Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-olsrv2-sec
draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-olsrv2-sec
Mobile Ad hoc Networking (MANET) U. Herberg
Internet-Draft Fujitsu Laboratories of America
Updates: 6130, xxxx (if approved) C. Dearlove
Intended status: Standards Track BAE Systems ATC
Expires: March 14, 2014 T. Clausen
LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
September 10, 2013
Integrity Protection for Control Messages in NHDP and OLSRv2
draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-olsrv2-sec-05
Abstract
This document specifies integrity and replay protection for the MANET
Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP) and the Optimized Link State
Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2). This protection is achieved by
using an HMAC-SHA-256 Integrity Check Value (ICV) TLV and a timestamp
TLV based on POSIX time.
The mechanism in this specification can also be used for other
protocols that use the generalized packet/message format described in
RFC 5444.
This document updates RFC 6130 and RFC xxxx by mandating the
implementation of this integrity and replay protection in NHDP and
OLSRv2.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 14, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Protocol Overview and Functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Message Generation and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Message Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Message Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3. Message Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3.1. Validating a Message Based on Timestamp . . . . . . . 11
6.3.2. Validating a Message Based on Integrity Check . . . . 12
7. Provisioning of Routers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Mitigated Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1.1. Identity Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1.2. Link Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1.3. Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.2. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
[RFC Editor note: Please replace "xxxx" throughout this document with
the RFC number assigned to [OLSRv2], and remove this note.]
This specification updates [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] by defining the
mandatory to implement security mechanisms (for integrity and replay
protection). A deployment of these protocols may choose to employ
alternative(s) to these mechanisms, in particular it may choose to
protect packets rather than messages, it may choose to use an
alternative integrity check value (ICV) with preferred properties,
and/or it may use an alternative timestamp. A deployment may choose
to use no such security mechanisms, but this is not recommended.
The mechanisms specified are the use of an ICV for protection of the
protocols' control messages, and the use of timestamps in those
messages to prevent replay attacks. Both use the TLV mechanism
specified in [RFC5444] to add this information to the messages.
These ICV and TIMESTAMP TLVs are defined in [RFC6622bis]. Different
ICV TLVs are used for HELLO messages in NHDP and TC (Topology
Control) messages in OLSRv2, the former also protecting the source
address of the IP datagram that contains the HELLO message. This is
because the IP datagram source address is used by NHDP to determine
the address of a neighbor interface, and is not necessarily otherwise
contained in the HELLO message, while OLSRv2's TC message is
forwarded in a new packet, and thus has no single IP datagram source
address.
The mechanism specified in this document is placed in the packet/
message processing flow as indicated in Figure 1. It exists between
the packet parsing/generation function of [RFC5444], and the message
processing/generation function of NHDP and OLSRv2.
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| |
Incoming | /|\ Outgoing
packet \|/ | packet
| |
+--------------------------------+
| |
| RFC5444 packet |
| parsing / generation |
| |
+--------------------------------+
| |
Messages | /|\ Messages with
\|/ | added TLVs
| |
D +--------------------------------+
R /__________________ | Mechanism specified in |
O \ Messages | this document |
P (failed check) | |
+--------------------------------+
| |
Messages | /|\ Messages
(passed check) \|/ |
| |
+--------------------------------+
| |
| NHDP/OLSRv2 message |
| processing / generation |
| |
+--------------------------------+
Figure 1: Relationship with RFC5444 and NHDP/OLSRv2
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
Additionally, this document uses the terminology and notation of
[RFC5444], [RFC6130], [OLSRv2], and [RFC6622bis].
3. Applicability Statement
[RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] enable specifications of extensions to
recognize additional reasons for rejecting a message as "badly formed
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and therefore invalid for processing", and mention security
(integrity protection) as an explicit example. This document
specifies a mechanism that provides this functionality.
Implementations of [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] MUST include this
mechanism, and deployments of [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] SHOULD use this
mechanism, except for when a different security mechanism is more
appropriate.
The applicability of this mechanism is determined by its
characteristics, which are that it:
o Specifies a security mechanism that is required to be included in
conforming implementations of [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2].
o Specifies an association of ICVs with protocol messages, and
specifies how to use a missing or invalid ICV as an reason to
reject a message as "badly formed and therefore invalid for
processing".
o Specifies the implementation of an ICV Message TLV, defined in
[RFC6622bis], using a SHA-256 based HMAC applied to the
appropriate message contents (and for HELLO messages also
including the IP datagram source address). Implementations of
[RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] MUST support an HMAC-SHA-256 ICV TLV, and
deployment SHOULD use it except when use of a different algorithm
is more appropriate. An implementation MAY use more than one ICV
TLV in a message, as long as they each use a different algorithm
or key to calculate the ICV.
o Specifies the implementation of a TIMESTAMP Message TLV, defined
in [RFC6622bis], to provide message replay protection.
Implementations of [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] using this mechanism
MUST support a POSIX time based timestamp, and deployments SHOULD
use it if the clocks in all routers in the network can be
synchronized with sufficient precision.
o Assumes that a router that is able to generate correct integrity
check values is considered trusted.
This mechanism does not:
o Specify which key identifiers are to be used in a MANET in which
the routers share more than one secret key. (Such keys will be
differentiated using the <key-id> field defined in an ICV TLV in
[RFC6622bis].)
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o Specify how to distribute cryptographic material (shared secret
key(s)).
o Specify how to detect compromised routers with valid keys.
o Specify how to handle (revoke) compromised routers with valid
keys.
4. Protocol Overview and Functioning
The mechanism specified in this document provides the following
functionalities for use with messages specified by [RFC6130] and
[OLSRv2]:
o Generation of ICV Message TLVs (as defined in [RFC6622bis]) for
inclusion in an outgoing message. An implementation of [RFC6130]
and [OLSRv2] MAY use more than one ICV TLV in a message, even with
the same type extension, but these ICV TLVs MUST each use
different keys, or they MUST use a different algorithm to
calculate the ICV, e.g., with different hash and/or cryptographic
functions when using type extension 1 or 2. An implementation of
[RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] MUST at least be able to generate an ICV
TLV using HMAC-SHA-256 and one or more secret keys shared by all
routers.
o Generation of TIMESTAMP Message TLVs (as defined in [RFC6622bis])
for inclusion in an outgoing message. An implementation of
[RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] MAY use more than one ICV TLV in a message,
but MUST NOT use the same type extension. An implementation of
[RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] that is able to synchronize the clocks in
all routers in the network with sufficient precision, MUST at
least be able to generate a TIMESTAMP TLV using POSIX time.
o Verification of ICV Message TLVs contained in a message, in order
to determine if this message MUST be rejected as "badly formed and
therefore invalid for processing" [RFC6130] [OLSRv2]. An
implementation of [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] MUST at least be able to
verify an ICV TLV using HMAC/SHA-256 and one or more secret keys
shared by all routers.
o Verification of TIMESTAMP Message TLVs (as defined in
[RFC6622bis]) contained in a message, in order to determine if
this message MUST be rejected as "badly formed and therefore
invalid for processing" [RFC6130] [OLSRv2]. An implementation of
[RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] that is able to synchronize the clocks in
all routers in the network with sufficient precision, MUST at
least be able to verify a TIMESTAMP TLV using POSIX time.
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ICV Packet TLVs (as defined in [RFC6622bis]) MAY be used by a
deployment of the multiplexing process defined in [RFC5444], either
as well as, or instead of, the protection of the NHDP and OLSRv2
messages. (Note that in the case of NHDP, the packet protection is
equally good, and also protects the packet header. In the case of
OLSRv2, the packet protection has different properties than the
message protection, especially for some forms of ICV. When packets
contain more than one message, the packet protection has lower
overheads in space and computation time.)
When a router generates a message on a MANET interface, this
mechanism:
o Specifies how to calculate an integrity check value for the
message.
o Specifies how to include that integrity check value using an ICV
Message TLV.
[RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] allow for rejecting incoming messages prior to
processing by NHDP or OLSRv2. This mechanism, when used, specifies
that a message MUST be rejected if the ICV Message TLV is absent, or
its value cannot be verified. Note that this means that routers
whose implementation of NHDP and/or OLSRv2 does not include this
specification will be ignored by routers using this mechanism, and
these two sets of routers will, by design, form disjoint MANETs.
(The unsecured MANET will retain some information about the secured
MANET, but be unable to use it, not having any recognized symmetric
links with the secured MANET.)
5. Parameters
This following router parameters are specified for use by the two
protocols; the first is required only by NHDP, but may be visible to
OLSRv2, the second is required only by OLSRv2:
o MAX_HELLO_TIMESTAMP_DIFF - The maximum age that a HELLO message to
be validated may have. If the current POSIX time of the router
validating the HELLO message, minus the timestamp indicated in the
TIMESTAMP TLV of the HELLO message, is greater than
MAX_HELLO_TIMESTAMP_DIFF, the HELLO message MUST be silently
discarded.
o MAX_TC_TIMESTAMP_DIFF - The maximum age that a TC message to be
validated may have. If the current POSIX time of the router
validating the TC message, minus the timestamp indicated in the
TIMESTAMP TLV of the TC message, is greater than
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MAX_TC_TIMESTAMP_DIFF, the TC message MUST be silently discarded.
The following constraints apply to these parameters:
o MAX_HELLO_TIMESTAMP_DIFF > 0
o MAX_TC_TIMESTAMP_DIFF > 0
These bounds are however insufficient, MAX_HELLO_TIMESTAMP_DIFF and
MAX_TC_TIMESTAMP_DIFF MUST be least as great as the maximum expected
"age" of a message (i.e., the time difference between a message has
been sent by a router and received by all intended destinations).
For HELLO messages this needs only cover a single hop, but TC
messages may have been forwarded a number of times. In particular
for TC messages, if using jitter as specified in [OLSRv2] and
[RFC5148], the largest contribution the age may be a delay of up to
F_MAXJITTER per hop (except the final hop) that the message has
traveled. Other factors in the delay of both message types, per hop,
may include the link-layer that is used in the MANET, and CPU and
memory resources of routers (e.g., queuing delays, and delays for
processing ICVs). An implementation MAY set lower and/or upper
bounds on these parameters, if so, then these MUST allow values
meeting these requirements. An implementation MAY make its value of
MAX_TC_TIMESTAMP_DIFF dependent on the number of hops that a TC
message has traveled.
The above constraints assume ideal time synchronization of the clock
in all routers in the network. The parameters
MAX_HELLO_TIMESTAMP_DIFF and MAX_TC_TIMESTAMP_DIFF (and any
constraints on them) MAY be increased to allow for expected timing
differences between routers (between neighboring routers for
MAX_HELLO_TIMESTAMP_DIFF, allowing for greater separation, but
usually not per hop, for MAX_TC_TIMESTAMP_DIFF).
Note that excessively large values of these parameters defeats their
objectives, so these parameters SHOULD be as large as is required,
but not significantly larger.
Using POSIX time allows a resolution of no more than one second. In
many MANET use cases, time synchronization much below one second is
not possible because of unreliable and high-delay channels, mobility,
interrupted communication, and possible limited resources.
In addition, when using the default message intervals and validity
times as specified in [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2], where the shortest
periodic message interval is 2 seconds, repeating the message within
a second is actually beneficial rather than harmful (at a small
bandwidth cost). Also, the use of [RFC5148] jitter can cause a
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message to take that long or more to traverse the MANET, thus even in
a perfectly synchronized network, the TC maximum delay would usually
be greater than 1 second.
A finer granulatity than 1 second, and thus the use of an alternative
timestamp, is however RECOMMENDED in cases where, possibly due to
fast moving routers, message validity times are below 1 second.
6. Message Generation and Processing
This section specifies how messages are generated and processed by
[RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] when using this mechanism.
6.1. Message Content
Messages MUST have the content specified in [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2]
respectively. In addition, messages that conform to this mechanism
MUST contain:
o At least one ICV Message TLV (as specified in [RFC6622bis]),
generated according to Section 6.2. Implementations of [RFC6130]
and [OLSRv2] MUST support the following version of the ICV TLV,
but other versions MAY be used instead, or in addition, in a
deployment, if more appropriate:
* For TC messages:
+ type-extension := 1
* For HELLO messages:
+ type-extension := 2
* hash-function := 3 (SHA-256)
* cryptographic-function := 3 (HMAC)
The ICV Value MAY be truncated as specified in [RFC6622bis]; the
selection of an appropriate length MAY be administratively
configured. A message MAY contain several ICV Message TLVs.
o At least one TIMESTAMP Message TLV (as specified in [RFC6622bis]),
generated according to Section 6.2. Implementations of [RFC6130]
and [OLSRv2] using this mechanism MUST support the following
version of the TIMESTAMP TLV, but other versions MAY be used
instead, or in addition, in a deployment, if more appropriate:
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* type-extension := 1
6.2. Message Generation
After message generation (Section 11.1 of [RFC6130] and Section 16.1.
of [OLSRv2]) and before message transmission (Section 11.2 of
[RFC6130] and Section 16.2 of [OLSRv2]), the additional TLVs
specified in Section 6.1 MUST (unless already present) be added to an
outgoing message when using this mechanism.
The following processing steps (when using a single timestamp version
and a single ICV algorithm) MUST be performed for a cryptographic
algorithm that is used for generating an ICV for a message:
1. All ICV TLVs (if any) are temporarily removed from the message.
Any temporarily removed ICV TLVs MUST be stored, in order to be
reinserted into the message in step 5. The message size and
Message TLV Block size are updated accordingly.
2. <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit>, if present, are temporarily
set to 0.
3. A TLV of type TIMESTAMP, as specified in Section 6.1, is added to
the Message TLV Block. The message size and Message TLV block
size are updated accordingly.
4. A TLV of type ICV, as specified in Section 6.1, is added to the
Message TLV Block. The message size and Message TLV block size
are updated accordingly.
5. All ICV TLVs that were temporary removed in step 1, are restored.
The message size and Message TLV Block size are updated
accordingly.
6. <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit>, if present, are restored to
their previous values.
An implementation MAY add either alternative TIMESTAMP and/or ICV
TLVs, or more than one TIMESTAMP and/or ICV TLVs. All TIMESTAMP TLVs
MUST be inserted before adding ICV TLVs.
6.3. Message Processing
Both [RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] specify that:
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"On receiving a ... message, a router MUST first check if the
message is invalid for processing by this router"
[RFC6130] and [OLSRv2] proceed to give a number of conditions that,
each, will lead to a rejection of the message as "badly formed and
therefore invalid for processing". When using a single timestamp
version, and a single ICV algorithm, the following conditions to that
list, each of which, if true, MUST cause NHDP or OLSRv2 (as
appropriate) to consider the message as invalid for processing when
using this mechanism:
1. The Message TLV Block of the message does not contain exactly one
TIMESTAMP TLV of the selected version. This version
specification includes the type extension. (The Message TLV
Block may also contain TIMESTAMP TLVs of other versions.)
2. The Message TLV block does not contain exactly one ICV TLV using
the selected algorithm and key identifier. This algorithm
specification includes the type extension, and for type
extensions 1 and 2, the hash function and cryptographic function.
(The Message TLV Block may also contain ICV TLVs using other
algorithms and key identifiers.)
3. Validation of the identified (in step 1) TIMESTAMP TLV in the
Message TLV block of the message fails, as according to
Section 6.3.1.
4. Validation of the identified (in step 2) ICV TLV in the Message
TLV block of the message fails, as according to Section 6.3.2.
An implementation MAY check the existence of, and verify, either
alternative TIMESTAMP and/or ICV TLVs, or more than one TIMESTAMP
and/or ICV TLVs.
6.3.1. Validating a Message Based on Timestamp
For a TIMESTAMP Message TLV with type extension 1 (POSIX time)
identified as described in Section 6.2:
1. If the current POSIX time minus the value of that TIMESTAMP TLV
is greater than MAX_HELLO_TIMESTAMP_DIFF (for a HELLO message) or
MAX_TC_TIMESTAMP_DIFF (for a TC message) then the message
validation fails.
2. Otherwise, the message validation succeeds.
If a deployment chooses to use a different type extension from 1,
appropriate measures MUST be taken to verify freshness of the
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message.
6.3.2. Validating a Message Based on Integrity Check
For an ICV Message TLV identified as described in Section 6.2:
1. All ICV Message TLVs (including the identified ICV Message TLV)
are temporarily removed from the message, and the message size
and Message TLV block size are updated accordingly.
2. The message's <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit> fields are
temporarily set to 0.
3. Calculate the integrity check value for the parameters specified
in the identified ICV Message TLV, as specified in [RFC6622bis].
4. If this integrity check value differs from the value of
<ICV-data> in the ICV Message TLV, then the message validation
fails. If the <ICV-data> has been truncated (as specified in
[RFC6622bis], the integrity check value calculated in the
previous step MUST be truncated to the TLV length of the ICV
Message TLV before comparing it with the <ICV-data>.
5. Otherwise, the message validation succeeds. The message's
<msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit> fields are restored to their
previous value, and the ICV Message TLVs are returned to the
message, whose size is updated accordingly.
7. Provisioning of Routers
Before a router using this mechanism is able to generate ICVs or
validate messages, it MUST acquire the shared secret key(s) to be
used by all routers that are to participate in the network. This
specification does not define how a router acquires secret keys.
Once a router has acquired suitable key(s) it MAY be configured to
use, or not use, this mechanism. Section 23.6 of [OLSRv2] provides a
rationale based on [BCP107] why no key management is specified for
OLSRv2.
8. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
[This section may be removed by the RFC Editor.]
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9. Security Considerations
This document specifies a security mechanism for use with NHDP and
OLSRv2 that allows for mitigating several security threats.
9.1. Mitigated Attacks
This section briefly summarizes security threats that are mitigated
by the mechanism presented in this document.
9.1.1. Identity Spoofing
As only routers possessing the selected shared secret key are able to
add a valid ICV TLV to a message, identity spoofing, where an
attacker falsely claims an identity of a valid router, is countered.
When using one or more shared keys for all routers in the MANET, it
is only possible to determine that it is a valid router in the
network, not to discern particular routers. Therefore, a malicious
router in possession of valid keys (e.g., a compromised router) may
still spoof the identity of another router using the same key.
9.1.2. Link Spoofing
Link spoofing, where an attacker falsely represents the existence of
a non-existent link, or otherwise misrepresents a link's state, is
countered by the mechanism specified in this document, using the same
argument as in Section 9.1.1.
9.1.3. Replay Attack
Replay attacks are partly countered by the mechanism specified in
this document, but this depends on synchronized clocks of all routers
in the MANET. An attacker that records messages to replay them later
can only do so in the selected time interval after the timestamp that
is contained in message. As an attacker cannot modify the content of
this timestamp (as it is protected by the identity check value), an
attacker cannot replay messages after this time. Within this time
interval it is still possible to perform replay attacks, however the
limits on the time interval are specified so that this will have a
limited effect on the operation of the protocol.
9.2. Limitations
If no synchronized clocks are available in the MANET, replay attacks
cannot be countered by the mechanism provided by this document. An
alternative version of the TIMESTAMP TLV defined in [RFC6622bis],
with a monotonic sequence number, may have some partial value in this
case, but will necessitate adding state to record observed message
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sequence number information.
The mechanism provided by this document does not avoid or detect
security attacks by routers possessing the shared secret key that is
used to generate integrity check values for messages.
This mechanism relies on an out-of-band protocol or mechanism for
distributing the shared secret key(s) (and if an alternative
integrity check value is used, any additional cryptographic
parameters).
This mechanism does not provide a key management mechanism. Refer to
[OLSRv2], Section 23.6, for a detailed discussion why the automated
key management requirements specified in [BCP107] do not apply for
OLSRv2 and NHDP.
10. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the following
people: Justin Dean (NRL), and Henning Rogge (Frauenhofer FKIE).
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Jacquet, P., and U. Herberg,
"The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2",
work in progress draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-19, March 2013.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih,
"Generalized MANET Packet/Message Format", RFC 5444,
February 2009.
[RFC6130] Clausen, T., Dean, J., and C. Dearlove, "Mobile Ad Hoc
Network (MANET) Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)",
RFC 6130, April 2011.
[RFC6622bis]
Herberg, U., Clausen, T., and C. Dearlove, "Integrity
Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions for Mobile Ad
Hoc Networks (MANETs)", work in
progress draft-ietf-manet-rfc6622-bis-02, April 2013.
Herberg, et al. Expires March 14, 2014 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Integrity Protection for NHDP and OLSRv2 September 2013
11.2. Informative References
[BCP107] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, June 2005.
[RFC5148] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and B. Adamson, "Jitter
Considerations in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)",
RFC 5148, February 2008.
Authors' Addresses
Ulrich Herberg
Fujitsu Laboratories of America
1240 E. Arques Ave.
Sunnyvale, CA, 94085,
USA
Email: ulrich@herberg.name
URI: http://www.herberg.name/
Christopher Dearlove
BAE Systems Advanced Technology Centre
West Hanningfield Road
Great Baddow, Chelmsford
United Kingdom
Phone: +44 1245 242194
Email: chris.dearlove@baesystems.com
URI: http://www.baesystems.com/
Thomas Heide Clausen
LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
91128 Palaiseau Cedex,
France
Phone: +33 6 6058 9349
Email: T.Clausen@computer.org
URI: http://www.thomasclausen.org/
Herberg, et al. Expires March 14, 2014 [Page 15]
