Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-kitten-scram-2fa
draft-ietf-kitten-scram-2fa
Network Working Group A. Melnikov
Internet-Draft Isode Ltd
Intended status: Standards Track 4 March 2024
Expires: 5 September 2024
Extensions to Salted Challenge Response (SCRAM) for 2 factor
authentication
draft-ietf-kitten-scram-2fa-04
Abstract
This specification describes an extension to family of Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL; RFC 4422) authentication
mechanisms called the Salted Challenge Response Authentication
Mechanism (SCRAM), which provides support for 2 factor
authentication. It also includes a separate extension for quick
reauthentication.
This specification also gives 2 examples of second factors: TOTP (RFC
6238) and FIDO CTAP1/U2F (Passkey).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 September 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. SCRAM Extension for 2FA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. SCRAM Extension for reauthentication . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Use of TOTP with SCRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Use of FIDO CTAP1/U2F with SCRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
13. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
SCRAM [RFC5802] is a password based SASL [RFC4422] authentication
mechanism that provides (among other things) mutual authentication
and binding to an external security layer such as TLS.
Two-factor authentication (2FA) is a way to add additional security
to an authentication exchange. The first "factor" is a password.
The second "factor" is a verification code retrieved from an
application on a mobile device or computer. 2FA is conceptually
similar to a security token device that banks in some countries
require for online banking. Some examples of 2FA systems are OTP
(one-time password) and TOTP (Time-based One-time Password algorithm,
such as [RFC6238]).
This specification describes an extension to SCRAM to provide 2
factor authentication. SCRAM already relies on passwords for
authentication. This document specifies how second "factors" can be
incorporated into SCRAM authentication. It also includes a separate
(but frequently used together with the 2 factor authentication)
extension for quick reauthentication.
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2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Formal syntax is defined by [RFC5234] including the core rules
defined in Appendix B of [RFC5234].
Example lines prefaced by "C:" are sent by the client and ones
prefaced by "S:" by the server. If a single "C:" or "S:" label
applies to multiple lines, then the line breaks between those lines
are for editorial clarity only, and are not part of the actual
protocol exchange.
2.1. Terminology
This document uses several terms defined in [RFC4949] ("Internet
Security Glossary") including the following: authentication,
authentication exchange, authentication information, brute force,
challenge-response, cryptographic hash function, dictionary attack,
eavesdropping, hash result, keyed hash, man-in-the-middle, nonce,
one-way encryption function, password, replay attack and salt.
Readers not familiar with these terms should use that glossary as a
reference. Other terms defined in [RFC5802] are also used in this
document.
3. SCRAM Extension for 2FA
This extension doesn't add any extra roundtrips to SCRAM
authentication. SCRAM was designed to be extensible, so it allows
for optional and mandatory attributes, which covered by MAC codes.
Second "factors" are conveyed in the second message ("client-final-
message-without-proof" ABNF production) sent from the client to the
server.
This extension doesn't change how the client authenticates the
server. This extension also doesn't cover enrollment with a 2FA
system, such enrollment happends out-of-band.
The server authenticates the client after receiving the second
message as described in Section 3 of [RFC5802]. If the client
included "type" and "second-factor" attributes defined in this
document (see Section 5) and the server supports the specified second
factor type, the server verifies content of the "second-factor"
according to the "type". If the second factor verification fails,
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the server MUST fail authentication and SHOULD return either
"replayed-second-factor" or "invalid-second-factor" error in the "e"
attribute. [[It would be possible to make the extra attributes
mandatory by using SCRAM's "m=", but the text above doesn't do that.
This is one of open issues to resolve.]]
4. SCRAM Extension for reauthentication
This reauthentication extension to SCRAM allows the server to return
a token that can be used for quick reauthentication and bypasses 2
factor authentication prompt to the user. The reauthentication token
is a randomly generated value [RFC4086]. The reauthentication token
is returned in the "o" attribute that is appended to the end of the
"server-final-message".
[[Note: it would be possible to extend SCRAM itself to do
reauthentication, by including an earlier received reauthentication
token in the "client-first-message" of a subsequent SCRAM
authentication. This will also turn off the server checking for 2
factor authentication information, unless the reauthentication
attempt is rejected by the server. In the meantime, this document
presents a couple of other alternatives on how to use other SASL
mechanisms with the reauthentication token.]]
When the HT-* mechanism [draft-schmaus-kitten-sasl-ht] is used for
the reauthentication after a successful SCRAM authentication, the
reauthentication token is the SASL-HT token (see
[draft-schmaus-kitten-sasl-ht]). [[Note that the HT hash should
probably match the SCRAM hash used or "be better".]]
5. Formal Syntax
This document defines the following new SCRAM attributes:
* t: This attribute specifies the type of second factor. This
document defines two possible types: "totp" (see Section 6) and
"ctap1" (see Section 8). If this attribute is specified, the "f"
attribute MUST also be specified.
* f: This attribute specifies the value of the second factor. For
"t=totp" it is 6 digit decimal number. [[Use 8 digits per Rick
van Rein?]] This attribute MUST be ignored unless the "t"
attribute is also specified.
* l: This attribute is used by some second factors (e.g. CTAP1) to
specify the challenge returned by the SCRAM server.
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* o: This attribute specifies the base64-encoded value of the
reauthentication token.
The following syntax specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur
Form (ABNF) notation as specified in [RFC5234].
type = "t=" type-value
; Complies with "attr-val" syntax.
; Returned in client-final-message.
type-value = "totp" / "ctap1" / value
; Type of second factor.
; Should be registered with IANA.
second-factor = "f=" second-factor-value
; Complies with "attr-val" syntax.
; Returned in client-final-message.
second-factor-value = 6DIGIT / value
; 6DIGIT when "t=totp".
server-challenge = "l=" base64
; Data returned by SCRAM server in server-first-message
; to be used for construction of second-factor-value.
server-error-value-ext =
"replayed-second-factor" /
"invalid-second-factor" /
"second-factor-value-missing"
value = <as defined in RFC 5802>
reauth-token = "o=" base64
; base64 encoding of reauthentication
; token.
; Returned in server-final-message.
6. Use of TOTP with SCRAM
When TOTP is used with SCRAM, the following values for "t" and "f"
attributes (see Section 5 for their generic syntax) are used:
* t: This attribute specifies the type of second factor. For TOTP
the value is "totp". If this attribute is specified, the "f"
attribute MUST also be specified.
* f: This attribute specifies the value of the second factor. For
"t=totp" it is 6 digit decimal number. This attribute MUST be
ignored unless the "t" attribute is also specified.
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A TOTP URI is specified with the following ABNF:
totp-uri = "otpauth" "://" "totp/" label "?secret=" secret
"&issuer=" issuer
label = issuer (":" / "%3A") identity
identity = 1*CHAR ; URI-encoded SASL identity
secret = 40 * HEXCHAR ; Base32 (hex) encoded secret with no padding.
issuer = 1*CHAR ; Issuer name.
7. Example
The following example extends the example from Section 5 of [RFC5802]
to demonstrate use of TOTP:
C: n,,n=user,r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL
S: r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL3rfcNHYJY1ZVvWVs7j,s=QSXCR+Q6sek8bf92,
i=4096
C: c=biws,r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL3rfcNHYJY1ZVvWVs7j,
t=totp,f=776804,p=v0X8v3Bz2T0CJGbJQyF0X+HI4Ts=
S: v=lz59pqV8S7suAoZWja4dJRkFsKQ=
Please note that TOTP extension described in this document works in
the same way with SCRAM-SHA-256/SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, SCRAM-SHA-512/
SCRAM-SHA-512-PLUS or any other SCRAM variants that use other hash
functions.
8. Use of FIDO CTAP1/U2F with SCRAM
Note that this section describes steps to achieve Client-to-
Authenticator Protocols v1 (CTAP1)/U2F 2FA in terms of CTAP2 API.
When FIDO CTAP1/U2F is used with SCRAM, the following values for "t",
"l" and "f" attributes (see Section 5 for their generic syntax) are
used:
* t: This attribute specifies the type of second factor. For FIDO
CTAP1/U2F the value is "ctap1". If this attribute is specified,
the "f" attribute MUST also be specified.
* l: base64-encoded challenge as returned by SCRAM server.
* f: This attribute specifies the value of the second factor. For
"t=ctap1" it is the CBOR-serialized [RFC8949] value of
authenticatorGetAssertionResponse map described below. This
attribute MUST be ignored unless the "t" attribute is also
specified.
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SCRAM client sends U2F_AUTHENTICATE command formatted as specified in
[FIDO-U2F-Raw-Message-Formats] to the authenticator (e.g. a USB or
NFC device).
The "P1" framing parameter to U2F_AUTHENTICATE is a single octet
parameter defined as follows:
* If "up" is set to false, set it to 0x08 (dont-enforce-user-
presence-and-sign).
* For USB, set it to 0x07 (check-only). This should prevent call
getting blocked on waiting for user input. If response returns
success, then call again setting the enforce-user-presence-and-
sign.
* For NFC, set it to 0x03 (enforce-user-presence-and-sign). The tap
has already provided the presence and won't block.
The "P2" framing parameter to U2F_AUTHENTICATE is a single octet that
always has the value 0x00.
The "request-data" framing parameter (u2fAuthenticateRequest) to
U2F_AUTHENTICATE is constructed as follows:
* The clientData structure (see Section 5.8.1 of [W3C_webauthn_3])
is filled in as follows:
- The "type" field has value "webauthn.get".
- The "challenge" field contains the base64url encoding of the
challenge provided by the Relying Party. This is the value of
the "l" attribute described above. (Note, possibly need to
base64-decode and base64url-encode.)
- The "origin" field contains the origin of the SCRAM client in
the format specified in [RFC6454], for example
"smtp://client.example.net:587".
- Other fields are specified in Section 5.8.1 of
[W3C_webauthn_3].
* Use clientDataHash parameter of [CTAP2] request as CTAP1/U2F
challenge parameter (32 bytes).
* Let rpIdHash be a byte string of size 32 initialized with SHA-256
hash of rp.id parameter as CTAP1/U2F application parameter (32
bytes). (The rp.id parameter is the hostname of the SCRAM
server.)
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* Let credentialId is the byte string initialized with the id for
this PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor.
* Let keyHandleLength be a byte initialized with length of
credentialId byte string.
* Let u2fAuthenticateRequest be a byte string with the following
structure:
+===================+=============+=================================+
| Length (in | Description | Value |
| bytes) | | |
+===================+=============+=================================+
| 32 | Challenge | Initialized with clientDataHash |
| | parameter | parameter bytes. |
+-------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+
| 32 | Application | Initialized with rpIdHash |
| | parameter | bytes. |
+-------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+
| 1 | Key handle | Initialized with |
| | length | keyHandleLength's value. |
+-------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+
| keyHandleLength | Key handle | Initialized with credentialId |
| | | bytes. |
+-------------------+-------------+---------------------------------+
Table 1
Generate authenticatorData from the U2F authentication response
message received from the authenticator:
* Copy bits 0 (the UP bit) and bit 1 from the CTAP2/U2F response
user presence byte to bits 0 and 1 of the CTAP2 flags,
respectively. Set all other bits of flags to zero. Note: bit
zero is the least significant bit. See also Authenticator Data
section of [W3C_webauthn_3].
* Let signCount be a 4-byte unsigned integer initialized with CTAP1/
U2F response counter field.
Let authenticatorData is a byte string of following structure:
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+===================+============================+==================+
| Length (in bytes) | Description | Value |
+===================+============================+==================+
| 32 | SHA-256 hash of | Initialized with |
| | the rp.id. | rpIdHash bytes. |
+-------------------+----------------------------+------------------+
| 1 | Flags | Initialized with |
| | | flags' value. |
+-------------------+----------------------------+------------------+
| 4 | Signature counter | Initialized with |
| | (signCount) | signCount bytes. |
+-------------------+----------------------------+------------------+
Table 2
Let authenticatorGetAssertionResponse be a CBOR map with the
following keys whose values are as follows:
* Set 0x01 with the credential from allowList that whose response
succeeded.
* Set 0x02 with authenticatorData bytes.
* Set 0x03 with signature field from CTAP1/U2F authentication
response message. Note: An ASN.1-encoded ECDSA signature value
ranges over 8-72 bytes in length.
9. Open Issues
Simon Josefsson: should this be a new SASL mechanism name, e.g.
CROTP-SHA-XXX?
Should we pick between TOTP and FIDO2 (CTAP1)?
Rick van Rein: specify a HOTP variant as well?
Rick van Rein: use TOTP with 6 or 8 digits? Register both variants?
10. Security Considerations
An OTP value is a sensitive piece of data and thus should only be
sent over a secure channel (such as TLS). Otherwise an attacker
might be able to intercept it and reuse it for authentication to the
SCRAM server.
TBD
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11. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to update the definition of the SASL family SCRAM
in the SASL Mechanism registry established by [RFC4422] to also point
to this document.
IANA is also requested to create a new subregistry of "SASL
mechanism" for registering second factor schemes used in the "t"
attribute as specified in this document.
The registration template is as follows:
SCRAM Second Factor Scheme Name:
Pointer to specification text:
Notes (optional):
The registration procedure for the above subregistry is Expert
Review.
IANA is requested to register a new value in the subregistry defined
above:
SCRAM Second Factor Scheme Name: TOTP
Pointer to specification text: [[ this document ]]
Notes (optional): (none)
12. Acknowledgements
Thank you to Stephen Farrell for motivating creation of this document
and to Dave Cridland for describing how TOTP can be used with XMPP in
XEP-0400. Thank you to Rick van Rein, Simon Josefsson and Ludovic
Bocquet for comments and corrections, but all final errors in this
document remain mine.
13. Normative References
[CTAP2] Bradley, J., Hodges, J., Jones, M., Kumar, A., Lindemann,
R., and J. Verrept, "Client to Authenticator Protocol
(CTAP)", FIDO fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-
ps-errata-20220621, June 2022,
<https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.1-ps-20210615/
fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.1-ps-errata-
20220621.html>.
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[draft-schmaus-kitten-sasl-ht]
Schmaus, F. and C. Egger, "The Hashed Token SASL
Mechanism", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
schmaus-kitten-sasl-ht-09, 6 November 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-schmaus-kitten-
sasl-ht-09.txt>.
[FIDO-U2F-Raw-Message-Formats]
Balfanz, D., Ehrensvard, J., and J. Lang, "FIDO U2F Raw
Message Formats", FIDO fido-u2f-raw-message-formats-v1.2-
ps-20170411, April 2017, <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/
fido-u2f-v1.2-ps-20170411/fido-u2f-raw-message-formats-
v1.2-ps-20170411.pdf>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC4422] Melnikov, A., Ed. and K. Zeilenga, Ed., "Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4422, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4422>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC5802] Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams,
"Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism
(SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5802, July 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5802>.
[RFC6238] M'Raihi, D., Machani, S., Pei, M., and J. Rydell, "TOTP:
Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm", RFC 6238,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6238, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6238>.
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[RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[W3C_webauthn_3]
"Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key
Credentials - Level 3", W3C WD webauthn-3, W3C webauthn-3,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/>.
Author's Address
Alexey Melnikov
Isode Ltd
Email: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com
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