Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) C. Tjhai
Internet-Draft M. Tomlinson
Updates: 7296 (if approved) Post-Quantum
Intended status: Standards Track G. Bartlett
Expires: 4 June 2023 Quantum Secret
S. Fluhrer
Cisco Systems
D. Van Geest
ISARA Corporation
O. Garcia-Morchon
Philips
V. Smyslov
ELVIS-PLUS
1 December 2022
Multiple Key Exchanges in IKEv2
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-12
Abstract
This document describes how to extend the Internet Key Exchange
Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) to allow multiple key exchanges to take
place while computing a shared secret during a Security Association
(SA) setup.
The primary application of this feature in IKEv2 is the ability to
perform one or more post-quantum key exchanges in conjunction with
the classical (Elliptic Curve) Diffie-Hellman (EC)DH key exchange, so
that the resulting shared key is resistant against quantum computer
attacks. Since there is currently no post-quantum key exchange that
is as well-studied as (EC)DH, performing multiple key exchanges with
different post-quantum algorithms along with the well-established
classical key exchange algorithms addresses this concern, since the
overall security is at least as strong as each individual primitive.
Another possible application for this extension is the ability to
combine several key exchanges in situations when no single key
exchange algorithm is trusted by both initiator and responder.
This document utilizes the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, by means of
which multiple key exchanges are performed when an IKE SA is being
established. It also introduces a new IKEv2 exchange
IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE, which is used for the same purpose when the IKE SA
is up (during rekeys or creating additional Child SAs).
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This document updates RFC7296 by renaming a transform type 4 from
"Diffie-Hellman Group (D-H)" to "Key Exchange Method (KE)" and
renaming a field in the Key Exchange Payload from "Diffie-Hellman
Group Num" to "Key Exchange Method". It also renames an IANA
registry for this transform type from "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-
Hellman Group Transform IDs" to "Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange
Method Transform IDs". These changes generalize key exchange
algorithms that can be used in IKEv2.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 June 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Problem Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Proposed Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Multiple Key Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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2.1. Design Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.1. IKE_SA_INIT Round: Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.2. IKE_INTERMEDIATE Round: Additional Key Exchanges . . 15
2.2.3. IKE_AUTH Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.4. CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.5. Interaction with IKEv2 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . 19
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1. Additional Considerations and Changes . . . . . . . . . . 21
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix A. Sample Multiple Key Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.1. IKE_INTERMEDIATE Exchanges Carrying Additional Key Exchange
Payloads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.2. No Additional Key Exchange Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.3. Additional Key Exchange in the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange
only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.4. No Matching Proposal for Additional Key Exchanges . . . . 31
Appendix B. Design Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Appendix C. Alternative Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1. Introduction
1.1. Problem Description
Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2) as specified in [RFC7296] uses
the Diffie-Hellman (DH) or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
algorithm, which shall be referred to as (EC)DH collectively, to
establish a shared secret between an initiator and a responder. The
security of the (EC)DH algorithms relies on the difficulty to solve a
discrete logarithm problem in multiplicative (and respectively
elliptic curve) groups when the order of the group parameter is large
enough. While solving such a problem remains infeasible with current
computing power, it is believed that general purpose quantum
computers will be able to solve this problem, implying that the
security of IKEv2 is compromised. There are, however, a number of
cryptosystems that are conjectured to be resistant against quantum
computer attack. This family of cryptosystems is known as post-
quantum cryptography (PQC). It is sometimes also referred to as
quantum-safe cryptography (QSC) or quantum-resistant cryptography
(QRC).
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1.2. Proposed Extension
This document describes a method to perform multiple successive key
exchanges in IKEv2. It allows integration of PQC in IKEv2, while
maintaining backwards compatibility, to derive a set of IKE keys that
is resistant to quantum computer attacks. This extension allows the
negotiation of one or more PQC algorithm to exchange data, in
addition to the existing (EC)DH key exchange data. It is believed
that the feature of using more than one post-quantum algorithms is
important as many of these algorithms are relatively new and there
may be a need to hedge the security risk with multiple key exchange
data from several distinct PQC algorithms.
IKE peers perform multiple successive key exchanges to establish an
IKE Security Association (SA). Each exchange produces a piece of
secret and these secrets are combined in a way such that:
(a) the final shared secret is computed from all of the component
key exchange secret;
(b) the shared secret as specified in [RFC7296] is obtained unless
both peers support and agree to use the additional key exchanges
introduced in this specification; and
(c) if any of the component key exchange method is a post-quantum
algorithm, the final shared secret is post-quantum secure.
Some post-quantum key exchange payloads may have sizes larger than
the standard maximum transmission unit (MTU) size, and therefore
there could be issues with fragmentation at the IP layer. In order
to allow using those larger payload sizes, this mechanism relies on
the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange as specified in [RFC9242]. With this
mechanism, the key exchange is initiated using a smaller, possibly
classical primitive, such as (EC)DH. Then, before the IKE_AUTH
exchange, one or more IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges are carried out,
each of which contains an additional key exchange. As the
IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange is encrypted, the IKE fragmentation
protocol [RFC7383] can be used. The IKE SK_* values are updated
after each exchange as described in Section 2.2.2, and so the final
IKE SA keys depend on all the key exchanges, hence they are secure if
any of the key exchanges are secure.
While this extension is primarily aimed for IKE SAs due to the
potential fragmentation issue discussed above, it also applies to
CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges as illustrated in Section 2.2.4 for
creating/rekeying of Child SAs and rekeying of IKE SAs.
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Note that readers should consider the approach defined in this
document as providing a long term solution in upgrading the IKEv2
protocol to support post-quantum algorithms. A short term solution
to make IKEv2 key exchange quantum secure is to use post-quantum pre-
shared keys as specified in [RFC8784].
Note also that the proposed approach of performing multiple
successive key exchanges in such a way that resulting session keys
depend on all of them is not limited to only addressing the threat of
quantum computer. It can also be used when all of the performed key
exchanges are classical (EC)DH primitives, where for some reasons
(e.g. policy requirements) it is essential to perform multiple of
them.
This specification does not attempt to address key exchanges with KE
payloads longer than 64 Kbytes; the current IKE payload format does
not allow such as possibility. At the time of writing, it appears
likely that there are a number of key exchanges available that would
not have such a requirement. However, if such a requirement is
needed, [I-D.tjhai-ikev2-beyond-64k-limit] discusses approaches that
could be taken to exchange huge payloads.
1.3. Changes
RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS SECTION.
Changes in this draft in each version iterations.
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-07
* Editorial changes.
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-06
* Updated draft with the allocated IANA values.
* Editorial changes following AD review.
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-05
* Updated the reference to RFC9242.
* Editorial changes.
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-04
* Introduction and initial sections are reorganized.
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* More clarifications for error handling added.
* ASCII arts displaying SA payload are added.
* Clarification for handling multiple round trips key exchange
methods added.
* DoS concerns added into Security Considerations section.
* Explicitly allow scenario when additional key exchanges are
performed only after peers are authenticated.
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-03
* More clarifications added.
* Figure illustrating initial exchange added.
* Minor editorial changes.
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-02
* Added a reference on the handling of KE payloads larger than 64KB.
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-01
* References are updated.
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-00
* Draft name changed as result of WG adoption and generalization of
the approach.
* New exchange IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE is defined for additional key
exchanges performed after CREATE_CHILD_SA.
* Nonces are removed from all additional key exchanges.
* Clarification that IKE_INTERMEDIATE must be negotiated is added.
draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-04
* Clarification about key derivation in case of multiple key
exchanges in CREATE_CHILD_SA is added.
* Resolving rekey collisions in case of multiple key exchanges is
clarified.
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draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-03
* Using multiple key exchanges CREATE_CHILD_SA is defined.
draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-02
* Use new transform types to negotiate additional key exchanges,
rather than using the KE payloads of IKE SA.
draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-01
* Use IKE_INTERMEDIATE to perform multiple key exchanges in
succession.
* Handle fragmentation by keeping the first key exchange (a standard
IKE_SA_INIT with a few extra notifies) small, and encrypting the
rest of the key exchanges.
* Simplify the negotiation of the 'extra' key exchanges.
draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-00
* Added a feature to allow more than one post-quantum key exchange
algorithms to be negotiated and used to exchange a post- quantum
shared secret.
* Instead of relying on TCP encapsulation to deal with IP level
fragmentation, a new key exchange payload that can be sent as
multiple fragments within IKE_SA_INIT message was introduced.
1.4. Document Organization
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 2
describes how multiple key exchanges are performed between two IKE
peers and how keying materials are derived for both SAs and Child
SAs. Section 3 discusses IANA considerations for the namespaces
introduced in this document, and Section 4 discusses security
considerations. In the Appendices sections, some examples of
multiple key exchanges are illustrated in Appendix A, Appendix B
summarizes design criteria and a summary of alternative approaches
that have been considered, but later discarded, are described in
Appendix C.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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2. Multiple Key Exchanges
2.1. Design Overview
Most post-quantum key agreement algorithms are relatively new, and
thus are not fully trusted. There are also many proposed algorithms,
with different trade-offs and relying on different hard problems.
The concern is that some of these hard problems may turn out to be
easier to solve than anticipated and thus the key agreement algorithm
may not be as secure as expected. A hybrid solution, when multiple
key exchanges are performed and the calculated shared key depends on
all of them, allows us to deal with this uncertainty by combining a
classical key exchange with a post-quantum one, as well as leaving
open the possibility of multiple post-quantum key exchanges.
In order to be able to use IKE fragmentation [RFC7383] for those key
exchanges that may have long public keys, this specification utilizes
the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange defined in [RFC9242]. The initial
IKE_SA_INIT messages do not have any inherent fragmentation support
within IKE; however, IKE_SA_INIT messages can include a relatively
short KE payload. The additional key exchanges are performed using
IKE_INTERMEDIATE messages that follow the IKE_SA_INIT exchange. This
is to allow the standard IKE fragmentation mechanisms (which cannot
be used in IKE_SA_INIT) to be available for the potentially large Key
Exchange payloads with post-quantum algorithm data.
Note that this document assumes, that each key exchange method
requires one round trip and consumes exactly one IKE_INTERMEDIATE
exchange. This assumption is valid for all classic key exchange
methods defined so far and for all post-quantum methods currently
known. For hypothetical future key exchange methods requiring
multiple round trips to complete, a separate document should define
how such methods are split into several IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges.
In order to minimize communication overhead, only the key shares that
are agreed to be used are actually exchanged. To negotiate
additional key exchanges seven new Transform Types are defined.
These transforms and Transform Type 4 share the same Transform IDs.
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It is assumed that new Transform Type 4 identifiers will be assigned
later for various post-quantum key exchanges [IKEV2TYPE4ID]. This
specification does not make a distinction between classical (EC)DH
and post-quantum key exchanges, nor post-quantum algorithms which are
true key exchanges versus post-quantum algorithms that act as key
transport mechanisms; all are treated equivalently by the protocol.
This document renames a field in the Key Exchange Payload from
"Diffie-Hellman Group Num" to "Key Exchange Method". It also renames
Transform Type 4 from "Diffie-Hellman Group (D-H)" to "Key Exchange
Method (KE)"; the corresponding renaming to the IANA registry is
described in Section 3.
The fact that newly defined transforms share the same registry for
possible Transform IDs with Transform Type 4, allows additional key
exchanges to be of any type - either post-quantum or classical (EC)DH
one. This approach allows any combination of the defined key
exchange methods to take place. This also allows IKE peers to
perform a single post-quantum key exchange in the IKE_SA_INIT without
additional key exchanges, provided that the IP fragmentation is not
an issue and that hybrid key exchange is not needed.
The SA payload in the IKE_SA_INIT message includes one or more newly
defined transforms which represent the extra key exchange policy
required by the initiator. The responder follows the usual IKEv2
negotiation rules: it selects a single transform of each type, and
returns all of them in the IKE_SA_INIT response message.
Then, provided that additional key exchanges are negotiated, the
initiator and the responder perform one or more IKE_INTERMEDIATE
exchanges. Following that, the IKE_AUTH exchange authenticates peers
and completes IKE SA establishment.
Initiator Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
<-- IKE_SA_INIT (additional key exchanges negotiation) -->
<-- {IKE_INTERMEDIATE (additional key exchange)} -->
...
<-- {IKE_INTERMEDIATE (additional key exchange)} -->
<-- {IKE_AUTH} -->
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2.2. Protocol Details
In the simplest case, the initiator starts a single key exchange (and
has no interest in supporting multiple), and it is not concerned with
possible fragmentation of the IKE_SA_INIT messages (either because
the key exchange it selects is small enough not to fragment, or the
initiator is confident that fragmentation will be handled either by
IP fragmentation, or transport via TCP).
In this case, the initiator performs the IKE_SA_INIT for a single key
exchange using a Transform Type 4 (possibly with a post quantum
algorithm), and including the initator KE payload. If the responder
accepts the policy, it responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response, and IKE
continues as usual.
If the initiator desires to negotiate multiple key exchanges, then
the initiator uses the protocol behavior listed below.
2.2.1. IKE_SA_INIT Round: Negotiation
Multiple key exchanges are negotiated using the standard IKEv2
mechanism, via SA payload. For this purpose seven new transform
types, namely Additional Key Exchange 1 (with IANA assigned value 6),
Additional Key Exchange 2 (7), Additional Key Exchange 3 (8),
Additional Key Exchange 4 (9), Additional Key Exchange 5 (10),
Additional Key Exchange 6 (11) and Additional Key Exchange 7 (12) are
defined. They are collectively called Additional Key Exchange
transforms in this document and have slightly different semantics
than the existing IKEv2 transform types. They are interpreted as an
indication of additional key exchange methods that peers agree to
perform in a series of IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges following the
IKE_SA_INIT exchange. The allowed transform IDs for these transform
types are the same as the IDs for Transform Type 4, so they all share
a single IANA registry for transform IDs.
Key exchange method negotiated via Transform Type 4 always takes
place in the IKE_SA_INIT exchange, as defined in [RFC7296].
Additional key exchanges negotiated via newly defined transforms MUST
take place in a series of IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges following the
IKE_SA_INIT exchange, performed in an order of the values of their
transform types, so that key exchange negotiated using Additional Key
Exchange i always precedes that of Additional Key Exchange i + 1.
Each additional key exchange method MUST be fully completed before
the next one is started.
Note that with these semantics, Additional Key Exchange transforms
are not associated with any particular type of key exchange and do
not have any specific per transform type transform IDs IANA registry.
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Instead they all share a single registry for transform IDs, namely
"Key Exchange Method Transform IDs", which are also shared by
Transform Type 4. All key exchange algorithms (both classical or
post-quantum) should be added to this registry. This approach gives
peers flexibility in defining the ways they want to combine different
key exchange methods.
When forming a proposal the initiator adds transforms for the
IKE_SA_INIT exchange using Transform Type 4. In most cases they will
contain classical (EC)DH key exchange methods, however it is not a
requirement. Additional key exchange methods are proposed using
Additional Key Exchange transform types. All of these transform
types are optional, the initiator is free to select any of them for
proposing additional key exchange methods. Consequently, if none of
the Additional Key Exchange transforms is included in the proposal,
then this proposal indicates performing standard IKEv2, as defined in
[RFC7296]. On the other hand, if the initiator includes any
Additional Key Exchange transform in the proposal, the responder MUST
select one of the algorithms proposed using this type. Note that
this is not a new requirement, but that this behavior is already
specified in Section 2.7 of [RFC7296]. A transform ID NONE MAY be
added to those transform types which contain key exchange methods
that the initiator believes is optional according to its local
policy.
The responder performs the negotiation using the standard IKEv2
procedure described in Section 3.3 of [RFC7296]. However, for the
Additional Key Exchange types, the responder's choice MUST NOT
contain duplicated algorithms (those with identical Transform ID and
attributes), except for the transform ID of NONE. An algorithm is
represented as a transform, in some cases the transform could include
a set of associated attributes that define details of the algorithm.
In this case, two transforms can be the same, but the attributes must
be different. Additionally, the order of the attributes does not
affect the equality of the algorithm, so two transforms
(ID=alg1,ATTR1=attr1,ATTR2=attr2) and
(ID=alg1,ATTR2=attr2,ATTR1=attr1) define the same algorithm. If the
responder is unable to select non-duplicated algorithm for each
proposed key exchange (either because the proposal contains too few
choices or due to the local policy restrictions on using the proposed
algorithms), then the responder MUST reject the message with an error
notification of type NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN. If the responder's message
contains one or more duplicated choices, the initiator should log the
error and MUST treat the exchange as failed. The initiator MUST NOT
initiate any IKE_INTERMEDIATE (or IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE) exchanges, so that
no new SA is created. If this happens in the CREATE_CHILD_SA
exchange, then the initiator MAY delete the IKE SA, over which the
invalid message was received, by sending a Delete payload.
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If the responder selects NONE for some Additional Key Exchange types
(provided they are proposed by the initiator), then the corresponding
Additional Key Exchange(s) in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange(s) MUST
NOT take place. Therefore if the initiator includes NONE in all of
the Additional Key Exchange transforms and the responder selects this
value for all of them, then no IKE_INTERMEDIATE messages performing
additional key exchanges will take place between the peers. Note
that the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges may still take place for other
purposes.
The initiator MAY propose non-consecutive Additional Key Exchange
transforms, for example proposing Additional Key Exchange 2 and
Additional Key Exchange 5 transforms only. The responder MUST treat
all of the omitted Additional Key Exchange transforms as if they are
proposed with Transform ID NONE.
Below is an example of the SA payload in the initiator's IKE_SA_INIT
request message. Here the abbreviation AKEi is used to denote the
i-th Additional Key Exchange transform defined in this document, and
an abbreviation KE for the Key Exchange transform, that this document
renames from the Diffie-Hellman Group transform. Additionally, the
notations PQ_KEM_1, PQ_KEM_2 and PQ_KEM_3 are used to represent some
not-yet defined Transform IDs of some popular post-quantum key
exchange methods.
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SA Payload
|
+--- Proposal #1 ( Proto ID = IKE(1), SPI size = 8,
| 9 transforms, SPI = 0x35a1d6f22564f89d )
|
+-- Transform ENCR ( ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16 )
| +-- Attribute ( Key Length = 256 )
|
+-- Transform KE ( ID = 4096-bit MODP Group )
|
+-- Transform PRF ( ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 )
|
+-- Transform AKE2 ( ID = PQ_KEM_1 )
|
+-- Transform AKE2 ( ID = PQ_KEM_2 )
|
+-- Transform AKE3 ( ID = PQ_KEM_1 )
|
+-- Transform AKE3 ( ID = PQ_KEM_2 )
|
+-- Transform AKE5 ( ID = PQ_KEM_3 )
|
+-- Transform AKE5 ( ID = NONE )
In this example, the initiator proposes to perform initial key
exchange using 4096-bit MODP group followed by two mandatory
additional key exchanges (i.e. Transforms AKE2 and AKE3) using
PQ_KEM_1 and PQ_KEM_2 methods in any order, then followed by
additional key exchange (i.e. Transform AKE5) using PQ_KEM_3 method
that may be omitted.
The responder might return the following SA payload, indicating that
it agrees to perform two additional key exchanges PQ_KEM_2 followed
by PQ_KEM_1 and does not want to perform PQ_KEM_3 additionally.
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SA Payload
|
+--- Proposal #1 ( Proto ID = IKE(1), SPI size = 8,
| 6 transforms, SPI = 0x8df52b331a196e7b )
|
+-- Transform ENCR ( ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16 )
| +-- Attribute ( Key Length = 256 )
|
+-- Transform KE ( ID = 4096-bit MODP Group )
|
+-- Transform PRF ( ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 )
|
+-- Transform AKE2 ( ID = PQ_KEM_2 )
|
+-- Transform AKE3 ( ID = PQ_KEM_1 )
|
+-- Transform AKE5 ( ID = NONE )
If the initiator includes any Additional Key Exchange transform types
into the SA payload in the IKE_SA_INIT exchange request message, then
it MUST also negotiate the use of the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange as
described in [RFC9242], by including INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED
notification in the same message. If the responder agrees to use
additional key exchanges while establishing initial IKE SA, it MUST
also return this notification in the IKE_SA_INIT response message,
thus confirming that IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange is supported and will
be used for transferring additional key exchange data. If the
IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange is not negotiated, then the peers MUST
treat any Additional Key Exchange transforms in the IKE_SA_INIT
exchange messages as unknown transform types and skip the proposals
they appear in. If no other proposals are present in the SA payload,
the peers will proceed as if no proposal is chosen (i.e. the
responder will send NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notification).
Initiator Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR, SAi1(.. AKE*...), KEi, Ni,
N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED) --->
HDR, SAr1(.. AKE*...), KEr, Nr,
[CERTREQ],
<--- N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)
It is possible that an attacker manages to send a response to the
initiator's IKE_SA_INIT request before the legitimate responder does.
If the initiator continues to create the IKE SA using this response,
the attempt will fail. Implementers may wish to consider a possible
defense technique described in Section 2.4 of [RFC7296].
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2.2.2. IKE_INTERMEDIATE Round: Additional Key Exchanges
For each additional key exchange agreed to in the IKE_SA_INIT
exchange, the initiator and the responder perform IKE_INTERMEDIATE
exchange, as described in [RFC9242].
Initiator Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR, SK {KEi(n)} -->
<-- HDR, SK {KEr(n)}
The initiator sends key exchange data in the KEi(n) payload. This
message is protected with the current SK_ei/SK_ai keys. The notation
KEi(n) denotes the n-th IKE_INTERMEDIATE KE payload from the
initiator and the integer n is sequential starting from 1.
On receiving this, the responder sends back key exchange payload
KEr(n), which denotes the n-th IKE_INTERMEDIATE KE payload from the
responder. As before, this message is protected with the current
SK_er/SK_ar keys.
The former "Diffie-Hellman Group Num" (now called "Key Exchange
Method") field in the KEi(n) and KEr(n) payloads MUST match the n-th
negotiated additional key exchange.
Once this exchange is done, both sides compute an updated keying
material:
SKEYSEED(n) = prf(SK_d(n-1), SK(n) | Ni | Nr)
where SK(n) is the resulting shared secret of this key exchange, Ni
and Nr are nonces from the IKE_SA_INIT exchange and SK_d(n-1) is the
last generated SK_d, (derived from IKE_SA_INIT for the first use of
IKE_INTERMEDIATE, otherwise from the previous IKE_INTERMEDIATE
exchange). The other keying materials SK_d, SK_ai, SK_ar, SK_ei,
SK_er, SK_pi, SK_pr are generated from the SKEYSEED(n) as follows:
{SK_d(n) | SK_ai(n) | SK_ar(n) | SK_ei(n) | SK_er(n) | SK_pi(n) |
SK_pr(n)} = prf+ (SKEYSEED(n), Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)
Both the initiator and the responder use these updated key values in
the next exchange (IKE_INTERMEDIATE or IKE_AUTH).
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2.2.3. IKE_AUTH Exchange
After all IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchanges have completed, the initiator
and the responder perform an IKE_AUTH exchange. This exchange is the
standard IKE exchange as described in [RFC7296] with the modification
of AUTH payload calculation described in [RFC9242].
2.2.4. CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange
The CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange is used in IKEv2 for the purposes of
creating additional Child SAs, rekeying these and rekeying IKE SA
itself. When creating or rekeying Child SAs, the peers may
optionally perform a key exchange to add a fresh entropy into the
session keys. In case of IKE SA rekey, the key exchange is
mandatory. Peers supporting this specification may want to use
multiple key exchanges in these situations.
Using multiple key exchanges with CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange is
negotiated similarly as in the initial IKE exchange, see
Section 2.2.1. If the initiator includes any Additional Key Exchange
transform in the SA payload (along with Transform Type 4) and the
responder agrees to perform additional key exchanges, then the
additional key exchanges are performed in a series of new
IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges that follows the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange.
The IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchange is introduced as a dedicated exchange
for transferring data of additional key exchanges following the key
exchange performed in the CREATE_CHILD_SA. Its Exchange Type value
is 44.
Key exchange negotiated via Transform Type 4 always takes place in
the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange, as per IKEv2 specification. Additional
key exchanges are performed in an order of the values of their
transform types, so that key exchange negotiated using Transform Type
n always precedes key exchange negotiated using Transform Type n + 1.
Each additional key exchange method MUST be fully completed before
the next one is started. Note, that this document assumes, that each
key exchange method consumes exactly one IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchange.
For the methods requiring multiple round trips, a separate document
should define how such methods are split into several IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE
exchanges.
After an IKE SA is created the window size may be greater than one
and multiple concurrent exchanges may be in progress, it is essential
to link the IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges together with the corresponding
CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange. Due to the fact that once an IKE SA is
created, all IKE exchanges are independent and do not have built-in
means to link one with another, a new status type notification
ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE is introduced for this purpose. Its Notify
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Message Type value is 16441, and Protocol ID and SPI Size are both
set to 0. The data associated with this notification is a blob
meaningful only to the responder, so that the responder can correctly
link successive exchanges. For the initiator the content of this
notification is an opaque blob.
The responder MUST include this notification in a CREATE_CHILD_SA or
IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE response message in case the next IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE
exchange is expected, filling it with some data that would allow
linking the current exchange to the next one. The initiator MUST
send back this notification intact in the request message of the next
IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchange.
Below is an example of CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange followed by three
additional key exchanges.
Initiator Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(CREATE_CHILD_SA), SK {SA, Ni, KEi} -->
<-- HDR(CREATE_CHILD_SA), SK {SA, Nr, KEr,
N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link1)}
HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK {KEi(1),
N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link1)} -->
<-- HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK {KEr(1),
N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link2)}
HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK {KEi(2),
N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link2)} -->
<-- HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK {KEr(2),
N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link3)}
HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK {KEi(3),
N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link3)} -->
<-- HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK {KEr(3)}
The former "Diffie-Hellman Group Num" (now called "Key Exchange
Method") field in the KEi(n) and KEr(n) payloads MUST match the n-th
negotiated additional key exchange.
It is possible that due to some unexpected events (e.g. reboot) the
initiator may lose its state and forget that it is in the process of
performing additional key exchanges and thus never start the
remaining IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges. The responder MUST handle this
situation gracefully and delete the associated state if it does not
receive the next expected IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE request after some
reasonable period of time. Note that due to various factors such as
computational resource and key exchange algorithm used, it is not
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possible to give a normative guidance on how long this timeout period
should be. In general, 5-20 seconds of waiting time should be
appropriate in most cases.
It is also possible that the initiator may take too long to prepare
and send the next IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE request or due to the network
conditions, the request is retransmitted. In this case, the message
may reach the responder when it has already deleted the associated
state following the advice above. If the responder receives an
IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE message for which it does not have a key exchange
state, it MUST send back a new error type notification
STATE_NOT_FOUND. This is a non-fatal error notification, its Notify
Message Type is 47, Protocol ID and SPI Size are both set to 0 and
the data is empty. If the initiator receives this notification in
response to IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchange performing additional key
exchange, it MUST cancel this exchange and MUST treat the whole
series of exchanges started from the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange as
failed. In most cases, the receipt of this notification is caused by
premature deletion of the corresponding state on the responder (the
time period between IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges appeared too long from
the responder's point of view, e.g. due to a temporary network
failure). After receiving this notification the initiator MAY start
a new CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange which may eventually be followed by
the IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges, to retry the failed attempt. If the
initiator continues to receive STATE_NOT_FOUND notifications after
several retries, it MUST treat this situation as a fatal error and
delete IKE SA by sending a DELETE payload.
When rekeying the IKE SA or the Child SA, it is possible that the
peers start doing this at the same time, which is called simultaneous
rekeying. Sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.2 of [RFC7296] describe how IKEv2
handles this situation. In a nutshell IKEv2 follows the rule that if
in case of simultaneous rekeying, two identical new IKE SAs (or two
pairs of Child SAs) are created, then one of them should be deleted.
Which one is to be deleted is determined by comparing the values of
four nonces that are used in the colliding CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges.
The IKE SA (or pair of Child SAs) that is created by the exchange in
which the smallest nonce is used should be deleted by the initiator
of this exchange.
With multiple key exchanges, the SAs are not yet created when the
CREATE_CHILD_SA is completed, they would be created only after the
series of IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges is finished. For this reason, if
additional key exchanges are negotiated in the CREATE_CHILD_SA
exchange in which the smallest nonce is used, then because there is
nothing to delete yet, the initiator of this exchange just stops the
rekeying process and it MUST NOT initiate the IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE
exchange.
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In most cases, rekey collisions are resolved in the CREATE_CHILD_SA
exchange. However, a situation may occur when due to packet loss,
one of the peers receives the CREATE_CHILD_SA message requesting
rekey of SA that is already being rekeyed by this peer (i.e. the
CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange initiated by this peer has been already
completed and the series of IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges is in
progress). In this case, a TEMPORARY_FAILURE notification MUST be
sent in response to such a request.
If multiple key exchanges are negotiated in the CREATE_CHILD_SA
exchange, then the resulting keys are computed as follows.
In case of IKE SA rekey:
SKEYSEED = prf(SK_d, SK(0) | Ni | Nr | SK(1) | ... SK(n))
In case of Child SA creation or rekey:
KEYMAT = prf+ (SK_d, SK(0) | Ni | Nr | SK(1) | ... SK(n))
In both cases, SK_d is from the existing IKE SA; SK(0), Ni, Nr are
the shared key and nonces from the CREATE_CHILD_SA respectively;
SK(1)...SK(n) are the shared keys from additional key exchanges.
2.2.5. Interaction with IKEv2 Extensions
It is believed that this specification requires no modification to
the IKEv2 extensions defined so far. In particular, IKE SA
resumption mechanism defined in [RFC5723] can be used to resume IKE
SAs created using this specification.
2.2.5.1. Interaction with Childless IKE SA
It is possible to establish IKE SAs with post-quantum algorithms only
using additional key exchanges, but without using IKE_INTERMEDIATE
exchanges. In this case, the IKE SA created from IKE_SA_INIT
exchange can be immediately rekeyed with CREATE_CHILD_SA using
additional key exchanges where IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE messages are used to
carry the key exchange payload. If classical key exchange method is
used in the IKE_SA_INIT message, the very first Child SA created in
IKE_AUTH will offer no resistance against the quantum threats.
Consequently, if the peers' local policy requires that all Child SAs
to be post-quantum secure, then the peers can avoid creating the very
first Child SA by adopting [RFC6023]. In this case, the initiator
sends two types of proposal in the IKE_SA_INIT request, one with and
another one without Additional Key Exchange transform(s). The
responder chooses the latter proposal type and includes
CHILDLESS_IKEV2_SUPPORTED notification in the IKE_SA_INIT response.
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Assuming that the initiator supports childless IKE SA extension, then
both peers performs the modified IKE_AUTH exchange described in
[RFC6023] and no Child SA is created in this exchange. The peers
should then immediately rekey the IKE SA and subsequently create the
Child SAs, all with additional key exchanges using CREATE_CHILD_SA
exchange.
It is also possible for the initiator to send proposals without
Additional Key Exchange transform(s) in the IKE_SA_INIT message and
in this instance, the responder will have no information whether or
not the initiator supports the extension in this specification. This
may not be efficient as the responder will have to wait for the
subsequent CREATE_CHILD_SA request to determine whether or not the
initiator's request is appropriate for its local policy.
The support for childless IKE SA is not negotiated, but it is the
responder that indicates the support for this mode. As such, the
responder cannot enforce the initiator to use this mode and
therefore, it is entirely possible that the initiator does not
support this extension and sends IKE_AUTH request as per [RFC7296]
instead of [RFC6023]. In this case, the responder may respond with
non-fatal error such as NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notify message type.
Note that if the initial IKE SA is used to transfer sensitive
information, then this information will not be protected using the
additional key exchanges, which may use post-quantum algorithms. In
this arrangement, the peers will have to use post-quantum algorithm
in Transform Type 4 in order to mitigate the risk of quantum attack.
3. IANA Considerations
This document adds new exchange type into the "IKEv2 Exchange Types"
registry:
44 IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE
This document renames Transform Type 4 defined in "Transform Type
Values" registry from "Diffie-Hellman Group (D-H)" to "Key Exchange
Method (KE)".
This document renames IKEv2 registry "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-
Hellman Group Transform IDs" to "Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange
Method Transform IDs".
This document adds the following Transform Types to the "Transform
Type Values" registry:
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Type Description Used In
-----------------------------------------------------------------
6 Additional Key Exchange 1 (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)
7 Additional Key Exchange 2 (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)
8 Additional Key Exchange 3 (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)
9 Additional Key Exchange 4 (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)
10 Additional Key Exchange 5 (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)
11 Additional Key Exchange 6 (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)
12 Additional Key Exchange 7 (optional in IKE, AH, ESP)
This document defines a new Notify Message Type in the "Notify
Message Types - Status Types" registry:
16441 ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE
and a new Notify Message Type in the "Notify Message Types - Error
Types" registry:
47 STATE_NOT_FOUND
3.1. Additional Considerations and Changes
The IANA is requested to add the following instructions for
designated experts for Transform Type 4 sub-registry.
While adding new KE methods, the following considerations must be
applied. A KE method must take exactly one round-trip (one IKE
exchange) and at the end of this exchange, both peers must be able to
derive the shared secret. In addition, any public value peers
exchanged during a KE method must fit into a single IKE message. If
these restrictions are not met for a KE method, then there must be
documentation on how this KE method is used in IKEv2.
The following changes to IANA are also requested. It is assumed that
RFCXXXX refers to this specification.
* Add a reference to RFCXXXX in the "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-
Hellman Group Transform IDs" registry.
* Replace the note on "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group
Transform IDs" registry with: This registry was originally named
"Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs" and was
renamed to its current name by [RFCXXXX]. It has been referenced
in its original name in a number of RFCs prior to [RFCXXXX]. To
find out requirement levels for Key Exchange Methods for IKEv2,
see [RFC8247].
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* Add this note to "Transform Type Values" registry: Transform Type
"Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange Method Transform IDs" was
originally named "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group
Transform IDs" and was renamed to its current name by [RFCXXXX].
It has been referenced in its original name in a number of RFCs
prior to [RFCXXXX]. All "Additional Key Exchange" entries use the
same "Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange Method Transform IDs" as the
"Key Exchange Method (KE)".
* Append RFCXXXX to the Reference column of Transform Type 4 in the
Transform Type Values registry.
* Append this note to "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group
Transform IDs" registry: All "Additional Key Exchange" entries use
these values as the "Key Exchange Method (KE)".
4. Security Considerations
The extension in this document is intended to mitigate two possible
threats in IKEv2, namely the compromise of (EC)DH key exchange using
Shor's algorithm while remaining backward compatible; and the
potential compromise of existing or future PQC key exchange
algorithms. To address the former threat, this extension allows the
establishment of a shared secret by using multiple key exchanges,
typically one classical (EC)DH and the other one post-quantum
algorithm. In order to address the latter threat, multiple key
exchanges using a post-quantum algorithm can be composed to form the
shared key.
Unlike key exchange methods (Transform Type 4), the Encryption
Algorithm (Transform Type 1), the Pseudorandom Function (Transform
Type 2) and the Integrity Algorithm (Transform Type 3) are not
susceptible to Shor's algorithm. However, they are susceptible to
Grover's attack [GROVER], which allows a quantum computer to perform
a brute force key search using quadratically fewer steps than the
classical counterpart. Simply increasing the key length can mitigate
this attack. It was previously believed that one needed to double
the key length of these algorithms. However, there are a number of
factors that suggest that it is quite unlikely to achieve the
quadratic speed up using Grover's algorithm. According to NIST
[NISTPQCFAQ], current applications can continue using AES algorithm
with the minimum key length of 128 bit. Nevertheless, if the data
needs to remain secure for many years to come, one may want to
consider using a longer key size for the algorithms in Transform
Types 1-3.
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SKEYSEED is calculated from shared SK(x) using an algorithm defined
in Transform Type 2. While a quantum attacker may learn the value of
SK(x), if this value is obtained by means of a classical key
exchange, other SK(x) values generated by means of a post-quantum
algorithm ensure that the final SKEYSEED is not compromised. This
assumes that the algorithm defined in the Transform Type 2 is quantum
resistant.
The ordering of the additional key exchanges should not matter in
general, as only the final shared secret is of interest.
Nonetheless, because the strength of the running shared secret
increases with every additional key exchange, an implementer may want
to first perform the most secure method (in some metrics) and
followed by less secure one(s).
The main focus of this document is to prevent a passive attacker
performing a "harvest and decrypt" attack. In other words, an
attacker that records messages exchanged today and proceeds to
decrypt them once he owns a quantum computer. This attack is
prevented due to the hybrid nature of the key exchange. Other
attacks involving an active attacker using a quantum-computer are not
completely solved by this document. This is for two reasons.
The first reason is because the authentication step remains
classical. In particular, the authenticity of the SAs established
under IKEv2 is protected using a pre-shared key or digital signature
algorithms. Whilst the pre-shared key option, provided the key is
long enough, is post-quantum secure, the other algorithms are not.
Moreover, in implementations where scalability is a requirement, the
pre-shared key method may not be suitable. Post-quantum authenticity
may be provided by using a post-quantum digital signature.
Secondly, it should be noted that the purpose of post-quantum
algorithms is to provide resistance to attacks mounted in the future.
The current threat is that encrypted sessions are subject to
eavesdropping and archived with decryption by quantum computers
taking place at some point in the future. Until quantum computers
become available there is no point in attacking the authenticity of a
connection because there are no possibilities for exploitation.
These only occur at the time of the connection, for example by
mounting an on-path attack. Consequently there is less urgency for
post-quantum authenticity compared to post-quantum confidentiality.
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Performing multiple key exchanges while establishing IKE SA increases
the responder's susceptibility to DoS attacks, because of an
increased amount of resources needed before the initiator is
authenticated. This is especially true for post-quantum key exchange
methods, where many of them are more memory and/or CPU intensive than
the classical counterparts.
Responders may consider recommendations from [RFC8019] to deal with
increased DoS attack susceptibility. It is also possible that the
responder only agrees to create initial IKE SA without performing
additional key exchanges, provided the initiator includes such an
option in its proposals. Then peers immediately rekey the initial
IKE SA with the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange and additional key exchanges
performed via the IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges. In this case, at the
point when resource-intensive operations are required, the peers have
already authenticated each other. However, in the context of hybrid
post-quantum key exchange this scenario would leave the initial IKE
SA (and initial Child SA if it is created) unprotected against
quantum computers. Nevertheless the rekeyed IKE SA (and Child SAs
that will be created over it) will have a full protection. This is
similar to the scenario described in [RFC8784]. Depending on the
arrangement and peers' policy, this scenario may or may not be
appropriate. For example, in the G-IKEv2 protocol
[I-D.ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2] the cryptographic materials are sent from
the group controller to the group members when the initial IKE SA is
created.
5. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Frederic Detienne and Olivier Pelerin
for their comments and suggestions, including the idea to negotiate
the post-quantum algorithms using the existing KE payload. The
authors are also grateful to Tobias Heider and Tobias Guggemos for
valuable comments. Thanks to Paul Wouters for reviewing the
document.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9242] Smyslov, V., "Intermediate Exchange in the Internet Key
Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 9242,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9242, May 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9242>.
6.2. Informative References
[GROVER] Grover, L., "A Fast Quantum Mechanical Algorithm for
Database Search", Proc. of the Twenty-Eighth Annual ACM
Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC 1996), 1996.
[I-D.ietf-ipsecme-g-ikev2]
Smyslov, V. and B. Weis, "Group Key Management using
IKEv2", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
ipsecme-g-ikev2-07, 6 October 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ipsecme-
g-ikev2-07.txt>.
[I-D.tjhai-ikev2-beyond-64k-limit]
Tjhai, C., Heider, T., and V. Smyslov, "Beyond 64KB Limit
of IKEv2 Payloads", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-tjhai-ikev2-beyond-64k-limit-03, 28 July 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tjhai-ikev2-beyond-
64k-limit-03.txt>.
[IKEV2TYPE4ID]
IANA, "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters:
Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/
ikev2-parameters.xhtml#ikev2-parameters-8>.
[NISTPQCFAQ]
NIST, "Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization: FAQs",
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/
faqs>.
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[RFC5723] Sheffer, Y. and H. Tschofenig, "Internet Key Exchange
Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Session Resumption", RFC 5723,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5723, January 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5723>.
[RFC6023] Nir, Y., Tschofenig, H., Deng, H., and R. Singh, "A
Childless Initiation of the Internet Key Exchange Version
2 (IKEv2) Security Association (SA)", RFC 6023,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6023, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6023>.
[RFC7383] Smyslov, V., "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2) Message Fragmentation", RFC 7383,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7383, November 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7383>.
[RFC8019] Nir, Y. and V. Smyslov, "Protecting Internet Key Exchange
Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Implementations from
Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks", RFC 8019,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8019, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8019>.
[RFC8784] Fluhrer, S., Kampanakis, P., McGrew, D., and V. Smyslov,
"Mixing Preshared Keys in the Internet Key Exchange
Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) for Post-quantum Security",
RFC 8784, DOI 10.17487/RFC8784, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8784>.
Appendix A. Sample Multiple Key Exchanges
This appendix shows some examples of multiple key exchanges. These
examples are non-normative and they describe some message flow
scenarios that may occur in establishing an IKE or CHILD SA. Note
that some payloads that are not relevant to multiple key exchanges
may be omitted for brevity.
A.1. IKE_INTERMEDIATE Exchanges Carrying Additional Key Exchange
Payloads
The exchanges below show that the initiator proposes the use of
additional key exchanges to establish an IKE SA. The initiator
proposes three sets of additional key exchanges and all of which are
optional. So the responder can choose NONE for some or all of the
additional exchanges if the proposed key exchange methods are not
supported or for whatever reasons the responder decides not to
perform the additional key exchange.
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Initiator Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAi1(.. AKE*...), --->
KEi(Curve25519), Ni, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)
Proposal #1
Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
256-bit key)
Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_1)
Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_2)
Transform AKE1 (ID = NONE)
Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_3)
Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_4)
Transform AKE2 (ID = NONE)
Transform AKE3 (ID = PQ_KEM_5)
Transform AKE3 (ID = PQ_KEM_6)
Transform AKE3 (ID = NONE)
<--- HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAr1(.. AKE*...),
KEr(Curve25519), Nr, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)
Proposal #1
Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
256-bit key)
Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_2)
Transform AKE2 (ID = NONE)
Transform AKE3 (ID = PQ_KEM_5)
HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEi(1)(PQ_KEM_2)} -->
<--- HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEr(1)(PQ_KEM_2)}
HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEi(2)(PQ_KEM_5)} -->
<--- HDR(IKE_INTERMEDIATE), SK {KEr(2)(PQ_KEM_5)}
HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{ IDi, AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr } --->
<--- HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{ IDr, AUTH, SAr2,
TSi, TSr }
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In this particular example, the responder chooses to perform two
additional key exchanges. It selects PQ_KEM_2, NONE and PQ_KEM_5 for
the first, second and third additional key exchanges respectively.
As per [RFC7296] specification, a set of keying materials are
derived, in particular SK_d, SK_a[i/r], SK_e[i/r]. Both peers then
perform an IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange carrying PQ_KEM_2 payload which
is protected with SK_e[i/r] and SK_a[i/r] keys. After the completion
of this IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, the SKEYSEED is updated using
SK(1), which is the PQ_KEM_2 shared secret, as follows.
SKEYSEED(1) = prf(SK_d, SK(1) | Ni | Nr)
The updated SKEYSEED value is then used to derive the following
keying materials
{SK_d(1) | SK_ai(1) | SK_ar(1) | SK_ei(1) | SK_er(1) | SK_pi(1) |
SK_pr(1)} = prf+ (SKEYSEED(1), Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)
As per [RFC9242] specification, both peers compute IntAuth_i1 and
IntAuth_r1 using the SK_pi(1) and SK_pr(1) keys respectively. These
values are required in the IKE_AUTH phase of the exchange.
In the next IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, the peers use SK_e[i/r](1) and
SK_a[i/r](1) keys to protect the PQ_KEM_5 payload. After completing
this exchange, keying materials are updated as below
SKEYSEED(2) = prf(SK_d(1), SK(2) | Ni | Nr)
{SK_d(2) | SK_ai(2) | SK_ar(2) | SK_ei(2) | SK_er(2) | SK_pi(2) |
SK_pr(2)} = prf+ (SKEYSEED(2), Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)
where SK(2) is the shared secret from the third additional key
exchange, i.e. PQ_KEM_5. Both peers then compute the values of
IntAuth_[i/r]2 using the SK_p[i/r](2) keys.
After the completion of the second IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange, both
peers continue to the IKE_AUTH exchange phase. As defined in
[RFC9242], the values IntAuth_[i/r]2 are used to compute IntAuth
which in turn is used to calculate the payload to be signed or MACed,
i.e. InitiatorSignedOctets and ResponderSignedOctets.
A.2. No Additional Key Exchange Used
The initiator proposes two sets of optional additional key exchanges,
but the responder does not support any of them. The responder
chooses NONE for each set and consequently, IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange
does not takes place and the exchange proceeds to IKE_AUTH phase.
The resulting keying materials are the same as those derived with
[RFC7296].
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Initiator Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAi1(.. AKE*...), --->
KEi(Curve25519), Ni, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)
Proposal #1
Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
256-bit key)
Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_1)
Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_2)
Transform AKE1 (ID = NONE)
Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_3)
Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_4)
Transform AKE2 (ID = NONE)
<--- HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAr1(.. AKE*...),
KEr(Curve25519), Nr, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)
Proposal #1
Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
256-bit key)
Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
Transform AKE1 (ID = NONE)
Transform AKE2 (ID = NONE)
HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{ IDi, AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr } --->
<--- HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{ IDr, AUTH, SAr2,
TSi, TSr }
A.3. Additional Key Exchange in the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange only
The exchanges below show that the initiator does not propose the use
of additional key exchanges to establish an IKE SA, but they are
required in order to establish a Child SA. In order to establish a
fully quantum-resistant IPsec SA, the responder includes a
CHILDLESS_IKEV2_SUPPORTED notification in their IKE_SA_INIT response
message. The initiator understands and supports this notification,
then exchanges a modified IKE_AUTH message with the responder and
rekeys the IKE SA immediately with additional key exchanges. Any
Child SA will have to be created via subsequent CREATED_CHILD_SA
exchange.
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Initiator Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAi1, --->
KEi(Curve25519), Ni, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED)
<--- HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAr1,
KEr(Curve25519), Nr, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
N(CHILDLESS_IKEV2_SUPPORTED)
HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{ IDi, AUTH } --->
<--- HDR(IKE_AUTH), SK{ IDr, AUTH }
HDR(CREATE_CHILD_SA), SK{ SAi(.. AKE*...), Ni, KEi(Curve25519) } --->
Proposal #1
Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
256-bit key)
Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_1)
Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_2)
Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_5)
Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_6)
Transform AKE2 (ID = NONE)
<--- HDR(CREATE_CHILD_SA), SK{ SAr(.. AKE*...),
Nr, KEr(Curve25519),
N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link1) }
Proposal #1
Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
256-bit key)
Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_2)
Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_5)
HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK{ KEi(1)(PQ_KEM_2), --->
N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link1) }
<--- HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK{ KEr(1)(PQ_KEM_2),
N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link2) }
HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK{ KEi(2)(PQ_KEM_5), --->
N(ADDITIONAL_KEY_EXCHANGE)(link2) }
<--- HDR(IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE), SK{ KEr(2)(PQ_KEM_5) }
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A.4. No Matching Proposal for Additional Key Exchanges
The initiator proposes the combination of PQ_KEM_1, PQ_KEM_2,
PQ_KEM_3, and PQ_KEM_4 as the additional key exchanges. The
initiator indicates that either PQ_KEM_1 or PQ_KEM_2 must be used to
establish an IKE SA, but Additional Key Exchange 2 is optional so the
responder can either select PQ_KEM_3 or PQ_KEM_4 or omit this key
exchange by selecting NONE. The responder, although supports the
optional PQ_KEM_3 and PQ_KEM_4 methods, does not support either
PQ_KEM_1 or PQ_KEM_2 mandatory method and therefore responds with
NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN notification.
Initiator Responder
---------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAi1(.. AKE*...), --->
KEi(Curve25519), Ni, N(IKEV2_FRAG_SUPPORTED),
N(INTERMEDIATE_EXCHANGE_SUPPORTED)
Proposal #1
Transform ECR (ID = ENCR_AES_GCM_16,
256-bit key)
Transform PRF (ID = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512)
Transform KE (ID = Curve25519)
Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_1)
Transform AKE1 (ID = PQ_KEM_2)
Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_3)
Transform AKE2 (ID = PQ_KEM_4)
Transform AKE2 (ID = NONE)
<--- HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), N(NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN)
Appendix B. Design Criteria
The design of the extension is driven by the following criteria:
1) Need for PQC in IPsec. Quantum computers, which might become
feasible in the near future, pose a threat to our classical
public key cryptography. PQC, a family of public key
cryptography that is believed to be resistant against these
computers, needs to be integrated into the IPsec protocol suite
to restore confidentiality and authenticity.
2) Hybrid. There is currently no post-quantum key exchange that is
trusted at the level that (EC)DH is trusted for against
conventional (non-quantum) adversaries. A hybrid post-quantum
algorithm to be introduced along with the well-established
primitives addresses this concern, since the overall security is
at least as strong as each individual primitive.
3) Focus on post-quantum confidentiality. A passive attacker can
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store all monitored encrypted IPsec communication today and
decrypt it once a quantum computer is available in the future.
This attack can have serious consequences that will not be
visible for years to come. On the other hand, an attacker can
only perform active attacks such as impersonation of the
communicating peers once a quantum computer is available,
sometime in the future. Thus, this specification focuses on
confidentiality due to the urgency of this problem and presents
a defense against the serious attack described above, but it
does not address authentication since it is less urgent at this
stage.
4) Limit amount of exchanged data. The protocol design should be
such that the amount of exchanged data, such as public-keys, is
kept as small as possible even if initiator and responder need
to agree on a hybrid group or multiple public-keys need to be
exchanged.
5) Not post-quantum specific. Any cryptographic algorithm could be
potentially broken in the future by currently unknown or
impractical attacks: quantum computers are merely the most
concrete example of this. The design does not categorize
algorithms as "post-quantum" or "non post-quantum" nor does it
create assumptions about the properties of the algorithms,
meaning that if algorithms with different properties become
necessary in the future, this extension can be used unchanged to
facilitate migration to those algorithms.
6) Limited amount of changes. A key goal is to limit the number of
changes required when enabling a post-quantum handshake. This
ensures easier and quicker adoption in existing implementations.
7) Localized changes. Another key requirement is that changes to
the protocol are limited in scope, in particular, limiting
changes in the exchanged messages and in the state machine, so
that they can be easily implemented.
8) Deterministic operation. This requirement means that the hybrid
post-quantum exchange, and thus, the computed keys, will be
based on algorithms that both client and server wish to support.
9) Fragmentation support. Some PQC algorithms could be relatively
bulky and they might require fragmentation. Thus, a design goal
is the adaptation and adoption of an existing fragmentation
method or the design of a new method that allows for the
fragmentation of the key shares.
10) Backwards compatibility and interoperability. This is a
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fundamental requirement to ensure that hybrid post-quantum IKEv2
and standard IKEv2 implementations as per [RFC7296]
specification are interoperable.
11) USA Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) compliance.
IPsec is widely used in Federal Information Systems and FIPS
certification is an important requirement. However, at the time
of writing, none of the algorithms that is believed to be post-
quantum is FIPS compliant yet. Nonetheless, it is possible to
combine this post-quantum algorithm with a FIPS compliant key
establishment method so that the overall design remains FIPS
compliant [NISTPQCFAQ].
12) Ability to use this method with multiple classical (EC)DH key
exchanges. In some situations peers have no single mutually
trusted key exchange algorithm (e.g., due to local policy
restrictions). The ability to combine two (or more) key
exchange methods in such a way that the resulting shared key
depends on all of them allows peers to communicate in this
situation.
Appendix C. Alternative Design
This section gives an overview on a number of alternative approaches
that have been considered, but later discarded. These approaches
are:
* Sending the classical and post-quantum key exchanges as a single
transform
A method to combine the various key exchanges into a single large
KE payload was considered; this effort is documented in a previous
version of this draft (draft-tjhai-ipsecme-hybrid-qske-ikev2-01).
This does allow us to cleanly apply hybrid key exchanges during
the Child SA; however it does add considerable complexity, and
requires an independent fragmentation solution.
* Sending post-quantum proposals and policies in KE payload only
With the objective of not introducing unnecessary notify payloads,
a method to communicate the hybrid post-quantum proposal in the KE
payload during the first pass of the protocol exchange was
considered. Unfortunately, this design is susceptible to the
following downgrade attack. Consider the scenario where there is
an on-path attacker sitting between an initiator and a responder.
The initiator proposes, through SAi payload, to use a hybrid post-
quantum group and as a fallback a Diffie-Hellman group, and
through KEi payload, the initiator proposes a list of hybrid post-
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quantum proposals and policies. The on-path attacker intercepts
this traffic and replies with N(INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD) suggesting to
downgrade to the fallback Diffie-Hellman group instead. The
initiator then resends the same SAi payload and the KEi payload
containing the public value of the fallback Diffie-Hellman group.
Note that the attacker may forward the second IKE_SA_INIT message
only to the responder, and therefore at this point in time, the
responder will not have the information that the initiator prefers
the hybrid group. Of course, it is possible for the responder to
have a policy to reject an IKE_SA_INIT message that (a) offers a
hybrid group but not offering the corresponding public value in
the KEi payload; and (b) the responder has not specifically
acknowledged that it does not supported the requested hybrid
group. However, the checking of this policy introduces
unnecessary protocol complexity. Therefore, in order to fully
prevent any downgrade attacks, using KE payload alone is not
sufficient and that the initiator MUST always indicate its
preferred post-quantum proposals and policies in a notify payload
in the subsequent IKE_SA_INIT messages following a
N(INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD) response.
* New payload types to negotiate hybrid proposal and to carry post-
quantum public values
Semantically, it makes sense to use a new payload type, which
mimics the SA payload, to carry a hybrid proposal. Likewise,
another new payload type that mimics the KE payload, could be used
to transport hybrid public value. Although, in theory a new
payload type could be made backwards compatible by not setting its
critical flag as per Section 2.5 of [RFC7296], it is believed that
it may not be that simple in practice. Since the original release
of IKEv2 in RFC4306, no new payload type has ever been proposed
and therefore, this creates a potential risk of having a backward
compatibility issue from non-conformant IKEv2 implementations.
Since there appears to be no other compelling advantages apart
from a semantic one, the existing transform type and notify
payloads are used instead.
* Hybrid public value payload
One way to transport the negotiated hybrid public payload, which
contains one classical Diffie-Hellman public value and one or more
post-quantum public values, is to bundle these into a single KE
payload. Alternatively, these could also be transported in a
single new hybrid public value payload, but following the same
reasoning as above, this may not be a good idea from a backward
compatibility perspective. Using a single KE payload would
require an encoding or formatting to be defined so that both peers
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are able to compose and extract the individual public values.
However, it is believed that it is cleaner to send the hybrid
public values in multiple KE payloads--one for each group or
algorithm. Furthermore, at this point in the protocol exchange,
both peers should have indicated support of handling multiple KE
payloads.
* Fragmentation
Handling of large IKE_SA_INIT messages has been one of the most
challenging tasks. A number of approaches have been considered
and the two prominent ones that have been discarded are outlined
as follows.
The first approach is to treat the entire IKE_SA_INIT message as a
stream of bytes, which is then split it into a number of
fragments, each of which is wrapped onto a payload that will fit
into the size of the network MTU. The payload that wraps each
fragment has a new payload type and it is envisaged that this new
payload type will not cause a backward compatibility issue because
at this stage of the protocol, both peers should have indicated
support of fragmentation in the first pass of the IKE_SA_INIT
exchange. The negotiation of fragmentation is performed using a
notify payload, which also defines supporting parameters such as
the size of fragment in octets and the fragment identifier. The
new payload that wraps each fragment of the messages in this
exchange is assigned the same fragment identifier. Furthermore,
it also has other parameters such as a fragment index and total
number of fragments. This approach has been discarded due to its
blanket approach to fragmentation. In cases where only a few
payloads need to be fragmented, this approach appears to be overly
complicated.
Another idea that has been discarded was fragmenting an individual
payload without introducing a new payload type. The idea is to
use the 9-th bit (the bit after the critical flag in the RESERVED
field) in the generic payload header as a flag to mark that this
payload is fragmented. As an example, if a KE payload is to be
fragmented, it may look as follows.
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1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Payload |C|F| RESERVED | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Diffie-Hellman Group Number | Fragment Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Fragment Index | Total Fragments |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Total KE Payload Data Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Fragmented KE Payload ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
When the flag F is set, this means the current KE payload is a
fragment of a larger KE payload. The Payload Length field denotes
the size of this payload fragment in octets--including the size of
the generic payload header. The two-octet RESERVED field
following Diffie-Hellman Group Number was to be used as a fragment
identifier to help assembly and disassembly of fragments. The
Fragment Index and Total Fragments fields are self-explanatory.
The Total KE Payload Data Length indicates the size of the
assembled KE payload data in octets. Finally, the actual fragment
is carried in Fragment KE Payload field.
This approach has been discarded because it is believed that the
working group may not want to use the RESERVED field to change the
format of a packet and that implementers may not like the added
complexity from checking the fragmentation flag in each received
payload. More importantly, fragmenting the messages in this way
may leave the system to be more prone to denial of service (DoS)
attacks. By using IKE_INTERMEDIATE to transport the large post-
quantum key exchange payloads, and using the generic IKEv2
fragmentation protocol [RFC7383] solve the issue.
* Group sub-identifier
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As discussed before, each group identifier is used to distinguish
a post-quantum algorithm. Further classification could be made on
a particular post-quantum algorithm by assigning additional value
alongside the group identifier. This sub- identifier value may be
used to assign different security parameter sets to a given post-
quantum algorithm. However, this level of details does not fit
the principles of the document where it should deal with generic
hybrid key exchange protocol, not a specific ciphersuite.
Furthermore, there are enough Diffie- Hellman group identifiers
should this be required in the future.
Authors' Addresses
C. Tjhai
Post-Quantum
Email: cjt@post-quantum.com
M. Tomlinson
Post-Quantum
Email: mt@post-quantum.com
G. Bartlett
Quantum Secret
Email: graham.ietf@gmail.com
S. Fluhrer
Cisco Systems
Email: sfluhrer@cisco.com
D. Van Geest
ISARA Corporation
Email: daniel.vangeest@isara.com
O. Garcia-Morchon
Philips
Email: oscar.garcia-morchon@philips.com
Valery Smyslov
ELVIS-PLUS
Email: svan@elvis.ru
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