Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs
draft-ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs
LAMPS Working Group M. Richardson, Ed.
Internet-Draft Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Standards Track O. Friel
Expires: 4 September 2024 Cisco
D. von Oheimb
Siemens
D. Harkins
The Industrial Lounge
3 March 2024
Clarification of RFC7030 CSR Attributes definition
draft-ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs-08
Abstract
The Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST, RFC7030) is ambiguous in
its specification of the CSR Attributes Response. This has resulted
in implementation challenges and implementor confusion.
This document updates RFC7030 (EST) and clarifies how the CSR
Attributes Response can be used by an EST server to specify both CSR
attribute OIDs and also CSR attribute values, in particular X.509
extension values, that the server expects the client to include in
subsequent CSR request.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 September 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. CSR Attributes Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Extensions to RFC 7030 section 2.6. . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Extensions to RFC 7030 section 4.5.2. . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Alternative: Use of CSR templates . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Co-existence with existing implementations . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. RFC8994/ACP subjectAltName with specific otherName . . . 6
5.1.1. Base64 encoded example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1.2. ASN.1 DUMP output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. RFC7030 original example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2.1. Base64 encoded example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2.2. ASN.1 DUMP output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. EST server requires a specific subjectAltName
extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3.1. Base64 encoded example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3.2. ASN.1 DUMP output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4. Require a public key of a specific size . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4.1. Base64 encoded example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4.2. ASN.1 DUMP output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.5. Require a public key of a specific curve . . . . . . . . 12
5.5.1. Base64 encoded example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.5.2. ASN.1 DUMP output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.6. Require a specific extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.6.1. Base64 encoded example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.6.2. ASN.1 DUMP output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. Identity and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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1. Introduction
Enrollment over Secure Transport [RFC7030] (EST) has been used in a
wide variety of applications. In particular, [RFC8994] and [RFC8995]
describe a way to use it in order to build out an autonomic control
plane (ACP) [RFC8368].
The ACP requires that each node be given a very specific
subjectAltName. In the ACP specification, the solution was for the
EST server to use section 2.6 of [RFC7030] to convey to the EST
client the actual subjectAltName that will end up in its certificate.
As a result of some implementation challenges, it came to light that
this particular way of using the CSR attributes was not universally
agreed upon, and it was suggested that it went contrary to section
2.6.
Section 2.6 says that the CSR attributes "can provide additional
descriptive information that the EST server cannot access itself".
This is extended to describe how the EST server can provide values
that it demands to use.
After significant discussion, it has been determined that Section 4.5
of [RFC7030] specification is sufficiently difficult to read and
ambiguous to interpret that clarification is needed.
This document motivates the different use cases, and provides
additional worked out examples.
Also, section 4.5.2 is extended to clarify the use of the existing
ASN.1 syntax [X.680][X.690]. This covers all uses and is fully
backward compatible with existing use.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. CSR Attributes Handling
3.1. Extensions to RFC 7030 section 2.6.
Replace the second paragraph with the following text:
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These attributes can provide additional descriptive information that
the EST server cannot access itself, such as the Media Access Control
(MAC) address of an interface of the EST client. The EST server can also
provide concrete values that it tells the client to include in the CSR,
such as a specific X.509 Subject Alternative Name extension. Moreover,
these attributes can indicate the type of the included public key
or which crypto algorithms to use for the self-signature,
such as a specific elliptic curve or a specific hash function that the client
is expected to use when generating the CSR.
3.2. Extensions to RFC 7030 section 4.5.2.
The ASN.1 syntax for CSR Attributes as defined in EST section 4.5.2
is as follows:
CsrAttrs ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF AttrOrOID
AttrOrOID ::= CHOICE (oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, attribute Attribute }
Attribute { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE {
type ATTRIBUTE.&id({IOSet}),
values SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type({IOSet}{@type}) }
This remains unchanged, such that bits-on-the-wire compatibility is
maintained.
Key parts that were unclear were which OID to use in the 'type' field
and that the 'values' field can contain an entire sequence of X.509
extensions.
The OID to use for such attributes in the 'type' field MUST be
extensionRequest, which has the numerical value
1.2.840.113549.1.9.14. There MUST be only one such Attribute.
The 'values' field of this attribute MUST contain a set with exactly
one element, and this element MUST by of type Extensions, as per
Section 4.1 of [RFC5280]:
Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension
Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
extnValue OCTET STRING
-- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value
-- corresponding to the extension type identified
-- by extnID
}
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An Extension comprises the OID of the specific X.509 extension
(extnID), optionally the 'critical' bit, and the extension value
(extnValue).
An Extensions structure, which is a sequence of elements of type
Extension, MUST NOT include more than one element with a particiular
extnID.
With this understanding, the needs of [RFC8994] and [RFC8995] are
satisfied with no change to the bits on the wire.
3.3. Alternative: Use of CSR templates
[RFC8295], Appendix B suggests an alternative that avoids the
piecemeal inclusion of attributes that [RFC7030] documented.
Instead, an entire CSR object is returned with various fields filled
out, and other fields waiting to be filled in, in a pKCS7PDU
attribute. In the suggested approach, the pKCS7PDU attribute
includes a Full PKI Data content type [RFC5272] and that in turn
includes a CSR or CRMF formatted request; see [RFC6268] Sections 5
and 9, respectively.
The drawback to this approach, particularly for the CSR, is that some
required fields are "faked"; specifically, the signature field on the
CSR is faked with an empty big string. The avoid this drawback, this
specification defines the Certificate Request Information Template
attribute for CsrAttrs, see Section 3.2, that is request minus the
useless signature wrapper as follows:
aa-certificationRequestInfoTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE CertificationRequestInfoTemplate IDENTIFIED BY
id-aa-certificationRequestInfoTemplate }
id-aa-certificationRequestInfoTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) TBD2 }
CertificateRequestInfoTemplate ::= CertificationRequestInfo
The CertificationRequestInfoTemplate uses the
CertificationRequestInfo from [RFC5912], Section 5 and is included
here for convenience:
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CertificationRequestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER { v1(0) } (v1,...),
subject Name,
subjectPKInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo{{ PKInfoAlgorithms }},
attributes [0] Attributes{{ CRIAttributes }}
}
Legacy servers MAY continue to use the [RFC7030] style piecemeal
attribute/value pairs, and MAY also include the template style
described here. Clients which understand both MUST use the template
only, and ignore all other CSRattrs elements. Older clients will
ignore this new element.
The version code is always v1 (0). As shown in the example below,
any empty values in the subject DN, and in any included X509v3
extensions are expected to be filled in by the client.
The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field must be present, but it MUST have an
empty bit string for the key, as the server does not know what key
will be used. The server MAY specify (in the OID), the type of the
key to use, but otherwise the OID type MUST be NULL.
Each of the attributes has a single attribute value instance in the
values set. Even though the syntax is defined as a set, there MUST
be exactly one instance of AttributeValue present.
4. Co-existence with existing implementations
5. Examples
Each example has a high-level (English) explanation of what is
expected. Some mapping back to the Attribute and Extension
definitions above are included. The base64 DER encoding is then
shown. The output of "dumpasn1" is then provided to detail what the
contents are.
5.1. RFC8994/ACP subjectAltName with specific otherName
A single subjectAltName extension is specified in a single Extension
attribute. This is what might be created by an [RFC8995] Registrar
that is asking for [RFC8994] AcpNodeName format otherNames.
5.1.1. Base64 encoded example
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<CODE BEGINS>
MGQwYgYJKoZIhvcNAQkOMVUwUwYDVR0RAQH/BEmgRzBFBggr
BgEFBQcICgw5cmZjODk5NCtmZDczOWZjMjNjMzQ0MDExMjIz
MzQ0NTUwMDAwMDAwMCtAYWNwLmV4YW1wbGUuY29t
<CODE ENDS>
5.1.2. ASN.1 DUMP output
There is a single subjectAltName Extension with an Attribute with
Extension type.
<30 64>
0 100: SEQUENCE {
<30 62>
2 98: SEQUENCE {
<06 09>
4 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER extensionRequest (1 2 840 113549 1 9 14)
: (PKCS #9 via CRMF)
<31 55>
15 85: SET {
<30 53>
17 83: SEQUENCE {
<06 03>
19 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectAltName (2 5 29 17)
: (X.509 extension)
<01 01>
24 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
<04 49>
27 73: OCTET STRING
: A0 47 30 45 06 08 2B 06 .G0E..+.
: 01 05 05 07 08 0A 0C 39 .......9
: 72 66 63 38 39 39 34 2B rfc8994+
: 66 64 37 33 39 66 63 32 fd739fc2
: 33 63 33 34 34 30 31 31 3c344011
: 32 32 33 33 34 34 35 35 22334455
: 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 00000000
: 2B 40 61 63 70 2E 65 78 +@acp.ex
: 61 6D 70 6C 65 2E 63 6F ample.co
: 6D m
: }
: }
: }
: }
5.2. RFC7030 original example
In this example, taken from [RFC7030], a few different attributes are
included.
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5.2.1. Base64 encoded example
<CODE BEGINS>
MEEGCSqGSIb3DQEJBzASBgcqhkjOPQIBMQcGBSuBBAAiMBYG
CSqGSIb3DQEJDjEJBgcrBgEBAQEWBggqhkjOPQQDAw==
<CODE ENDS>
5.2.2. ASN.1 DUMP output
1. The challengePassword attribute is included to indicate that the
CSR should include this value.
2. An ecPublicKey attribute is provided with the value secp384r1 to
indicate what kind of key should be submitted.
3. An extensionRequest container with an OID 1.3.6.1.1.1.1.22
(macAddress), but without a value, to indicate that the CSR
should include an X.509v3 extension with this value.
4. The ecdsaWithSHA384 OID is included to indicate what kind of hash
is expected to be used for the self-signature of the PCKS#10 CSR
structure.
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<30 41>
0 65: SEQUENCE {
<06 09>
2 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER challengePassword (1 2 840 113549 1 9 7)
: (PKCS #9)
<30 12>
13 18: SEQUENCE {
<06 07>
15 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1)
: (ANSI X9.62 public key type)
<31 07>
24 7: SET {
<06 05>
26 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp384r1 (1 3 132 0 34)
: (SECG (Certicom) named elliptic curve)
: }
: }
<30 16>
33 22: SEQUENCE {
<06 09>
35 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER extensionRequest (1 2 840 113549 1 9 14)
: (PKCS #9 via CRMF)
<31 09>
46 9: SET {
<06 07>
48 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 1 1 1 22'
: }
: }
<06 08>
57 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3)
: (ANSI X9.62 ECDSA algorithm with SHA384)
: }
5.3. EST server requires a specific subjectAltName extension
This example is the same as the previous one except that instead of
the OID for a macAddress, a subjectAltName is specified as the only
Extension element.
5.3.1. Base64 encoded example
<CODE BEGINS>
MGYGCSqGSIb3DQEJBzASBgcqhkjOPQIBMQcGBSuBBAAiMDsG
CSqGSIb3DQEJDjEuMCwGA1UdEQEB/wQioCAwHgYIKwYBBQUH
CAoMEnBvdGF0b0BleGFtcGxlLmNvbQYIKoZIzj0EAwM=
<CODE ENDS>
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5.3.2. ASN.1 DUMP output
1. The challengePassword attribute is included to indicate that the
CSR should include this value.
2. An ecPublicKey attribute is provided with the value secp384r1 to
indicate what kind of key should be submitted.
3. An extensionRequest container with a subjectAltName value
containing the name potato@example.com
4. The ecdsaWithSHA384 OID is included to indicate what kind of hash
is expected to be used for the self-signature of the PCKS#10 CSR
structure.
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<30 66>
0 102: SEQUENCE {
<06 09>
2 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER challengePassword (1 2 840 113549 1 9 7)
: (PKCS #9)
<30 12>
13 18: SEQUENCE {
<06 07>
15 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1)
: (ANSI X9.62 public key type)
<31 07>
24 7: SET {
<06 05>
26 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp384r1 (1 3 132 0 34)
: (SECG (Certicom) named elliptic curve)
: }
: }
<30 3B>
33 59: SEQUENCE {
<06 09>
35 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER extensionRequest (1 2 840 113549 1 9 14)
: (PKCS #9 via CRMF)
<31 2E>
46 46: SET {
<30 2C>
48 44: SEQUENCE {
<06 03>
50 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectAltName (2 5 29 17)
: (X.509 extension)
<01 01>
55 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
<04 22>
58 34: OCTET STRING
: A0 20 30 1E 06 08 2B 06 . 0...+.
: 01 05 05 07 08 0A 0C 12 ........
: 70 6F 74 61 74 6F 40 65 potato@e
: 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 2E 63 xample.c
: 6F 6D om
: }
: }
: }
<06 08>
94 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3)
: (ANSI X9.62 ECDSA algorithm with SHA384)
: }
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5.4. Require a public key of a specific size
The CSR requires a public key of a specific size
5.4.1. Base64 encoded example
<CODE BEGINS>
MCkGCSqGSIb3DQEJBzARBgkqhkiG9w0BAQExBAICEAAGCSqG
SIb3DQEBCw==
<CODE ENDS>
5.4.2. ASN.1 DUMP output
1. Provide a CSR with an RSA key that's 4096 bits and sign it with
sha256
<30 29>
0 41: SEQUENCE {
<06 09>
2 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER challengePassword (1 2 840 113549 1 9 7)
: (PKCS #9)
<30 11>
13 17: SEQUENCE {
<06 09>
15 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
: (PKCS #1)
<31 04>
26 4: SET {
<02 02>
28 2: INTEGER 4096
: }
: }
<06 09>
32 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
: (PKCS #1)
: }
5.5. Require a public key of a specific curve
The CSR requires a public key with a specific curve
5.5.1. Base64 encoded example
<CODE BEGINS>
MD0GCSqGSIb3DQEJBzASBgcqhkjOPQIBMQcGBSuBBAAiMBIGCSqGSIb3DQEJDjEFBgNVBAUGCCqGSM49BAMD
<CODE ENDS>
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5.5.2. ASN.1 DUMP output
Provide a CSR with an ECC key from p384, include your serial number,
and sign it with sha384.
<30 3D>
0 61: SEQUENCE {
<06 09>
2 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER challengePassword (1 2 840 113549 1 9 7)
: (PKCS #9)
<30 12>
13 18: SEQUENCE {
<06 07>
15 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1)
: (ANSI X9.62 public key type)
<31 07>
24 7: SET {
<06 05>
26 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp384r1 (1 3 132 0 34)
: (SECG (Certicom) named elliptic curve)
: }
: }
<30 12>
33 18: SEQUENCE {
<06 09>
35 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER extensionRequest (1 2 840 113549 1 9 14)
: (PKCS #9 via CRMF)
<31 05>
46 5: SET {
<06 03>
48 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
: (X.520 DN component)
: }
: }
<06 08>
53 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3)
: (ANSI X9.62 ECDSA algorithm with SHA384)
: }
5.6. Require a specific extension
The CSR is required to have an EC key, to include a serial number, a
friendly name, favorite drink, and be signed with SHA512.
5.6.1. Base64 encoded example
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<CODE BEGINS>
MFQGCSqGSIb3DQEJBzASBgcqhkjOPQIBMQcGBSuBBAAjMCkG
CSqGSIb3DQEJDjEcBgNVBAUGCSqGSIb3DQEJFAYKCZImiZPy
LGQBBQYIKoZIzj0EAwQ=
<CODE ENDS>
5.6.2. ASN.1 DUMP output
Provide a CSR with an EC key from sha521, include your serial number,
friendly name, and favorite drink, and sign it with sha512
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<30 54>
0 84: SEQUENCE {
<06 09>
2 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER challengePassword (1 2 840 113549 1 9 7)
: (PKCS #9)
<30 12>
13 18: SEQUENCE {
<06 07>
15 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1)
: (ANSI X9.62 public key type)
<31 07>
24 7: SET {
<06 05>
26 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp521r1 (1 3 132 0 35)
: (SECG (Certicom) named elliptic curve)
: }
: }
<30 29>
33 41: SEQUENCE {
<06 09>
35 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER extensionRequest (1 2 840 113549 1 9 14)
: (PKCS #9 via CRMF)
<31 1C>
46 28: SET {
<06 03>
48 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5)
: (X.520 DN component)
<06 09>
53 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: friendlyName (for PKCS #12) (1 2 840 113549 1 9 20)
: (PKCS #9 via PKCS #12)
<06 0A>
64 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 5'
: }
: }
<06 08>
76 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA512 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 4)
: (ANSI X9.62 ECDSA algorithm with SHA512)
: }
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations from EST [RFC7030] section 6 are
unchanged.
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6.1. Identity and Privacy Considerations
An EST server may use this mechanism to instruct the EST client about
the identities it should include in the CSR it sends as part of
enrollment. The client may only be aware of its IDevID Subject,
which includes a manufacturer serial number. The EST server can use
this mechanism to tell the client to include a specific fully
qualified domain name in the CSR in order to complete domain
ownership proofs required by the CA. Additionally, the EST server
may deem the manufacturer serial number in an IDevID as personally
identifiable information, and may want to specify a new random opaque
identifier that the pledge should use in its CSR. This may be
desirable if the CA and EST server have different operators.
7. IANA Considerations
IANA is asked to allocate two new Object Identifiers:
* One from the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry at for the ASN.1 module; see
Appendix A, and
* One from the SMI Security for S/MIME Attributes
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2) registry for the Certification Request
Information Template attribute; see Section 3.3 and Appendix A.
8. Acknowledgements
Corey Bonnell crafted example02 using a different tool, and this
helped debug other running code.
9. Changelog
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.
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[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5911] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 5911,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5911, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5911>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8994] Eckert, T., Ed., Behringer, M., Ed., and S. Bjarnason, "An
Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)", RFC 8994,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8994, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8994>.
[RFC8995] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8995>.
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[X.680] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021, February 2021,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1:2021,
February 2021, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680>.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC8295] Turner, S., "EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport)
Extensions", RFC 8295, DOI 10.17487/RFC8295, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8295>.
[RFC8368] Eckert, T., Ed. and M. Behringer, "Using an Autonomic
Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network
Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM)",
RFC 8368, DOI 10.17487/RFC8368, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8368>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
| RFC EDITOR: Please replace TBD1 and TBD2 with the value
| assigned by IANA during the publication of [I-D.ietf-lamps-
| rfc7030-csrattrs].
This appendix provides an ASN.1 module [X.680] for the Certification
Request Information Template attribute, and it follows the
conventions established in [RFC5911], [RFC5912], and [RFC6268].
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CRITemplateModule
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-critemplate(TBD1) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
ATTRIBUTE -- [RFC5911]
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
CertificationRequestInfo -- [RFC5912]
FROM PKCS-10
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69) }
;
aa-certificationRequestInfoTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE CertificationRequestInfoTemplate IDENTIFIED BY
id-aa-certificationRequestInfoTemplate }
id-aa-certificationRequestInfoTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) TBD2 }
CertificationRequestInfoTemplate ::= CertificationRequestInfo
END
Authors' Addresses
Michael Richardson (editor)
Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
Owen Friel
Cisco
Email: ofriel@cisco.com
Dr. David von Oheimb
Siemens
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Email: dev@ddvo.net
Dan Harkins
The Industrial Lounge
Email: dharkins@lounge.org
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