Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report
draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report
MARF Working Group H. Fontana
Internet-Draft January 18, 2012
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: July 21, 2012
Authentication Failure Reporting using the Abuse Report Format
draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-10
Abstract
This memo registers an extension report type to the Abuse Reporting
Format (ARF), affecting multiple registries, for use in generating
receipt-time reports about messages that fail one or more email
message authentication checks.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 21, 2012.
Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Email Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Base 64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4. Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. ARF Extension for Authentication Failure Reporting . . . . . . 5
3.1. New ARF Feedback Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. New ARF Header Field Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1. Required For All Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2. Optional For All Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.3. Required For DKIM Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.4. Optional For DKIM Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.5. Required For ADSP Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.6. Required For SPF Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Authentication Failure Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Syntax For Added ARF Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Updates to ARF Feedback Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Updates to ARF Header Field Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. Inherited Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2. Forgeries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.3. Automatic Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.4. Envelope Sender Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.5. Reporting Multiple Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.6. Redaction of Data in DKIM Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix B. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.1. Example Use of ARF Extension Headers . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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1. Introduction
The Abuse Reporting Format ([ARF]) defines a message format for
sending reports of abuse in the messaging infrastructure, with an eye
towards automating both the generation and consumption of those
reports. There is now also a desire to extend the ARF format to
include reporting of messages that fail to authenticate using known
message authentication methods, such as DomainKeys Identified Mail
([DKIM]) and Sender Policy Framework ([SPF]), as these are sometimes
evidence of abuse that can be detected and reported through automated
means. The same mechanism can be used to convey forensic information
about the specific reason the authentication method failed. Thus,
this memo presents such extensions to ARF that allow for detailed
reporting of message authentication method failures.
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2. Definitions
2.1. Keywords
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].
2.2. Email Architecture
This memo uses some terms whose definitions and descriptions can be
found in [EMAIL-ARCH].
2.3. Base 64
base64 is defined in Section 4 of [BASE64].
The values that are base64 encodings MAY contain FWS for formatting
purposes as per the usual header field wrapping defined in [MAIL].
During decoding, any characters not in the base64 alphabet are
ignored so that such line wrapping does not harm the value. The ABNF
token "FWS" is defined in [DKIM]. No other extensions to the valid
base64 character set are permitted.
2.4. Technologies
There are technologies in email security that provide authentication
services and some that do authorization. These are often conflated.
A discussion of this that is useful for establishing context can be
found in Section 1.5.2 in [AUTH-RESULTS].
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3. ARF Extension for Authentication Failure Reporting
The current report format defined in [ARF] lacks some specific
features required to do effective email authentication failure
reporting. This section defines extensions to ARF to accommodate
this requirement.
A single report describes a single email authentication failure.
Multiple reports MAY be used to report multiple failures for a single
message.
3.1. New ARF Feedback Type
A new feedback type of "auth-failure" is defined as an extension per
Section 7.3 of [ARF].
A message that uses this feedback type has the following modified
header field requirements for the second (machine-parseable) [MIME]
part of the report:
Authentication-Results: Syntax as specified in [AUTH-RESULTS].
Furthermore, [ARF] specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at
most once; for this extension, this field MUST be present, but
MUST reflect only a single authentication method's result.
Original-Envelope-Id: Syntax as specified in [ARF]. Furthermore,
[ARF] specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at most once;
for this extension, this field's inclusion is RECOMMENDED, where
that value is available, to aid in diagnosing of the
authentication failure.
Original-Mail-From: Syntax as specified in [ARF]. Furthermore,
[ARF] specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at most once;
for this extension, this field's inclusion is RECOMMENDED, where
that value is available, to aid in diagnosing of the
authentication failure.
Source-IP: Syntax as specified in [ARF]. Furthermore, [ARF]
specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at most once; for
this extension, this field's inclusion is RECOMMENDED, where that
value is available, to aid in diagnosing of the authentication
failure.
Reported-Domain: Syntax as specified in [ARF]. Furthermore, [ARF]
specifies this field is OPTIONAL and appears at most once; for
this extension, this field MUST be present if such a value is
available.
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Delivery-Result: As specified in Section 3.2.2. This field is
OPTIONAL, but MUST NOT appear more than once. If present, it
SHOULD indicate the outcome of the message in some meaningful way,
but MAY be set to "other" for local policy reasons.
The third MIME part of the message is either of type "message/rfc822"
(as defined in [MIME-TYPES]) or "text/rfc822-headers" (as defined in
[REPORT]) and contains a copy of the entire header block from the
original message. This part MUST be included (contrary to [REPORT],
which makes it optional).
For privacy reasons, report generators might need to redact portions
of a reported message such as an identifier or address associated
with the end user whose complaint action resulted in the report. A
discussion of relevant issues and a suggested method for doing so can
be found in [I-D.IETF-MARF-REDACTION].
3.2. New ARF Header Field Names
The following new ARF field names are defined as extensions to
Section 3.1 of [ARF].
3.2.1. Required For All Reports
Auth-Failure: Indicates the failure from an email authentication
method that is being reported. The list of valid values is
enumerated in Section 3.3.
3.2.2. Optional For All Reports
Delivery-Result: The final message disposition that was enacted by
the Administrative Management Domain (ADMD) generating the report
and MUST NOT appear more than once. Possible values are:
delivered: The message was delivered (not specific as to where).
spam: The message was delivered to the recipient's spam folder
(or equivalent).
policy: The message was not delivered to the intended inbox due
to a failure from an email authentication method. The specific
action taken is not specified.
reject: The message was rejected.
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other: The message had a final disposition not covered by one of
the above values.
3.2.3. Required For DKIM Reports
DKIM-Domain: The domain that signed the message, taken from the "d="
tag of the signature.
DKIM-Identity: The identity of the signature that failed
verification, taken from the "i=" tag of the signature.
DKIM-Selector: The selector of the signature that failed
verification, taken from the "s=" tag of the signature.
3.2.4. Optional For DKIM Reports
DKIM-Canonicalized-Header: A base64 encoding of the canonicalized
header of the message as generated by the verifier.
DKIM-Canonicalized-Body: A base64 encoding of the canonicalized body
of the message as generated by the verifier. The encoded content
MUST be limited to those octets that contribute to the DKIM body
hash (i.e., the value of the "l=" tag; see Section 3.7 of [DKIM]).
If DKIM-Canonicalized-Header and DKIM-Canonicalized-Body encode
redacted data, they MUST NOT be included. Otherwise, they SHOULD be
included. The data presented there have to be exactly the
canonicalized header and body as defined by [DKIM] and computed at
the verifier. This is because these fields are intended to aid in
identifying message alterations that invalidate DKIM signatures in
transit. Including redacted data in them renders the data unusable.
(See also Section 3.1 and Section 6.6 for further discussion.)
3.2.5. Required For ADSP Reports
DKIM-ADSP-DNS: Includes the Author Domain Signing Practices (ADSP)
policy used to obtain the verifier's ADSP result. This MUST be
formatted per Section 4.2.1 of [ADSP].
3.2.6. Required For SPF Reports
SPF-DNS: This field MUST appear once for every Sender Policy
Framework ([SPF]) SPF record used to obtain the SPF result. It
MUST include the DNS RRTYPE used, the DNS domain from which the
record was retrieved, and the content of that record. The syntax
is defined in Section 4.
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3.3. Authentication Failure Types
The list of defined email authentication failure types used in the
"Auth-Failure:" header field (defined above), is as follows:
adsp: The message did not conform to the author domain's published
[ADSP] signing practises. The DKIM-ADSP-DNS field MUST be
included in the report.
bodyhash: The body hash in the signature and the body hash computed
by the verifier did not match. The DKIM-Canonicalized-Body field
SHOULD be included in the report (see Section 3.2.4).
revoked: The DKIM key referenced by the signature on the message has
been revoked. The DKIM-Domain and DKIM-Selector fields MUST be
included in the report.
signature: The DKIM signature on the message did not successfully
verify against the header hash and public key. The DKIM-Domain
and DKIM-Selector fields MUST be included in the report, and the
DKIM-Canonicalized-Header field SHOULD be included in the report
(see Section 3.2.4).
spf: The evaluation of the author domain's SPF record produced a
"none", "fail", "softfail", "temperror" or "permerror" result.
("none" is not strictly a failure per [SPF], but a service that
demands successful SPF evaluations of clients could treat it like
a failure.)
Supplementary data MAY be included in the form of [MAIL]-compliant
comments. For example, "Auth-Failure: adsp" could be augmented by a
comment to indicate that the failed message was rejected because it
was not signed when it should have been. See Appendix B for an
example.
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4. Syntax For Added ARF Header Fields
The [ABNF] definitions for the new fields are as follows:
auth-failure = "Auth-Failure:" [CFWS]
( "adsp" / "bodyhash" / "revoked" /
"signature" / "spf" ) [CFWS] CRLF
; "CFWS" is defined in [MAIL]
delivery-result = "Delivery-Result:" [CFWS]
( "delivered" / "spam" /"policy" /
"reject" / "other" ) [CFWS] CRLF
dkim-header = "DKIM-Canonicalized-Header:" [CFWS]
base64string CRLF
; "base64string" is defined in [DKIM]
dkim-sig-domain = "DKIM-Domain:" [CFWS] dkim-domain [CFWS]
CRLF
; "dkim-domain" is defined in [DKIM]
dkim-identity = "DKIM-Identity:" [CFWS] [ local-part ] "@"
domain-name [CFWS] CRLF
; "local-part" is defined in [MAIL]
dkim-selector = "DKIM-Selector:" [CFWS] selector [CFWS] CRLF
; "selector" is defined in [DKIM]
dkim-adsp-dns = "DKIM-ADSP-DNS:" [CFWS]
quoted-string [CFWS] CRLF
; "quoted-string" is defined in [MAIL]
dkim-body = "DKIM-Canonicalized-Body:" [CFWS]
base64string CRLF
dkim-selector-dns = "DKIM-Selector-DNS:" [CFWS]
quoted-string [CFWS] CRLF
spf-dns = "SPF-DNS:" [CFWS] ( "txt" / "spf" ) [CFWS] ":" [CFWS]
domain [CFWS] ":" [CFWS] quoted-string [CFWS] CRLF
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5. IANA Considerations
As required by [IANA], this section contains registry information for
the extension to [ARF].
5.1. Updates to ARF Feedback Types
The following feedback type is added to the Feedback Report Type
Values registry:
Feedback Type: auth-failure
Description: email authentication failure report
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current
5.2. Updates to ARF Header Field Names
The following headers are added to the Feedback Report Header Fields
registry:
Field Name: Auth-Failure
Description: Type of email authentication method failure
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current
Field Name: Delivery-Result
Description: Final disposition of the subject message
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current
Field Name: DKIM-ADSP-DNS
Description: Retrieved DKIM ADSP record
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current
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Field Name: DKIM-Canonicalized-Body
Description: Canonicalized body, per DKIM
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current
Field Name: DKIM-Canonicalized-Header
Description: Canonicalized header, per DKIM
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current
Field Name: DKIM-Domain
Description: DKIM signing domain from "d=" tag
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current
Field Name: DKIM-Identity
Description: Identity from DKIM signature
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current
Field Name: DKIM-Selector
Description: Selector from DKIM signature
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current
Field Name: DKIM-Selector-DNS
Description: Retrieved DKIM key record
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current
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Field Name: SPF-DNS
Description: Retrieved SPF record
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current
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6. Security Considerations
Security issues with respect to these reports are similar to those
found in [DSN].
6.1. Inherited Considerations
Implementers are advised to consider the Security Considerations
sections of [DKIM], [ADSP] [SPF] and [ARF].
6.2. Forgeries
These reports can be forged as easily as ordinary Internet electronic
mail. User agents and automatic mail handling facilities (such as
mail distribution list exploders) that wish to make automatic use of
DSNs of any kind should take appropriate precautions to minimize the
potential damage from denial-of-service attacks.
Security threats related to forged DSNs include the sending of:
a. A falsified email authentication method failure notification when
the message was in fact delivered to the indicated recipient;
b. Falsified signature information, such as selector, domain, etc.
Perhaps the simplest means of mitigating this threat is to assert
that these reports should themselves be signed with something like
DKIM. On the other hand, if there's a problem with the DKIM
infrastructure at the verifier, signing DKIM failure reports might
produce reports that aren't trusted or even accepted by their
intended recipients.
6.3. Automatic Generation
Automatic generation of these reports by verifying agents can cause a
denial-of-service attack when a large volume of e-mail is sent that
causes email authentication failures for whatever reason.
Limiting the rate of generation of these messages might be
appropriate but threatens to inhibit the distribution of important
and possibly time-sensitive information.
In general ARF feedback loop terms, it is suggested that report
generators only create these (or any) ARF reports after an out-of-
band arrangement has been made between two parties. This mechanism
then becomes a way to adjust parameters of an authorized abuse report
feedback loop that is configured and activated by private agreement
rather than starting to send them automatically based solely on
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discovered data in the DNS.
6.4. Envelope Sender Selection
In the case of transmitted reports in the form of a new message, it
is necessary to consider the construction and transmission of the
message so as to avoid amplification attacks, deliberate or
otherwise. See Section 5 of [ARF] for further information.
6.5. Reporting Multiple Incidents
If it is known that a particular host generates abuse reports upon
certain incidents, an attacker could forge a high volume of messages
that will trigger such a report. The recipient of the report could
then be innundated with reports. This could easily be extended to a
distributed denial-of-service attack by finding a number of report-
generating servers.
The incident count referenced in [ARF] provides a limited form of
mitigation. The host generating reports may elect to send reports
only periodically, with each report representing a number of
identical or near-identical incidents. One might even do something
inverse-exponentially, sending reports for each of the first ten
incidents, then every tenth incident up to 100, then every 100th
incident up to 1000, etc. until some period of relative quiet after
which the limitation resets.
The use of this for "near-identical" incidents in particular causes a
degradation in reporting quality, however. If for example a large
number of pieces of spam arrive from one attacker, a reporting agent
might decide only to send a report about a fraction of those
messages. While this averts a flood of reports to a system
administrator, the precise details of each incident are similarly not
sent.
6.6. Redaction of Data in DKIM Reports
This memo requires that the canonicalized header and body be returned
without being subject to redaction when a DKIM failure is being
reported. This is necessary to ensure that the returned
canonicalized forms are useful for debugging as they must be compared
to the equivalent form at the signer. If a message is altered in
transit, and the returned data are also redacted, the redacted
portion and the altered portion may overlap, rendering the comparison
results meaningless. However, unredacted data can leak information
the reporting entity considers to be private. It is for this reason
the return of the canonicalized forms is not required.
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7. References
7.1. Normative References
[ABNF] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 5234, January 2008.
[ADSP] Allman, E., Delany, M., Fenton, J., and J. Levine, "DKIM
Sender Signing Practises", RFC 5617, August 2009.
[ARF] Shafranovich, Y., Levine, J., and M. Kucherawy, "An
Extensible Format for Email Feedback Reports", RFC 5965,
August 2010.
[AUTH-RESULTS]
Kucherawy, M., "Message Header Field for Indicating
Message Authentication Status", RFC 5451, April 2009.
[BASE64] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[DKIM] Crocker, D., Hansen, T., and M. Kucherawy, "DomainKeys
Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", RFC 6376,
September 2011.
[I-D.IETF-MARF-REDACTION]
Falk, JD., "Redaction of Potentially Sensitive Data from
Mail Abuse Reports", I-D draft-ietf-marf-redaction,
March 2011.
[IANA] Alvestrand, H. and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, May 2008.
[KEYWORDS]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
[MAIL] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
October 2008.
[MIME] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.
[MIME-TYPES]
Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
November 1996.
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[REPORT] Vaudreuil, G., "The Multipart/Report Content Type for the
Reporting of Mail System Administrative Messages",
RFC 3462, January 2003.
[SPF] Wong, M. and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
for Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail, Version 1",
RFC 4408, April 2006.
7.2. Informative References
[DSN] Moore, K. and G. Vaudreuil, "An Extensible Message Format
for Delivery Status Notifications", RFC 3464,
January 2003.
[EMAIL-ARCH]
Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598,
October 2008.
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Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to acknowledge the following for their review and
constructive criticism of this proposal: Frank Ellerman, J.D. Falk,
Scott Kitterman, John Levine, Mike Markley, Kelly Wanser, Murray
Kucherawy and Alessandro Vesely.
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Appendix B. Example
This section contains an example of the use of the extension defined
by this memo.
B.1. Example Use of ARF Extension Headers
An ARF-formatted report using the proposed ARF extension fields:
Message-ID: <433689.81121.example@mta.mail.receiver.example>
From: "SomeISP Antispam Feedback" <feedback@mail.receiver.example>
To: arf-failure@sender.example
Subject: FW: You have a new bill from your bank
Date: Sat, 8 Oct 2011 15:15:59 -0500 (CDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/report;
boundary="------------Boundary-00=_3BCR4Y7kX93yP9uUPRhg";
report-type=feedback-report
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
--------------Boundary-00=_3BCR4Y7kX93yP9uUPRhg
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
This is an authentication failure report for an email message
received from a.sender.example on 8 Oct 2011 20:15:58 +0000 (GMT).
For more information about this format please see [this memo].
--------------Boundary-00=_3BCR4Y7kX93yP9uUPRhg
Content-Type: message/feedback-report
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Feedback-Type: auth-failure
User-Agent: Someisp!Mail-Feedback/1.0
Version: 1
Original-Mail-From: anexample.reply@a.sender.example
Original-Envelope-Id: o3F52gxO029144
Authentication-Results: mta1011.mail.tp2.receiver.example;
dkim=fail (bodyhash) header.d=sender.example
Auth-Failure: bodyhash
DKIM-Canonicalized-Body: VGhpcyBpcyBhIG1lc3NhZ2UgYm9keSB0
aGF0IGdvdCBtb2RpZmllZCBpbiB0cmFuc2l0LgoKQXQgdGhlIHNhbWU
gdGltZSB0aGF0IHRoZSBib2R5aGFzaCBmYWlscyB0byB2ZXJpZnksIH
RoZQptZXNzYWdlIGNvbnRlbnQgaXMgY2xlYXJseSBhYnVzaXZlIG9yI
HBoaXNoeSwgYXMgdGhlClN1YmplY3QgYWxyZWFkeSBoaW50cy4gIElu
ZGVlZCwgdGhpcyBib2R5IGFsc28gY29udGFpbnMKdGhlIGZvbGxvd2l
uZyB0ZXh0OgoKICAgUGxlYXNlIGVudGVyIHlvdXIgZnVsbCBiYW5rIG
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NyZWRlbnRpYWxzIGF0CiAgIGh0dHA6Ly93d3cuc2VuZGVyLmV4YW1wb
GUvCgpXZSBhcmUgaW1wbHlpbmcgdGhhdCwgYWx0aG91Z2ggbXVsdGlw
bGUgZmFpbHVyZXMKcmVxdWlyZSBtdWx0aXBsZSByZXBvcnRzLCBhIHN
pbmdsZSBmYWlsdXJlIGNhbiBiZQpyZXBvcnRlZCBhbG9uZyB3aXRoIH
BoaXNoaW5nIGluIGEgc2luZ2xlIHJlcG9ydC4K
DKIM-Domain: sender.example
DKIM-Identity: @sender.example
DKIM-Selector: testkey
Arrival-Date: 8 Oct 2011 20:15:58 +0000 (GMT)
Source-IP: 192.0.2.1
Reported-Domain: a.sender.example
Reported-URI: http://www.sender.example/
--------------Boundary-00=_3BCR4Y7kX93yP9uUPRhg
Content-Type: text/rfc822-headers
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Authentication-Results: mta1011.mail.tp2.receiver.example;
dkim=fail (bodyhash) header.d=sender.example;
spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=anexample.reply@a.sender.example
Received: from smtp-out.sender.example
by mta1011.mail.tp2.receiver.example
with SMTP id oB85W8xV000169;
Sat, 08 Oct 2011 13:15:58 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; c=relaxed/simple; a=rsa-sha256;
s=testkey; d=sender.example; h=From:To:Subject:Date;
bh=2jUSOH9NhtVGCQWNr9BrIAPreKQjO6Sn7XIkfJVOzv8=;
b=AuUoFEfDxTDkHlLXSZEpZj79LICEps6eda7W3deTVFOk4yAUoqOB
4nujc7YopdG5dWLSdNg6xNAZpOPr+kHxt1IrE+NahM6L/LbvaHut
KVdkLLkpVaVVQPzeRDI009SO2Il5Lu7rDNH6mZckBdrIx0orEtZV
4bmp/YzhwvcubU4=
Received: from mail.sender.example
by smtp-out.sender.example
with SMTP id o3F52gxO029144;
Sat, 08 Oct 2011 13:15:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from internal-client-001.sender.example
by mail.sender.example
with SMTP id o3F3BwdY028431;
Sat, 08 Oct 2011 13:15:24 -0700 (PDT)
Date: Sat, 8 Oct 2011 16:15:24 -0400 (EDT)
Reply-To: anexample.reply@a.sender.example
From: anexample@a.sender.example
To: someuser@receiver.example
Subject: You have a new bill from your bank
Message-ID: <87913910.1318094604546@out.sender.example>
--------------Boundary-00=_3BCR4Y7kX93yP9uUPRhg--
Fontana Expires July 21, 2012 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Auth Failure Reporting January 2012
Example 1: Example ARF report using these extensions
This example ARF message is making the following assertion:
o DKIM verification of the signature added within "example.com"
failed
o The cause for the verification failure was a mismatch between the
body contents observed at the verifier and the body hash contained
in the signature.
Fontana Expires July 21, 2012 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft Auth Failure Reporting January 2012
Author's Address
Hilda L. Fontana
3579 E. Foothill Blvd., suite 282
Pasadena, CA 91107
US
Phone: +1 626 676 8852
Email: hilda@hfontana.com
Fontana Expires July 21, 2012 [Page 21]
