Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc7321bis
draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc7321bis
Network Working Group P. Wouters
Internet-Draft Red Hat
Obsoletes: 7321 (if approved) D. Migault
Intended status: Standards Track J. Mattsson
Expires: December 21, 2017 Ericsson
Y. Nir
Check Point
T. Kivinen
INSIDE Secure
June 19, 2017
Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance
for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)
draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc7321bis-06
Abstract
This document updates the Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements for ESP and AH. The goal of these document is to enable
ESP and AH to benefit from cryptography that is up to date while
making IPsec interoperable.
This document obsoletes RFC 7321.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 21, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Updating Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage
Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Updating Algorithm Requirement Levels . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Document Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Manual Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Encryption must be Authenticated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. ESP Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. ESP and AH Authentication Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. ESP and AH Compression Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Summary of Changes from RFC 7321 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] and the
Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] are the mechanisms for applying
cryptographic protection to data being sent over an IPsec Security
Association (SA) [RFC4301].
This document provides guidance and recommendations so that ESP and
AH can be used with a cryptographic algorithms that are up to date.
The challenge of such document is to make sure that over the time
IPsec implementations can use secure and up-to-date cryptographic
algorithms while keeping IPsec interoperable.
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1.1. Updating Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance
The field of cryptography evolves continuously. New stronger
algorithms appear and existing algorithms are found to be less secure
than originally thought. Therefore, algorithm implementation
requirements and usage guidance need to be updated from time to time
to reflect the new reality. The choices for algorithms must be
conservative to minimize the risk of algorithm compromise.
Algorithms need to be suitable for a wide variety of CPU
architectures and device deployments ranging from high end bulk
encryption devices to small low-power IoT devices.
The algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance may need
to change over time to adapt to the changing world. For this reason,
the selection of mandatory-to-implement algorithms was removed from
the main IKEv2 specification and placed in a separate document.
1.2. Updating Algorithm Requirement Levels
The mandatory-to-implement algorithm of tomorrow should already be
available in most implementations of AH/ESP by the time it is made
mandatory. This document attempts to identify and introduce those
algorithms for future mandatory-to-implement status. There is no
guarantee that the algorithms in use today may become mandatory in
the future. Published algorithms are continuously subjected to
cryptographic attack and may become too weak or could become
completely broken before this document is updated.
This document only provides recommendations for the mandatory-to-
implement algorithms and algorithms too weak that are recommended not
to be implemented. As a result, any algorithm listed at the IPsec
IANA registry not mentioned in this document MAY be implemented. It
is expected that this document will be updated over time and next
versions will only mention algorithms which status has evolved. For
clarification when an algorithm has been mentioned in [RFC7321], this
document states explicitly the update of the status.
Although this document updates the algorithms to keep the AH/ESP
communication secure over time, it also aims at providing
recommendations so that AH/ESP implementations remain interoperable.
AH/ESP interoperability is addressed by an incremental introduction
or deprecation of algorithms. In addition, this document also
considers the new use cases for AH/ESP deployment, such as Internet
of Things (IoT).
It is expected that deprecation of an algorithm is performed
gradually. This provides time for various implementations to update
their implemented algorithms while remaining interoperable. Unless
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there are strong security reasons, an algorithm is expected to be
downgraded from MUST to MUST- or SHOULD, instead of MUST NOT.
Similarly, an algorithm that has not been mentioned as mandatory-to-
implement is expected to be introduced with a SHOULD instead of a
MUST.
The current trend toward Internet of Things and its adoption of AH/
ESP requires this specific use case to be taken into account as well.
IoT devices are resource constrained devices and their choice of
algorithms are motivated by minimizing the footprint of the code, the
computation effort and the size of the messages to send. This
document indicates "(IoT)" when a specified algorithm is specifically
listed for IoT devices. Requirement levels that are marked as "IoT"
apply to IoT devices and to server-side implementations that might
presumably need to interoperate with them, including any general-
purpose VPN gateways.
1.3. Document Audience
The recommendations of this document mostly target AH/ESP
implementers as implementations need to meet both high security
expectations as well as high interoperability between various vendors
and with different versions. Interoperability requires a smooth move
to more secure cipher suites. This may differ from a user point of
view that may deploy and configure AH/ESP with only the safest cipher
suite.
This document does not give any recommendations for the use of
algorithms, it only gives implementation recommendations for
implementations. The use of algorithms by users is dictated by the
security policy requirements for that specific user, and are outside
the scope of this document.
The algorithms considered here are listed by the IANA as part of the
IKEv2 parameters. IKEv1 is out of scope of this document. IKEv1 is
deprecated and the recommendations of this document must not be
considered for IKEv1, nor IKEv1 parameters be considered by this
document.
The IANA registry for Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
Parameters contains some entries that are not for use with ESP or AH.
This document does not modify the status of those algorithms.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
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"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
We define some additional terms here:
SHOULD+ This term means the same as SHOULD. However, it is likely
that an algorithm marked as SHOULD+ will be promoted at
some future time to be a MUST.
SHOULD- This term means the same as SHOULD. However, an algorithm
marked as SHOULD- may be deprecated to a MAY in a future
version of this document.
MUST- This term means the same as MUST. However, we expect at
some point that this algorithm will no longer be a MUST in
a future document. Although its status will be determined
at a later time, it is reasonable to expect that if a
future revision of a document alters the status of a MUST-
algorithm, it will remain at least a SHOULD or a SHOULD-
level.
IoT stands for Internet of Things.
3. Manual Keying
Manual Keying SHOULD NOT be used as it is inherently dangerous.
Without any secure keying protocol such a IKE, IPsec does not offer
Perfect Forward Secrecy ("PFS") protection and there is no entity to
ensure refreshing of session keys, tracking SPI uniqueness and
ensuring nonces, IVs and counters are never re-used. This document
was written for deploying ESP/AH using IKE ([RFC7296]) and assumes
that keying happens using IKE version 2 or higher.
If Manual Keying is used regardless, Counter Mode algorithms such as
ENCR_AES_CTR, ENCR_AES_CCM, ENCR_AES_GCM and ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305
MUST NOT be used as it is incompatible with a secure and persistent
handling of the counter, as explained in the Security Considerations
Section of [RFC3686]. This particularly applies to IoT devices that
have no state across reboots. As of publication date of this
document, ENCR_AES_CBC is the only Mandatory-To-Implement encryption
algorithm suitable for Manual Keying.
4. Encryption must be Authenticated
Encryption without authentication is not effective and MUST NOT be
used. IPsec offers three ways to provide both encryption and
authentication:
o ESP with an AEAD cipher
o ESP with a non-AEAD cipher + authentication
o ESP with a non-AEAD cipher + AH with authentication
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The fastest and most modern method is to use ESP with a combined mode
cipher such as an AEAD cipher that handles encryption/decryption and
authentication in a single step. In this case, the AEAD cipher is
set as the encryption algorithm and the authentication algorithm is
set to none. Examples of this are ENCR_AES_GCM_16 and
ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305.
A more traditional approach is to use ESP with an encryption and an
authentication algorithm. This approach is slower, as the data has
to be processed twice, once for encryption/decryption and once for
authentication. An example of this is ENCR_AES_CBC combined with
AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256.
The last method that can be used is ESP+AH. This method is NOT
RECOMMENDED. It is the slowest method and also takes up more octets
due to the double header of ESP+AH, resulting in a smaller effective
MTU for the encrypted data. With this method, ESP is only used for
confidentiality without an authentication algorithm and a second
IPsec protocol of type AH is used for authentication. An example of
this is ESP with ENCR_AES_CBC with AH with AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256.
5. ESP Encryption Algorithms
+-------------------------+-------------+---------+--------------+
| Name | Status | AEAD | Comment |
+-------------------------+-------------+---------+--------------+
| ENCR_DES_IV64 | MUST NOT | No | UNSPECIFIED |
| ENCR_DES | MUST NOT | No | [RFC2405] |
| ENCR_3DES | SHOULD NOT | No | [RFC2451] |
| ENCR_BLOWFISH | MUST NOT | No | [RFC2451] |
| ENCR_3IDEA | MUST NOT | No | UNSPECIFIED |
| ENCR_DES_IV32 | MUST NOT | No | UNSPECIFIED |
| ENCR_NULL | MUST | No | [RFC2410] |
| ENCR_AES_CBC | MUST | No | [RFC3602][1] |
| ENCR_AES_CCM_8 | SHOULD(IoT) | Yes | [RFC4309] |
| ENCR_AES_GCM_16 | MUST | Yes | [RFC4106][1] |
| ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 | SHOULD | Yes | [RFC7634] |
+-------------------------+-------------+---------+--------------+
[1] - This requirement level is for 128-bit and 256-bit keys.
192-bit keys remain at MAY level. (IoT) - This requirement is for
interoperability with IoT. Only 128-bit keys are at the given level.
IPsec sessions may have very long life time, and carry multiple
packets, so there is a need to move to 256-bit keys in the long term.
For that purpose the requirement level for 128 bit keys and 256 bit
keys are at MUST (when applicable). In that sense 256 bit keys
status has been raised from MAY in RFC7321 to MUST.
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IANA has allocated codes for cryptographic algorithms that have not
been specified by the IETF. Such algorithms are noted as
UNSPECIFIED. Usually, the use of theses algorithms is limited to
specific cases, and the absence of specification makes
interoperability difficult for IPsec communications. These
algorithms were not been mentioned in [RFC7321] and this document
clarify that such algorithms MUST NOT be implemented for IPsec
communications.
Similarly IANA also allocated code points for algorithms that are not
expected to be used to secure IPsec communications. Such algorithms
are noted as Non IPsec. As a result, these algorithms MUST NOT be
implemented.
Various older and not well tested and never widely implemented
ciphers have been changed to MUST NOT.
ENCR_3DES status has been downgraded from MAY in RFC7321 to SHOULD
NOT. ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is a more modern approach alternative
for ENCR_3DES than ENCR_AES_CBC and so it expected to be favored to
replace ENCR_3DES.
ENCR_BLOWFISH has been downgraded to MUST NOT as it has been
deprecated for years by TWOFISH, which is not standarized for ESP and
therefore not listed in this document. Some implementations support
TWOFISH using a private range number.
ENCR_NULL status was set to MUST in [RFC7321] and remains a MUST to
enable the use of ESP with only authentication which is preferred
over AH due to NAT traversal. ENCR_NULL is expected to remain MUST
by protocol requirements.
ENCR_AES_CBC status remains at MUST. ENCR_AES_CBC MUST be
implemented in order to enable interoperability between
implementations that followed RFC7321. However, there is a trend for
the industry to move to AEAD encryption, and the overhead of
ENCR_AES_CBC remains quite large so it is expected to be replaced by
AEAD algorithms in the long term.
ENCR_AES_CCM_8 status was set to MAY in [RFC7321] and has been raised
from MAY to SHOULD in order to interact with Internet of Things
devices. As this case is not a general use case for VPNs, its status
is expected to remain as SHOULD.
ENCR_AES_GCM_16 status has been updated from SHOULD+ to MUST in order
to favor the use of authenticated encryption and AEAD algorithms.
ENCR_AES_GCM_16 has been widely implemented for ESP due to its
increased performance and key longevity compared to ENCR_AES_CBC.
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ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 was not ready to be considered at the time of
RFC7321. It has been recommended by the CRFG and others as an
alternative to AES-CBC and AES-GCM. It is also being standardized
for ESP for the same reasons. At the time of writing, there are not
enough ESP implementations of ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 to be able to
introduce it at the SHOULD+ level. Its status has been set to SHOULD
and is expected to become MUST in the long term.
6. ESP and AH Authentication Algorithms
Authentication algorithm recommendations in this section are
targeting two types of communications:
o Authenticated only communications without encryption, such as ESP
with NULL encryption or AH communications.
o Communications that are encrypted with non-AEAD algorithm which
MUST be combined with an authentication algorithm.
+------------------------+------------------+-----------------------+
| Name | Status | Comment |
+------------------------+------------------+-----------------------+
| AUTH_NONE | MUST / MUST NOT | [RFC7296] AEAD |
| AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96 | MUST NOT | [RFC2403][RFC7296] |
| AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 | MUST- | [RFC2404][RFC7296] |
| AUTH_DES_MAC | MUST NOT | [UNSPECIFIED] |
| AUTH_KPDK_MD5 | MUST NOT | [UNSPECIFIED] |
| AUTH_AES_XCBC_96 | SHOULD | [RFC3566][RFC7296] |
| | | (IoT) |
| AUTH_AES_128_GMAC | MAY | [RFC4543] |
| AUTH_AES_256_GMAC | MAY | [RFC4543] |
| AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 | MUST | [RFC4868] |
| AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 | SHOULD | [RFC4868] |
+------------------------+------------------+-----------------------+
(IoT) - This requirement is for interoperability with IoT
AUTH_NONE has been downgraded from MAY in RFC7321 to MUST NOT. The
only case where AUTH_NONE is acceptable is when authenticated
encryption algorithms are selected from Section 5. In all other
cases, AUTH_NONE MUST NOT be selected. As ESP and AH both provide
authentication, one may be tempted to combine these protocols to
provide authentication. As mentioned by RFC7321, it is NOT
RECOMMENDED to use ESP with NULL authentication - with non
authenticated encryption - in conjunction with AH; some
configurations of this combination of services have been shown to be
insecure [PD10]. In addition, AUTH_NONE authentication cannot be
combined with ESP NULL encryption.
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AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96 and AUTH_KPDK_MD5 were not mentioned in RFC7321. As
MD5 is known to be vulnerable to collisions, these algorithms MUST
NOT be used.
AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 has been downgraded from MUST in RFC7321 to MUST-
as there is an industry-wide trend to deprecate its usage.
AUTH_DES_MAC was not mentioned in RFC7321. As DES is known to be
vulnerable, it MUST NOT be used.
AUTH_AES_XCBC_96 is set as SHOULD only in the scope of IoT, as
Internet of Things deployments tend to prefer AES based HMAC
functions in order to avoid implementing SHA2. For the wide VPN
deployment, as it has not been widely adopted, it has been downgraded
from SHOULD to MAY.
AUTH_AES_128_GMAC status has been downgraded from SHOULD+ to MAY.
Along with AUTH_AES_192_GMAC and AUTH_AES_256_GMAC, these algorithms
should only be used for AH and not for ESP. If using ENCR_NULL,
AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 is recommended for integrity. If using AES-
GMAC in ESP without authentication, ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC is
recommended. Therefore, these ciphers are kept at MAY.
AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 was not mentioned in RFC7321, as no SHA2 based
authentication was mentioned. AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 MUST be
implemented in order to replace AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96. Note that due to
a long standing common implementation bug of this algorithm that
truncates the hash at 96-bits instead of 128-bits, it is recommended
that implementations prefer AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 over
AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 if they implement AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256.
AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256 SHOULD be implemented as a future replacement
of AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128 or when stronger security is required.
This value has been preferred to AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384, as the
additional overhead of AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512 is negligible.
7. ESP and AH Compression Algorithms
+----------------+----------+-------------+
| Name | Status | Comment |
+----------------+----------+-------------+
| IPCOMP_OUI | MUST NOT | UNSPECIFIED |
| IPCOMP_DEFLATE | MAY | [RFC2393] |
| IPCOMP_LZS | MAY | [RFC2395] |
| IPCOMP_LZJH | MAY | [RFC3051] |
+----------------+----------+-------------+
(IoT) - This requirement is for interoperability with IoT
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Compression was not mentioned in RFC7321. As it is not widely
deployed, it remains optional and at the MAY-level.
8. Summary of Changes from RFC 7321
The following table summarizes the changes from RFC 7321.
RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS PARAGRAPH AND REPLACE XXXX IN THE
TABLE BELOW WITH THE NUMBER OF THIS RFC
+-------------------+----------+-----------------+
| Algorithm | RFC 7321 | RFC XXXX |
+-------------------+----------+-----------------+
| ENCR_AES_GCM_16 | SHOULD+ | MUST |
| ENCR_AES_CCM_8 | MAY | SHOULD |
| ENCR_AES_CTR | MAY | (*) |
| ENCR_3DES | MAY | SHOULD NOT |
| AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 | MUST | MUST- |
| AUTH_AES_128_GMAC | SHOULD+ | MAY |
| AUTH_NONE | MAY | MUST / MUST NOT |
+-------------------+----------+-----------------+
(*) This algorithm is not mentioned in the above sections, so it
defaults to MAY.
9. Acknowledgements
Some of the wording in this document was adapted from [RFC7321], the
document that this one obsoletes, which was written by D. McGrew and
P. Hoffman.
10. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
11. Security Considerations
The security of a system that uses cryptography depends on both the
strength of the cryptographic algorithms chosen and the strength of
the keys used with those algorithms. The security also depends on
the engineering and administration of the protocol used by the system
to ensure that there are no non-cryptographic ways to bypass the
security of the overall system.
This document concerns itself with the selection of cryptographic
algorithms for the use of ESP and AH, specifically with the selection
of mandatory-to-implement algorithms. The algorithms identified in
this document as "MUST implement" or "SHOULD implement" are not known
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to be broken at the current time, and cryptographic research to date
leads us to believe that they will likely remain secure into the
foreseeable future. However, this is not necessarily forever.
Therefore, we expect that revisions of that document will be issued
from time to time to reflect the current best practice in this area.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC7321] McGrew, D. and P. Hoffman, "Cryptographic Algorithm
Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication
Header (AH)", RFC 7321, DOI 10.17487/RFC7321, August 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7321>.
12.2. Informative References
[PD10] Paterson, K. and J. Degabriele, "On the (in)security of
IPsec in MAC-then-encrypt configurations (ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, ACM CCS)", 2010.
[RFC2393] Shacham, A., Monsour, R., Pereira, R., and M. Thomas, "IP
Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp)", RFC 2393,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2393, December 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2393>.
[RFC2395] Friend, R. and R. Monsour, "IP Payload Compression Using
LZS", RFC 2395, DOI 10.17487/RFC2395, December 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2395>.
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[RFC2403] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within
ESP and AH", RFC 2403, DOI 10.17487/RFC2403, November
1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2403>.
[RFC2404] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within
ESP and AH", RFC 2404, DOI 10.17487/RFC2404, November
1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2404>.
[RFC2405] Madson, C. and N. Doraswamy, "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher
Algorithm With Explicit IV", RFC 2405,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2405, November 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2405>.
[RFC2410] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and
Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, DOI 10.17487/RFC2410,
November 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2410>.
[RFC2451] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher
Algorithms", RFC 2451, DOI 10.17487/RFC2451, November
1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2451>.
[RFC3051] Heath, J. and J. Border, "IP Payload Compression Using
ITU-T V.44 Packet Method", RFC 3051, DOI 10.17487/RFC3051,
January 2001, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3051>.
[RFC3566] Frankel, S. and H. Herbert, "The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm
and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 3566, DOI 10.17487/RFC3566,
September 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3566>.
[RFC3602] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher
Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3602, September 2003,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3602>.
[RFC3686] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 3686, DOI 10.17487/RFC3686, January 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3686>.
[RFC4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4106, DOI 10.17487/RFC4106, June 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4106>.
[RFC4309] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM
Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4309, DOI 10.17487/RFC4309, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4309>.
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[RFC4543] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message
Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", RFC 4543,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4543, May 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4543>.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC7634] Nir, Y., "ChaCha20, Poly1305, and Their Use in the
Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) and IPsec", RFC 7634,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7634, August 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7634>.
Authors' Addresses
Paul Wouters
Red Hat
Email: pwouters@redhat.com
Daniel Migault
Ericsson
8400 boulevard Decarie
Montreal, QC H4P 2N2
Canada
Phone: +1 514-452-2160
Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
John Mattsson
Ericsson AB
SE-164 80 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
Wouters, et al. Expires December 21, 2017 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft ESP and AH Algorithm Requirements June 2017
Yoav Nir
Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.
5 Hasolelim st.
Tel Aviv 6789735
Israel
Email: ynir.ietf@gmail.com
Tero Kivinen
INSIDE Secure
Eerikinkatu 28
HELSINKI FI-00180
FI
Email: kivinen@iki.fi
Wouters, et al. Expires December 21, 2017 [Page 14]
