Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth
draft-ietf-lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth
Network Working Group A. Becker
Internet-Draft R. Guthrie
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jenkins
Expires: 1 June 2024 NSA
29 November 2023
Related Certificates for Use in Multiple Authentications within a
Protocol
draft-ietf-lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth-03
Abstract
This document defines a new CSR attribute, relatedCertRequest, and a
new X.509 certificate extension, RelatedCertificate. The use of the
relatedCertRequest attribute in a CSR and the inclusion of the
RelatedCertificate extension in the resulting certificate together
provide additional assurance that two certificates each belong to the
same end entity. This mechanism is particularly useful in the
context of non-composite hybrid authentication, which enables users
to employ the same certificates in hybrid authentication as in
authentication done with only traditional or post-quantum algorithms.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 June 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. CSR and Related Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. The relatedCertRequest Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. CSR Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Related Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. The RelatedCertificate Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Endpoint Protocol Multiple Authentication Processing . . 8
5. Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. CA Organization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
The goal of this document is to define a method for providing
assurance that two X.509 (aka PKIX) end-entity certificates are owned
by the same entity, in order to perform multiple authentications
where each certificate corresponds to a distinct digital signature.
This method aims to facilitate the use of two certificates for
authentication in a secure protocol while minimizing changes to the
certificate format [RFC5280] and to current PKI best practices.
When using non-composite hybrid public key mechanisms, the party
relying on a certificate (an authentication verifier or a key-
establishment initiator) will want assurance that the private keys
associated with each certificate are under the control of the same
entity. This document defines a certificate extension,
RelatedCertificate, that signals that the certificate containing the
extension is able to be used in combination with the other specified
certificate.
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A certification authority (CA) organization (defined here as the
entity or organization that runs a CA and determines the policies and
tools the CA will use) that is asked to issue a certificate with such
an extension may want assurance from a registration authority (RA)
that the private keys (for example, corresponding to two public keys
- one in an extant certificate, and one in a current request) belong
to the same entity. To facilitate this, a CSR attribute is defined,
called relatedCertRequest, that permits an RA to make such an
assertion.
1.1. Overview
The general roadmap of this design is best illustrated via an entity
(device, service, user token, etc.) that has an existing certificate
(Cert A) and requests a new certificate (Cert B), perhaps as part of
an organization’s update strategy.
* For protocols where authentication is not negotiated, and rather
is limited by what the signer offers, such as in CMS and S/MIME,
either Cert A's signing key, Cert B's signing key, or both signing
keys may be invoked, according to which validators the signer
anticipates.
* For protocols where authentication is negotiated in-protocol, such
as TLS and IKEv2, either Cert A or Cert B's signing key may be
invoked, according to the preference of the validator. If the
protocol is enabled to do so, peers may request that both Cert A
and Cert B are used for authentication.
A validator that prefers multiple authentication types may be
assisted by the inclusion of relevant information in the signer’s
certificate – that is, information that indicates the existence of a
related certificate, and some assurance that those certificates have
been issued to the same entity. This document describes a
certificate request attribute and certificate extension that provide
such assurance.
To support this concept, this document defines a new CSR attribute,
relatedCertRequest, which contains information on how to locate a
previously-issued certificate (Cert A) and provides evidence that the
requesting entity owns that certificate. When the RA makes the
request to the CA, the CA uses the given information to locate Cert
A, and then verifies ownership before generating the new certificate,
Cert B.
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2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. CSR and Related Certificates
3.1. The relatedCertRequest Attribute
This section defines a new CSR attribute designed to allow the RA to
attest that the owner of the public key in the CSR also owns the
public key associated with the end-entity certificate identified in
this attribute. The relatedCertRequest attribute indicates the
location of a previously issued certificate that the end-entity owns
and wants identified in the new certificate requested through the
CSR.
The relatedCertRequest attribute has the following syntax:
relatedCertRequest ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX RequesterCertificate
ID { TBD }
}
RequesterCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
certID IssuerAndSerialNumber,
requestTime BinaryTime,
locationInfo UniformResourceIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING }
The RequesterCertificate type has four fields:
* The certID field uses the IssuerAndSerialNumber type [RFC5652] to
identify a previously issued end-entity certificate that the
requesting entity also owns. IssuerAndSerialNumber is repeated
here for convenience:
IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name,
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
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* The requestTime field uses the BinaryTime type [RFC6019] in order
to ensure freshness, such that the signed data can only be used at
the time of the initial CSR. The means by which the CA and RA
synchronize time is outside the scope of this document.
BinaryTime is repeated here for convenience:
BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
* The locationInfo field uses UniformResourceIdentifier to provide
information on the location of the other certificate the
requesting entity owns. We define UniformResourceIdentifier as:
UniformResourceIdentifier ::= IA5String
The UniformResourceIdentifier is a pointer to a location via HTTP/
HTTPS, or a dataURI. This field can contain one of two acceptable
values:
* - If the request for (new) Cert B is to the same CA organization
as issued (existing) Cert A, then the UniformResourceIdentifier
value SHOULD be available via HTTP or HTTPS, and therefore must be
a URL that points to a file containing a certificate or
certificate chain that the requesting entity owns, as detailed in
[RFC5280]. The file must permit access to a CMS 'certs-only'
message containing the end entity X.509 certificate, or the entire
certificate chain. All certificates contained must be DER
encoded.
- If the request for (new) Cert B is to a CA organization
different to the CA organization that issued the certifacte
(existing) Cert A referenced in the CSR, then the
UniformResourceIdentifier value MAY be a dataURI [RFC2397]
containing inline degenerate PKCS#7 consisting of all the
certificates and CRLs required to validate the traditional
certificate. This allows validation without the CA having to
retrieve certificates/CRLs from another CA. Further discussion of
requirements for this scenario is in Section 5.
* The signature field provides evidence that the requesting entity
owns the certificate indicated by the certID. Specifically, the
signature field contains a digital signature over the
concatenation of DER encoded requestTime and
IssuerAndSerialNumber. The concatenated value is signed using the
signature algorithm and private key associated with the
certificate identified by the certID field.
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- If the related certificate is a key establishment certificate
(e.g., using RSA key transport or ECC key agreement), use the
private key to sign one time for POP (as detailed in NIST SP
800-57 Part 1 Rev 5 Section 8.1.5.1.1.2)
The validation of this signature by the CA ensures that the owner of
the CSR also owns the certificate indicated in the relatedCertRequest
attribute.
3.2. CSR Processing
The information provided in the relatedCertRequest attribute allows
the CA to locate a previously issued certificate that the requesting
entity owns, and verify ownership by using the public key in that
certificate to validate the signature in the relatedCertRequest
attribute.
If a CA receives a CSR that includes the relatedCertRequest attribute
and that CA supports the attribute, the CA:
* MUST retrieve and validate the certificate identified in the
relatedCertRequest using the information provided in
UniformResourceIdentifier. The CA then extracts the
IssuerAndSerialNumber from the indicated certificate and compares
this value against the IssuerAndSerialNumber provided in the
certID field of relatedCertRequest.
* MUST check that the BinaryTime indicated in the requestTime field
is sufficiently fresh.
* MUST verify the signature field of the relatedCertRequest
attribute. The CA validates the signature using the public key
associated with the certificate it located via the info provided
in the UniformResourceIdentifier field. The details of the
validation process are outside the scope of this document.
* SHOULD issue the new certificate containing the RelatedCertificate
extension as specified in Section 4, which references the
certificate indicated in the attribute’s IssuerAndSerialNumber
field.
The RA MUST only allow a previously-issued certificate to be
indicated in the relatedCertRequest attribute in order to enable the
CA to perform the required signature verification.
The RA MAY send the CA a CSR containing a relatedCertRequest
attribute that includes the IssuerAndSerialNumber of a certificate
that was issued by a different CA.
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4. Related Certificate
4.1. The RelatedCertificate Extension
This section profiles a new X.509v3 certificate extension,
RelatedCertificate. RelatedCertificate creates an association
between the certificate containing the RelatedCertificate extension
(Cert B) and the certificate referenced within the extension (Cert
A). When two end-entity certificates are used in a protocol, where
one of the certificates contains a RelatedCertificate extension that
references another certificate, the authenticating entity is provided
with additional assurance that all certificates belong to the same
entity.
The RelatedCertificate extension is an octet string that contains the
hash of a single end-entity certificate.
The RelatedCertificate extension has the following syntax:
-- Object Identifiers for certificate extension
id-relatedCertificate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
-- X.509 Certificate extension
RelatedCertificate ::= OCTET STRING
-- hash of entire related certificate }
The extension is comprised of an octet string, which is the digest
value obtained from hashing the entire related certificate identified
in the CSR attribute defined above, relatedCertRequest. The
algorithm used to hash the certificate in the RelatedCertificate
extension MUST match the hash algorithm used to sign the certificate
that contains the extension.
ED NOTE: We recognize the following SCVP structure from [RFC5055] may
be preferable to defining a new extension, however, it adds extra
bytes of options for the hash function that may be deemed unnecessary
for the RelatedCertificates extension. The structure is repeated
here for convenience:
SCVPCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash OCTET STRING,
IssuerSerial SCVPIssuerSerial,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT {algorithm sha-1}}
This extension SHOULD NOT be marked critical. Marking this extension
critical would severely impact interoperability.
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For certificate chains, this extension MUST only be included in the
end-entity certificate.
For the RelatedCertificate extension to be meaningful, a CA that
issues a certificate with this extension:
* MUST only include a certificate in the extension that is listed
and validated in the relatedCertRequest attribute of the CSR
submitted by the requesting entity.
* MUST ensure that the related certificate at least contains the KU
bits and EKU OIDs [RFC5280] being asserted in the certificate
being issued.
* SHOULD determine that all certificates are valid at the time of
issuance. The usable overlap of validity periods is a Subscriber
concern.
4.2. Endpoint Protocol Multiple Authentication Processing
When the preference to use a non-composite hybrid authentication mode
is expressed by an endpoint through the protocol itself (e.g., during
negotiation), the use of the RelatedCertificate extension and its
enforcement are left to the protocol's native authorization mechanism
(along with other decisions endpoints make about whether to complete
or drop a connection).
If an endpoint has indicated that it is willing to do non-composite
hybrid authentication and receives the appropriate authentication
data, it SHOULD check end-entity certificates (Cert A and Cert B) for
the RelatedCertificate extension. If present in one certificate, for
example Cert B, it SHOULD:
* Compute the appropriate hash of Cert A, the other end-entity
certificate received. The hash algorithm is the same as the one
used to sign the certificate containing the extension.
* Verify that the hash value matches the hash entry in the
RelatedCertificate extension of Cert B.
It is outside the scope of this document how to proceed with
authentication based on the outcome of this verification process.
Different determinations may be made depending on each peer’s policy
regarding whether both or at least one authentication needs to
succeed.
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5. Use Case
The general design of this method is best illustrated through
specific use within a migration strategy to PQ cryptography via a
non-composite hybrid authentication mechanism. The intent is for a
CA issuing a new, PQ certificate to add an X.509 extension that
provides information about a previously-issued, traditional
certificate in which the private key is controlled by the same end
entity as the PQ certificate.
In the following scenario, an entity currently has a traditional
certificate, and is requesting a new, PQ certificate be issued with
the RelatedCertificate extension included that references the
entity's traditional certificate.
The RA receives a CSR for a PQ certificate, where the CSR includes
the relatedCertRequest attribute detailed in this document. The
relatedCertRequest attribute includes a certID field that identifies
the entity's previously-issued traditional certificate, and a
signature field in which the requesting entity produces a digital
signature over the certID and a nonce, using the private key of the
certificate identified by the certID.
The purpose of the relatedCertRequest attribute is to serve as a tool
for the RA to provide assurance to the CA organization that the
entity that controls the private key of the PQ certificate being
requested alos controls the private key of the referenced,
previously-issued traditional certificate.
Upon receipt of the CSR, the CA issues a PQ certificate to the
requesting entity that includes the RelatedCertificate extension
detailed in this document; the extension includes a hash of the
entire traditional certificate identified in the CSR. The X.509
extension creates an association between the PQ certificate and the
traditional certificate via end-entity ownership.
The attribute and subsequent extension together provide assurance
from the CA organization that the same end-entity controls the
private keys of both certificates. It is neither a requirement nor a
mandate that either certificate be used with the other; it is simply
an assurance that they can be used together, as they are under the
control of the same entity.
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6. CA Organization Considerations
The relatedCertRequest CSR attribute provides assertion to the CA
organization issuing Cert B, of end entity control of the private key
of a related certificate, Cert A. There may arise scenarios where a
public-facing CA organization is not configured to validate
signatures associated with certificates that have been issued by a
different CA organization. In this case, recognition of the contents
in the relatedCertRequest attribute may be contingent upon a pre-
arranged contract with pre-configured trust anchors from the other CA
organization, and include agreements on certificate policy with
regards to certificate application, issuance, and acceptance.
Further, matching policies between CA organizations on protection of
private key may be necessary in order for the whole assurance level
from the other CA organization to be accepted.
In a similar vein, if the CA organization issuing the PQ certificate
can recognize the relatedCertRequest attribute in the CSR and wishes
to issue the certificate with the RelatedCerts extension, it may be
the case that a different CA organization issued the related
certificate referenced in the CSR. In order to ensure that the
certificates have been issued under homogeneous sets of security
parameters, the certificate policies should be the same with regard
to common security requirements. The issuing CA, as part of related
certificate public key validation, determines what policies are
acceptable for the certification path of the related certificate.
The issuing CA determines what is acceptable to them in terms of
certificate policy, to ensure that the policies for protection of
private key are sufficient. The relatedCertRequest attribute and
subsequent RelatedCertificate certificate extension are solely
intended to provide assurance that both private keys are controlled
by the same end entity.
7. Security Considerations
This document inherits security considerations identified in
[RFC5280].
The mechanisms described in this document provide only a means to
express that multiple certificates are related. They are intended
for the interpretation of the recipient of the data in which they are
embedded (i.e. a CSR or certificate). They do not by themselves
effect any security function.
Authentication, unlike key establishment, is necessarily a one-way
arrangement. That is, authentication is an assertion made by a
claimant to a verifier. The means and strength of mechanism for
authentication have to be to the satisfaction of the verifier. A
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system security designer needs to be aware of what authentication
assurances are needed in various parts of the system and how to
achieve that assurance. In a closed system (e.g. Company X
distributing firmware to its own devices) the approach may be
implicit. In an online protocol like IPsec where the peers are
generally known, any mechanism selected from a pre-established set
may be sufficient. For more promiscuous online protocols, like TLS,
the ability for the verifier to express what is possible and what is
preferred – and to assess that it got what it needed – is important.
A certificate is an assertion of binding between an identity and a
public key. However, that assertion is based on several other
assurances – specifically, that the identity belongs to a particular
physical entity, and that that physical entity has control over the
private key corresponding to the public. For any hybrid approach, it
is important that there be evidence that the same entity controls all
private keys at time of use (to the verifier) and at time of
registration (to the CA).
All hybrid implementations are vulnerable to a downgrade attack in
which a malicious peer does not express support for PQ algorithms,
resulting in an exchange that can only rely upon traditional
algorithms for security.
Implementors should be aware of risks that arise from the retrieval
of a related certificate via the UniformResourceIdentifier provided
in the relatedCertRequest CSR attribute, if the URI points to
malicious code. Implementors should ensure the data is properly
formed and validate the retrieved data fully.
8. IANA Considerations
This document defines an extension for use with X.509 certificates.
IANA is requested to register an OID in the PKIX certificate
extensions arc [RFC7299]:
id-pe-relatedCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe TBD2 }
with this document as the Required Specification.
This document defines a CSR attribute. IANA is requested to register
an OID:
id-aa-relatedCertRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aa TBD1 }
This document defines an ASN.1 Module in Appendix A. IANA is
requested to register an OID for the module identifier:
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id-mod-related-cert-2023(TBD0)
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2397] Masinter, L., "The "data" URL scheme", RFC 2397,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2397, August 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2397>.
[RFC5055] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.
Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
(SCVP)", RFC 5055, DOI 10.17487/RFC5055, December 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5055>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6019] Housley, R., "BinaryTime: An Alternate Format for
Representing Date and Time in ASN.1", RFC 6019,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6019, September 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6019>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>.
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[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
The following RelatedCertificate ASN.1 module describes the
RequesterCertificate type found in the relatedCertAttribute. It
pulls definitions from modules defined in [RFC5912], and [RFC6268],
and [RFC6019] for the IssuerAndSerialNumber type, and BinaryTime
type, respectively.
RelatedCertificate { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-related-cert-2023(TBD0)}
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
ATTRIBUTE, EXTENSION
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- in [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
IssuerAndSerialNumber
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
id-mod-cms-2009(58) }
BinaryTime
FROM BinarySigningTimeModule -- in [RFC6019]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
id-mod-binarySigningTime(27) } ;
-- Object identifier arcs
id-pe OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 1 }
id-aa OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) usa(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) attributes(2) }
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-- relatedCertificate Extension
id-pe-relatedCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe TBD2 }
RelatedCertificate ::= OCTET STRING
ext-relatedCertificate EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX RelatedCertificate
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-relatedCert }
-- relatedCertRequest Attribute
id-aa-relatedCertRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aa TBD1 }
RequesterCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
certID IssuerAndSerialNumber,
requestTime BinaryTime,
locationInfo UniformResourceIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING }
UniformResourceIdentifier ::= IA5String
aa-relatedCertRequest ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE RequesterCertificate
IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-relatedCertRequest }
END
Authors' Addresses
Alison Becker
National Security Agency
Email: aebecke@uwe.nsa.gov
Rebecca Guthrie
National Security Agency
Email: rmguthr@uwe.nsa.gov
Michael Jenkins
National Security Agency
Email: mjjenki@cyber.nsa.gov
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