
monitored and linked via RID in a single consortium also abiding
by the consortiums use guidelines.
o System use prohibiting the consortiums participating NPs from
inappropriately tracing non-attack traffic to locate sources or
mitigate traffic unlawfully within the jurisdiction or region.
Inter-consortium Considerations:
o System use between peering consortiums MUST also adhere to any
government communication regulations that apply between those two
regions, such as encryption export and import restrictions.
o System use between consortiums MUST not request traffic traces
and actions beyond the scope intended and permitted by law or
inter-consortium agreements.
o System use between consortiums MUST respect national boundary
issues and limit requests to appropriate system use and not to
achieve their own agenda to limit or restrict traffic that is
otherwise permitted within the country in which the peering
consortium resides.
RID is useful in determining the true source of a packet that
traverses multiple networks or to communicate security incidents
and automate the response.
In order to identify the source and trace multiple networks, the
packet header information along with 8 bytes of payload are used in
the packet identification. The information obtained from the trace
may determine the identity of the source host or the network
provider used by the source of the traffic. It should be noted
that the trace mechanism used across a single-network provider may
also raise privacy concerns for the clients of the network.
Methods that may raise concern include those which involve storing
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packets for some length of time in order to trace packets after the
fact. Monitoring networks for intrusions and for tracing
capabilities also raises concerns for potentially sensitive valid
traffic that may be traversing the monitored network. IDS and
single-network tracing is outside of the scope of this document,
but the concern should be noted and addressed within the use
guidelines of the network. Some IDS and single-network trace
mechanisms attempt to properly address these issues. RID is
designed to provide the information needed by any single-network
trace mechanism. The provider's choice of a single trace mechanism
depends on resources, existing solutions, and local legislation.
Privacy concerns in regard to the single-network trace must be
dealt with at the client-to-network provide level and are out of
scope for RID messaging.
The identity of the true source of an attack packet being traced
through RID could be sensitive. The true identity listed in a
Result message can be protected through the use of encryption
on the fields containing the identity, using the public encryption
key for the originating NP. Alternatively, the action taken may be
listed without the identity being revealed to the originating NP.
The ultimate goal of the RID communication system is to stop or
mitigate attack traffic, not to ensure the identity of the attack
traffic is known to involved parties. The NP that identifies the
source needs to deal directly with the involved parties and proper
authorities in order to determine the guidelines for the release of
such information, if it is regarded as sensitive. In some
situations, systems used in attacks are compromised by an unknown
source and, in turn, are used to attack other systems. In that
situation, the reputation of a business or organization may be at
stake, and the action taken may be the only additional information
reported in the Result message to the originating system. If
the security incident is a minor incident, such as a zombie system
used in part of a large-scale DDoS attack, ensuring the system is
taken off the network until it has been fixed may be sufficient.
The textual descriptions should include details of the incident in
order to protect the reputation of the unknowing attacker and
prevent the need for additional investigation. Local, state, or
national laws may dictate the appropriate reporting action for
specific security incidents.
Privacy becomes an issue whenever sensitive data traverses a
network. For example, if an attack occurred between a specific
source and destination, then every network provider in the path of
the trace would become aware that the cyber attack occurred. In a
targeted attack, it may not be desirable for the information that
two nation states are battling a cyber war to become general
knowledge to all intermediate parties. However, it is important to
allow the traces to take place in order to halt the activity since
the health of the networks in the path could also be at stake
during the attack. This provides a second argument for allowing
the Result message to only include an action taken and not
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the identity of the offending host. In the case of an
Investigation request, where the originating NP is aware of the NP
that will receive the request for processing, the free-form text
areas of the document could be encrypted using the public key of
the destination NP to ensure that no other NP in the path can read
the contents The encryption would be accomplished through the W3C
specification for encrypting an element.
In some situations, all network traffic of a nation may be granted
through a single network provider. In that situation, options must
support sending Result messages from a downstream peer of
that network provider. That option provides an additional level of
abstraction to hide the identity and the NP of the identified
source of the traffic. Legal action may override this technical
decision after the trace has taken place, but that is out of the
technical scope of this document.
Privacy concerns when using an Investigation Request to request
action close to the source of valid attack traffic needs to be
considered. Although the intermediate NPs relay the request to the
closest NP to the source, the intermediate NPs do not require the
ability to see the contents of the packet or the text description
field(s) in the request. This message type does not require any
action by the intermediate RID systems, except to relay the packet
to the next NP in the path. Therefore, the contents of the request
may be encrypted. The intermediate NPs would only need to know how
to direct the request to the manager of the AS number in which the
source IP address belongs.
Traces must be legitimate security-related incidents and not used
for purposes such as sabotage or censorship. An example of such
abuse of the system would include a request to block or rate-limit
legitimate traffic to prevent information from being shared between
users on the Internet (restricting access to online versions of
papers) or restricting access from a competitor's product in order
to sabotage a business.
Inter-consortium RID communications raise additional issues
especially when the peering consortiums reside in different
regions or nations. TraceRequests and requested actions to
mitigate traffic must adhere to the appropriate use guidelines and
yet prevent abuse of the system. First, the peering consortiums
MUST identify the types of traffic that can be traced between the
borders of the participating NPs of each consortium. The traffic
traced should be limited to security incident-related traffic.
Second, the traces permitted within one consortium if passed to a
peering consortium may infringe upon the peering consortium's
freedom of information laws. An example would be a consortium in
one country permitting a trace of traffic containing objectionable
material, outlawed within that country. The RID trace may be a
valid use of the system within the confines of that country's
network border; however, it may not be permitted to continue across
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network boundaries where such content is permitted under law. By
continuing the trace in another country's network, the trace and
response could have the effect of improperly restricting access to
data. A continued trace into a second country may break the laws
and regulations of that nation. Any such traces MUST cease at the
country's border.
The privacy concerns listed in this section have addressed issues
of privacy among the trusted parties involved in a trace within an
NP, a RID consortium, and peering RID consortiums. Data
used for RID communications must also be protected from parties
that are not trusted. This protection is provided through the
authentication and encryption of documents as they traverse the
path of trusted servers. Each RID system MUST perform a
bi-directional authentication when sending a RID message and use
the public encryption key of the upstream or downstream peer to
send a message or document over the network. This means that the
document is decrypted and re-encrypted at each RID system either
via S/MIME or TLS over BEEP or HTTPS. The RID messages must be
decrypted at each RID system in order to properly process the
request or relay the information. Today's processing power is more
than sufficient to handle the minimal burden of encrypting and
decrypting relatively small typical RID messages.
7. Security Considerations
Communication between NPs' RID systems must be protected. An out-
of-band network, either logical or physical, would prevent outside
attacks against RID communication. An out-of-band connection
would be ideal, but not necessarily practical. Authenticated
encrypted tunnels between RID systems MUST be used to provide
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and privacy for the data.
Trust relationships are based on consortiums and established trust
relationships of PKI cross certifications of consortiums. By using
SOAP, RIDPolicy information, Transport Layer Security (TLS), and
the XML security features of encryption and digital signatures,
RID takes advantage of existing security standards. The standards
provide clear methods to ensure messages are secure, authenticated,
authorized, meet policy and privacy guidelines, and maintain
integrity.
As specified in the relevant sections of this document, the XML
digital signature and XML encryption are used in the following
cases:
XML Digital Signature
O Originator of the Trace or Investigation Request MUST sign the
RecordItem class data to provide authentication to all
upstream participants in the trace of the origin. This
signature MUST be passed to all recipients of the TraceRequest.
O For all message types, the full RID message MUST be signed by
the sending peer to provide authentication and integrity to the
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receiving RID system.
XML Encryption
O The entire message may be encrypted to provide an extra layer
of security between peers so that the message is not only
encrypted for the transport, but also while stored. This
behavior would be agreed upon between peers or a consortium, or
determined on a per message basis based on security
requirements. The RIDPolicy class will be presented in clear
text in the SOAP header.
O An Investigation request, or any other message type that may be
relayed through RID systems other than the intended destination
as a result of trust relationships, may be encrypted for the
intended recipient. This may be necessary if the RID network
is being used for message transfer, the intermediate parties
do not need to have knowledge of the request contents, and a
direct communication path does not exist. In that case, the
RIDPolicy class is used by intermediate parties and is
maintained in the SOAP header in clear text.
O The action taken in the Result message may be encrypted
using the key of the request originator. In that case, the
intermediate parties can view the RIDPolicy information and
know the trace has been completed and do not need to see the
action. If the use of encryption were limited to sections of
the message, the History class information would be
encrypted. Otherwise, the entire message, with the exception
of the RIDPolicy information and incident identifier, could be
encrypted for the originator of the request. The existence
of the Result message for an incident would tell the
intermediate parties used in the path of the trace that the
incident trace has been completed.
Policies between NPs must be established to provide guidelines for
communication. The policy should include communication methods,
security, and fall-back procedures. The policy should establish a
method to protect communications of RID systems between all
bordering NPs. The trust relationships should extend to all
bordering NPs to support tracing and stopping attacks throughout
the network. A fully meshed communication ability would provide
the means for all RID messages to be sent directly to the intended
RID system. If a fully meshed communication system is
not available, messages may have to traverse multiple systems to
reach the intended RID system. Other policy considerations
include how the RegistryHandle and RID system IP address should be
shared. This should also be coupled with any necessary pre-shared
key or certificate (or trusted Security Authority) stored in the
RID system for encryption negotiation where PKI is in use.
Note: The contact information and corresponding IP address for a
network RID system is shared among cooperating networks via
a predefined table. This information may be stored locally in RID
systems or a central database accessible on the secured network
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used for inter-NP messaging. The repository can also be used as
the border directory to other consortiums for sharing public key
information necessary to establish and protect communications.
The method of passing a TraceRequest message to subsequent
networks eliminates the need for granting access to remote
entities to configure network equipment on border networks. Access
to network equipment to configure systems for trace continuance
remains in the responsibility of the parties who own and manage
that equipment. Thus, there is no need to share authentication
information with devices outside of the network operation center
managing the device. Network administrators, who have the ability
to base the decision on the available resources and other factors
of their network, maintain control of the continuance of a trace.
8. IANA Considerations
This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas
conforming to a registry mechanism described in [RFC3688].
Registration request for the iodef-rid namespace:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0
Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section 10.2 of
this document.
XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.
Registration request for the iodef-rid XML schema:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:iodef-rid-1.0
Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section 10.2 of
this document.
XML: See the "RID Schema Definition" section 5 of this document.
9. Summary
Security incidents and denial-of-service attacks have always been
difficult to trace as a result of the spoofed sources, resource
limitations, and bandwidth utilization problems. Incident response
is often slow even when the IP address is known to be valid because
of the resources required to notify the responsible party of the
attack and then to stop or mitigate the attack traffic. Methods to
identify and trace attacks near real time are essential to
thwarting attack attempts. Network providers need policies and
automated methods to combat the hacker's efforts. NPs need
automated monitoring and response capabilities to identify and
trace attacks quickly without resource-intensive side effects.
Integration with a centralized communication system to coordinate
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the detection, tracing, and identification of attack sources on a
single network is essential. RID provides a way to integrate a
network provider's resources for each aspect of attack detection,
tracing, and source identification and extends the communication
capabilities among network providers. The communication is
accomplished through the use of flexible IODEF XML-based documents
that may originate on an IDS system wrapped in a RID message. A
TraceRequest or Investigation request is communicated to an
upstream provider and may result in an upstream trace or in an
action to stop or mitigate the attack traffic. The messages are
communicated among peers with security inherent to the RID
messaging scheme provided through existing standards such as XML
encryption and digital signatures. Policy information is carried
in the RID message itself through the use of the RIDPolicy. RID
provides the timely communication among NPs, which is essential for
incident handling.
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10. References
[ISO 9594/8] CCITT Rec. X.509 (1994) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:1994,
Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection The
Directory: Authentication Framework
[RFC791] "Internet Protocol, DARPA Internet Program, Protocol
Specification." Information Sciences Institute, University of
Southern California. September 1981.
[RFC1213] "Management Information Base for Network Management of
TCP/IP-based Internets: MIB-II." K. McCloghrie and M . Rose. March
1991.
[RFC1215] "A Convention for Defining Traps for use with the SNMP."
M. Rose. March 1991.
[RFC1930] "Guidelines for creation, selection, and registration of
an Autonomous System (AS)." J. Hawkinson and T. Bates. March 1996.
[RFC2246] "The TLS Protocol." T. Dierks and C. Allen.
January 1999.
[RFC2256] "A Summary of the X.500(96) User Schema for use with
LDAPv3." M. Wahl. December 1997.
[RFC2459] "Internet Public Key Infrastructure: Part I: X.509
Certificate and CRL Profile." R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, and
D. Solo. January 1999.
[RFC2527] "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate
Policy and Certification Practices Framework." S. Chokhani and
W. Ford. March 1999.
[RFC2528] "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Representation of Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) Keys in Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates." R. Housley and
W. Polk. March 1999.
[RFC2720] "Traffic Flow Measurement: Meter MIB." N. Brownlee.
October 1999.
[RFC2722]"Traffic Flow Measurement: Architecture." N. Brownlee, C.
Mills, and G. Ruth. October 1999.
[RFC2723] "SRL: A Language for Describing Traffic Flows and
Specifying Actions for Flow Groups." N. Brownlee. October 1999.
[RFC2827] "Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service
Attacks Which Employ IP Source Address Spoofing." P. Ferguson and
D. Senie. May 2000.
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[RFC3688] "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, M. Mealling,
January 2004.
[RFC3821] "An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for
Authorization." S. Farrell and R. Housley. April 2002.
[RFCXXXX] "The Incident Data Exchange Format Data Model and XML
Implementation." J. Meijer, R. Danyliw, and Y. Demchenko.
August 2006.
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-inch-iodef-08.txt
[RFCXXXX] "Requirements for the Format for INcident information
Exchange," Y. Demchenko, R. Danyliw, and G. Keeni, June 2006.
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-inch-requirements-
08.txt
[1] Advanced and Authenticated Marking Schemes for IP Traceback.
D. Song and A. Perrig. IEEE INFOCOM 2001.
[2] Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algoritms, and Source Code
B.C. Schneier. Second edition. John Wiley & Sons. 1996.
[3] "CenterTrack: An IP Overlay Network for Tracing DoS Floods."
R. Stone. 9th Usenix Security Symposium Proceedings. August
2000.
[4] Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition). W3C
Recommendation. T. Bray, E. Maler, J. Paoli, and C. M. Sperberg-
McQueen. October 2000.
http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/REC-xml-20001006
[5] http://www.cisco.com/go/netflow
[6] http://www.info-sec.com/denial/infosece.html-ssi
[7] "Hash Based IP Traceback." A. Snoren, L. Sanchez, C. Jones,
F. Tchakountio, S. Kent, and W. Strayer. SIGCOMM'01. August 2001.
[8] "ICMP Traceback Messages." S. M. Bellovin, M. Leech, and
T. Taylor. Internet Draft:
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/03mar/I-D/draft-ietf-itrace-04.txt
February 2003.
[9] "Inferring Internet Denial of Service Activity." D. Moore,
G. M. Voelker, and S. Savage. Published in Proceedings
of the 2001 USENIX Security Symposium.
[10] "MULTOPS: A Data-Structure For Bandwidth Attack Detection."
T. M. Gil and M. Poletta. Published in Proceedings of
the 2001 USENIX Security Symposium.
[11] "Network Congestion Monitoring and Detection using the IMI
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infrastructure." T. Saitoh, G. Mansfield, and N.Shiratori.
Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University.
[12] PKCS 5 v2.0 Password-Based Cryptography Standard. RSA Security
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-5/index.html.
March 1999.
[13] PKCS 7 Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard. RSA Security.
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-7/index.html.
May 1997.
[14] "Practical Network support for IP Traceback." S. Savage,
D. Wetherall, A. Karlin, and T. Anderson. SIGCOMM'00. August 2000.
[15] Security Architecture for Open Agent Systems. Vrije
Universiteit. Y. Demchenko, B. Overiender, and H. M. Boonstra.
http://carol.science.uva.nl/~demch/worksinprogress/
draft-saas-paper03.pdf
[16] "Security in a Web Services World: A Proposed Architecture
and Roadmap." IBM and Microsoft. April 2002.
http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/webservices/library/ws-secmap
[17] SOAP Version 1.2 Part 0: Primer. W3C Recommendation.
http://www.w3c.org/TR/REC-soap12-part0-20030624/. 24 June 2004.
[18] SOAP Version 1.2 Part 1:Messaging Framework. W3C
Recommendation. http://www.w3c.org/TR/REC-soap12-part1-20030624/.
24 June 2004.
[19] "Trends in Denial of Service Attack Technology." K. Houle,
G. Weaver, N. Long, and R. Thomas. CERT Coordination Center.
October 2001.
[20] XML Encryption Syntax and Processing, W3C Recommendation.
T. Imamura, B. Dillaway, and E. Simon. December 2002.
http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/
[21] XML Schema. E. Van der Vlist. O'Reilly. 2002.
[22] XML-Signature Syntax and Processing. W3C Recommendation.
M. Bartel, J. Boyer, B. Fox, B. LaMacchia, and E. Simon. February
2002. http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/#sec-Design.
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10.1 Acknowledgements
Many thanks to coworkers and the Internet community for reviewing
and commenting on the draft as well as providing recommendations to
simplify and secure the protocol: Dr. Robert K. Cunningham, Cynthia
D. McLain, Dr. William Streilein, Iljitsch van Beijnum, Steve
Bellovin, Yuri Demchenko, Jean-Francois Morfin, Jose Nazaro,
Stephen Northcutt, Jeffrey Schiller, Brian Trammell, Roman Danyliw,
and Tony Tauber.
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
10.2 Author Information
Kathleen M. Moriarty
MIT Lincoln Laboratory
244 Wood Street
Lexington, MA 02420
Email: Moriarty@ll.mit.edu
Intellectual Property Statement
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Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC
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document. For more information consult the online list of claimed
rights.
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Disclaimer of Validity
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
Sponsor Information
This work was sponsored by the Air Force under Air Force
Contract FA8721-05-C-0002.
"Opinions, interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations
are those of the author and are not necessarily endorsed
by the United States Government."
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