Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-marf-as
draft-ietf-marf-as
MARF Working Group J. Falk
Internet-Draft Return Path
Updates: 5965 (if approved) M. Kucherawy, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track Cloudmark
Expires: October 27, 2012 April 25, 2012
Creation and Use of Email Feedback Reports: An Applicability Statement
for the Abuse Reporting Format (ARF)
draft-ietf-marf-as-16
Abstract
RFC 5965 defines an extensible, machine-readable format intended for
mail operators to report feedback about received email to other
parties. This Applicability Statement describes common methods for
utilizing this format for reporting both abuse and authentication
failure events. Mailbox Providers of any size, mail sending
entities, and end users can use these methods as a basis to create
procedures that best suit them. Some related optional mechanisms are
also discussed.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 27, 2012.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Solicited and Unsolicited Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Generating And Handling Solicited Abuse Reports . . . . . . . 4
4.1. General Considerations for Feedback Providers . . . . . . 5
4.2. Where To Send Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. What To Put In Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.4. General Considerations for Feedback Consumers . . . . . . 5
4.5. What To Expect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.6. What To Do With Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Generating and Handling Unsolicited Abuse Reports . . . . . . 6
5.1. General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. When To Generate Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. Where To Send Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.4. What To Put In Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.5. What To Do With Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Generating Automatic Authentication Failure Reports . . . . . 10
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. In Other Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Forgeries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.3. Amplification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.4. Automatic Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.5. Reporting Multiple Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
The Abuse Reporting Format (ARF) was initially developed for two very
specific use cases. Initially, it was intended to be used for
reporting feedback between large email operators, or from large email
operators to end user network access operators, any of whom could be
presumed to have automated abuse-handling systems. Secondarily, it
is used by those same large mail operators to send those same reports
to other entities, including those involved in sending bulk email for
commercial purposes. In either case, the reports would be triggered
by direct end user action such as clicking on a "report spam" button
in their email client.
Though other uses for the ARF format defined in [RFC5965] have been
discussed (and may be documented similarly in the future), abuse
remains the primary application, with a small amount of adoption of
extensions that enable authentication failure reporting.
This Applicability Statement provides direction for using the Abuse
Reporting Format (ARF) in both contexts. It also includes some
statements about the use of ARF in conjunction with other email
technologies.
The purpose for reporting abusive messages is to stop recurrences.
The methods described in this document focus on automating abuse
reporting as much as practical, so as to minimize the work of a
site's abuse team. There are further reasons why abuse feedback
generation is worthwhile, such as instruction of mail filters or
reputation trackers, or to initiate investigations of particularly
egregious abuses. These other applications are not discussed in this
memo.
Further introduction to this topic may be found in [RFC6449], which
is effectively an Applicability Statement written outside of the IETF
and thus never achieved IETF consensus. Much of the content for that
document was input to this one.
At the time of publication of this document, five feedback types are
registered. This document only discusses two of them ("abuse" and
"auth-failure") as they are seeing sufficient use in practice that
applicability statements can be made about them. The others, i.e.,
"fraud" [RFC5965] and "not-spam" [RFC6430], are either too new or too
seldomly used to be included here.
1.1. Discussion
[RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to publication.]
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This document is being discussed within the IETF MARF Working Group,
on the marf@ietf.org mailing list.
2. Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119], and are
intended to replace the Requirement Levels described in Section 3.3
of [RFC2026].
Some of the terminology used in this document is taken from
[RFC5598].
"Mailbox Provider" refers to an organization that accepts, stores,
and offers access to [RFC5322] messages ("email messages") for end
users. Such an organization has typically implemented SMTP
([RFC5321]), and might provide access to messages through IMAP
([RFC3501]), POP ([RFC1939]), a proprietary interface designed for
HTTP ([RFC2616]), or a proprietary protocol.
3. Solicited and Unsolicited Reports
The original application of [RFC5965], and still by far the most
common, is when two mail systems make a private agreement to exchange
abuse reports, usually reports due to recipients manually reporting
messages as spam. We refer to these as solicited reports.
Other uses for ARF involve such reports sent between parties that
don't know each other. These unsolicited reports are sent without
prior arrangement between the parties as to the context and meaning
of the reports, so the constraints on how these unsolicited reports
need to be structured such that the reports generated are likely to
be useful to the recipient, to what address(es) they can usefully be
sent, what issues the can be used to report, and how they can be
handled by the receiver of the report are very different.
The two cases are covered separately in following sections.
4. Generating And Handling Solicited Abuse Reports
[The numbered items in these subsections are not intended to be in a
paricular sequence. The numbers are here during document development
to make it easier to identify the items for discussion, and will be
removed before publication.]
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4.1. General Considerations for Feedback Providers
1. A Mailbox Provider receives reports of abusive or unwanted mail
from its users, most often by providing a "report spam" button
(or similar nomenclature) in the MUA (Mail User Agent). The
method of transferring this message and any associated metadata
from the MUA to the Mailbox Provider's ARF processing system is
not defined by any standards document, but is discussed further
in Section 3.2 of [RFC6449]. Policy concerns related to the
collection of this data are discussed in Section 3.4 of
[RFC6449].
2. To implement the recommendations of this memo, the reports are
formatted per [RFC5965], and transmitted as an email message
([RFC5322]), typically using SMTP ([RFC5321]).
3. Ongoing maintenance of an ARF processing system is discussed in
Section 3.6 of [RFC6449].
4.2. Where To Send Reports
1. The Mailbox Provider SHOULD NOT send reports to addresses that
have not explicitly requested them. A valid deviation might be
the result of local policy instructions. The process whereby
such parties may request the reports is discussed in Section 3.5
of [RFC6449].
4.3. What To Put In Reports
1. The reports SHOULD use "Feedback-Type: abuse", for its type.
Although a Mailbox Provider generating the reports can use other
types appropriate to the nature of the abuse being reported, the
operator receiving the reports might not treat different feedback
types differently.
2. The following fields are optional in [RFC5965], but SHOULD be
used in this context when their corresponding values are
available: Original-Mail-From, Arrival-Date, Source-IP, Original-
Rcpt-To. Other optional fields can be included, as the
implementer feels is appropriate.
3. User-identifiable data MAY be obscured as described in [RFC6590].
4.4. General Considerations for Feedback Consumers
1. ARF report streams are established proactively between Feedback
Providers and Feedback Consumers. Recommendations for preparing
to make that request are discussed in Section 4.1 of [RFC6449].
2. Operators MUST be able to accept ARF [RFC5965] reports as email
messages [RFC5322] over SMTP [RFC5321]. These and other types of
email messages that can be received are discussed in Section 4.2
of [RFC6449].
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3. Recipients of feedback reports that are part of formal feedback
arrangements have to be capable of handling large volumes of
reports. This could require automation of report processing.
Discussion of this can be found in Section 4.4 of [RFC6449].
4.5. What To Expect
1. The list of vaild Feedback-Types is defined in [RFC5965], which
created an IANA registry for valid values to allow for
extensions. However, an automated report processing system MUST
NOT reject (in the SMTP sense) a report based solely on an
unknown Feedback-Type, to allow for handling of new types that
are not yet supported. The automated system can simply set
reports of unknown types aside for manual handling. However,
Mailbox Providers might only make use of the "abuse" Feedback-
Type. Therefore, report receivers might be required to do
additional analysis to separate different types of abuse reports
after receipt if they do not have prior specific knowledge of the
sender of the report.
2. Reports receivers MUST accept reports that have obscured their
user-identifiable data as described in [RFC6590]. That document
also discusses the handling of such reports. This technique is
also discussed in Section 4.4 of [RFC6449].
4.6. What To Do With Reports
1. Section 4.3 of [RFC6449] discusses actions that mail operators
might take upon receiving a report (or multiple reports).
5. Generating and Handling Unsolicited Abuse Reports
[The numbered items in these subsections are not intended to be in a
paricular sequence. The numbers are here during document development
to make it easier to identify the items for discussion, and will be
removed before publication.]
5.1. General Considerations
1. It is essential for report recipients to be capable of throttling
reports being sent to avoid damage to their own installations.
Therefore, Feedback Providers MUST provide a way for report
recipients to request that no further reports be sent.
Unfortunately, no standardized mechanism for such requests exists
to date, and all existing mechanisms for meeting this requirement
are out-of-band.
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2. Message authentication is generally a good idea, but it is
especially important to encourage credibility of and thus
response to unsolicited reports. Therefore, as with any other
message, Feedback Providers sending unsolicited reports SHOULD
send reports that they believe will pass Sender Policy Framework
([RFC4408]) and/or DomainKeys Identified Mail ([RFC6376]) checks.
5.2. When To Generate Reports
1. Handling of unsolicited reports has a significant cost to the
report receiver. Senders of unsolicited reports, especially
those sending large volumes of them automatically SHOULD NOT send
reports that cannot be used as a basis for action by the
recipient, whether this is due to the report being sent about an
incident that is not abuse-related, the report being sent to an
email address that won't result in action, or the content or
format of the report being hard for the recipient to read or use.
2. Feedback Providers SHOULD NOT report all mail sent from a
particular sender merely because some of it is determined to be
abusive.
3. Mechanical reports of mail that "looks like" spam, based solely
on the results of inline content analysis tools, SHOULD NOT be
sent since, because of their subjective nature, they are unlikely
to provide a basis for the recipient to take action. Complaints
generated by end users about mail that is determined by them to
be abusive, or mail delivered to "spam trap" or "honeypot"
addresses, are far more likely to be accurate and MAY be sent.
4. If a Feedback Provider applies the Sender Policy Framework
[RFC4408] to arriving messages, a report SHOULD NOT be generated
to the RFC5321.MailFrom domain if the SPF evaluation produced a
"Fail", "SoftFail", "TempError" or "PermError" report, as no
reliable assertion or assumption can be made that use of the
domain was authorized. A valid exception would be specific
knowledge that the SPF result is not definitive for that domain
under those circumstances (for example, a message that is also
signed using DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM, [RFC6376]) by the
same domain, and that signature validates).
5.3. Where To Send Reports
1. Rather than generating feedback reports themselves, MUAs SHOULD
make abuse reports back to their mailbox providers so that they
can generate and send ARF messages on behalf of end users (see
Section 3.2 of [RFC6449]). This allows centralized processing
and tracking of reports, and provides training input to filtering
systems. There is, however, no standard mechanism for this
signaling between MUAs and mailbox providers to trigger abuse
reports.
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2. Feedback Providers SHOULD NOT send reports to recipients that are
uninvolved or only peripherally involved. For example, they
SHOULD NOT send reports to the operator of every Autonomous
System in the path between the apparent originating system and
the operator generating the report. Instead, they need to send
reports to recipients that are both responsible for the messages
and are able to do something about them.
3. Deciding where to send an unsolicited report will typically rely
on heuristics. Abuse addresses in WHOIS ([RFC3912]) records of
the IP address relaying the subject message and/or of the domain
name found in the results of a PTR ("reverse lookup") query on
that address are likely reasonable candidates, as is the
abuse@domain role address (see [RFC2142]) of related domains.
Unsolicited reports SHOULD NOT be sent to email addresses that
are not clearly intended to handle abuse reports. Legitimate
candidates include those found in WHOIS records or on a web site
that either are explicitly described as an abuse contact, or are
of the form "abuse@domain".
4. Where an abusive message is authenticated using a domain-level
authentication technology such as DKIM ([RFC6376]) or SPF
([RFC4408]), the domain that has been verified by the
authentication mechanism is often a reasonable candidate for
receiving feedback about the message. For DKIM, though, while
the authenticated domain has some responsibility for the mail
sent, it can be a poor contact point for abuse issues (for
example, it could represent the message's author but not its
sender, it could identify the bad actor responsible for the
message, or it could refer to a domain that cannot receive mail
at all).
5. Often, unsolicited reports will have no meaning if sent to abuse
reporting addresses belonging to the abusive parties themselves.
In fact, it is possible that such reports might reveal
information about complainants. Reports SHOULD NOT be sent to
such addresses if they can be identified beforehand, except where
the abusive party is known to be responsive to such reports.
5.4. What To Put In Reports
1. Reports SHOULD use "Feedback-Type: abuse", but can use other
types as appropriate. However, the Mailbox Provider generating
the reports cannot assume that the operator receiving the reports
will treat different Feedback-Types differently.
2. Reports SHOULD include the following optional fields whenever
their corresponding values are available and applicable to the
report: Original-Mail-From, Arrival-Date, Source-IP, Original-
Rcpt-To. Other optional fields can be included, as the
implementer feels is appropriate.
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3. Experience suggests use of ARF is advisable in most contexts.
Automated recipient systems can handle abuse reports sent in ARF
format at least as well as any other format such as plain text,
with or without a copy of the message attached. That holds even
for systems that did not request ARF format reports, assuming
such reports are generated considering the possibility of
recipients that don't use automated ARF parsing. Anyone sending
unsolicited reports in ARF format can legitimately presume that
some recipients will only be able to access the human readable
(first, text/plain) part of it, and SHOULD include all
information needed also in this part. Further, they SHOULD
ensure that the report is readable when viewed as plain text, to
give low-end ticketing systems as much assistance as possible.
In extreme cases, failure to take these steps may result in the
report being discarded or ignored.
5.5. What To Do With Reports
1. Receivers of unsolicited reports can take advantage of the
standardized parts of the ARF format to automate processing.
Independent of the sender of the report, they can improve
processing by separating valid from invalid reports by, for
example, looking for references to IP address ranges, domains,
and mailboxes for which the recipient organization is responsible
in the copy of the reported message, and by correlating multiple
reports of similar messages to identify bulk email senders.
2. Per Section 4.4 of [RFC6449], a network service provider MAY use
ARF data for automated forwarding of feedback messages to the
originating customer.
3. Published abuse mailbox addresses SHOULD NOT reject non-ARF
messages based solely on the format, as generation of ARF
messages can occasionally be unavailable or not applicable.
Deviation from this requirement could be done due to local policy
decisions regarding other message criteria.
4. Although [RFC6449] suggests that replying to feedback is not
useful, in the case of receipt of ARF reports where no feedback
arrangement has been established, a non-automated reply might be
desirable to indicate what action resulted from the complaint,
heading off more severe filtering by the Feedback Provider. In
addition, using an address that cannot receive replies precludes
any requests for additional information, and increases the
likelihood that further reports will be discarded or blocked.
Thus, a Feedback Provider sending unsolicited reports SHOULD NOT
generate reports for which a reply cannot be received. Where an
unsolicited report results in the establishment of contact with a
responsible and responsive party, this can be saved for future
complaint handling and possible establishment of a formal
(solicited) feedback arrangement. See Section 3.5 of [RFC6449]
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for a discussion of establishment of feedback arrangements.
6. Generating Automatic Authentication Failure Reports
[These numbered items are not intended to be in a paricular sequence.
The numbers are here during document development to make it easier to
identify the items for discussion, and will be removed before
publication.]
There are some cases where report generation is caused by automation
rather than user request. A specific example of this is reporting,
using the ARF format (or extensions to it), of messages that fail
particular message authentication checks. Examples of this include
[I-D.IETF-MARF-DKIM-REPORTING] and [I-D.IETF-MARF-SPF-REPORTING].
The considerations presented below apply in those cases.
The applicability statement for this use case is somewhat smaller as
many of the issues associated with abuse reports are not relevant to
reports about authentication failures.
1. Automatic feedback generators MUST select actual message
recipients based on data provided by willing report receivers.
In particular, recipients MUST NOT be selected using heuristics.
2. If the message under evaluation by the Verifier is an ARF
([RFC5965]) message, a report MUST NOT be automatically
generated.
3. The message for a new report sent via SMTP MUST be constructed so
as to avoid amplification attacks, deliberate or otherwise. The
envelope sender address of the report MUST be chosen so that
these reports will not generate mail loops. Similar to Section 2
of [RFC3464], the envelope sender address of the report MUST be
chosen to ensure that no feedback reports will be issued in
response to the report itself. Therefore, when an SMTP
transaction is used to send a report, the MAIL FROM command
SHOULD use the NULL reverse-path, i.e., "MAIL FROM:<>". An
exception to this would be the use of a reverse-path selected
such that SPF checks on the report will pass; in such cases, the
operator will need to make provisions to avoid the amplification
attack or mail loop via other means.
4. Reports SHOULD use "Feedback-Type: auth-failure", but MAY use
other types as appropriate. However, the Mailbox Provider
generating the reports cannot assume that the operator receiving
the reports will treat different Feedback-Types differently.
5. These reports SHOULD include the following optional fields,
although they are optional in [RFC5965], whenever their
corresponding values are available: Original-Mail-From, Arrival-
Date, Source-IP, Original-Rcpt-To. Other optional fields can be
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included, as the implementer feels is appropriate.
7. IANA Considerations
[RFC Editor: please remove this section prior to publication.]
This document has no IANA actions.
8. Security Considerations
8.1. In Other Documents
Implementers are strongly urged to review, at a minimum, the Security
Considerations sections of [RFC5965] and [RFC6449].
8.2. Forgeries
Feedback Providers that relay user complaints directly, rather than
by reference to a stored message (e.g., IMAP or POP), could be duped
into sending a complaint about a message that the complaining user
never actually received, as an attack on the purported originator of
the falsified message. Feedback Providers need to be resilient to
such attack methods.
Also, these reports may be forged as easily as ordinary Internet
electronic mail. User agents and automatic mail handling facilities
(such as mail distribution list exploders) that wish to make
automatic use of reports of any kind should take appropriate
precautions to minimize the potential damage from denial-of-service
attacks.
Perhaps the simplest means of mitigating this threat is to assert
that these reports should themselves be signed with something like
DKIM and/or authorized by something like SPF. Note, however, that if
there is a problem with the email infrastructure at either end, DKIM
and/or SPF may result in reports that aren't trusted or even accepted
by their intended recipients, so it is important to make sure those
components are properly configured. Use of both technologies in
tandem can resolve this concern to a degree since they generally have
disjoint failure modes.
8.3. Amplification Attacks
Failure to comply with the recommendations regarding selection of the
envelope sender can lead to amplification denial-of-service attacks.
This is discussed in Section 6 as well as in [RFC3464].
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8.4. Automatic Generation
ARF ([RFC5965]) reports have historically been generated individually
as a result of some kind of human request, such as someone clicking a
"Report Abuse" button in a mail reader. In contrast, the mechanisms
described in some extension documents (i.e.,
[I-D.IETF-MARF-DKIM-REPORTING] and [I-D.IETF-MARF-SPF-REPORTING]) are
focused around automated reporting. This obviously implies the
potential for much larger volumes or higher frequency of messages,
and thus greater mail system load (both for Feedback Providers and
report receivers).
Those mechanisms are primarily intended for use in generating reports
to aid implementers of DKIM ([RFC6376]), ADSP ([RFC5617]), and SPF
([RFC4408]), and other related protocols during development and
debugging. They are not generally intended for prolonged forensic
use, specifically because of these load concerns. However, extended
use is possible by ADMDs that want to keep a close watch for fraud or
infrastructure problems. It is important to consider the impact of
doing so on both Feedback Providers and the requesting ADMDs.
A sender requesting these reports can cause its mail servers to be
overwhelmed if it sends out signed messages whose signatures fail to
verify for some reason, provoking a large number of reports from
Feedback Providers. Similarly, a Feedback Provider could be
overwhelmed by a large volume of messages requesting reports whose
signatures fail to validate, as those now need to send reports back
to the signer.
Limiting the rate of generation of these messages may be appropriate
but threatens to inhibit the distribution of important and possibly
time-sensitive information.
In general ARF feedback loop terms, it is often suggested that
Feedback Providers only create these (or any) ARF reports after an
out-of-band arrangement has been made between two parties. These
extension mechanisms then become ways to adjust parameters of an
authorized abuse report feedback loop that is configured and
activated by private agreement rather than starting to send them
automatically based solely on data found in the messages, which may
have unintended consequences.
8.5. Reporting Multiple Incidents
If it is known that a particular host generates abuse reports upon
certain incidents, an attacker could forge a high volume of messages
that will trigger such a report. The recipient of the report could
then be innundated with reports. This could easily be extended to a
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distributed denial-of-service attack by finding a number of report-
generating servers.
The incident count referenced in ARF ([RFC5965]) provides a limited
form of mitigation. The host generating reports can elect to send
reports only periodically, with each report representing a number of
identical or nearly-identical incidents. One might even do something
inverse-exponentially, sending reports for each of the first ten
incidents, then every tenth incident up to 100, then every 100th
incident up to 1000, etc., until some period of relative quiet after
which the limitation resets.
The use of this for "nearly-identical" incidents in particular causes
a degradation in reporting quality, however. If for example a large
number of pieces of spam arrive from one attacker, a reporting agent
could decide only to send a report about a fraction of those
messages. While this averts a flood of reports to a system
administrator, the precise details of each incident are similarly not
sent.
Other rate limiting provisions might be considered, including
detection of a temporary failure response from the report destination
and thus halting report generation to that destination for some
period, or simply imposing or negotiating a hard limit on the number
of reports to be sent to a particular receiver in a given time frame.
9. Acknowledgements
The author and editor wish to thank Steve Atkins, John Levine, Shmuel
Metz, S. Moonesamy, and Alessandro Vesely for their contributions to
this memo.
All of the Best Practices referenced by this document are found in
[RFC6449], written within the Collaboration Committee of the
Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group (MAAWG).
Finally, the original author wishes to thank the doctors and staff at
the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center for doing what they
do.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
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[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
October 2008.
[RFC5322] Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
October 2008.
[RFC5598] Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598,
July 2009.
[RFC5965] Shafranovich, Y., Levine, J., and M. Kucherawy, "An
Extensible Format for Email Feedback Reports", RFC 5965,
August 2010.
10.2. Informative References
[I-D.IETF-MARF-DKIM-REPORTING]
Kucherawy, M., "Extensions to DKIM for Failure Reporting",
draft-ietf-marf-dkim-reporting (work in progress),
January 2012.
[I-D.IETF-MARF-SPF-REPORTING]
Kitterman, S., "SPF Authentication Failure Reporting using
the Abuse Report Format", draft-ietf-marf-spf-reporting
(work in progress), January 2012.
[RFC1939] Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3",
STD 53, RFC 1939, May 1996.
[RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
[RFC2142] Crocker, D., "MAILBOX NAMES FOR COMMON SERVICES, ROLES AND
FUNCTIONS", RFC 2142, May 1997.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC3464] Moore, K. and G. Vaudreuil, "An Extensible Message Format
for Delivery Status Notifications", RFC 3464,
January 2003.
[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.
[RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
September 2004.
Falk & Kucherawy Expires October 27, 2012 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft ARF AS April 2012
[RFC4408] Wong, M. and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
for Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail, Version 1",
RFC 4408, April 2006.
[RFC5617] Allman, E., Fenton, J., Delany, M., and J. Levine,
"DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Author Domain Signing
Practices (ADSP)", RFC 5617, August 2009.
[RFC6376] Crocker, D., Hansen, T., and M. Kucherawy, "DomainKeys
Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", RFC 6376,
September 2011.
[RFC6430] Li, K. and B. Leiba, "Email Feedback Report Type Value:
not-spam", RFC 6430, November 2011.
[RFC6449] Falk, J., "Complaint Feedback Loop Operational
Recommendations", RFC 6449, November 2011.
[RFC6590] Falk, J. and M. Kucherawy, "Redaction of Potentially
Sensitive Data from Mail Abuse Reports", RFC 6590,
April 2012.
Authors' Addresses
J.D. Falk
Return Path
100 Mathilda Street, Suite 100
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
USA
URI: http://www.returnpath.net/
M. Kucherawy (editor)
Cloudmark
128 King St., 2nd Floor
San Francisco, CA 94107
US
Email: msk@cloudmark.com
Falk & Kucherawy Expires October 27, 2012 [Page 15]
